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AND THE YALTA WORLD**

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The collection of archival materials was prepared for the International Scientific and Diplomatic Congress «Yalta World: Historical Experience and Prospects» dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Yalta Conference, the creation of the UN and UNESCO. It contains documents and materials on the history of the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition, the Tehran, Yalta and Berlin (Potsdam) conferences of the leaders of the three great powers — the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. The collection includes documents on the formation of the UN, UNESCO, the implementation of the Yalta World and the formation of a stable multipolar world order based on the partnership of civilizations (Yalta World — 2). The introductory articles of the collection reveal the true history of the Second World War and the Yalta World and provide a description of the documents and materials contained in the collection.

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Putin V.V. The Real Lessons of the 75th Anniversary of World War II



Seventy-five years have passed since the end of the Great Patriotic War. Several generations have grown up over the years. The political map of the planet has changed. The Soviet Union that claimed an epic, crushing victory over Nazism and saved the entire world is gone. Besides, the events of that war have long become a distant memory, even for its participants. So why does Russia celebrate the ninth of May as the biggest holiday? Why does life almost come to a halt on June 22? And why does one feel a lump rise in their throat?

They usually say that the war has left a deep imprint on every family's history. Behind these words, there are fates of millions of people, their sufferings and the pain of loss. Behind these words, there is also the pride, the truth and the memory.

For my parents, the war meant the terrible ordeals of the Siege of Leningrad where my two-year-old brother Vitya died. It was the place where my mother miraculously managed to survive. My father, despite being exempt from active duty, volunteered to defend his hometown. He made the same decision as millions of Soviet citizens. He fought at the Nevsky Pyatachok bridgehead and was severely wounded. And the more years pass, the more I feel the need to talk to my parents and learn more about the war period of their lives. However, I no longer have the opportunity to do so. This is the reason why I treasure in my heart those conversations I had with my father and mother on this subject, as well as the little emotion they showed.

People of my age and I believe it is important that our children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren understand the torment and hardships their ancestors had to endure. They need to understand how their ancestors managed to persevere and win. Where did their sheer, unbending willpower that amazed and fascinated the whole world come from? Sure, they were defending their home, their children, loved ones and families. However, what they shared was the love for their homeland, their Motherland. That deep-seated, intimate feeling is fully reflected in the very essence of our nation and became one of the decisive factors in its heroic, sacrificial fight against the Nazis.

I often wonder: What would today's generation do? How will it act when faced with a crisis situation? I see young doctors, nurses, sometimes fresh graduates that go to the "red zone" to save lives. I see our servicemen that fight international terrorism in the Northern Caucasus and fought to the

bitter end in Syria. They are so young. Many servicemen who were part of the legendary, immortal 6th Paratroop Company were 19-20 years old. But all of them proved that they deserved to inherit the feat of the warriors of our homeland that defended it during the Great Patriotic War.

This is why I am confident that one of the characteristic features of the peoples of Russia is to fulfill their duty without feeling sorry for themselves when the circumstances so demand. Such values as selflessness, patriotism, love for their home, their family and Motherland remain fundamental and integral to the Russian society to this day. These values are, to a large extent, the backbone of our country's sovereignty.

Nowadays, we have new traditions created by the people, such as the Immortal Regiment. This is the memory march that symbolizes our gratitude, as well as the living connection and the blood ties between generations. Millions of people come out to the streets carrying the photographs of their relatives that defended their Motherland and defeated the Nazis. This means that their lives, their ordeals and sacrifices, as well as the Victory that they left to us will never be forgotten.

We have a responsibility to our past and our future to do our utmost to prevent those horrible tragedies from happening ever again. Hence, I was compelled to come out with an article about World War II and the Great Patriotic War. I have discussed this idea on several occasions with world leaders, and they have showed their support. At the summit of CIS leaders held at the end of last year, we all agreed on one thing: it is essential to pass on to future generations the memory of the fact that the Nazis were defeated first and foremost by the Soviet people and that representatives of all republics of the Soviet Union fought side by side together in that heroic battle, both on the frontlines and in the rear. During that summit, I also talked with my counterparts about the challenging pre-war period.

That conversation caused a stir in Europe and the world. It means that it is indeed high time that we revisited the lessons of the past. At the same time, there were many emotional outbursts, poorly disguised insecurities and loud accusations that followed. Acting out of habit, certain politicians rushed to claim that Russia was trying to rewrite history. However, they failed to rebut a single fact or refute a single argument. It is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to argue with the original documents that, by the way, can be found not only in the Russian, but also in the foreign archives.

Thus, there is a need to further examine the reasons that caused the world war and reflect on its complicated events, tragedies and victories, as well as its lessons, both for our country and the entire world. And like I said, it is crucial to rely exclusively on archive documents and contemporary evidence while avoiding any ideological or politicized speculations.

I would like to once again recall the obvious fact. The root causes of World War II mainly stem from the decisions made after World War I. The Treaty of Versailles became a symbol of grave injustice for Germany. It basically implied that the country was to be robbed, being forced to pay enormous reparations to the Western allies that drained its economy. French marshal Ferdinand Foch who served as the Supreme Allied Commander gave a prophetic description of that Treaty: "This is not peace. It is an armistice for twenty years."

It was the national humiliation that became a fertile ground for radical sentiments of revenge in Germany. The Nazis skillfully played on people's emotions and built their propaganda promising to deliver Germany from the "legacy of Versailles" and restore the country to its former power while essentially pushing German people into war. Paradoxically, the Western states, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States, directly or indirectly contributed to this. Their financial and industrial enterprises actively invested in German factories and plants manufacturing military products. Besides, many people in the aristocracy and political establishment supported radical, far-right and nationalist movements that were on the rise both in Germany and in Europe.

The "Versailles world order" caused numerous implicit controversies and apparent conflicts. They revolved around the borders of new European states randomly set by the victors in World War I. That

boundary delimitation was almost immediately followed by territorial disputes and mutual claims that turned into “time bombs”.

One of the major outcomes of World War I was the establishment of the League of Nations. There were high expectations for that international organization to ensure lasting peace and collective security. It was a progressive idea that, if followed through consistently, could actually prevent the horrors of a global war from happening again.

However, the League of Nations dominated by the victorious powers of France and the United Kingdom proved ineffective and just got swamped by pointless discussions. The League of Nations and the European continent in general turned a deaf ear to the repeated calls of the Soviet Union to establish an equitable collective security system, and sign an Eastern European pact and a Pacific pact to prevent aggression. These proposals were disregarded.

The League of Nations also failed to prevent conflicts in various parts of the world, such as the attack of Italy on Ethiopia, the civil war in Spain, the Japanese aggression against China and the Anschluss of Austria. Furthermore, in case of the Munich Betrayal that, in addition to Hitler and Mussolini, involved British and French leaders, Czechoslovakia was taken apart with the full approval of the League of Nations. I would like to point out in this regard that, unlike many other European leaders of that time, Stalin did not disgrace himself by meeting with Hitler who was known among the Western nations as quite a reputable politician and was a welcome guest in the European capitals.

Poland was also engaged in the partition of Czechoslovakia along with Germany. They decided together in advance who would get what Czechoslovak territories. On September 20, 1938, Polish Ambassador to Germany Józef Lipski reported to Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland Józef Beck on the following assurances made by Hitler: “...in case of a conflict between Poland and Czechoslovakia over our interests in Teschen, the Reich would stand by Poland.” The Nazi leader even prompted and advised that Poland started to act “only after the Germans occupy the Sudetes.”

Poland was aware that without Hitler’s support, its annexationist plans were doomed to fail. I would like to quote in this regard a record of the conversation between German Ambassador to Warsaw Hans-Adolf von Moltke and Józef Beck that took place on October 1, 1938, and was focused on the Polish-Czech relations and the position of the Soviet Union in this matter. It says: “Mr. Beck expressed real gratitude for the loyal treatment accorded [to] Polish interests at the Munich conference, as well as the sincerity of relations during the Czech conflict. The attitude of the Führer and Chancellor was fully appreciated by the Government and the public [of Poland].”

The partition of Czechoslovakia was brutal and cynical. Munich destroyed even the formal, fragile guarantees that remained on the continent. It showed that mutual agreements were worthless. It was the Munich Betrayal that served as a “trigger” and made the great war in Europe inevitable.

Today, European politicians, and Polish leaders in particular, wish to sweep the Munich Betrayal under the carpet. Why? The fact that their countries once broke their commitments and supported the Munich Betrayal, with some of them even participating in divvying up the take, is not the only reason. Another is that it is kind of embarrassing to recall that during those dramatic days of 1938, the Soviet Union was the only one to stand up for Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet Union, in accordance with its international obligations, including agreements with France and Czechoslovakia, tried to prevent the tragedy from happening. Meanwhile, Poland, in pursuit of its interests, was doing its utmost to hamper the establishment of a collective security system in Europe. Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Józef Beck wrote about it directly in his letter of September 19, 1938 to the aforementioned Ambassador Józef Lipski before his meeting with Hitler: “...in the past year, the Polish government rejected four times the proposal to join the international interfering in defense of Czechoslovakia.”

Britain, as well as France, which was at the time the main ally of the Czechs and Slovaks, chose to withdraw their guarantees and abandon this Eastern European country to its fate. In so doing, they

sought to direct the attention of the Nazis eastward so that Germany and the Soviet Union would inevitably clash and bleed each other white.

That is the essence of the western policy of appeasement, which was pursued not only towards the Third Reich but also towards other participants of the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact – the fascist Italy and militarist Japan. In the Far East, this policy culminated in the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese agreement in the summer of 1939, which gave Tokyo a free hand in China. The leading European powers were unwilling to recognize the mortal danger posed by Germany and its allies to the whole world. They were hoping that they themselves would be left untouched by the war.

The Munich Betrayal showed to the Soviet Union that the Western countries would deal with security issues without taking its interests into account. In fact, they could even create an anti-Soviet front, if needed.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did its utmost to use every chance of creating an anti-Hitler coalition. Despite – I will say it again – the double-dealing on the part of the Western countries. For instance, the intelligence services reported to the Soviet leadership detailed information on the behind-the-scenes contacts between Britain and Germany in the summer of 1939. The important thing is that those contacts were quite active and practically coincided with the tripartite negotiations between France, Great Britain and the USSR, which were, on the contrary, deliberately protracted by the Western partners. In this connection, I will cite a document from the British archives. It contains instructions to the British military mission that came to Moscow in August 1939. It directly states that the delegation was to proceed with negotiations very slowly, and that the Government of the United Kingdom was not ready to assume any obligations spelled out in detail and limiting their freedom of action under any circumstances. I will also note that, unlike the British and French delegations, the Soviet delegation was headed by top commanders of the Red Army, who had the necessary authority to “sign a military convention on the organization of military defense of England, France and the USSR against aggression in Europe.”

Poland played its role in the failure of those negotiations as it did not want to have any obligations to the Soviet side. Even under pressure from their Western allies, the Polish leadership rejected the idea of joint action with the Red Army to fight against the Wehrmacht. It was only when they learned of the arrival of Ribbentrop to Moscow that J. Beck reluctantly and not directly, through French diplomats, notified the Soviet side: “... in the event of joint action against the German aggression, cooperation between Poland and the Soviet Union is not out of the question, in technical circumstances which remain to be agreed.” At the same time, he explained to his colleagues: “... I agreed to this wording only for the sake of the tactics, and our core position in relation to the Soviet Union is final and remains unchanged.”

In these circumstances, the Soviet Union signed the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany. It was practically the last among the European countries to do so. Besides, it was done in the face of a real threat of war on two fronts – with Germany in the west and with Japan in the east, where intense fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River was already underway.

Stalin and his entourage, indeed, deserve many legitimate accusations. We remember the crimes committed by the regime against its own people and the horror of mass repressions. In other words, there are many things the Soviet leaders can be reproached for, but poor understanding of the nature of external threats is not one of them. They saw how attempts were made to leave the Soviet Union alone to deal with Germany and its allies. Bearing in mind this real threat, they sought to buy precious time needed to strengthen the country's defenses.

Nowadays, we hear lots of speculations and accusations against modern Russia in connection with the Non-Aggression Pact signed back then. Yes, Russia is the legal successor state to the USSR, and the Soviet period – with all its triumphs and tragedies – is an inalienable part of our thousand-year-long history. However, let us recall that the Soviet Union gave a legal and moral assessment of the so-called Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. The Supreme Soviet in its resolution of 24 December 1989 official-

ly denounced the secret protocols as “an act of personal power” which in no way reflected “the will of the Soviet people who bear no responsibility for this collusion.”

Yet other states have preferred to forget the agreements carrying signatures of the Nazis and Western politicians, not to mention giving legal or political assessments of such cooperation, including the silent acquiescence – or even direct abetment – of some European politicians in the barbarous plans of the Nazis. It will suffice to remember the cynical phrase said by Polish Ambassador to Germany J. Lipski during his conversation with Hitler on 20 September 1938: “...for solving the Jewish problem, we [the Poles] will build in his honor ... a splendid monument in Warsaw.”

Besides, we do not know if there were any secret “protocols” or annexes to agreements of a number of countries with the Nazis. The only thing that is left to do is to take their word for it. In particular, materials pertaining to the secret Anglo-German talks still have not been declassified. Therefore, we urge all states to step up the process of making their archives public and publishing previously unknown documents of the war and pre-war periods – the way Russia has done it in recent years. In this context, we are ready for broad cooperation and joint research projects engaging historians.

But let us go back to the events immediately preceding the Second World War. It was naïve to believe that Hitler, once done with Czechoslovakia, would not make new territorial claims. This time the claims involved its recent accomplice in the partition of Czechoslovakia – Poland. Here, the legacy of Versailles, particularly the fate of the so-called Danzig Corridor, was yet again used as the pretext. The blame for the tragedy that Poland then suffered lies entirely with the Polish leadership, which had impeded the formation of a military alliance between Britain, France and the Soviet Union and relied on the help from its Western partners, throwing its own people under the steamroller of Hitler’s machine of destruction.

The German offensive was mounted in full accordance with the blitzkrieg doctrine. Despite the fierce, heroic resistance of the Polish army, on 8 September 1939 – only a week after the war broke out – the German troops were on the approaches to Warsaw. By 17 September, the military and political leaders of Poland had fled to Romania, abandoning its people, who continued to fight against the invaders.

Poland’s hope for help from its Western allies was in vain. After the war against Germany was declared, the French troops advanced only a few tens of kilometers deep into the German territory. All of it looked like a mere demonstration of vigorous action. Moreover, the Anglo-French Supreme War Council, holding its first meeting on 12 September 1939 in the French city of Abbeville, decided to call off the offensive altogether in view of the rapid developments in Poland. That was when the infamous Phony War started. What Britain and France did was a blatant betrayal of their obligations to Poland.

Later, during the Nuremberg trials, German generals explained their quick success in the East. The former chief of the operations staff of the German armed forces high command, General Alfred Jodl admitted: “... we did not suffer defeat as early as 1939 only because about 110 French and British divisions stationed in the west against 23 German divisions during our war with Poland remained absolutely idle.”

I asked for retrieval from the archives of the whole body of materials pertaining to the contacts between the USSR and Germany in the dramatic days of August and September 1939. According to the documents, paragraph 2 of the Secret Protocol to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 stated that, in the event of territorial-political reorganization of the districts making up the Polish state, the border of the spheres of interest of the two countries would run “approximately along the Narew, Vistula and San rivers”. In other words, the Soviet sphere of influence included not only the territories that were mostly home to Ukrainian and Belarusian population but also the historically Polish lands in the Vistula and Bug interfluvium. This fact is known to very few these days.

Similarly, very few know that, immediately following the attack on Poland, in the early days of September 1939 Berlin strongly and repeatedly called on Moscow to join the military action. However, the Soviet leadership ignored those calls and planned to avoid engaging in the dramatic developments as long as possible.

It was only when it became absolutely clear that Great Britain and France were not going to help their ally and the Wehrmacht could swiftly occupy entire Poland and thus appear on the approaches to Minsk that the Soviet Union decided to send in, on the morning of 17 September, Red Army units into the so-called Eastern Borderlines, which nowadays form part of the territories of Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania.

Obviously, there was no alternative. Otherwise, the USSR would face seriously increased risks because – I will say this again – the old Soviet-Polish border ran only within a few tens of kilometers of Minsk. The country would have to enter the inevitable war with the Nazis from very disadvantageous strategic positions, while millions of people of different nationalities, including the Jews living near Brest and Grodno, Przemyśl, Lvov and Wilno, would be left to die at the hands of the Nazis and their local accomplices – anti-Semites and radical nationalists.

The fact that the Soviet Union sought to avoid engaging in the growing conflict for as long as possible and was unwilling to fight side by side with Germany was the reason why the real contact between the Soviet and the German troops occurred much farther east than the borders agreed in the secret protocol. It was not on the Vistula River but closer to the so-called Curzon Line, which back in 1919 was recommended by the Triple Entente as the eastern border of Poland.

As is known, there is hardly any point in using the subjunctive mood when we speak of the past events. I will only say that, in September 1939, the Soviet leadership had an opportunity to move the western borders of the USSR even farther west, all the way to Warsaw, but decided against it.

The Germans suggested formalizing the new status quo. On September 28, 1939 Joachim von Ribbentrop and V. Molotov signed in Moscow the *Boundary and Friendship Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union*, as well as the secret protocol on changing the state border, according to which the border was recognized at the demarcation line where the two armies de-facto stood.

In autumn 1939, the Soviet Union, pursuing its strategic military and defensive goals, started the process of the incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Their accession to the USSR was implemented on a contractual basis, with the consent of the elected authorities. This was in line with international and state law of that time. Besides, in October 1939, the city of Vilna and the surrounding area, which had previously been part of Poland, were returned to Lithuania. The Baltic republics within the USSR preserved their government bodies, language, and had representation in the higher state structures of the Soviet Union.

During all these months there was an ongoing invisible diplomatic and politico-military struggle and intelligence work. Moscow understood that it was facing a fierce and cruel enemy, and that a covert war against Nazism was already going on. And there is no reason to take official statements and formal protocol notes of that time as a proof of 'friendship' between the USSR and Germany. The Soviet Union had active trade and technical contacts not only with Germany, but with other countries as well. Whereas Hitler tried again and again to draw the Soviet Union into Germany's confrontation with the UK. But the Soviet government stood firm.

The last attempt to persuade the USSR to act together was made by Hitler during the visit of Molotov to Berlin in November 1940. But Molotov accurately followed Stalin's instructions and limited himself to a general discussion of the German idea of the Soviet Union joining the Tripartite Pact signed by Germany, Italy and Japan in September 1940 and directed against the UK and the USA. No wonder that already on November 17 Molotov gave the following instructions to Soviet plenipotentiary representative in London Ivan Maisky: "For your information...No agreement was signed or was intended to be signed in Berlin. We just exchanged our views in Berlin...and that was all...Apparently, the Germans and the Japanese seem anxious to push us towards the Gulf and India. We declined the discussion of this matter as we consider such advice on the part of Germany to be inappropriate." And on November 25 the Soviet leadership called it a day altogether by officially putting forward to Berlin the conditions that were unacceptable to the Nazis, including the withdrawal of German troops from

Finland, mutual assistance treaty between Bulgaria and the USSR, and a number of others. Thus it deliberately excluded any possibility of joining the Pact. Such position definitely shaped the Fuehrer's intention to unleash a war against the USSR. And already in December, putting aside the warnings of his strategists about the disastrous danger of having a two-front war, Hitler approved the Barbarossa Plan. He did this with the knowledge that the Soviet Union was the major force that opposed him in Europe and that the upcoming battle in the East would decide the outcome of the world war. And he had no doubts as to the swiftness and success of the Moscow campaign.

And here I would like to highlight the following: Western countries, as a matter of fact, agreed at that time with the Soviet actions and recognized the Soviet Union's intention to ensure its national security. Indeed, back on October 1, 1939 Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty back then, in his speech on the radio said, "Russia has pursued a cold policy of self-interest... But that the Russian armies should stand on this line [the new Western border is meant] was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace." On October 4, 1939 speaking in the House of Lords British Foreign Secretary Halifax said, "...it should be recalled that the Soviet government's actions were to move the border essentially to the line recommended at the Versailles Conference by Lord Curzon... I only cite historical facts and believe they are indisputable." Prominent British politician and statesman D. Lloyd George emphasized, "The Russian armies occupied the territories that are not Polish and that were forcibly seized by Poland after the First World War ... It would be an act of criminal insanity to put the Russian advancement on a par with the German one."

In informal communications with Soviet plenipotentiary representative Maisky, British diplomats and high-level politicians spoke even more openly. On October 17, 1939 Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs R. A. Butler confided him that the British government circles believed there could be no question of returning Western Ukraine and Belarus to Poland. According to him, if it had been possible to create an ethnographic Poland of a modest size with a guarantee not only of the USSR and Germany, but also of Britain and France, the British government would have considered itself quite satisfied. On October 27, 1939, Chamberlain's senior advisor H. Wilson said that Poland had to be restored as an independent state on its ethnographic basis, but without Western Ukraine and Belarus.

It is worth noting that in the course of these conversations the possibilities for improving British-Soviet relations were also being explored. These contacts to a large extent laid the foundation for future alliance and anti-Hitler coalition. Churchill stood out among other responsible and far-sighted politicians and, despite his infamous dislike for the USSR, had been in favour of cooperating with the Soviets even before. Back in May 1939, he said in the House of Commons, "We shall be in mortal danger if we fail to create a grand alliance against aggression. The worst folly would be to drive away any natural cooperation with Soviet Russia." And after the start of hostilities in Europe, at his meeting with Maisky on October 6, 1939 he confided that there were no serious contradictions between the UK and the USSR and, therefore, there was no reason for strained or unsatisfactory relations. He also mentioned that the British government was eager to develop trade relations and willing to discuss any other measures that might improve the relationships.

The Second World War did not happen overnight, nor did it start unexpectedly or all of a sudden. And German aggression against Poland was not out of nowhere. It was the result of a number of tendencies and factors of the world policy of that time. All pre-war events fell into place to form one fatal chain. But, undoubtedly, the main factors that predetermined the greatest tragedy in the history of mankind were state egoism, cowardice, appeasement of the aggressor who was gaining strength, and unwillingness of political elites to search for a compromise.

Therefore, it is unfair to claim that the two-day visit to Moscow of Nazi Foreign Minister Ribbentrop was the main reason for the start of the Second World War. All the leading countries are to a certain

extent responsible for its outbreak. Each of them made fatal mistakes, arrogantly believing that they could outsmart others, secure unilateral advantages for themselves or stay away from the impending world catastrophe. And this short-sightedness, the refusal to create a collective security system cost millions of lives and tremendous losses.

Saying this, I by no means intend to take on the role of a judge, to accuse or acquit anyone, let alone initiate a new round of international information confrontation in the historical field that could set countries and peoples at loggerheads. I believe that it is academics with a wide representation of respected scientists from different countries of the world who should search for a balanced assessment of what happened. We all need the truth and objectivity. On my part, I have always encouraged my colleagues to build a calm, open and trust-based dialogue, to look at the common past in a self-critical and unbiased manner. Such an approach will make it possible not to repeat the errors committed back then and to ensure peaceful and successful development for years to come.

However, many of our partners are not yet ready for joint work. On the contrary, pursuing their goals, they increase the number and the scope of information attacks against our country, trying to make us provide excuses and feel guilty, and adopt thoroughly hypocritical and politically motivated declarations. Thus, for example, the resolution on the Importance of European Remembrance for the Future of Europe approved by the European Parliament on 19 September 2019 directly accused the USSR together with the Nazi Germany of unleashing the Second World War. Needless to say, there is no mention of Munich in it whatsoever.

I believe that such ‘paperwork’ – for I cannot call this resolution a document – which is clearly intended to provoke a scandal, is fraught with real and dangerous threats. Indeed, it was adopted by a highly respectable institution. And what does that show? Regrettably, this reveals a deliberate policy aimed at destroying the post-war world order whose creation was a matter of honour and responsibility for States a number of representatives of which voted today in favour of this deceitful resolution. Thus, they challenged the conclusions of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the efforts of the international community to create after the victorious 1945 universal international institutions. Let me remind you in this regard that the process of European integration itself leading to the establishment of relevant structures, including the European Parliament, became possible only due to the lessons learnt from the past and its accurate legal and political assessment. And those who deliberately put this consensus into question undermine the foundations of the entire post-war Europe.

Apart from posing a threat to the fundamental principles of the world order, this also raises certain moral and ethical issues. Desecrating and insulting the memory is mean. Meanness can be deliberate, hypocritical and pretty much intentional as in the situation when declarations commemorating the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War mention all participants in the anti-Hitler coalition except for the Soviet Union. Meanness can be cowardly as in the situation when monuments erected in honour of those who fought against Nazism are demolished and these shameful acts are justified by the false slogans of the fight against an unwelcome ideology and alleged occupation. Meanness can also be bloody as in the situation when those who come out against neo-Nazis and Bandera’s successors are killed and burned. Once again, meanness can have different manifestations, but this does not make it less disgusting.

Neglecting the lessons of history inevitably leads to a harsh payback. We will firmly uphold the truth based on documented historical facts. We will continue to be honest and impartial about the events of World War II. This includes a large-scale project to establish Russia’s largest collection of archival records, film and photo materials about the history of World War II and the pre-war period.

Such work is already underway. Many new, recently discovered or declassified materials were also used in the preparation of this article. In this regard, I can state with all responsibility that there are no archive documents that would confirm the assumption that the USSR intended to start a preven-

tive war against Germany. The Soviet military leadership indeed followed a doctrine according to which, in the event of aggression, the Red Army would promptly confront the enemy, go on the offensive and wage war on enemy territory. However, such strategic plans did not imply any intention to attack Germany first.

Of course, military planning documents, letters of instruction of Soviet and German headquarters are now available to historians. Finally, we know the true course of events. From the perspective of this knowledge, many argue about the actions, mistakes and misjudgment of the country's military and political leadership. In this regard, I will say one thing: along with a huge flow of misinformation of various kinds, Soviet leaders also received true information about the upcoming Nazi aggression. And in the pre-war months, they took steps to improve the combat readiness of the country, including the secret recruitment of a part of those liable for military duty for military training and the redeployment of units and reserves from internal military districts to western borders.

The war did not come as a surprise, people were expecting it, preparing for it. But the Nazi attack was truly unprecedented in terms of its destructive power. On June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union faced the strongest, most mobilized and skilled army in the world with the industrial, economic and military potential of almost all Europe working for it. Not only the Wehrmacht, but also German satellites, military contingents of many other states of the European continent, took part in this deadly invasion.

The most serious military defeats in 1941 brought the country to the brink of catastrophe. Combat power and control had to be restored by extreme means, nation-wide mobilization and intensification of all efforts of the state and the people. In summer 1941, millions of citizens, hundreds of factories and industries began to be evacuated under enemy fire to the east of the country. The manufacture of weapons and munition, that had started to be supplied to the front already in the first military winter, was launched in the shortest possible time, and by 1943, the rates of military production of Germany and its allies were exceeded. Within six months, the Soviet people did something that seemed impossible. Both on the front lines and the home front. It is still hard to realize, understand and imagine what incredible efforts, courage, dedication these greatest achievements were worth.

The tremendous power of Soviet society, united by the desire to protect their native land, rose against the powerful, armed to the teeth, cold-blooded Nazi invading machine. It stood up to take revenge on the enemy, who had broken, trampled peaceful life, people's plans and hopes.

Of course, fear, confusion and desperation were taking over some people during this terrible and bloody war. There were betrayal and desertion. The harsh split caused by the revolution and the Civil War, nihilism, mockery of national history, traditions and faith that the Bolsheviki tried to impose, especially in the first years after coming to power – all of this had its impact. But the general attitude of the absolute majority of Soviet citizens and our compatriots who found themselves abroad was different – to save and protect the Motherland. It was a real and irrepressible impulse. People were looking for support in true patriotic values.

The Nazi "strategists" were convinced that a huge multinational state could easily be brought to heel. They thought that the sudden outbreak of the war, its mercilessness and unbearable hardships would inevitably exacerbate inter-ethnic relations. And that the country could be split into pieces. Hitler clearly stated: "Our policy towards the peoples living in the vastness of Russia should be to promote any form of disagreement and division".

But from the very first days, it was clear that the Nazi plan had failed. The Brest Fortress was protected to the last drop of blood by its defenders of more than 30 ethnicities. Throughout the war, the feat of the Soviet people knew no national boundaries – both in large-scale decisive battles and in the protection of every foothold, every meter of native land.

The Volga region and the Urals, Siberia and the Far East, the republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia became home to millions of evacuees. Their residents shared everything they had and provided all the support they could. Friendship of peoples and mutual help became a real indestructible fortress for the enemy.

The Soviet Union and the Red Army, no matter what anyone is trying to prove today, made the main and crucial contribution to the defeat of Nazism. These were heroes who fought to the end surrounded by the enemy at Bialystok and Mogilev, Uman and Kiev, Vyazma and Kharkov. They launched attacks near Moscow and Stalingrad, Sevastopol and Odessa, Kursk and Smolensk. They liberated Warsaw, Belgrade, Vienna and Prague. They stormed Koenigsberg and Berlin.

We contend for genuine, unvarnished, or whitewashed truth about war. This national, human truth, which is hard, bitter and merciless, has been handed down to us by writers and poets who walked through fire and hell of front trials. For my generation, as well as for others, their honest and deep stories, novels, piercing trench prose and poems have left their mark in my soul forever. Honoring veterans who did everything they could for the Victory and remembering those who died on the battlefield has become our moral duty.

And today, the simple and great in its essence lines of Alexander Tvardovsky's poem "I was killed near Rzhev ..." dedicated to the participants of the bloody and brutal battle of the Great Patriotic War in the center of the Soviet-German front line are astonishing. Only in the battles for Rzhev and the Rzhevsky Salient from October 1941 to March 1943, the Red Army lost 1,154, 698 people, including wounded and missing. For the first time, I call out these terrible, tragic and far from complete figures collected from archive sources. I do it to honor the memory of the feat of known and nameless heroes, who for various reasons were undeservingly, and unfairly little talked about or not mentioned at all in the post-war years.

Let me cite you another document. This is a report of February 1954 on reparation from Germany by the Allied Commission on Reparations headed by Ivan Maisky. The Commission's task was to define a formula according to which defeated Germany would have to pay for the damages sustained by the victor powers. The Commission concluded that "the number of soldier-days spent by Germany on the Soviet front is at least 10 times higher than on all other allied fronts. The Soviet front also had to handle four-fifths of German tanks and about two-thirds of German aircraft." On the whole, the USSR accounted for about 75 percent of all military efforts undertaken by the anti-Hitler coalition. During the war period, the Red Army "ground up" 626 divisions of the Axis states, of which 508 were German.

On April 28, 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt said in his address to the American nation: "These Russian forces have destroyed and are destroying more armed power of our enemies – troops, planes, tanks, and guns – than all the other United Nations put together". Winston Churchill in his message to Joseph Stalin of September 27, 1944, wrote "that it is the Russian army that tore the guts out of the German military machine..."

Such an assessment has resonated throughout the world. Because these words are the great truth, which no one doubted then. Almost 27 million Soviet citizens lost their lives on the fronts, in German prisons, starved to death and were bombed, died in ghettos and furnaces of the Nazi death camps. The USSR lost one in seven of its citizens, the UK lost one in 127, and the USA lost one in 320. Unfortunately, this figure of the Soviet Union's hardest and grievous losses is not exhaustive. The painstaking work should be continued to restore the names and fates of all who have perished – Red Army soldiers, partisans, underground fighters, prisoners of war and concentration camps, and civilians killed by the death squads. It is our duty. And here, members of the search movement, military-patriotic and volunteer associations, such projects as the electronic database "Pamyat Naroda", which contains archival documents, play a special role. And, surely, close international cooperation is needed in such a common humanitarian task.

The efforts of all countries and peoples who fought against a common enemy resulted in victory. The British army protected its homeland from invasion, fought the Nazis and their satellites in the Mediterranean and North Africa. American and British troops liberated Italy and opened the Second Front. The US dealt powerful and crushing strikes against the aggressor in the Pacific Ocean. We remember the tremendous sacrifices made by the Chinese people and their great role in defeating Japanese militarists. Let us not forget the fighters of Fighting France, who did not fall for the shameful capitulation and continued to fight against the Nazis.

We will also always be grateful for the assistance rendered by the Allies in providing the Red Army with ammunition, raw materials, food and equipment. And that help was significant – about 7 percent of the total military production of the Soviet Union.

The core of the anti-Hitler coalition began to take shape immediately after the attack on the Soviet Union where the United States and Britain unconditionally supported it in the fight against Hitler's Germany. At the Tehran conference in 1943, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill formed an alliance of great powers, agreed to elaborate coalition diplomacy and a joint strategy in the fight against a common deadly threat. The leaders of the Big Three had a clear understanding that the unification of industrial, resource and military capabilities of the USSR, the United States and the UK will give unchallenged supremacy over the enemy.

The Soviet Union fully fulfilled its obligations to its allies and always offered a helping hand. Thus, the Red Army supported the landing of the Anglo-American troops in Normandy by carrying out a large-scale Operation Bagration in Belarus. In January 1945, having broken through to the Oder River, it put an end to the last powerful offensive of the Wehrmacht on the Western Front in the Ardennes. Three months after the victory over Germany, the USSR, in full accordance with the Yalta agreements, declared war on Japan and defeated the million-strong Kwantung Army.

Back in July 1941, the Soviet leadership declared that the purpose of the War against fascist oppressors was not only the elimination of the threat looming over our country, but also help for all the peoples of Europe suffering under the yoke of German fascism. By the middle of 1944, the enemy was expelled from virtually all of the Soviet territory. However, the enemy had to be finished off in its lair. And so the Red Army started its liberation mission in Europe. It saved entire nations from destruction and enslavement, and from the horror of the Holocaust. They were saved at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives of Soviet soldiers.

It is also important not to forget about the enormous material assistance that the USSR provided to the liberated countries in eliminating the threat of hunger and in rebuilding their economies and infrastructure. That was being done at the time when ashes stretched for thousands of miles all the way from Brest to Moscow and the Volga. For instance, in May 1945, the Austrian government asked the USSR to provide assistance with food, as it "had no idea how to feed its population in the next seven weeks before the new harvest." The state chancellor of the provisional government of the Austrian Republic Karl Renner described the consent of the Soviet leadership to send food as a saving act that the Austrians would never forget.

The Allies jointly established the International Military Tribunal to punish Nazi political and war criminals. Its decisions contained a clear legal qualification of crimes against humanity, such as genocide, ethnic and religious cleansing, anti-Semitism and xenophobia. Directly and unambiguously, the Nuremberg Tribunal also condemned the accomplices of the Nazis, collaborators of various kinds.

This shameful phenomenon manifested itself in all European countries. Such figures as Pétain, Quisling, Vlasov, Bandera, their henchmen and followers – though they were disguised as fighters for national independence or freedom from communism – are traitors and slaughterers. In inhumanity, they often exceeded their masters. In their desire to serve, as part of special punitive groups they willingly executed the most inhuman orders. They were responsible for such bloody events as the shoot-

ings of Babi Yar, the Volhynia massacre, burnt Khatyn, acts of destruction of Jews in Lithuania and Latvia.

Today as well, our position remains unchanged – there can be no excuse for the criminal acts of Nazi collaborators, there is no statute of limitations for them. It is therefore bewildering that in certain countries those who are smirched with cooperation with the Nazis are suddenly equated with the Second World War veterans. I believe that it is unacceptable to equate liberators with occupants. And I can only regard the glorification of Nazi collaborators as a betrayal of the memory of our fathers and grandfathers. A betrayal of the ideals that united peoples in the fight against Nazism.

At that time, the leaders of the USSR, the United States, and the UK faced, without exaggeration, a historic task. Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill represented the countries with different ideologies, state aspirations, interests, cultures, but demonstrated great political will, rose above the contradictions and preferences and put the true interests of peace at the forefront. As a result, they were able to come to an agreement and achieve a solution from which all of humanity has benefited.

The victorious powers left us a system that has become the quintessence of the intellectual and political quest of several centuries. A series of conferences – Tehran, Yalta, San Francisco and Potsdam – laid the foundation of a world that for 75 years had no global war, despite the sharpest contradictions.

Historical revisionism, the manifestations of which we now observe in the West, and primarily with regard to the subject of the Second World War and its outcome, is dangerous because it grossly and cynically distorts the understanding of the principles of peaceful development, laid down at the Yalta and San Francisco conferences in 1945. The major historic achievement of Yalta and other decisions of that time is the agreement to create a mechanism that would allow the leading powers to remain within the framework of diplomacy in resolving their differences.

The twentieth century brought large-scale and comprehensive global conflicts, and in 1945 the nuclear weapons capable of physically destroying the Earth also entered the scene. In other words, the settlement of disputes by force has become prohibitively dangerous. And the victors in the Second World War understood that. They understood and were aware of their own responsibility towards humanity.

The cautionary tale of the League of Nations was taken into account in 1945. The structure of the UN Security Council was developed in a way to make peace guarantees as concrete and effective as possible. That is how the institution of the permanent members of the Security Council and the right of the veto as their privilege and responsibility came into being.

What is veto power in the UN Security Council? To put it bluntly, it is the only reasonable alternative to a direct confrontation between major countries. It is a statement by one of the five powers that a decision is unacceptable to it and is contrary to its interests and its ideas about the right approach. And other countries, even if they do not agree, take this position for granted, abandoning any attempts to realize their unilateral efforts. So, in one way or another, it is necessary to seek compromises.

A new global confrontation started almost immediately after the end of the Second World War and was at times very fierce. And the fact that the Cold War did not grow into the Third World War has become a clear testimony of the effectiveness of the agreements concluded by the Big Three. The rules of conduct agreed upon during the creation of the United Nations made it possible to further minimize risks and keep confrontation under control.

Of course, we can see that the UN system currently experiences certain tension in its work and is not as effective as it could be. But the UN still performs its primary function. The principles of the UN Security Council are a unique mechanism for preventing a major war or global conflict.

The calls that have been made quite often in recent years to abolish the veto power, to deny special opportunities to permanent members of the Security Council are actually irresponsible. After all, if that happens, the United Nations would in essence become the League of Nations – a meeting for empty talk without any leverage on the world processes. How it ended is well known. That is why the

victorious powers approached the formation of the new system of the world order with utmost seriousness seeking to avoid repetition of the mistakes of their predecessors.

The creation of the modern system of international relations is one of the major outcomes of the Second World War. Even the most insurmountable contradictions – geopolitical, ideological, economic – do not prevent us from finding forms of peaceful coexistence and interaction, if there is the desire and will to do so. Today the world is going through quite a turbulent time. Everything is changing, from the global balance of power and influence to the social, economic and technological foundations of societies, nations and even continents. In the past epochs, shifts of such magnitude have almost never happened without major military conflicts. Without a power struggle to build a new global hierarchy. Thanks to the wisdom and farsightedness of the political figures of the Allied Powers, it was possible to create a system that has restrained from extreme manifestations of such objective competition, historically inherent in the world development.

It is a duty of ours – all those who take political responsibility and primarily representatives of the victorious powers in the Second World War – to guarantee that this system is maintained and improved. Today, as in 1945, it is important to demonstrate political will and discuss the future together. Our colleagues – Mr. Xi Jinping, Mr. Macron, Mr. Trump and Mr. Johnson – supported the Russian initiative to hold a meeting of the leaders of the five nuclear-weapon States, permanent members of the Security Council. We thank them for this and hope that such a face-to-face meeting could take place as soon as possible.

What is our vision of the agenda for the upcoming summit? First of all, in our opinion, it would be useful to discuss steps to develop collective principles in world affairs. To speak frankly about the issues of preserving peace, strengthening global and regional security, strategic arms control, as well as joint efforts in countering terrorism, extremism and other major challenges and threats.

A special item on the agenda of the meeting is the situation in the global economy. And above all, overcoming the economic crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Our countries are taking unprecedented measures to protect the health and lives of people and to support citizens who have found themselves in difficult living situations. Our ability to work together and in concert, as real partners, will show how severe the impact of the pandemic will be, and how quickly the global economy will emerge from the recession. Moreover, it is unacceptable to turn the economy into an instrument of pressure and confrontation. Popular issues include environmental protection and combating climate change, as well as ensuring the security of the global information space.

The agenda proposed by Russia for the upcoming summit of the Five is extremely important and relevant both for our countries and for the entire world. And we have specific ideas and initiatives on all the items.

There can be no doubt that the summit of Russia, China, France, the United States, and the UK can play an important role in finding common answers to modern challenges and threats, and will demonstrate a common commitment to the spirit of alliance, to those high humanist ideals and values for which our fathers and grandfathers were fighting shoulder to shoulder.

Drawing on a shared historical memory, we can trust each other and must do so. That will serve as a solid basis for successful negotiations and concerted action for the sake of enhancing the stability and security on the planet and for the sake of prosperity and well-being of all States. Without exaggeration, it is our common duty and responsibility towards the entire world, towards the present and future generations.

Vladimir Putin serves as President of the Russian Federation.

Yakovets Yu.V. The True History of World War II and Yalta World. Introductory article.



Introduction. The Constellation of Historical Anniversaries and the Search for Truth

The year 2020 concentrates a whole constellation of historical anniversaries: 75 years since the Yalta and Berlin (Potsdam) conferences of the three great powers; victory in the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War; formation of the UN and UNESCO. These events are marked by many conferences, forums, and monographs. However, there is a dangerous tendency to rewrite history, reevaluate its results, and arrange the trial of the vanquished in the war over the victors. The concept of the Soviet historian M.N. Pokrovsky that history is a policy turned into the past is being implemented. This tendency is especially dangerous because it is being imposed on a new generation through the media and the education system. The restoration of historical truth becomes an urgent need, referring to the authentic archival documents and says and statements by the participants of these historical events themselves.

The contribution to the restoration of the true history is made by the Pitirim Sorokin – Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute who is a leader in the formation of the theory, history and future of civilizations and their interaction. This has been reflected in a number of monographs on the theory, history, dialogue and the future of civilization, and in the preparation with the support of the Presidential Grants Foundation of the International Scientific and Diplomatic Congress “Yalta World: Historical Experience and Prospects” (May 19-25, 2020), in the opening of scientific and educational Internet site “Yalta Peace” (<http://yaltapeace.ru/>) and in the publication and collection of archival materials “Yalta Conference and the Yalta World”. It was necessary to rethink the theory and history of world wars, the stages of the Second World War, the historical significance of the conferences of the leaders of the three great powers as an institute of strategic partnership and the union of civilizations, the stages of the implementation of the Yalta world, the factors of its destruction, the beginning of the birth of the Yalta world – 2 – strategies for establishing a sustainable multipolar world order based on partnership of civilizations and leading powers.

1. Theory and History of World Wars

Wars between states and civilizations have been waged since their inception more than 5 millennia ago in the epoch of early class civilizations, they were of a local character of a clash of states in a narrow strip to the North of the equator. During the period of ancient civilization (1st millennium B.C. – 5th century A.D.), they were supplemented by wars between world powers and empires (Greco-Persian wars, wars between Rome and Carthage, and so on). In the Middle Ages wars expanded the area, including the wars between civilizations (Mongolian, Eastern Slavic and Western civilizations, the Crusades of the Christian western civilization of Europe against the Muslim world).

During the period of early industrial civilization (16-18 centuries), this was the destruction by the Western civilization of the ancient civilizations of America, wars developed between the Spanish, Portuguese and British, Russian and Ottoman world empires. However, these wars did not have the global character of world wars of the industrial civilization over the past two centuries. Let us consider their main features.

The clash of civilization groups and leading powers, covering most of the states and population of the world, organic connection with the half-century Kondratieff and century-old civilizational cycles. N.D. Kondratieff discovered the regularity of the aggravation of military-political contradictions and wars on the up wave of large cycles of conjuncture¹. World wars connected to transformation of the system of civilizational genotypes and economic orders of the world becomes even more devastating in its scope and consequences. Based on such theoretical approach it is possible to identify four local wars of different nature and scope for the last two centuries.

First, the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the 19th century, acting as a clash of world empires – French, British, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, Ottoman, which covered most of oecumene and the world population. They ended in the Peace of Vienna and the formation of the Holy Union led by Russia to maintain peace. This was observed on the up wave of the 1st Kondratieff cycle.

Second, already in the mid-1850s, on the up wave of the second Kondratieff cycle, clashes between world civilizations occurred – the Crimean War between the Russian, British, French and Ottoman Empires, the Franco-Prussian war, which ended with the short-lived Treaty of Paris; clashes of the Russian and Ottoman empires in the Balkans.

Third, the First World War between the Entente powers (Britain, France, Russia) and the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires, which ended in a revolution in Russia, in the Treaty of Versailles and the formation of the League of Nations. This happened during the 3rd Kondratieff cycle.

Fourth, the Second World War, which was developed on the up wave of the fourth Kondratieff cycle after the world crisis of 1929-1933, the establishment of the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy, formation of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis and opposing them British, French Empire, the USSR and China. The war began in 1937, it acquired a global character in 1941-1945, concluded with the formation of the Yalta world and the creation of the United Nations.

The up wave of the 5th Kondratieff cycle was accompanied by a wave of terrorist attacks and local wars at the beginning of the 21st century, the resumption of the Cold War. The new world war was a hybrid in nature and was characterized by the US desire to establish a unipolar world, relying on the expansion of NATO borders and a new arms race.

It seems appropriate to expand fundamental knowledge on the theory, history and the future of world wars and hold an Interdisciplinary discussion on this issue in 2021.

¹ Kondratieff N.D. Large Cycles of Conjuncture and the Theory of Foresight. M: Ekonomika, 2002

2. The Stages of the Second World War (1937-1945)

It is generally considered the beginning of the Second World War September 1, 1939 – the dates of the German attack on Poland and the entry into the war of Great Britain and France. However, in reality, the Second World War began two years earlier in Asia. The actual start of the Second World War should be viewed June 7, 1937 – the beginning of Japanese- Chinese war – the clash of Japanese, Chinese, Eurasian, and Buddhist civilization. At the same stage, the clashes between Japan and the USSR in June 1938 and the battle of Khalkhin Gol in May 1939 took place. The USSR and the USA actively helped China. More than 200 Soviet pilots took part in the hostilities against Japanese aviation in 1938-41; more than 40 of them are buried in the memorial cemetery in Wuhan.

In parallel, the centers of the Second World War in Europe were formed – the civil war in Spain (from June 1936 to April 1939), in which a military clash was actually waged between Germany, Italy and the USSR. As a result of the Munich Betrayal between the governments of Germany, Great Britain, Italy and France, the division of Czechoslovakia took place. The USSR was ready to provide military assistance to Czechoslovakia, but Poland refused to let in the Soviet troops, and itself took part in the division of Czechoslovakia.

In order to postpone the dates of the inevitable military clash, the USSR had to sign non-aggression treaties with Germany (1939) and Japan (1941). Due to the accession of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus and the Baltic Republics to the USSR, their occupation by the fascist troops was postponed for two years. The announcement by the presidents of Poland and Ukraine the USSR as the initiator of the Second World War actually calls into question the legitimacy of the inclusion of Western Ukraine as part of Ukraine, Western Belarus as part of Belarus and the transfer of lands from East Germany to Poland on the basis of the decision of the Berlin (Potsdam) conference as a compensation for the preservation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus as part of the USSR.

The second stage was the period from September 1939 to June 1941, when the “phony war” between Germany and France turned into a defeat of the French and British troops, capture of France, other north-European, south-European countries, Yugoslavia and Greece, the concentration in the hands of the German-Italian bloc of most of Europe and its economic and military resources.

The third, decisive stage of the Second World War covers the period from June 22, 1941 – September 3, 1945: the fascist German attack, its satellites on the USSR, the Japanese attack on the United States on December 7, 1941 and the proclamation of the United Nations declaration on January 1, 1942 . Thus, the Second World War acquired an overall planetary character. This period was characterized by confrontation of the opposing camps, formation of military-political union between the USSR, USA. and Great Britain, the key points of which were the Teheran, Yalta and Berlin (Potsdam) conference of the heads of three great powers who led the anti-Hitler coalition.

An active role in the Second World War was played by the heroic struggle of China against the Japanese occupiers (the losses of China during the war exceeded 35 million people) and the participation of representatives of fighting France on the Russian-German front and in the liberation of France. The Second World War ended with the surrender of fascist Germany in 1945 and militaristic Japan on September 3, 1945.

The decisive role in the victory over fascist Germany was played by the Soviet Union, which paid 25 million lives for the victory. This was clearly recognized by the main partners who played their role in the victory over the Nazi bloc and, above all, Roosevelt, Churchill, Truman and Attlee, as can be seen from the published correspondence between Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill, Truman and Attlee

of 1941-1945. The entry of the USSR into the war against Japan in August 1945 and the defeat of the Kwantung army accelerated the process of surrender of Japan.

The effect of the law of polarization and the socio-political partnership of civilizations and states, social strata and generations in the periods of civilizational crises manifested itself in it.

Given the desire of a number of foreign historians and politicians to rewrite the history of the Second World War by the inclusion of the USSR among its initiators together with Hitlerite Germany it is necessary, through the efforts of Russian, Chinese and other scientists, to prepare and publish to the 85th anniversary of the Second World War the fundamental work on the history of the Second World War and discuss it at the International Scientific and Diplomatic Congress in Moscow in 2022.

3. Conferences of the Three Great Powers Leaders

It is of particular interest the original documents of the institute of strategic partnership and military-political union – Conferences of the heads of three great powers as well as the meeting of their leaders and the Moscow conference of 1943 of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, USA, UK and China (October 18 – November 11, 1943).

Out of the posted on the website “Yalta Peace” and published in the book “The Yalta World” the correspondence between Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill, Truman and Attlee, and the memoirs of Churchill and Gromyko, it is obvious what a tremendous work on the interaction, pooling of resources and efforts of the allied countries was performed to counter the German-Japanese aggression and to organize the defeat of the powers of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis.

Of particular importance in this regard was the Yalta Conference (February 4-11, 1945), which received the password Argonauts. At this conference there were identified the directions of the defeat of fascist Germany, its satellites, entry into the war of the USSR against Japan, the basic contours of the post-war peace in Europe, the transmission of the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril islands of the USSR, the UN formation and the post-war world order (later known as “Yalta World”). The highest evaluation of the results is evidenced by the letters of Roosevelt and Churchill after the end of the Conference.

The final chord of the military-political union of the three powers was the Berlin (Potsdam Conference), which was attended by the new leaders of the United States (Truman) and Great Britain (Attlee) (July 17 – August 2, 1945). At this conference, the decisions of the Yalta Conference were implemented, the difficult issues of the post-war definition of the European borders (Poland), the terms of control over occupied Germany, the participation time frames for the USSR in the war against militaristic Japan were solved. According to available information within the framework of the first stage of such Conference it was concluded a secret treaty of the USSR, USA and the UK signed by Stalin, Churchill and Truman about the joint struggle against the threat of the emergence of fascism in any form and in any location (with a treaty period of 250 years). Unfortunately, the text of this agreement has not been so far found in the classified archives. The archival documents and memoirs posted on the site convincingly show that in the presence of a common mortal threat, close unions of world powers with different socio-political systems are possible to successfully address common strategic tasks and respond to the formidable challenges of the epoch.

Given the crucial importance of the conferences of the leaders of the three great powers in the formation of the UN and the definition of the foundations of the post-war world order (Yalta world), it would be advisable to place Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin correspondence as an official UN document and widely distribute it in information networks as well as in the Russian houses of science and culture and organization of compatriots abroad.

4. The Difficult Path of the Yalta World

In the second half of 1945, the half-century period of the Yalta world began, which in turn went through several stages. At the first stage before the start of the Korean War (June 25, 1945) it continued the partnership of the three great powers for the implementation of joint decisions of the Yalta and Berlin Conferences, on the implementation of the Yalta world, signature of the Charter on the foundation of the United Nations Organization (June 26, 1945) and formation of the UNESCO (1945). Initially cooperation of the three great powers to implement the decisions of the Berlin (Potsdam) conference went on constructively, there were held three conferences of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA and the UK which implemented the decision of the Moscow Conference (December 1945) and the Paris Conference (February 1947). However, the contradictions caused by the US desire to realize its monopoly on atomic weapons gradually increased. The US General Staff devised secret plans for atomic war against the Soviet Union. These controversies manifested most clearly in the Truman doctrine and Churchill's Fulton speech in March 1946. Military confrontation between the USSR and the USA increased, competition in the field of development of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The confrontation between the two superpowers was reflected in the creation of the military-political NATO bloc (April 4, 1949) and, in contrast to it, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (May 14, 1955).

The second stage of the implementation of the Yalta world began with the Korean War of 1950-1953. It was virtually a military clash between the United States, China and the USSR, where the UN acted on the U.S. side (the USSR temporarily suspended its activities in the UN Security Council, which made it to use the veto), the arms race unfolded.

Relations escalated between the allies during the Berlin crisis in 1958-1961. During the Caribbean crisis of 1961, it arose a real threat of a thermonuclear war between the USSR and the USA. Periodically, there were observed tendencies for easing tension and expanding contacts between the USSR and the USA, for example, during Khrushchev's friendly visit to the United States, his meetings and negotiations with Eisenhower in September 1959.

The constructive cooperation of the UN Security Council permanent members and the UN General Assembly continued to expand the UN by including countries freed from colonial dependence, on developing a strategy for international cooperation and assisting developing countries, as well as addressing major global problems, carrying out peacekeeping operations and providing assistance in natural disasters and catastrophes. Partnership of great powers developed in the key areas of disarmament, strengthening peace and security in Europe, and preventing the threat of nuclear war and the strengthening of environmental security and space exploration. Under mutual control, measures were taken to limit nuclear stockpiles and destruction of the most dangerous types of means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

The resolution of the Caribbean crisis and reaching the agreement on removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba and US missiles from Turkey marked the beginning of the third stage of the implementation of the Yalta world, when there were signs of detente of international relations. The USSR, the USA, and the UK signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater in 1963. During the Vietnam War (1965-1973), the USSR and the PRC actually participated in the clash on the side of North Vietnam, giving it significant support with modern weapons. In 1975, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed. The USSR and the United States signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1) in 1991. In 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was signed, to which 190 UN member states are parties.

International organizations were formed to monitor compliance with essential treaties – the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). All this significantly reduced

the risk of the outbreak of thermonuclear war and a suicidal clash of civilizations. The year 2001 was declared by the UN the year of partnership between civilizations. Since the beginning of the 1980s it was almost stopped the “Cold War” between the two superpowers and military-political blocs headed by them.

Another area of partnership between civilizations and leading powers with the leading role of the United Nations were joint activities on environmental protection and rational nature management. In 1972, the UN Conference on the Environment decided to establish the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Global Environment Facility. In 1989, a report by an international group of experts, “Our Common Future” proclaimed the Global Sustainable Development Strategy, taking into account the interests of present and future generations. This Strategy was approved in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, concretized in the Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the UN summit in 2000, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 in Johannesburg, at the UN Conference on sustainable development “Rio + 20” in Rio de Janeiro in 2012 and in the Sustainable Development Goals for 2030, adopted by the UN Summit in September 2015.

Gagarin’s flight into space in 1961 and his visits to about 30 countries helped to strengthen the authority of the USSR and trust between countries, the implementation and principles of the Yalta world.

The third direction of the successful implementation of the partnership of the leading powers on the basis of the Yalta world was cooperation in space exploration and implementation of the Russian-American project “Soyuz – Apollo “ in 1975, the establishment and successful operation on the basis of multilateral cooperation of the International Space Station since 1998.

Thus, the Yalta world provided the conditions for a relatively peaceful development of mankind for half a century, prevention of the threat of nuclear war and the record high rate of economic and social development: from 1950-1973, the average annual GDP growth amounted to 4.9%, with GDP growth 2.9% per capita.

An interdisciplinary research should also be conducted on an international basis on the history of the Yalta world and more widely present the outputs of such research in modern history textbooks.

5. The Destruction of the Yalta World and the Birth of the Yalta World-2

From the end of the 20th century the signs of the destruction of the Yalta world and the threat of a clash of civilizations began to mount. Self-disintegration of the USSR, Warsaw Pact, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance created the illusion of the ruling elite of the United States on the establishment of a unipolar world order under the undivided dominance of the US and NATO as an instrument of such domination. The rapid expansion of NATO took place with the inclusion of the states of Eastern Europe and a part of the republics of the former USSR. The new strategy was proclaimed in the monograph Zbigniew Brzezinski “The Grand Chessboard”. The first acts of the implementation of these strategies were the bombing of NATO in Yugoslavia, aggression in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. The response was a sharp increase in terrorism, which manifested itself in the tragedy of September 11, 2001 and reached its apogee in the creation of a terrorist state ISIS. In Huntington’s book of 1996 it is predicted the inevitability of the clash of the west and the Muslim civilization. Since the beginning of the 21st century, and especially from 2015, clearly marked the deployment of a new world war in its hybrid and diffused forms. An arms race is unfolding, and the threat of accidental and malicious use of weapons of mass destruction is growing. Economic sanctions in response to the Ukrainian crisis has strained relations between the West and Russia. The UN efforts to implement the Sustainable Development Strategy have not been successful in terms of deployment of global civilizational crisis, strengthening the arms race, strengthening of threat of environmental disaster and adverse climate changes. Sharp aggravation of global contradictions has caused a counter reaction of the emer-

gence of foundations for a sustainable multi-polar world order based on dialogue and partnership among civilizations, with the leading role of the UN. At the head of this movement there are turned to be Russia and China which proclaimed the strategies of the Greater Eurasian Partnership and the One Belt, One Road Initiative. At the Munich Conference in 2007, President of Russia V.V. Putin proclaimed the Strategy of the formation of a multipolar world order. The role of Russia increases as the world leader in the development and implementation of such strategy. This tendency was scientifically substantiated as a result of the creation by Russian scientists of the Yalta Civilizational Club and the preparation of a series of reports on the strategy for the formation of a sustainable multipolar world order based on partnership of civilizations. It is going on the preparation of a scientific platform of the Conferences of the heads of the States permanent members of the Security Council, which can be developed at the International scientific and diplomatic Congress on May 19-25, 2020, submitted to the UN leadership, the head of the States permanent members of the UN Security Council and presented at the 15th Civilization Forum dedicated to the 75th anniversary of UNESCO (Paris, 2020) and at the meeting of the Round table at the Jubilee 75th session of the UN General Assembly (March 2021). This will contribute to the creation of the scientific base and the implementation of the proposals on the meeting of the heads of states – permanent members of the UN Security Council, articulated by the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin at the Forum in Jerusalem in January 2020.

It is evident that the accumulated burden of problems and contradictions cannot be resolved by one meeting, it will require several Conferences with a detailed study of the nodal problems in view of the groundwork done by the scientists. This will be reflected in future reports of the Yalta Civilizational Club: in 2021 on the Strategy for overcoming the world economic crisis on the basis of partnership between civilizations and enhancing the UN regulatory role; in 2022 on the Strategy on dialogue and partnership of civilizations in the sociodemographic sphere; in 2023 on Dialogue and partnership of civilizations in the socio-cultural sphere in science, education and culture under the UNESCO leading role. This will be facilitated by the holding in 2020 to the 75th anniversary of the founding of UNESCO of the 15th civilization forum with a discussion of the draft Universal Declaration of UNESCO on dialogue and partnership of civilization in science, education, culture and ethics.

In preparing the Collection in Russian and English, a significant number of sources have been used, including the correspondence of Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill during the Second World War, as well as materials organized by the Federal Archival Agency together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Russian Historical Society documentary exhibition – “Stalin – Churchill – Roosevelt: The Common Struggle against Fascism”, including the greeting of Russian Federation President V.V. Putin to the organizers of the exhibition. This made it possible to attract a significant number of archival materials published for the first time, including documents dated March 1, 1941 with a US warning about the preparation of a plan for Germany to attack the Soviet Union and a letter to Stalin from Churchill dated April 19, 1941 about the plans of the German military command to move troops to the borders of the USSR. Unfortunately, these warnings were not accepted by Stalin. They indicate that the prerequisites for the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition developed even before fascist Germany attack on the USSR.

Conclusion

Historical facts cited in the collection of archival documents and materials indicate that from the mid-1930s a new geopolitical divide began to take shape, based on the confrontation between Hitlerite Germany, fascist Italy and militaristic Japan, which declared their claims to world domination, on the one hand, and progressive and conservative forces – the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France and China opposing them. A direct military clash with them, the Second World War,

their confrontation began in the East – with the Japanese attack on China in June 1937 and the clash of Japan, the USSR and Mongolia at Khalkhin Gol (May – September 1939) and in the West – the confrontation of the USSR and Germany during the Spanish Civil War. At the next stage of the World War II (from September 1939 to June 1941), Germany captured Poland, defeated France and Great Britain and subjugated almost the whole of Western and Eastern Europe, occupied Norway, Yugoslavia and Greece. The Second World War began with the attack of Hitlerite Germany and its satellites and Japan on the United States, the proclamation of the United Nations Declaration on January 1, 1942, and ended with the surrender of Germany on May 8-9, 1945 and Japan on September 2, 1945.

The decisive force for the victory in World War II was the close military-political union of the three great powers – the USSR, the USA and Great Britain with the participation of China and fighting France, and the Conferences of the leaders of the three great powers – Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, especially the Yalta Conference of February 1945 became the core of this alliance, which laid the solid foundation for the post-war world order, the creation of the UN and the implementation of the Yalta world during the post-war decades until the 1990s. The documents cited in the collection convincingly demonstrate the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the victory over Hitlerite Germany and its allies, and about the great contribution that this multilateral military-political partnership with the United States and Great Britain made to this victory.

A long historical horizon from the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the implementation of the Yalta world allows us to give a more complete and objective assessment of the historical significance of these events, causes and the prospects for the prevention of civilizational crisis of the late 20th – beginning of the 21st centuries on the basis of formation of humanistically-noospheric civilization and a sustainable multi-polar world order based on a partnership of civilizations and leading powers. Favorable conditions for this are created from the transition in the 2020s to the up wave of the 6th Kondratieff and the 7th civilizational cycles. This will require consolidation of progressive and conservative forces and reliance on the scientific bases of a long-term strategy developed by scientists, forming a new paradigm of scientific knowledge that meets the realities of the 21st century. Another important factor in the implementation of this strategy is to adopt the vision of civilization crisis factors and prospects to overcome it by the leaders of the new generation, to whom it passes the determining role of the development and implementation of the new global strategy. The above findings on the real history of the Second World War and the Yalta world are confirmed by archival documents and materials published in the collection “The Yalta Conference and Yalta World” and placed on the site “Yalta Peace” (www.yaltapeace.ru).

O.K. Shevchenko. Foreword



The given collection is the first attempt in the national science to present in one book a polyphonic spectrum of archival materials testifying to the origins, conservation procedures and destruction techniques of the Treaty of Yalta (Pax Yalta). Besides, every page of it testifies to the fact that the humanity's only way to the peaceful coexistence of civilizations is paved with partnership and respect for each other's peculiarities. This way has a symbolic name – the United Nations Organization.

The proposed documents are extremely diverse both in form and in content. They include the epistolary heritage of the leaders of the Big Three, the decisions of the UN Security Council, the transcripts of the world leaders' verbal punchfest and the refined formulations of international treaties.

The collection consists of three big chapters. The first chapter – «Yalta Conference» reveals the special techniques for creating the «New World Order» under the conditions when the old order had already passed into oblivion, and the new one has not been born yet. It includes documents written before the Treaty of Yalta was signed and even prior to the Yalta Conference of 1945. They are, above all, the Atlantic Charter and the negotiations in Tehran. The bulk of the collection is devoted to the Yalta Conference, but the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, which to a great extent drew a line under World War II and created a new Yalta system of the world order, is not left unnoticed.

The second chapter, «The Treaty of Yalta: Historical Experience», contains archival evidence describing the international relations in the crucible of World War II: from the UN documents to local acts, for example, on the peaceful coexistence of nations within Europe – the Helsinki Final Act.

The third chapter, «Towards a Sustainable Multipolar World Order (the Treaty of Yalta 2.0)», combines documents testifying to the crisis of «Pax Yalta» and the relentless attempts to discredit and destroy it. But any action leads to counteraction, therefore it is not surprising that the aggressive attitude towards «Pax Yalta» encounters stiff resistance reflected in the documents of the chapter.

The documents supplemented with minimal comments in the book are not secret materials taken from any armored strongboxes in the Russian Federal Security Service, Russia's Military Intelligence Service or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. All of them are publicly available, many of them can be found on the Internet. But they are scattered across dozens of sites, distributed across thousands of pages and not brought together into a single logical structure, systematically testifying to the key milestones of the formation and crisis of the World Order. The compilers of this collection have sifted through a significant amount of information identifying the key documents for un-

derstanding the processes. As a rule, the complete versions of archival documents or their complete carbon copies are presented here. In case of abridgements or omissions, compilers always refer to the sources where the complete versions of the corresponding documents can be found.

Of course, it has proved to be impossible to include all the relevant documents of the described period into the collection. It is planned to do in the future if a federal special-purpose program is available. The collection is a trial version which displays the most «painful» present-day issues. These are really present-day issues, for despite the fact that some documents are 75 years old, they nevertheless do not refer to the past, but to the present. And in the light of the numerous statements made about the Treaty of Yalta 2.0 (see this collection), they may even become burning issues in the future.

In 2020, it seems to us that the disputes among the leading powers are systemic in nature and are based on structural contradictions eliminating the possibility of equal partnership. But the documents of the 1940s – 1980s suggest the opposite. Even taking into account the total difference in the economy, domestic policy and ideology, compromises can and must be sought. The 1990s, characterized by aggression against Yugoslavia, Libya, Syria and Iraq, show that even under these conditions it is possible to «cut off at the knees» any aggressor and deal peacefully with numerous consequences of wars. Such examples are not only of historical importance, but represent the most important incentive for the implementation of positive projects in modern international relations.

The evidence is reflected not only in current documents (the latest ones are dated November-December, 2019), but also in the opinion of the general public. By the way, the collection presents an assortment of facts and ideas creating a scientific platform for drafting the Treaty of Yalta 2.0, thus demonstrating that the process of getting out of the «Treaty of Yalta 1.0 Crisis» is not only the desire of certain politicians, but also the powerful efforts of the scientific community.

Part 1.

The Yalta Conference

1.1. FORMATION OF THE ANTI-HITLER COALITION

1.2. The Tehran Conference

1.3. The Yalta Conference

1.4. The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference

1.5. The End of the Second World War. The Surrender of Japan

To the Organizers and Guests of the Historical and Documentary Exhibition “Stalin – Churchill – Roosevelt: The Common Struggle against Fascism”

Dear friends!



I consider it extremely important that the Federal Archival Agency, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Russian Historical Society, continue to implement a fundamental scientific and educational project dedicated to the turning, key milestones of the history of the 20th century. And after two large, substantial exhibitions about the causes and the beginning of World War II, a new large-scale historical and documentary exposition opens – “Stalin – Churchill – Roosevelt: The Common Struggle against Fascism”, telling about the cooperation of the three great powers – allies of the anti-Hitler coalition during the war .

I note that, despite political differences and different, sometimes diametrically opposed views on the unfolding events, the leaders of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the USA were able to correctly prioritize, rise above personal ambitions, and on key issues – come to mutual agreement, develop common approaches to complex problems – in the interests of a rapid end to World War II, the establishment of a global security system based on collective actions and the UN Charter.

We greatly appreciate the contribution of our allies-in-arms to the defeat of nazism. Together with soldiers and officers of the Red Army, they fought shoulder to shoulder

against a cruel and merciless enemy, defended the ideals of freedom and humanism. Together – they brought near the long-awaited and so dear Victory to everyone.

This is convincingly evidenced by the unique archival documents presented at the exhibition, and many of them for the first time.

Today, when humanity is facing new global challenges and threats, we must make full use of the invaluable experience of international cooperation and true alliance gained by our countries during the Second World War.

I am sure that the exhibition will arouse wide public interest and will contribute to the preservation of historical truth. And of course, special words of gratitude – to its organizers – for the great, painstaking, and selfless labor.

V. Putin


Translation: Dorovskaya Yu.V.

Source: <http://alliance.rusarchives.ru/ru/privetstvie-prezidenta-rossiyskoy-federacii-vv-putina>

Cipher telegram from Ivan Maisky, plenipotentiary representative of the USSR to Great Britain, to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs about his conversation with Winston Churchill on the situation in Europe. March 24, 1938

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

“In the conversation, Churchill said inter alia, ‘20 years ago, I fought communism with all my energy, as I believed at the time that communism with its idea of the world revolution posed a very grave danger to the British Empire. Today, communism does not pose such a danger. In contrast, a very grave danger to the British Empire in our time is German Fascism with its idea of the hegemony of Berlin.’”



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2.

стоятся сегодня). Все поведение Черчилля не оставляло сомнения в его искренности.

2. Мне пришлось прочитать Черчиллю довольно длинную лекцию по политграмоте и дать ему подробное разъяснение о наших последних событиях. Черчилль очень внимательно слушал, от времени до времени вставлял вопросы и замечания. Когда я кончил, он воскликнул: "ну, слава богу, Вы меня сильно обнадежили. Я ненавижу Троцкого, давно уже слежу за его деятельностью и считаю его злым гением России. Я целиком за политику Сталина. Сталин создает сильную Россию, - это как раз то, что сейчас больше всего нужно". Затем Черчилль мне горячо стал доказывать, как важно было бы именно сейчас, чтобы СССР каким-либо крупным актом перед лицом всего мира показав, что все рассказы об его будто бы слабости лишены всяких оснований. На мой вопрос, что он имеет в виду, Черчилль после мгновенного раздумья сказал, что например такой эффект могло бы иметь наше торжественное и совершенно твердое заявление об оказании серьезной помощи Чехословакии в случае агрессии против нее. "Конечно, - прибавил Черчилль - при условии, что Франция выполнит свои обязательства в чем, не сомневаюсь". Я ответил, что мы всегда выполняем свои обещания, и что всем это известно. Черчилль возразил: "Я это

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3.

знаю. Сталин - солидный и надежный человек. На него можно положиться. Он свое слово держит. Но все-таки в определенные моменты важно бывает подчеркнуть даже общеизвестные вещи. Сейчас такой момент. Если бы СССР сделал то заявление, по поводу Чехословакии, которое я имею ввиду, сделал бы не подспудно, а открыто громко демонстративно, - уверяю Вас это имело бы огромное значение и для сохранения Чехословакии, и для дела мира, и для укрепления международной репутации Вашей стороны".

3. По вопросу о внутренних перспективах в Англии Черчилль держится того мнения, что положение Чемберлена пошатнулось, что на прошлой неделе в воздухе нахло министерским кризисом, но что сейчас премьер несколько укрепился в связи с его согласием до известной степени сдвинуться со своей прежней позиции в области внешней политики. Из кое-каких намеков Черчилля мне стало ясно, что Чемберлен дал ему какое-то заверение, и что именно это явилось причиной отсрочки поездки Черчилля в Париж, предполагавшейся в прошлый "уикенд". Посмотрим сегодня в чем состояли заверения премьера. Тем не менее Черчилль заявил, что будет выступать сегодня в палате с критикой правительственной позиции. Черчилль полагает одна

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4.

ю, что реконструкция кабинета неизбежна в оравнительно близком будущем, ибо сейчас на очереди стоит вопрос о временной отмене различных профсоюзных правил и ограничений в целях повышения продукции оружейной промышленности, а далее станет вопрос о гражданской конскрипции в целях повышения обороноспособности страны. Такие меры можно провести только при поддержке оппозиции, на что последняя не пойдет при наличии нынешнего кабинета. Особенно ненавидит оппозиция самого Чемберлена. Черчилль предвидит поэтому перестройку правительства возможно даже на коалиционных с оппозицией началах. Почти несомненно, что при такой перестройке в правительство войдут Иден /и, от себя добавлю, также Черчилль/.

4. Черчилль считает, что Гитлер в ближайшее время едва ли открыто ударит по Чехословакии. По его мнению, следующий этап Гитлера - "освоение" Венгрии, что не трудно. Чехословакию же пока он будет донимать изнутри, через Генлейна, а также с помощью разных мер хозяйственного порядка. Возможно, что через Венгрию Гитлер протянет руку в Румынию. Германия бьет на то, чтобы когда Чехословакия окажется совершенно изолированной внешне и потрясенной изнутри "она потеряла бы нервы и упала бы, как зрелый плод в руки Гитлера по возможности

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5.

без сопротивления, дабы не вводить в игру таких опасных для него факторов, как Франция и СССР. Вообще же по убеждению Черчилля Гитлер сейчас явно берет курс на создание "Серединной Европы" от Немецкого до Черного и Средиземного морей и, если он не встретит своевременного отпора, то в 4-5 лет сможет реализовать свою мечту. "Серединная Европа" была бы исключительно опасной как для СССР, так и для Англии и Франции и потому, они имеют общие интересы в борьбе против Германии. Вот почему Черчилль придает такое колоссальное значение скорейшему созданию "великого альянса". Исходя из этих соображений, он полностью согласен и приветствует последнее выступление Литвинова в Москве. В разговоре Черчилль между прочим сказал: "20 лет назад я боролся со всей доступной мне энергией против коммунизма, потому, что в то время я считал коммунизм с его идеей мировой революции величайшей опасностью для Британской империи. Сейчас коммунизм такой опасности для империи не представляет. Наоборот, в наши дни величайшей опасностью для Британской империи является германский нацизм с его идеей мировой гегемонии Берлина. Поэтому в настоящее время я со всей доступной мне энергией борюсь против Гитлера. Если бы опасность для империи со стороны фашизма исчезла и опять возникла опасность со стороны ком-

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
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дунизма, я - говорю это совершенно открыто - вновь стал бы с вами бороться. Однако на ближайший период времени, во всяком случае до конца моей жизни /Черчилль сейчас 63 года/, такой ситуации не предвижу. На этот период времени нам с вами по пути. Вот почему я за тесное сотрудничество между Англией, Францией и СССР".

24.III.38 г. Майский.

1-экз. хк/лс
 гп. 25.III.13-55
 мп. Яковлев.

Верно: 

Message from Winston Churchill to Joseph Stalin on the threat of Fascism. June 24, 1940

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Russian translation.

English original.

“Geographically our two countries lie at the opposite extremities of Europe, and from the point of view of systems of government it may be said that they stand for widely differing systems of political thought. <...>

The Soviet Government is alone in a position to judge whether Germany’s present bid for the hegemony of Europe threatens the interests of the Soviet Union, and if so, how best those interests can be safeguarded.”

MESSAGE FROM MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL TO
MONSIEUR STALIN

At this time, when the face of Europe is changing hourly, I should like to take the opportunity of your receiving His Majesty's new Ambassador to ask the latter to convey to you a message from myself.

Geographically our two countries lie at the opposite extremities of Europe, and from the point of view of systems of government it may be said that they stand for widely differing systems of political thought. But I trust that these facts need not prevent the relations between our two countries in the international sphere from being harmonious and mutually beneficial.

In the past — indeed in the recent past — our relations have, it must be admitted, been clouded by mutual suspicions; and last August the Soviet Government decided that the interests of the Soviet

Union



Union required that they should break off negotiations with us and enter into a close relation with Germany. Thus Germany became your friend almost at the same moment as she became our enemy.

But since then a new factor has arisen which, I venture to think, makes it desirable that both our countries should re-establish our previous contacts, so that if necessary we may be able to consult together as regards those affairs in Europe which must necessarily interest us both. At the present moment the problem before all Europe — our two countries included — is how the states and peoples of Europe are going to react towards the prospect of Germany's establishing a hegemony over the continent.

The fact that both our countries are not wholly in Europe, but on her extremities, puts them in a special position. We are better enabled than others less fortunately placed

placed to resist German's hegemony, and, as you know, the British Government certainly intend to use their geographical position and their great resources to this end.

In fact Great Britain's policy is concentrated on two objects, viz one, to save herself from the German domination which the Nazi Government wishes to impose, and two, to free the rest of Europe from the domination which Germany is now in process of imposing on it.

The Soviet Government is alone in a position to judge whether Germany's present bid for the hegemony of Europe threatens the interests of the Soviet Union, and if so, how best those interests can be safeguarded. But I have felt that the crisis through which Europe, and indeed the world, is passing is so grave as to warrant my laying before you frankly the position as it presents itself to the British Government. This, I hope, will ensure that in any discussions which the Soviet

Government

Cipher telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in the USA K.A. Umansky to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs about a conversation with US Under Secretary of State S. Welles regarding a possible German attack on the USSR. March 1, 1941

2. Welles made the following statement to me, warning that Steinhardt was instructed to say the same to you: according to confidential information at the disposal of the American government and the American government has not the slightest doubts about its authenticity, the German military plans are that after achieving victory over the UK, despite the support of the latter by the United States, to attack the USSR, and the plans for such attack were developed by the German command in every detail. The American government takes into account that the Soviet government might treat this information with distrust and will consider it as propaganda, intrigue or untruth. However the Amgov emphasizes that it has unquestionable evidence of the veracity of this information, which it communicates to the Soviet government only because it believes that those countries that uphold their integrity and independence in the face of the German plans for unlimited aggression have a moral right to receive such information and a friendly warning. In order to reduce the possible doubts of the Soviet government, he, Welles adds that the information does not come from the UK sources.

Answered to Welles that I would advise Molotov of the fact that this information was communicated to me, which, as far as I can personally judge, does not fit into the well-known picture of the international situation. Regardless of the current nature of Soviet-German relations, and even if one theoretically assumes that someone in Germany cherishes such plans, it seems to me personally that the German government cannot but understand the doom of such plans, due to the high defense power of the USSR, strategic positions and economic strength which has strengthened so much in recent years, and in particular since the outbreak of the current war. I do not have the right to subject this information to the severe assessment that he, Welles justified, but naturally it comes to mind similar statements and information circulated with tendentious goals before and after Munich, which only led to miscalculations of a number of governments, which suggested that the USSR may become an object of unpunished aggression. But, of course, I can only thank the Amgov for communicating confidential information and will convey to Molotov the motives that prompted the American government to share this information with us. Welles began to emphasize again that the information was authoritative and of such a nature that it was impossible to doubt it.

Translation: Dorovskaya Yu.V.

Source: <http://alliance.rusarchives.ru/en/nachalo-vtoroy-mirovoy-voyny-rozhdenie-antigitlerovskoy-koalicii>


Message from Winston Churchill to Joseph Stalin on the plans of German military commanders for shifting troops to the east. April 19, 1941

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Russian translation.

English original.

“I have sure information from a trusted agent that when Germans thought they had got Yugoslavia in the net, that is to say after March 20th, they began to move three out of five Panzer divisions from Roumania to Southern Poland. The moment they heard of Serbian revolution this movement was countermanded. Your Excellency will readily appreciate the significance of these facts.”



Message from Mr Winston Churchill
to Monsieur Stalin.

I have sure information from a trusted agent that when Germans thought they had got Yugoslavia in the net, that is to say after March 20th, they began to move three out of five Panzer divisions from Roumania to Southern Poland. The moment they heard of Serbian revolution this movement was countermanded. Your Excellency will readily appreciate the significance of these facts.

За это ~~позволение~~ ~~разрешение~~
наблюдение на Северном полюсе улич-
ные же полагали ~~идею~~ по време-
ное правомерно ~~правительство~~.

Уже после совещания набеде-
на и германский посол в Москве Шу-
ландер в 5-е. Во время улич ~~слова~~
заявил ^{на, как} ~~народному~~ комиссару ~~или~~
Герману ~~ден~~, ~~Шуландер~~ ~~он~~ ~~имени~~
Своего ~~правительства~~, что ~~слова~~ ~~герман~~
свое ~~правительство~~ ~~якобы~~ ~~слова~~
было ~~поднято~~ ~~именно~~ ~~во~~ ~~время~~ ~~конференции~~ ~~в~~ ~~Москве~~
комиссару ~~народному~~ ~~германскому~~ ~~или~~ ~~Крас-~~
ной у ~~русского~~ ~~германского~~ ~~правительства~~.

Но ~~он~~ ~~на~~ ~~это~~ ~~слова~~ ~~якобы~~
сво ~~имени~~ ~~своего~~ ~~правительства~~,
было ~~заявлено~~, что до ~~последней~~ ~~минуты~~
Германское ~~правительство~~ не ~~пред~~ ~~близко~~
было ~~присутствия~~ ~~и~~ ~~северному~~ ~~полюсу~~.
Значит и это Германское ~~слова~~ ~~якобы~~ ~~не~~ ~~есть~~.

Пратугалыты. Абулалы Сауатты бы-
 тавалыт каныкмытымы ууерималыт с
 жолуу каныкмытымы дубалыт ~~каныкмыты~~
 аралыт ууерималыт, и ~~каныкмыты~~ каныкмытымы
 Советской абвалыт, с жолуу войномалыт
 жолуу перед рединой, перед советской
 кардыт, и каныкмытымы каныкмытымы.
 ины ууерималыт ~~каныкмыты~~ ~~каныкмыты~~
~~и ууерималыт~~ ~~каныкмыты~~ ~~каныкмыты~~
 Каныкмытымы ууерималыт. ~~Каныкмыты~~
 ууерималыт за каныкмытымы!

Personal message from Winston Churchill to Joseph Stalin.**July 8, 1941*****Russian State Archive of Social and Political History****Russian translation.**English original.*

“We are all very glad here that the Russian armies are making such strong and spirited resistance to the utterly unprovoked and merciless invasion of the Nazis. There is general admiration for the bravery and tenacity of the Soviet soldiers and people. We shall do everything to help you that time, geography and our growing resources allow. The longer the war lasts the more help we can give.”

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Personal Message from Mr Churchill to Monsieur Stalin :

We are all very glad here that the Russian armies are making such strong and spirited resistance to the utterly unprovoked and merciless invasion of the Nazis. There is general admiration for the bravery and tenacity of the Soviet soldiers and people. We shall do everything to help you that time, geography and our growing resources allow. The longer the war lasts the more help we can give. We are making very heavy attacks both by day and night with our Air Force upon all German occupied territories and all Germany within our reach. About 400 aeroplanes made daylight sorties overseas yesterday. On Saturday night over 200 heavy bombers attacked German towns, some carrying three tons apiece, and last night nearly 250 heavy bombers were operating. This will go on. Thus we hope to force Hitler to bring back some of his air power to the West and gradually take some of the strain off you. Besides this the Admiralty have at my desire prepared a serious operation to come off in the near future in the Arctic, after which I hope that contact will be established between the British and Russian navies. Meanwhile by sweeping along the Norwegian coast we have intercepted various supply ships which were moving North against you.

We welcome the arrival of the Russian military mission in order to concert future plans.


We have only got to go on increasingly to beat the life out of the villains.

Agreement and Protocol for Joint Action by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the War against Germany. July 12, 1941

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

The parties to the agreement pledged themselves to provide support and assistance to each other in the war against Hitlerite Germany and not to negotiate or conclude, except by mutual consent, any armistice or peace treaty.

The protocol, signed the same day, stipulated that the agreement would come into force as soon as it was signed and that it would not require ratification.




Personal message from Joseph Stalin to Winston Churchill with a proposal to open a second front. July 18, 1941

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Marks in blue pencil by Joseph Stalin.

“...I should inform you that the situation of the Soviet troops at the front continues to be tense. <...> I believe that the military situation of the Soviet Union as well as of Great Britain would considerably improve if a front against Hitler were opened in the west (Northern France) and north (the Arctic). The front in Northern France would not only draw Hitler’s forces away from the east but also prevent Hitler’s invasion of England.”



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Англии. Я представляю трудность создания такого фронта, но мне кажется, что несмотря на трудности его следовало бы создать не только ради нашего общего дела, но и ради интересов самой Англии. Легче всего создать такой фронт именно теперь, когда силы Гитлера отвлечены на восток и когда Гитлер еще не успел закрепить за собой занятые на востоке позиции.

Еще легче создать фронт на севере. Здесь потребуются только действия английских морских и воздушных сил без высадки войскового десанта, без высадки артиллерии. В этой операции примут участие советские сухопутные, морские и авиационные силы. Мы бы приветствовали, если бы Великобритания могла перебросить сюда около одной легкой дивизии или больше норвежских добровольцев, которых можно было бы перебросить в северную Норвегию для повстанческих действий против немцев.

В июле 1944г.

**US Presidential Representative Harry Hopkins and Joseph Stalin,
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR,
during a meeting in the Kremlin. July 31, 1941**

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Photo by Nikolai Vlasik



Source: <http://alliance.rusarchives.ru/en/nachalo-vtoroy-mirovoy-voiny-rozhdenie-antigitlerovskoy-koalicii>

Declaration of Principles issued by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. August 14, 1941

THE Atlantic Charter

THE President of THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

1. *Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other.*
 2. *They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.*
 3. *They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.*
 4. *They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.*
 5. *They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security.*
 6. *After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling*
- in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.*
7. *Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.*
 8. *They believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.*

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

August 14, 1941

**Message from Winston Churchill to Joseph Stalin
on deliveries of fighter aircraft and the organisation
of a transport corridor through Iran. August 30, 1941**

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Russian translation.

English original.

Marks in red and blue pencil by Joseph Stalin.

“We are expediting the despatch of the 200 Tomahawks about which I telegraphed in my last message. Our two squadrons should reach Murmansk about September 6th, comprising 40 Hurricanes. <...> We could send 100 now and two batches of fifty soon afterwards, together with mechanics, instructors, spare parts and equipment, to Archangel. Meanwhile arrangements could be made to begin accustoming your pilots and mechanics to the new type if you will send them to our squadrons at Murmansk. <...>

It would be a good thing to let the world know that the British and Soviet forces had actually joined hands.”



Personal Message from Prime Minister to
Monsieur Stalin.

I have been searching for any way to give you help in your splendid resistance pending the long-term arrangements which we are discussing with the United States of America and which will form the subject of the Moscow Conference. M. Maiski has represented that fighter aircraft are much needed in view of your heavy losses. We are expediting the despatch of the 200 Tomahawks about which I telegraphed in my last message. Our two squadrons should reach Murmansk about September 6th, comprising 40 Hurricanes. You will, I am sure, realise that fighter aircraft are the foundation of our home defence, besides which we are trying to obtain air superiority in Libya and also to provide Turkey so as to bring her in on our side. Nevertheless I could send 200 more Hurricanes, making 440 fighters in all, if your pilots could use them effectively. These would be eight and twelve gun Hurricanes, which we have found very deadly in action. We could send 100 now and two batches of fifty soon afterwards, together with mechanics, instructors, spare parts and equipment, to Archangel. Meanwhile arrangements could be made to begin accustoming your pilots and mechanics to the new type if you will send them to our squadrons at Murmansk. If you feel that this would be useful, orders will be given here accordingly, and a full technical memorandum is being telegraphed through our Military Air Mission.

/ The

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The news that the Persians have decided to cease resistance is most welcome. Even more than safeguarding the oilfields, our object in entering Persia has been to get another through route to you which cannot be cut. For this purpose we must develop the railway from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian and make sure that it runs smoothly with reinforcements of railway material from India. The Foreign Secretary has given to M. Maiski for you the kind of terms which we should like to make with the Persian Government so as to have a friendly people and not be compelled to waste a number of divisions merely guarding the railway line. Food is being sent from India, and if the Persians submit we shall resume the payment of oil royalties now due to the Shah. We are instructing our advance guards to push on and join hands with your forces at a point to be fixed by the military commanders somewhere between Hamadan and Qasvin. It would be a good thing to let the world know that the British and Soviet forces had actually joined hands. In our view it would be better at this moment for neither of us to enter Tehran in force, as all we want is a through route. We are making a large-scale base at Basrah, and we hope to make this a well-equipped warm water reception port for American supplies, which can thus surely reach the Caspian and Volga regions.

I must again express the admiration of the British nation for the wonderful fight which the Russian armies and the Russian people are making against the Nazi criminals. General MacFarlane was immensely impressed by all he saw at the front. A very hard time lies before us, but Hitler will not have a pleasant winter under our ever-increasing air bombardment.

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I was gratified by the very firm warning which Your Excellency gave to Japan about supplies via Vladivostok. President Roosevelt seemed disposed when I met him to take a strong line against further Japanese aggression, whether in the South or in the North-west Pacific, and I made haste to declare that we would range ourselves upon his side should war come. I am most anxious to do more for General Chang Kai-shek than we have hitherto felt strong enough to do. We do not want war with Japan, and I am sure that the way to stop it is to confront these people, who are divided and far from sure of themselves, with the prospect of the heaviest combination.

P. Stafford Cripps


Note from British ambassador Archibald C. Kerr to Vyacheslav Molotov with a personal and most secret message from Winston Churchill to Joseph Stalin on war criminals. October 13, 1943

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Russian translation.

English original.

“When any armistice is made with any government that may be established in Germany, all German officers and soldiers and members of the Nazi party who were responsible for or voluntarily participated in the aforementioned atrocities, killings and executions shall be sent to the countries in which their horrendous acts were committed in order to appear in court and be punished by the laws of these liberated countries and the free governments established there.”



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Перевод с английского.

РАСЕКРЕЧЕНО
~~СТРОГО СЕКРЕТНО И ЛИЧНО.~~

-1-

ПОСЛАНИЕ ОТ ПРЕМЬЕР-МИНИСТРА г-на УИНСТОНА ЧЕРЧИЛЛЯ
МАРШАЛУ СТАЛИНУ.

Не будете ли Вы любезны рассмотреть вопрос о том, не могло ли что либо вроде нижеследующего быть опубликовано за нашими тремя подписями:

" Великобритания, Соединенные Штаты и Советский Союз (если какой-либо другой порядок перечисления считается более подходящим, мы вполне готовы быть последними) получили из различных источников свидетельства о зверствах, убийствах и хладнокровных массовых казнях, которые совершаются гитлеровскими вооруженными силами во многих странах, захваченных ими из которых они теперь неуклонно изгоняются. Жестокости нацистского господства не являются новым фактом и все народы или территории находящиеся в их власти страдали от худшей формы террористического правительств. Новое заключается в том, что многие из этих территорий сейчас освобождаются продвигающимися вперед армиями держав-освободительниц и что в своем отчаянии отступающие гитлеровцы гунь удваивают свои бесжалостные жестокости.

2. В соответствии с вышеизложенным три союзные державы, выступая в интересах 32-х об"единенных наций, настоящим торжественно делают заявление и предупреждение своей следующей декларацией:

В момент предоставления любого перемирия любому правительству, которое может быть создано в Германии, все германские офицеры и солдаты и члены нацистской партии, которые были ответственны за, или добровольно приняли участие в вышеупомянутых зверствах, убийствах и казнях, будут отосланы в страны, в которых были совершены их отвратительные действия для того, чтобы они могли быть судимы и наказаны в соответствии с законами этих освобожденных стран и свободных правительств, которые будут там созданы. Списки будут составлены со всеми возможными подробностями, полученными от всех этих стран в особенности с учетом

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оккупированных частей России, Польши и Чехословакии, Югославии и Греции, включая Крит и другие острова, Норвегии, Дании, Нидерландов, Бельгии, Люксембурга, Франции и Италии.

Таким образом немцы, которые принимают участие в массовых расстрелах итальянских офицеров или в казнях французских, нидерландских, бельгийских и норвежских заложников или критских крестьян или же те, которые принимали участие в истреблении которому был подвергнут народ Польши, или в истреблении населения на территориях Советских Республик, которые сейчас очищаются от врага, должны знать, что они независимо от расходов будут отправлены обратно в места их преступлений и будут судимы на месте народами, над которыми они совершали насилия. Пусть те, кто еще не обогрил своих рук невинной кровью будут предупреждены о том, чтобы они не оказались в числе виновных, ибо три союзных Державы наверняка найдут их даже на краю света и выдадут их их обвинителям с тем, чтобы могло свершиться правосудие.

Эта Декларация не затрагивает вопроса о главных преступниках, преступления которых не связаны с определенным географическим местом.

(Подписи) Рузвельт
Сталин
Черчилль".

Если бы что-либо вроде этого (а я особенно не настаиваю на формулировках) было бы опубликовано за нашими тремя подписями, это, как я полагаю, вызвало бы у некоторых из этих негодяев опасение быть замешанными в этих убийствах, особенно теперь, когда они знают, что они будут побиты.

Мы знаем, например, что репрессии, которыми мы угрожали за поляков вызвали смягчение жестокостей, которым там подвергается народ. Нет сомнения, что использование врагом оружия в форме террора, возлагает дополнительное бремя на наши армии. У многих немцев может заговорить совесть если они будут знать, что их вернут обратно и будут судить в той стране и возможно на том самом месте, где были



MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL.

BRITISH EMBASSY

MOSCOW

October 13th, 1943.

Dear Mr. Molotov

I transmit to you herewith a most secret and personal message from the Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin on the subject of war criminals which I shall be grateful if you will transmit to its destination.

2. Mr Churchill has addressed a similar message to President Roosevelt.

*Yours sincerely
Anthony Eden*

His Excellency
Monsieur V.M. Molotov,
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
Moscow.

Personal message from Winston Churchill to Joseph Stalin on the first deliveries of arms and munitions through Lend-Lease. September 21, 1941


Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Russian translation.

English original. Hand-signed by Winston Churchill

“President Roosevelt has decided that our proposals shall, in the first instance, deal with the monthly quotas we shall send to you in the nine months period from October 1941 to June 1942 inclusive. <...>

You will realise that the quotas up to the end of June 1942 are supplied almost entirely out of British production, or production which the United States would have given us under our own purchases or under the Lease and Lend Bill.”



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the best advantage.

The American proposals have not yet gone beyond the end of June 1942, but I have no doubt that considerably larger quotas can be furnished by both countries thereafter, and you may be sure we shall do our utmost to repair as far as possible the grievous curtailments which your war industries have suffered through the Nazi invasion. I will not anticipate what Lord Beaverbrook will have to say upon this subject.

You will realise that the quotas up to the end of June 1942 are supplied almost entirely out of British production, or production which the United States would have given us under our own purchases or under the Lease and Lend Bill. The United States were resolved to give us virtually the whole of their exportable surplus, and it is not easy for them within that time to open out effectively new sources of supply. I am hopeful that a further great impulse will be given to the production of the United States, and that by 1943 the mighty industry of America will be in full war swing. For our part, we shall not only make substantially increased contributions from our

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own existing forecast production, but also try to obtain from our people an extra further effort to meet our common needs. You will understand, however, that our Army and its supply which has been planned is perhaps only one-fifth or one-sixth as large as that of yours or Germany's. Our first duty and need is to keep open the seas, and our second duty is to obtain decisive superiority in the Air. These have the first claims upon the man power of our 44,000,000 in the British Islands. We can never hope to have an Army or Army munitions industries comparable to those of the great Continental military powers. None the less, we will do our utmost to aid you.

General Ismay, who is my personal representative on the Chiefs of the Staff's Committee, and is thoroughly acquainted with the whole field of our military policy, is authorised to study with your Commanders any plans for practical cooperation which may suggest themselves.

If we can clear our western flank in Libya of the enemy, we shall have considerable forces, both Air and Army, to cooperate upon the southern flank of the Russian front.

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It seems to me that the most speedy and effective help would come if Turkey could be induced to resist a German demand for the passage of troops, or better still, if she would enter the war on our side. You will I am sure attach due weight to this.

I have always shared your sympathy for the Chinese people in their struggle to defend their native land against Japanese aggression. Naturally we do not want to add Japan to the side of our foes, but the attitude of the United States, resulting from my conference with President Roosevelt, has already enforced a far more sober view upon the Japanese Government. I made haste to declare on behalf of His Majesty's Government that should the United States be involved in war with Japan, Great Britain would immediately range herself on her side. I think that all our three countries should, so far as possible, continue to give aid to China, and that this may go to considerable lengths without provoking a Japanese declaration of war.

There is no doubt that a long period of struggle

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-5-

and suffering lies before our peoples, but I have great hopes that the United States will enter the war as a belligerent, and if so, I cannot doubt that we have but to endure to conquer.

I am hopeful that as the war continues, the great masses of the peoples of the British Empire, the Soviet Union, the United States and China, which alone comprise two-thirds of the entire human race, may be found marching together against their persecutors; and I am sure the road they travel will lead to victory.

*With heartfelt wishes for
the success of the Russian armies, & of
the ruin of the Nazi tyrants,*

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

Winston Churchill

His Excellency
Monsieur Joseph Stalin.

Members of the American and British delegations arrive for a meeting in Moscow. September 28, 1941

State Historical Museum

Photo by Fyodor Kislov.



From left to right: A. Krutikov, A. Shakhurin, A. Vyshinsky, N. Kuznetsov, S. Cripps, W. Aitken (Lord Beaverbrook), L. Steinhardt, A. Hardman, F. Molochkov, and K. Umansky.

Source: <http://alliance.rusarchives.ru/en/nachalo-vtoroy-mirovoy-voyny-rozhdenie-antigitlerovskoy-koalicii>

Moscow Conference. September 30, 1941

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History



From left to right: British Minister of Supply W. Aitken (Lord Beaverbrook), translator V. Pavlov (standing), People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Molotov, and US special representative A. Harriman.

Source: <http://alliance.rusarchives.ru/en/nachalo-vtoroy-mirovoy-voiny-rozhdenie-antigitlerovskoy-koalicii>

Secret protocol of the Moscow Conference of representatives of the USA, USSR and Great Britain. October 1, 1941

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

Russian and English originals.

«The Conference of the representatives of three powers – the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the U.S.A. – which met in Moscow on September 29th, 1941 and was held till October 1st, 1941, has, on the basis... of the investigation of submitted data, arrived at the unanimous decision concerning the provision of supplies, which will be made available at British and U.S.A. centres of production for the Soviet Union by Great Britain and the United States of America within the period beginning from October 1941 till the end of June 1942.»

СЕКРЕТНЫЙ ПРОТОКОЛ КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЕЙ СССР,
ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ И США, СОСТОЯВШЕЙСЯ В МОСКВЕ
С 29 СЕНТЯБРЯ ПО 1 ОКТЯБРЯ 1941 ГОДА.

Конференция представителей трех держав - СССР, Великобритании и США, собравшаяся в Москве 29 сентября 1941 года и заседавшая по 1 октября, на основании заявлений, сделанных означенными представителями, и изучения представленных материалов, приняла к единодушному решению о снабжении Советского Союза Великобританией и Соединенными Штатами Америки, каковое снабжение будет разрешено к поставке в производственных центрах Великобритании и США в период, начиная с октября 1941 года до конца июня 1942 года. Великобритания и США окажут помощь в транспортировке материалов в СССР и помогут в их доставке. Список предметов снабжения следующий:

	<u>Заявка СССР</u>	<u>Удовлетворение</u>
1. <u>Самолеты</u>	-По 400 штук в месяц, из них 300 штук бомбардировщиков ближнего действия и 100 штук истребителей.	По 400 самолетов в месяц, из них 100 бомбардировщиков и 300 истребителей. В этом числе из Великобритании - по 200 истребителей в месяц и из США - по 100 истребителей и по 100 бомбардировщиков в месяц.
2. <u>Танки</u> (пушечные)	-По 1.100 штук в месяц, малых или средних, или тех и других в любой пропорции.	По 500 танков в месяц, из них не более 50% малых. Сверх того, будут поставляться из Великобритании танкетки (с пулеметами) по 200 штук в месяц, а в дальнейшем и больше.
3. <u>Зенитные пушки</u> 37 мм или выше (45 мм, 75 мм, 90 мм) с боеприпасом.	-По 300 штук в месяц.	152 зенитные пушки 90 мм в течение 9 месяцев с боеприпасом из США.
4. <u>Противотанковые орудия</u> 37 мм или выше до 60 мм с боеприпасом.	-По 300 штук в месяц.	756 орудий 37 мм до истечения 9 месяцев из США и 500 2-х фунтовых (около 40 мм) орудий с 1.000 снарядов на пушку в течение 9 месяцев из Великобритании, а всего 1.256 орудий.

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| 5. <u>Противотанковые</u>
<u>ружья от 12 мм</u>
<u>до 19 мм с бое-</u>
<u>припасом.</u> | -По 2.000 штук в месяц. | 14 мм по 200 штук в месяц
с 200 патронами на ружье.
После конца настоящего года
количество будет увеличено
до 250 ружей в месяц, а с
марта месяца 1942 г. до 300
ружей в месяц, с еще большим
увеличением в дальнейшем ко-
личества ружей и патронов из
Великобритании. |
| 6. <u>Разведывательные</u>
<u>автомобили.</u> | -По 2.000 штук в месяц и
<u>грузовики (3 тонны, 2 и</u>
<u>1 1/2 тн.) по 10.000 штук</u>
<u>в месяц.</u> | 5.000 штук в течение ближай-
ших 9 месяцев из США.
Г-н Гарриман предполагает
выяснить возможность увеличе-
ния этого количества разведы-
вательных автомобилей, а так-
же определить цифру поставок
грузовиков. |
| 7. <u>Полевые телефонные</u>
<u>аппараты</u> | -с фоноиндукторным вы-
зовом -по 6.000 шт. в
месяц; без источника
питания -по 6.000 штук
в месяц. | } Вопрос о поставке этих пред-
метов будет выяснен в Вашин-
гтоне, причем, однако, уже
теперь имеются шансы на неко-
торые поставки их. |
| 8. <u>Полевой телефон-</u>
<u>ный провод (семи-</u>
<u>жильный)</u> | -По 100.000 километров
в месяц. | |
| 9. <u>Полвоинный теле-</u>
<u>графный кабель</u>
<u>(гуттаперчевый)</u> | -По 50 километров в
месяц. | |
| 10. <u>Морской кабель</u> | -По 100 километров в
месяц. | |
| 11. <u>А л у м и н и й</u> | -По 4.000 тонн в месяц
(не считая 5.000 тн.
отгруженных в сентябре)
и <u>дуралюминевый прокат</u>
по 500 тонн в месяц. | Сверх находящихся уже в пути
5.000 тонн, будет поставлять-
ся по 2.000 тонн в месяц из
Канады в течение 9 месяцев.
Кроме того, г-н Гарриман
выяснит возможность поставки
из США по 2.000 тонн алюми-
ния и по 500 тонн дуралюми-
ниевого проката в месяц. |
| 12. <u>О л о в о</u> | -По 1.500 тонн в месяц. | По 1.500 тонн в месяц из
Великобритании. |
| 13. <u>С в и н ц</u> | -По 7.000 тонн в месяц. | По 7.000 тонн в месяц из
Великобритании. |
| 14. <u>Н и к е л ь</u> | -По 800 тонн в месяц. | Вопрос снабжения этим ме-
таллом будет немедленно
изучен в Великобритании
и США. |

3.

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| 15. <u>Модуль</u> | -По 300 тонн в месяц. | По 300 тонн в месяц из США. |
| 16. <u>Кобальт</u> | -По 10 тонн в месяц. | По 10 тонн в месяц из Великобритании. |
| 17. <u>Мель электролитная</u> | -По 3.000 тонн в месяц. | По 3.000 тонн в месяц из Великобритании. |
| 18. <u>Латунный прокат</u> | -По 5.000 тонн в месяц. | Часть будет доставлена из США, а остальное будет принято во внимание с целью осуществления по возможности этого снабжения. |
| 19. <u>Магнитные сплавы</u> | -По 300 тонн в месяц. | В Лондоне и Вашингтоне будет выяснено количество возможных поставок. |
| 20. <u>Литий электролитный</u> | -По 1.500 тонн в месяц. | Великобритания гарантирует поставку по 1.500 тонн в месяц, выражая надежду, что половина этого количества будет поставляться из США, не связывая, однако, американское правительство. |
| 21. <u>Биметалл</u> | -По 3.000 тонн в месяц. | Великобритания и США изучат возможности поставки этого металла. |
| 22. <u>Трубы и другие изделия из меди</u> | -По 300 тонн в месяц. | Г-н Гарриман будет рекомендовать поставку этих материалов. |
| 23. <u>Ферросилиций</u> | -По 7.000 тонн в месяц. | } Размеры поставки будут изучены в Великобритании и в США. |
| 24. <u>Феррохром</u> | -По 2.000 тонн в месяц. | |
| 25. <u>Броневые листы для танков</u> | -По 10.000 тонн в месяц. | 1.000 тонн в месяц из США. Возможность увеличения поставок будет выяснена в Вашингтоне. |
| 26. <u>Твердые сплавы и режущий инструмент</u> | -На сумму по 500.000 долларов в месяц. | Размеры поставок будут изучены в Великобритании и в США. |
| 27. <u>Серебрянка</u> | -По 50 тонн в месяц. | Предложение будет изучено, возможно, что поставки будут осуществлены. |
| 28. <u>Быстрорежущая сталь</u> | -По 300 тонн в месяц. | } Поставка этих предметов будет принята во внимание по получении спецификаций. |
| 29. <u>Сталь инструментальная (углеродистая и легированная)</u> | -По 1.500 тонн в месяц. | |
| 30. <u>Сталь калиброванная (углеродистая и легированная)</u> | -По 13.000 тонн в месяц. | |

4.

31. <u>Сталь горяче-катаная</u> (углеродистая и легированная)	-По 7.000 тонн в месяц	} Вопрос будет подвергнут изучению в Великобритании и в США.
32. <u>Стальные заготовки</u> хромо-кремне-марганцевые	-По 8.000 тонн в месяц	
33. <u>Стальная лента</u> холодно-катанная	-По 8.000 тонн в месяц	} Вопрос об этих предметах был изучен Американской Делегацией, которая предлагает возможным удовлетворение советских заявок. Ответ может быть дан только после изучения вопроса в США.
34. <u>Стальной лист</u> холодно-катанный	-По 8.000 тонн в месяц	
35. <u>Валая кесть</u>	-По 4.000 тонн в месяц	
36. <u>Стальная проволока</u> по спецификации	-По 7.000 тонн в месяц	
37. <u>Стальной трос</u>	-По 1.200 тонн в месяц	} 80 тонн уже поставляется из США. Именная заявка на 70 тонн в месяц будет удовлетворена по возможности из США.
38. <u>Стальные трубы</u> легированные	-По 300 тонн в месяц	
39. <u>Проволока из нержавеющей стали</u>	-По 60 тонн в месяц	
40. <u>Проволока никромовая</u>	-По 70 тонн в месяц.	} Предполагается, что это количество может быть доставлено из США.
41. <u>Проволока кобальтовая</u>	-По 4.000 тонн в месяц.	
42. <u>Толудол</u>	-По 4.000 тонн в месяц.	1.250 тонн в месяц будут поставляться из США, начиная с ноября с.г. Будет изучена возможность увеличения этих поставок. Кроме того, возможно скорее будут отправлены 10.000 тонн Тиг, при чем месячное количество будет сообщено в скором времени из Вашингтона.

5.

43. Порох <u>нитрогли- церияновыи</u>	-По 3.000 тонн в месяц	} Вопрос должен быть изучен соответствующими инстанциями в Лондоне и в Вашингтоне.
44. <u>Фенол</u>	-По 1.500 тонн в месяц	
45. <u>Нейтропродукты</u> (авиабензины, компоненты авиабензинов, масла и смазки, авиобензины и газойль) по спецификации.	-По 20.000 тонн в месяц.	США всегда будут готовы получать предложения о поддержании необходимых запасов в СССР.
46. <u>Этилен-гликоль</u>	-По 120 тонн в месяц.	Вопрос об удовлетворении этой заявки будет изучен в Вашингтоне.
47. <u>Промыслии натр</u>	-По 100 тонн в месяц.	Ввиду отсутствия информации, вопрос должен быть изучен в США.
48. <u>Фосфор</u>	-По 100 тонн в месяц.	Будет доставлено из США.
49. <u>Дибутылдталаат</u>	-По 300 тонн в месяц	} Вопрос будет изучен в Лондоне и Вашингтоне.
50. <u>Диметиланилин</u>	-По 300 тонн в месяц	
51. <u>Дибиниламин</u>	-По 300 тонн в месяц	
52. <u>Коллоксилин нитролаковий</u>	-По 300 тонн в месяц	
53. <u>Металлорежущие станки по спецификации</u>	-По 1.200 штук в месяц	} Признается желательным удовлетворить советские заявки, но не могут быть гарантированы те или иные типы или классификации. Все станки, какие могут быть доставлены, будут поставляться СССР из Великобритании и США.
54. <u>Электропечи</u>	-По 50 штук в месяц	
55. <u>Кузнечно-прессовое оборудование по спецификации</u>	-На сумму по 4 млн. долларов в месяц.	
56. <u>Разное промышленное оборудование</u>	-На сумму по 3 млн. долларов в месяц.	
57. <u>Алмази</u>	-На сумму по 150.000 долларов в месяц.	Будут поставляться из Великобритании.
58. <u>Абразивы</u>	-На сумму по 300.000 долларов в месяц.	Нет сомнений в возможности снабжения этими предметами, но необходимо выяснение вопроса в США.

6.

59. Графитированные электроны -По 400 тонн в месяц. Будут поставлены из США.
60. Графит тигельный (цейлонский) -По 100 тонн в месяц. Некоторое количество может быть доставлено из Великобритании и после выяснения точное количество будет сообщено Москве.
61. Каучук -По 6.000 тонн в месяц
62. Джут -По 4.000 тонн в месяц
63. Шеллак -По 300 тонн в месяц
64. Кожа полочная -По 1.500 тонн в месяц. США разрешили уже к вывозу 3.000 тонн. Может быть разрешено и больше после рассмотрения в Вашингтоне.
65. Шерсть - 2.000 тонн в месяц. Будет разрешена к вывозу из Великобритании.
66. Армейские ботинки -По 400.000 пар в месяц.
67. Армейское сукно -По 1.200.000 метров в месяц.
68. Пшеница -По 200.000 тонн в месяц. Можно достать в Канаде, где имеются большие запасы.
69. Сахар -По 70.000 тонн в месяц. Большие количества имеются в Филиппинах и в Голландской Индии.
70. Какао-бобы -По 1.500 тонн в месяц. Поставки будут из Великобритании.
71. Заявка по военно-морскому флоту. (согласно приложения) будет рассмотрена в Лондоне и Вашингтоне.

7.

72. Заявка по медицинскому снабжению (согласно приложения) будет рассмотрена в Лондоне и Вашингтоне. Американский Красный Крест уже дал согласие на поставку некоторых материалов.

Заявка Великобритании на товары из СССР (согласно приложения) будет рассмотрена в Москве.

В случае изменений в военном положении и перенесения тяжести обороны на другие театры военных действий, заинтересованные три государства посоветуются между собой и решат относительно внесения необходимых поправок в настоящее Соглашение.

Москва, 7 октября 1941 года.

Венглия

Председатель Делегации
Великобритании

Председатель Делегации
СССР

В. Молотов

W. R. Harrison

Председатель Делегации
США



Приложение № 1.ПРОГРАММА ЗАЯВОК ВОЕННО-МОРСКОГО ФЛОТАначиная с октября 1941 года до конца июня 1942 года.

1. Военно-морские корабли.
 - а) Миноносцы
до конца 1941 года - 8 шт.
 - б) Антимагнитные тральщики
до конца 1941 года - 9 шт.
2. Военно-морское вооружение.
 - а) 130 мм. 55 калибров тела ору-
дий с затворами и запасными
частями (Диккерс)
до конца 1941 года - 150 шт.
 - б) 127мм. универсальная установ-
ка с полным комплектом запасных
частей и принадлежностей, запас-
ными свободными трубами и ком-
плектом боезапаса
до конца 1941 года - 100 шт.
в 1-м полуг.1942 г. - 200 шт.

Всего: - 300 шт.

 - в) 25-37мм. морские зенитные аз-
томаты с запасными стволами, с
запчастями и принадлежностями,
комплексом боезапаса
до конца 1941 года - 500 шт.
в 1-м полуг.1942 г. - 1000 шт.

Всего: - 1500 шт.

 - г) 12,7 - 14 мм. зенитные пуле-
меты на корабельном станке с
запчастями и комплектом бое-
запаса
до конца 1941 года - 1000 шт.
в 1-м полуг.1942 г. - 2000 шт.

Всего: - 3000 шт.
3. Дизели и моторы судовые, комплектно с приборами.
 - а) мощность 1.100 - 1.800 л.с.
600 оборотов в минуту
в 1-м полуг.1942 г. - 150 шт.

2.

б) мощность 150-210 л.с. 450 оборотов в минуту в 1-м полуг.1942 г.	-	40 шт.
в) запасные части к дизелям "Рустон" мощностью 75 л.с. до конца 1941 г.	-	80 компл.
г) запасные части к дизелям "Рустон" мощностью 48 л.с. до конца 1941 года	-	80 компл.
д) бензиновые или дизельные мор- ские моторы со всеми агрега- тами мощн.1000-1200 л.с.2000 оборотов в минуту в 1-м полуг.1942 г.	-	300 шт.
е) дизель-генераторы постоянного тока:		
220 вольт 18-20 квт. 800 оборотов в минуту в 1-м полуг.1942 г.	-	100 шт.
115 вольт 50 квт. 600-700 оборотов в минуту в 1-м полуг.1942 г.	-	50 шт.
4. <u>Корабельные приборы "Аадикс".</u>		
до конца 1941 года	-	150 шт.

Приложение № 2.

ПРОГРАММА ЗАЯВОК НА МЕДИЦИНСКИЕ
ИНСТРУМЕНТЫ, МЕДИКАМЕНТЫ И ХИМИКАТЫ

НАЧИНАЯ С ОКТЯБРЯ 1941 ГОДА ДО КОНЦА ЯНВАРЯ 1942 ГОДА

1. Пинцеты анатомические	250.000 штук
2. Пинцеты хирургические	200.000 "
3. Пинцеты Кохера разм. 5½"	200.000 "
4. Пинцеты Пеана разм. 5½"	200.000 "
5. Шприцы Рекорд в 2,0 с 2 иглами	200.000 "
6. " Рекорд в 5,0 с 2 иглами	50.000 "
7. " Рекорд в 10,0 с 2 иглами	200.000 "
8. " Рекорд в 20,0 с 2 иглами	50.000 "
9. Иглы с канюлей Рекорд № 28 разм. 0,7х35мм.	5.000.000 "
10. Тоже № 26 разм. 0,8х35мм	3.000.000 "
11. Тоже № 23 разм. 0,9х40мм	1.000.000 "
12. Тоже № 16 разм. 1,2х50мм	1.000.000 "
13. Иглы для переливания крови	150.000 "
14. Ножницы Штудля для снятия гипсовых повязок	25.000 "
15. Радорасширители Госе	5.000 "
16. Крочки Дуайена эритче	10.000 "
17. Крочки фольювала 4-х зуб. острие	15.000 "
18. Дрели для проведения спиц	5.000 "
19. Автоклавы 11,5/8х21" с 2-мя компл. бикс и лампы для нагрева	1.000 "
20. Электромагнит глазной типа Млингер	50 "
21. Рентген-аппараты переносные	100 "
22. Экраны просвечивающие 30х40см.	1.000 "

2.

23. Пинцеты ушные	5.000 шт.
24. Клемаи Бакхауза	20.000 "
25. Скальпели оршинские № 1	100.000 "
26. " " № 3	100.000 "
27. Ножницы ампутационные	20.000 "
28. Ножницы Купера	100.000 "
29. " Листера	25.000 "
30. " прямые тупоконечные	100.000 "
31. Иглы для спинномозгов. Пункции	20.000 "
32. Иглодержатели Матье	25.000 "
33. " Мейо-Гегара	25.000 "
34. Крочки Фарабефа	25.000 "
35. Пилы Зигеля	30.000 "
36. Распаторы Дуайена лезвие	5.000 "
37. " Фарабефа изогнутые	15.000 "
38. Шпиль Фарабефа	5.000 "
39. " Дальгрена	5.000 "
40. Стерилизаторы	50.000 "
41. Трубки трахеотомические № 2	5.000 "
42. " " № 4	10.000 "
43. " " № 6	5.000 "
44. Кусачки Вайтинга изогнутые	5.000 "
45. Коловорот Дуайена	3.000 "
46. Пилы ампутационные	15.000 "
47. Коричанги изогнутые	30.000 "
48. Наборы пробных оптических стекол	300 "
49. Грелки резиновые	250.000 "
50. Пузыри для льда	150.000 "
51. Жгуты кровоостанавлив.	100.000 "
52. Шери Ричардсона	150.000 "
53. Лейкопластырь ассортимент.	500.000 пакетов.

3.

54. Перчатки хирургические	500.000 пар
55. " анатомические	100.000 "
56. Подкладная клеенка	1 млн.метров
57. Трубка резиновая для пере- ливания крови 5 мн	3 тн.
58. Кокаин солянокислый	1 тн.
59. Новокаин	3 тн.
60. Ксероформ	5 тн.
61. Ланолин	100 тн.
62. Хлорамин	100 тн.
63. Сульфаниридин	30 тн.
64. Сульфаниламид	65 тн.
65. Пиримидон	30 тн.
66. Диминал	5 тн.
67. Кофеин	35 тн.
68. Корень инекакуани	3 тн.
69. Теобромин	20 тн.
70. Бензойная кислота	10 тн.
71. Бромистый натр	30 тн.
72. " калий	30 тн.
73. Агар. Агар.	100 тн.
74. Пептон	3 тн.
75. Э м е т и н	25 кгр.
76. Маннит	500 "
77. Мальтоза	,500 "
78. Лактоза	500 "
79. Пилокарпин	30 "
80. Кардивалол (метразол)	500 "
81. Дамус сухой	150 "
82. Кедровое масло	150 кгр.
83. Строфантин	750.000 ампул.

Приложение № 3.

ПОСТАВКИ, КОТОРЫЕ ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИЯ ЖЕЛАЕТ
ПОЛУЧИТЬ ОТ СОВЕТСКОГО СОЮЗА.

Наименование товара.	Испрашиваемое количество.	Испрашиваемые сроки поставки.
Архангельский деготь	50 тонн	В пределах 6-8 месяцев.
Перхлорат аммония	50 тонн	В пределах 6-8 месяцев.
Анилин или нитробензин	3.000 тонн	6 месячных поставок, с ноября по апрель.
Хлорат бария	50 тонн	Т о ж е.
Пчелиный воск	100 тонн	На 12 месяцев.
Листья беладонны	до 10 тонн	Несрочно.
Корень беладонны	до 10 тонн	Несрочно.
.....ла	200 тонн	На 12 месяцев.
Хромовая руда	10.000 тонн	Срочно.
Китайский воск.....	5 тонн	На 12 месяцев.
Диметиланилин	200 тонн	6-8 месяцев.
Э ф е д р а	10 тонн	6-8 месяцев.
Б е л е н а	до 5 тонн	
Конский волос	300 тонн	
Солончатый корень	до 500 тонн	
Ликоподий	4 тонны	6-8 месяцев.
Магnezит	15.000 тонн	6-8 месяцев. 5.000 тонн уже отгружены. Великобритания возвратит Советскому Союзу добычу магния из поставленных Советским Союзом количеств.
Хлористый калий	5.000 тонн	К декабрю.
Кориандровое масло.....	до 500 кгр.	Несрочно.
Фенхельное масло	до 500 кгр.	Несрочно.
Сосновая смола	до 1.000 тонн	Срочно.
Платина	1.400 кгр.	Срочно. 700 кгр. немедленно.
Перхлорат калия	50 тонн	6-8 месяцев.
Винтовки и боеприпасы	250.000 плюс 1.000 патронов для каждой.	Срочно.
Сантонин	1 тонна	6-8 месяцев.
Мелк и отходы шелка....	500.000 англо-фунтов.	К концу 1941 года.
Л е с	В количествах, определенных в зависимости от наличного тоннажа.	
Консервированная лососина		

Confidential Protocol
of the Conference of the Representatives of the U.S.S.R.
Great Britain and the U.S.A. which took place in Moscow
from September 29th till October 1st, 1941.

The Conference of the representatives of three powers - the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the U.S.A. which met in Moscow on September 29th, 1941 and was held till October 1st, 1941 has, on the basis of the statements made by the said representatives and of the investigation of submitted data, arrived at the unanimous decision concerning the provision of supplies, which will be made available at British and U.S.A. centres of production, for the Soviet Union by Great Britain and the United States of America within the period, beginning from October 1941 till the end of June 1942. Great Britain and the U.S.A. will give aid to the transportation of these materials to the Soviet Union and will help with the delivery.

The list is as follows:-

	<u>Engaged for by the</u> <u>U.S.S.R.</u>	<u>Satisfied.</u>
1. <u>Aeronautics.</u>	400 planes monthly, of which 300 bombers of short distance action and 100 fighters.	400 planes monthly of which 100 bombers and 300 fighters. From Great Britain - 200 fighters monthly and from the U.S.A. 100 fighters and 100 bombers monthly.
2. <u>Tanks.</u> (gun-type)	1,100 monthly, small or medium, or both in any proportion.	500 tanks monthly, of which small tanks not exceeding 50%. In addition to that, from Great Britain will be supplied per month 200 tankettes (with machine-guns) after that the number will be increased.

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<u>Inquired for by the</u> <u>U.S.S.R.</u>	<u>Satisfied.</u>
70. <u>Cocoa Beans.</u> 1,500 tons monthly.	Supplies will be from Great Britain.
71. The enquiry for the Navy (in accordance with the Annex) will be considered in London and Washington.	
72. The enquiry for Medical Supply (in accordance with the Annex) will be considered in London and Washington. The American Red Cross has already agreed to give some of the items.	

The enquiry of Great Britain for supplies from the U.S.S.R. (in accordance with the Annex) will be considered in Moscow.


In the event of the war situation changing and the burden of defence being transferred to other theatres of war it will be necessary for the 3 countries concerned to consult together, and to decide what adjustment of the present arrangement is necessary.

Moscow, October 1st 1941.

Chairman of the Delegation
of the U.S.S.R.

Chairman of the Delegation
of Great Britain

Chairman of the Delegation
of the U.S.A.



**Personal message from Winston Churchill to Joseph Stalin
on the dispatch of convoys to the USSR. October 6, 1941**

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Russian translation.

English original.

“I am glad to learn from Lord Beaverbrook of the success of the Tripartite Conference at Moscow. ‘Bis dat qui cito dat.’ We intend to run a continuous cycle of convoys leaving every ten days. The following are on their way and arrive at Archangel on October 12th.”

Вручено г. Кришисом г. Мамозову 17/11/42



(Перевод без Ручательства)

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ЛИЧНОЕ ПОСЛАНИЕ
ОТ Г-НА ЧЕРЧИЛЛА Г-НУ СТАЛИНУ

Извещение, которое я получил от лорда Бивербрук об успехе тройственной конференции, состоявшейся в Москве, доставило мне большое удовольствие. "Bis dat qui cito dat" — тот дает вдвое, кто быстро дает. Мы надеемся проводить беспрестанный цикл конвоев, которые будут отправляться с промежутками в десять дней. Следующие грузы находятся уже в пути и придут в Архангельск двенадцатого Октября: двадцать тяжелых танков, сто девяносто три истребителя (до-октябрьской квоты). Следующие грузы отправляются 12-го Октября и намечены к доставке двадцать девятого: сто сорок тяжелых танков, сто самолетов типа Харрикэн, двести тележек пулеметов типа Брен, двести противотанковых винтовок с патронами, пятьдесят двух-фунтовых орудий со снарядами. Следующие отправляются двадцать второго: двести истребителей, сто двадцать тяжелых танков. Из этого следует что вся октябрьская квота самолетов и двести восемьдесят танков придут в Россию к шестому ^{тележек} ноября. Октябрьская квота/пулеметов типа Брен, противотанковых винтовок и двух-фунтовых орудий для танков придут все в Октябре. Двадцать танков были погружены для транспорта через Персию и пятнадцать будут немедленно отправлены из Канады через Владивосток.

Таким образом общее число отправленных танков будет соответствовать на трехсот пятнадцати, значит

девятнадцать

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девятнадцать меньше нашей полной квоты. Это количество будет пополнено в Ноябре. Вышеупомянутая программа не включает снабжений из Соединенных Штатов.

При организации этого регулярного цикла конвоев мы рассчитываем что Архангельск будет принимать главную часть доставок. Я предполагаю что эта часть работы уже производится.

Лучшие пожелания.

6-го Октября 1941 г.

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Personal Message from Mr Churchill to Monsieur Stalin.

I am glad to learn from Lord Beaverbrook of the success of the Tripartite Conference at Moscow. "Bis dat qui cito dat". We intend to run a continuous cycle of convoys leaving every ten days. The following are on their way and arrive at Archangel on October 12th : 20 heavy tanks, 193 fighters (pre-October quota). The following will sail on October 12th arriving October 29th : 140 heavy tanks, 100 Hurricanes, 200 Bren carriers, 200 anti-tank rifles and ammunition, 50 2-pounder guns and ammunition. The following will sail on October 22nd : 200 fighters, 120 heavy tanks. The above shows that the total October quota of aircraft and 280 tanks will arrive in Russia by November 6th. The October quota of Bren carriers, anti-tank rifles and 2-pounder tank guns will all arrive in October. 20 tanks have been shipped to go via Persia and 15 are about to be shipped from Canada via Vladivostok. Total of tanks shipped will therefore be 315 which is 19 short of our full quota. This number will be made up in November. Above programme does not take into account goods from the United States.

In arranging this regular cycle of convoys we are counting on Archangel to handle the main bulk of deliveries. I presume this part of the job is in hand.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
MOSCOW:
October 7th, 1941.

Cipher telegram from Vyacheslav Molotov to Soviet ambassador to the USA with a message from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Joseph Stalin on the extension of a loan to the USSR and the reply message from Joseph Stalin to Franklin D. Roosevelt. November 5, 1941

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

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СТРОГО СЕКРЕТНО
Служба коней воспримает.

ХОЛОДНАЯ ШКОРТЕЛЕГРАММА

Вид: Е 1 .. 7. СТРАШУ
 " Е 2 .. 7. МОЛОТОВУ
 " Е 3 .. 10-А СТАЛИН
 " Е 4
 " Е 5

В ВАШИНГТОН М. СССР .. отпр. 8-20 5/11 - 1741г. экз. Е
 тов. ГРОМКО.

Немедленно.

В колумби Етейнгарт передал тов. Вышинокому следующий 8д-мемуар:

"В личном послании г-ну Сталину Президент Рузвельт заявляет:

1. что он видел Протокол Конференции Трех Держав в Уоскве и одобрил оценки Американской Миссии данные, изложенные в нем;
2. что он одобрил все списки военного снаряжения и вооружения и отдал распоряжение, чтобы насколько возможно и как можно скорее были предоставлены сырьевые материалы;
3. что он дал распоряжение начать поставки немедленно и продолжать производить их в возможно наибольшем объеме;
4. чтобы избежать финансовых затруднений, он отдал распоряжение о немедленном проведении мероприятий, при которых поставки могут производиться согласно Закону о даче вооружения взаими как в аренду на сумму 1 миллиарда долларов;
5. он предлагает, с одобрения Советского Правительства, что Соединенные Штаты не взимают процентов с задолженности, которая может быть сделана Советским Правительством, и которая вытекает из этих поставок, и что платежи по задолженности, которая может быть сделана Советским Правительством, должны начаться только спустя 5 лет после окончания войны, и что платежи будут производиться в течение 10 лет после истечения этого пятилетнего периода.
6. Президент надеется, что Советское Правительство предпримет специальные усилия, чтобы продать Соединенным Штатам те товары и сырье которые имеются в распоряжении, и в которых могут нуждаться Соединенные Штаты. Выручка по поставкам Соединенным Штатам зачисляется на счет

~~ОТЛИЧНО СЕКРЕТНО~~
Сигнал - код не воспроизводится.

ПОЛОЖИВАЯ ТЕЛЕГРАМА

Кому: И I
 " И II
 " И III
 " И IV
 " И V

№ 10488.... отпр. 10 авг. 1945 г.

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Правительства Советского Союза;

7. Президент пользуется случаем, чтобы выразить Советскому Правительству благодарность за быстроту, с которой г-н Сталин и его соратники провели Конференцию Трех Держав в Москве, и заверяет его, что постановления этой Конференции будут максимально выполнены;

8. Президент выражает надежду, что г-н Сталин не наведет восты в контакт непосредственно с ним, если этого потребуют обстоятельства".

В своем препроводительном письме Штейнгардт заявляет, что в его Вд-мемуаре передается суть послания Рузвельта, а устно он сказал тов. Вышинскому, что точный текст послания он будто бы не может передать, так как это раскрывало бы американский код.

Вам поручается попросить срочный прием у Рузвельта и сообщить ему, что Штейнгардту будет передан в Куэбэке 5 ноября посланный из Москвы ответ тов. Сталина на послание Рузвельта, и что текст этого ответа Вами получен для передачи его содержания Рузвельту в Вашингтоне.

Вот точный текст этого ответа тов. Сталина, подписанный 4 ноября:

"Господин Президент,

Хотя текст Вашего послания я еще не получил, Посол Соединенных Штатов Америки г-н Штейнгардт передал мне через г-на Вышинского 2 ноября с.г. напечатанную записку с вложенным содержанием Вашего послания на мое имя.

В связи с этим позвольте мне прежде всего выразить полное согласие с Вашей оценкой работ Конференции Трех Держав в Москве, что следует отнести в наибольшей мере к заслугам г-на Гарримана, а также

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ОТРИЦАТЕЛЬНО
Секция связи с союзниками.

МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ ТЕЛЕГРАММА

Кому: М I
 " " II
 " " III
 " " IV
 " " V

№ 10428 отп. 1945 г. 28.02.45

- 2 -

г-ня Биннербука, сделавши все возможное для успешного завершения работ Конференции в кратчайший срок. За Ваше заявление о том, что постановления Конференции будут максимально выполнены, Советское Правительство выражает свою глубокую признательность.

Ваше решение, г-н Президент, о том, чтобы предоставить Советскому Союзу беспроцентный заем на сумму в 1 миллиард долларов на оплату поставок вооружения и сырьевых материалов, Советскому Союзу, Советское Правительство принимает с искренней благодарностью, как исключительно серьезную поддержку Советского Союза в его громадной и трудной борьбе с нашим общим врагом, с кровавым гитлеризмом.

По поручению Правительства СССР я выражаю полное согласие с изложенными Вами условиями предоставления Советскому Союзу этого займа, платежи по которому должны начаться спустя 5 лет после окончания войны и будут прекращаться в течение 10 лет после истечения этого пятилетнего периода.

Правительство СССР готово сделать все необходимое, чтобы поставить Соединенным Штатам Америки те товары и сырье, которые имеются в его распоряжении, и в которых могут нуждаться Соединенные Штаты.

Что касается выраженного Вами, г-н Президент, положения, чтобы между Вами и мной было бы немедленно установлен личный непосредственный контакт, если этого потребуют обстоятельства, то я с удовольствием присоединюсь к этому Вашему пожеланию и готов, со своей стороны, сделать все возможное для осуществления этого.

С искренним уважением - И. СТАЛИН".

Етсфигардту будет вручен также английский перевод ответа тов. Сталина. Поэтому, чтобы избежать расхождений перевода, Вы должны передать только копии русского текста, но не передавать английского текста.

Результаты беседы с Рузвельтом телеграфите.


Молотов.

В-квб. хс Инфротдел. Получение подтвердите. Бляков. Верно: 

пол. 5/ЖИ 0-40 *1945* *Кем. в 7/26/45*

President Franklin D. Roosevelt signing the Declaration of War against Japan. December 8, 1941

National Archives and Records Administration, USA



Source: <http://alliance.rusarchives.ru/en/nachalo-vtoroy-mirovoy-voiny-rozhdenie-antigitlerovskoy-koalicii>

Cipher telegram from Vyacheslav Molotov in Washington on his conversation with Franklin D. Roosevelt on opening a second front. May 30, 1942

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

“...I spoke of the need to draw away at least 40 German divisions to the western front in summer and autumn of this year.

Roosevelt and Marshall replied that, while they wanted very much to do so, ships were still lacking for dislocating troops to France. They did not say anything more specific.”

2037 № 3254/мин 55

ШИФРТЕЛЕГРАММА **СТРОГО СЕКРЕТНО**
СЛУЖБЕ КОММУНИКАЦИОННОЙ

№ 1	Огальскому	№ 2	Налоговому
№ 3	Огальскому	№ 4	Валютам
№ 5	Огальскому	№ 6	Деканскому
№ 7	Молотову	№ 8	10-й бригаде
№ 9	Берия	№ 10	

ВАШИНГТОН 4859 7 20 31.У 42 3

4860 01.38.39 **ВНЕ ОПРЕДЕЛ.**

29 мая вечером состоялся обед у Рузвельта с участием только Гопенса и Лежендилов. После обеда была довольно длительная, но малосодержательная беседа.

10 мая состоялась основная беседа о втором фронте в том же составе плюс генерал Маршалл и адмирал Вилт. Я напомнил часть моего прихода, подчеркнул, что в вопросе о войне с Германией разница между 42 и 43 годами может получиться не в пользу 43 года. Если СССР не поддержит напора гитлеровских войск в 1942 году, то в 1943 году Гитлер будет гораздо сильнее чем ныне, а советская армия не сможет справиться на своем фронте почти все это войско, как это имеет место теперь. И здесь я поставил вопрос о возможности летом и осенью этого года оттянуть на западный фронт хотя бы 40 германских дивизий.

В ответ на это Рузвельт и Маршалл заявили, что хотели бы это сделать, но даже дело упирается в недостатке судов для переброски войск во Францию. Ничего конкретного они мне не сказали.

Дни /Рузвельт/ устроил в честь меня ужасный банкет.

Нам сейчас в Вашингтон можно считать законченной. Теперь дело за проверкой истинности сообщения, что потребует три-четыре дня. Использую это время, чтобы побывать в Нью-Йорке. Одно билете вентре сообщу.

30.У.42 г. МОЛотов.

9-011-АД
опн.31.У.9-45
инп.Абразин.


Верно: *[подпись]*

На основании 61-й статьи 1 закона о печати отменяется, распространяется только на лиц, указанных в № 4 статьи 61-1

Instructions from Joseph Stalin to Vyacheslav Molotov regarding his talks with Franklin D. Roosevelt on deliveries to the USSR. May 31, 1942

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation


- “1) Organisation of a monthly caravan of ships from US ports directly to Arkhangelsk with a convoy by the US Navy.
 2) Monthly aerial deliveries of 50 B-25 bombers through Basra or Teheran.
 3) Monthly deliveries of 150 Boston III bombers to Persian Gulf ports where they would be assembled for us.
 4) Monthly deliveries of 3,000 cargo planes to Persian Gulf ports where they would be assembled for us.”



Telephonogram from Joseph Stalin to Vyacheslav Molotov in Washington with instructions to share the Soviet Government's stance on maintaining peace after the war with Franklin D. Roosevelt. June 1, 1942

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

«Roosevelt's ideas about maintaining peace after the war are totally right. There is no doubt that the only way to preserve peace in the future is to create a unified Anglo-American-Soviet military force capable of preventing aggression. It would also be a good idea to include China.»



Cipher telegram from Vyacheslav Molotov in Washington to Joseph Stalin stating that he has presented to Franklin D. Roosevelt the draft second protocol and programme of deliveries to the USSR from England and the USA for the period between July 1, 1942 and June 30, 1943. June 3, 1942

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

“From US and British ports, 3.3 million short tons shall be sent to northern ports and 1.1 million tons to the Persian Gulf, i.e., 4.4 million short tons altogether, instead of the 8 million tons that we requested from the British and the Americans by US estimates... <...>

The US proposes delivering a total amount of 7 million short tons worth 3 billion dollars, including 1.1 million tons of army and navy equipment, arms and munitions worth 2 billion dollars; 1.8 million tons of materials, machine tools and equipment worth 400 million dollars; and 4.3 million tons of food worth 600 million dollars.”

1061 № 3328/1000 88

ШИФРТЕЛЕГРАММА

~~СТРОГО СЕКРЕТНО~~
СЧИТАЕ КОПИИ ВОСПРЕЩАЕТСЯ

Экз. № 1-РАЗМЕТКА	Экз. № 6-т. Маленкову	Экз. № 11-т.
№ 2-т. Сталину	№ 7-т. Вышинскому	№ 12-т.
№ 3-т. Сталину	№ 8-т. Деканову	№ 13-т.
№ 4-т. Молотову	№ 9-т. 10-й Отдел	№ 14-т.
№ 5-т. Берия	№ 10-т.	№ 15-т.

Из ВАШИНГТОНА № 4977 от 8 час 45 мин. 4.VI 1942 г. экз. № 3

4978 сп.50.51. ВНЕ ОЧЕРЕДИ.

31 мая Рузвельт вручил мне проект второго протокола и программы поставок Советскому Союзу со стороны США и Англии на период с 1 июля 1942 г. по 30 июня 1943 г.

Основное содержание протокола следующее:

1. Для отправки из портов США и Англии будет предоставлено 3300000 коротких тонн в северные порты и 1100000 тонн в Персидский залив, то-есть всего 4400000 коротких тонн вместо заявленных нами американцам и англичанам по подсчетам американцев 8 миллионов тонн /Берия обещает срочно произвести свой подсчет наших заявок в тоннаже/.
2. Мы должны выбрать из нашей заявки такие виды вооружения, оборудования и материалов, из числа предлагаемых нам США и Англией, которые укладывались бы в тоннаж 4400000 тонн.
3. Эта программа может частично изменяться в ходе войны.
4. США продлят финансовые соглашения на покрытие расходов по американским поставкам. Финансирование по английским поставкам будет происходить на основе кредитного соглашения от 16 августа 1941 г. по всему снабжению, а по военному снабжению на основе английского Ленд-Лиз, который еще подлежит обсуждению.
5. США предлагают поставки общим количеством в 7 миллионов коротких тонн стоимостью в 3 миллиарда долларов, из них 1100000

200 МЛ. 1-4 Отд. 100

По истечении 48-ми часов с момента получения, телеграмма подлежит возвращению в 10-й Отдел НКВД

ШИФРТЕЛЕГРАММА

СТРОГО СЕКРЕТНО

СНЯТИЕ КОПИИ ВОСПРЕЩАЕТСЯ

Экз. № 1-РАЗМЕТКА	Экз. № 6-т.	Экз. № 11-т.
№ 7-т.	№ 7-т.	№ 12-т.
№ 3-т.	№ 8-т.	№ 13-т.
№ 4-т.	№ 9-т.	№ 14-т.
№ 5-т.	№ 10-т.	№ 15-т.

Из 4978 № 4977 вол. час. мин. 19 г. экз. № 3

- 2 -

тонн военного и военно-морского оборудования, вооружения и боеприпасов стоимостью в 2 миллиарда долларов, 1800000 тонн материалов, станков и оборудования стоимостью в 400 миллионов долларов и 4300000 тонн пищевых продуктов стоимостью в 600 миллионов долларов. Разница между цифрами 7 миллиардов американских грузов и 4,4 миллиардов англо-американских поставок согласно пункта 1 настоящей телеграммы требует выяснения, что будет сделано Беллевым сегодня или завтра.

6. Англичане по проекту должны производить поставки и после 1 июля 1942 г. в масштабах прошлого года московского протокола. /Это не соответствует известному письму Бивербрука на имя Майского, в котором говорилось, что англичане взяли на себя обязательство производить поставки и после 1 июля на 50% больше предыдущего периода, а с 1 января 1943 г. увеличить эти поставки еще на 50 процентов.

Со своей стороны должен добавить следующее: проект протокола только переведен на русский язык и полный его текст сегодня начнем передавать в Москву на рассмотрение. После получения указаний инстанции этот проект должен быть обсужден комиссией Беллева с соответствующими организациями в Вашингтоне - ~~7-го~~ ~~предусмотрено~~ проектом.

90

ШИФРТЕЛЕГРАММА

СТРОГО СЕКРЕТНО
СНЯТИЕ КОПИЙ ВОСПРЕЩАЕТСЯ

Экз. № 1-РАЗМЕТАА	Экз. № 6-т.	Экз. № 11-т.
№ 2-т.	№ 7-т.	№ 12-т.
№ 3-т.	№ 8-т.	№ 13-т.
№ 4-т.	№ 9-т.	№ 14-т.
№ 5-т.	№ 10-т.	№ 15-т.

На **4978** № **4977** пол. час. мин. Цу. т. экз. № **3**

- 2 -

Я не считал возможным заниматься сейчас этим вопросом в Вашингтоне или даже приступить к выяснению совместно с американцами отдельных пока неясных его пунктов.

3.VI.42 г. МОЛОТОВ.

ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ: Подчеркнутое запрошено.

9-экз. ЛС
отп. 4.VI.12-45
вып. Абрамкин.

Верно: 

Лит. 541 1-4 Обр. 100

По истечении 48-ми часов с момента получения, телеграмма подлежит возвращению в Ю-Я Отдел НКВД

Cipher telegram from Vyacheslav Molotov to Soviet ambassador in London Ivan Maisky with an invitation from Joseph Stalin to Winston Churchill to visit the USSR. July 31, 1942

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

“I would greatly appreciate it if you could come to the USSR for the joint consideration of urgent issues of the war against Hitler, whose threat against England, the USA and the USSR is becoming particularly acute today.”

141

Н.К.И.Д. Исход. № 3615
 десятый отдел *П* Получена 23 час. 15 мин. 31. УП. 1942.
 Отправлена 24 час. 00 мин. 31. УП. 1942.

СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО
 Ссылки копии обспрашивается
 Спец. № 903

Шифрованная телеграмма

Кому: ДОНДОН Кому: СВЯЩОСЛ Экз. № 1

Передайте Идену следующий ответ тов. Сталина Черчиллю:
 " Премьеру Черчиллю от премьера Сталина. Совершенно секретно.
 Получил оба Ваши послания от 31 июля.
 Настоящим от имени Советского правительства приглашаю Вас прибыть
 в СССР для встречи с членами правительства.
 Я был бы весьма признателен Вам, если бы Вы смогли прибыть в
 СССР для совместного рассмотрения неотложных вопросов войны против
 Гитлера, угроза со стороны которого в отношении Англии, США и СССР
 теперь достигла особой силы.
 Я думаю, что наиболее подходящим местом нашей встречи была бы
 Москва, откуда мне, членам правительства и руководителям Генштаба
 невозможно отлучиться в настоящий момент напряженной борьбы с нем-
 цами.
 Присутствие начальника Имперского Генерального Штаба было бы
 очень желательным.
 Дату встречи я просил бы Вас определить, как Вам будет удобно
 в зависимости от того, как Вам удастся закончить дела в Каире, за-
 ранее зная, что с моей стороны возражений на счет даты не будет.
 Выражаю Вам признательность за согласие направить очередной кон-
 вой с военными поставками в СССР в начале сентября. Нами, при всей
 трудности отвлечения авиации с фронта, будут приняты все возможные
 меры для усиления воздушной защиты транспор-
 тов и конвой.

1. Тов. Сталину _____
 2. Тов. Молотову _____
 3. Тов. Вышинскому _____
 4. Тов. _____ _____

31 июля 1942 года".
 Исполнение телеграфите.
 МОЛОТОВ.

Отп. 3 экз. ЕМ
 24.00.31.УП.42

Верно Келин № 4394/июль

Cipher telegram from Vyacheslav Molotov to Soviet ambassador in London Ivan Maisky with a message from Joseph Stalin to Winston Churchill. July 23, 1942

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

“In any case, I could hardly imagine that the British government would refuse to deliver military materials to us at a time when the Soviet Union has dire need of military materials due to major tensions on the Soviet-German front...

As to the second issue, i.e., the organisation of a second front in Europe, I'm afraid that it has become unserious.”

133

Н.К.И.Д. Исход. № 3478
 ДЕСЯТЫЙ ОТДЕЛ Подучена 3 час. 50 мин. 23/УП 1942 г.
 Отправлена 5 час. 30 мин. 23/УП 1942 г.

СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО
 Снято копий - испрашивается
 Спец. № 793

Шифрованная телеграмма

Куда ЛОНДОН Кому СОВПОСОД Эск. № 1

Прошу немедленно передать Черчиллю следующий ответ тов. Сталина на последнее послание Черчилля:

"Послание премьер-министра Сталина премьеру Черчиллю."

Получил Ваше послание от 18 июля. Из послания видно, что, во-первых, правительство Великобритании отказывается продолжать снабжение Советского Союза военными материалами по северному пути и, во-вторых, несмотря на известное согласованное Англо-Советское коммюнике о принятии неотложных мер по организации второго фронта в 1942 году, правительство Великобритании откладывает это дело на 1943 год.

Наши военно-морские специалисты считают доводы английских морских специалистов о необходимости прекращения подвоза военных материалов в северные порты СССР несостоятельными. Они убеждены, что при доброй воле и готовности выполнить взятые на себя обязательства, подвоз мог бы осуществляться регулярно с большими потерями для немцев. Приказ Английского адмиралтейства 17-ому конвою покинуть транспорта и вернуться в Англию, а транспортным судам рассыпаться и добираться в одиночку до советских портов без эскорта наши специалисты считают непонятным и необъяснимым. Я, конечно, не считаю,

1. Тов. _____
 2. Тов. _____
 3. Тов. _____
 4. Тов. _____

134

Н.К.И.Д. Исход. № 3478

ДЕСЯТЫЙ ОТДЕЛ Подумана _____ час. _____ мин. _____ 194 г.

СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО
Синий копий посылается

Отправлена _____ час. _____ мин. _____ 194 г. Спец. № _____

Шифрованная телеграмма

Куда _____ Кому _____ Эск. № _____

- 2 -

что регулярный подвоз в северные советские порты возможен без риска и потерь. Но в обстановке войны ни одно большое дело не может быть осуществлено без риска и потерь. Вам, конечно, известно, что Советский Союз несет несравненно более серьезные потери. Во всяком случае, я никак не мог предположить, что правительство Великобритании откажет нам в подвозе военных материалов именно теперь, когда Советский Союз особенно нуждается в подвозе военных материалов в момент серьезного напряжения на советско-германском фронте. Понятно, что подвоз через персидские порты ни в какой мере не окупит той потери, которая будет иметь место при отказе от подвоза северным путем.

Что касается второго вопроса, а именно вопроса об организации второго фронта в Европе, то я боюсь, что этот вопрос начинает принимать несерьезный характер. Исходя из создавшегося положения на советско-германском фронте, я должен заявить самым категорическим образом, что Советское правительство не может примириться с откладыванием организации второго фронта в Европе на 1943 г.

Надеюсь, что Вы не будете в обиде на то, что я счел нужным откровенно и честно высказать свое мнение и мнение моих коллег по

Копии:

1. Тов. _____
2. Тов. _____
3. Тов. _____
4. Тов. _____

135

Н.К.И.Д. Исход. № 3478

ДЕСЯТЫЙ ОТДЕЛ Получена _____ час. _____ мин. _____ 194 г.

Отправлена _____ час. _____ мин. _____ 194 г.

СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО
Служба связи — воспринимается
Спец. № _____

Шифрованная телеграмма

Куда _____ Кому _____ Экз. № _____

- 3 -

вопросам, затронутым в Вашем послании.

И. СТАЛИН".

Исполнение телеграфьте.

В духе этого ответа Вы можете выступить перед депутатами парламента, а также устроить беседу с журналистами.

МОЛОТОВ.

Верно: *[Signature]*

1380
№ 454/100

Копии:

1. Тов. Сталину _____
2. Тов. Молотову _____
3. Тов. в дело. _____
4. Тов. _____

3-экз. м.в.
отп. 23/УП. 42 г.

Source: <http://alliance.rusarchives.ru/en/nachalo-vtoroy-mirovoy-voiny-rozhdenie-antigitlerovskoy-koalicii>

Memorandum from Joseph Stalin to Winston Churchill on opening a second front. August 13, 1942


Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Marks in blue pencil and purple ink by Joseph Stalin.

The memorandum was read aloud during the meeting between Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill in the Kremlin on 13 August 1942.

“...The refusal of the British government to open a second European front in 1942 inflicts a moral blow on all the Soviet people who are expecting the creation of a second front, aggravates the situation of the Red Army on the front lines, and obstructs the plans of the Soviet military leadership. <...>

We therefore believe that one could and should open a second front in Europe in 1942.”



14

- 2 -

положение Англии и всех остальных союзников.

Мне и моим коллегам кажется, что 1942 год представляет наиболее благоприятные условия для создания второго фронта в Европе, так как почти все силы немецких войск и притом лучшие силы отвлечены на восточный фронт, а в Европе оставлено незначительное количество сил и притом худших сил. Неизвестно будет ли представлять 1943 год такие же благоприятные условия для создания второго фронта как 1942 год. Мы считаем поэтому, что именно в 1942 году возможно и следует создать второй фронт в Европе. Но мне к сожалению не удалось убедить в этом господина премьер-министра Великобритании, а г.Гарриман представитель президента США при переговорах в Москве целиком поддержал господина премьер-министра.

W. G. A. M. M.

13 августа 1942г.

In the Kremlin. August 14, 1942

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History



1 – From left to right: British Prime Minister W. Churchill, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR J. Stalin.



9 – From left to right: British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs A. Cadogan, translator V. Pavlov, British Prime Minister W. Churchill, US presidential envoy A. Harriman, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR J. Stalin, and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Molotov.



11 – From left to right: British Prime Minister W. Churchill, US presidential envoy A. Harriman, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR J. Stalin, and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Molotov.


Reciprocal memorandum from Winston Churchill to Joseph Stalin. August 14, 1942

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Russian translation.

English original.

“The best second front in 1942, and the only large-scale operation possible from the Atlantic, is TORCH [code name for the allied debarkation in Northern Africa]. If this can be effected in October, it will give more aid to Russia than any other plan.”



West upon it. In the opinion of all the British Naval, Military and Air authorities the operation could only end in disaster. Even if the lodgment were made, it would not bring a single division back from Russia. It would also be far more a running sore for us than for the enemy, and would use up wastefully and wantonly the key men and the landing craft required for real action in 1945. This is our settled view. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff will go into details with the Russian Commanders to any extent that may be desired.

3. No promise has been broken by Great Britain or the United States. I point to paragraph 5 of my Aide Memoire given to Mr. Molotov on the 10th June, 1942 which distinctly says: "We can, therefore, give no promise." This Aide Memoire followed upon lengthy conversations, in which the very small chance of such a plan being adopted was made abundantly clear. Several of these conversations are on record.

4. However, all the talk about an Anglo-American invasion of France this year has misled the enemy, and


GR 300

has held large air forces and considerable military forces on the French Channel coast. It would be injurious to all common interests, especially Russian interests, if any public controversy arose in which it would be necessary for the British Government to unfold to the nation the crushing argument which they conceive themselves to possess against SLEDGEHAMMER. Widespread discouragement would be caused to the Russian Armies who have been buoyed up on this subject, and the enemy would be free to withdraw further forces from the West. The wisest course is to use SLEDGEHAMMER as a blind for TORCH, and proclaim TORCH, when it begins, as the second front. This is what we ourselves mean to do.

5. We cannot admit that the conversations with Mr. Molotov about the second front, safeguarded as they were by reservations both oral and written, formed any ground for altering the strategic plans of the Russian High Command.

6. We reaffirm our resolve to aid our Russian allies by every practicable means.

W
14.8.42




Source: <http://alliance.rusarchives.ru/en/nachalo-vtoroy-mirovoy-voyny-rozhdenie-antigitlerovskoy-koalicii>

Message from Soviet ambassador to the USA Maksim Litvinov to the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyacheslav Molotov about the Allies' inability to open a second front in Europe. October 13, 1942

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

“The stance of the President on the second front has become more rigid recently. ...In our last conversations, he tried to assume the airs of a man who is firmly convinced that no debarkation is possible at the present time. This is due to the fact that he has become involved in operations in Africa, which currently exclude any operations on the Western European coast. There is no doubt that he is under Churchill's influence in this matter (as in most others).”



143.

честве нового доказательства невозможности высадочных операций. Успешность же плана поглотит на некоторое время значительную часть англо-американских военных, морских и воздушных сил и успокоит общественное мнение. Я полагаю, что мы не должны однако давать за-тихать движению за европейский второй фронт, а наоборот к этому вопросу время от времени вновь возвращаться. Хотел бы знать Ваши соображения по этому поводу.

В отношении снабжения у меня создалось впечатление, что президент хотел бы максимально удовлетворить наши требования и тем компенсировать нас за отсутствие второго фронта. Но и здесь он всецело в руках своих генералов и адмиралов, которые все больше и больше прд'являют требований для удовлетворения якобы собственных американских нужд. Выдвижение идеи создания десятиmillionной армии в обеспечение независимого американского продолжения войны при всяких обстоятельствах должно все больше и больше с'уживать возможность снабжения СССР, Англии и Китая. Мне стало известно, что за последнее время англичане сильно ворчат по поводу невыполнения их заявок, в особенности по части стали.


На действиях президента и всей администрации уже отражается, и в течение ближайших месяцев все больше и больше будет отражаться, близость выборов. Предварительные избирательные процессы показали, что анти-рузвельтовские и изоляционистские элементы отнюдь не ослабели, а наоборот могут рассчитывать на значительный успех при окончательных выборах. Президент сильно повредил себе, сделав ложный шаг и показав свою слабость в выборной кампании в штате Нью-Йорк. Бывший ^{главный организатор} ~~генеральный секретарь~~ демократической партии, содействовавший первому и вторичному избранию Рузвельта президен-

45

том, бывший член его кабинета, Фарли, как Вам вероятно известно, выступал против кандидатуры Рузвельта при последних президентских выборах, желая сам попасть в президенты. Вследствие этого произошел разрыв между президентом и Фарли, и последний перенес свою политическую активность в партийную организацию штата Нью-Йорк. Вследствие подачи в отставку нынешнего нью-йоркского губернатора Лемана Фарли выдвинул кандидатуру нынешнего нью-йоркского прокурора Беннета, демократа, не принадлежащего к числу сторонников Рузвельта, полу-изоляциониста. Когда Фарли об этом сообщил президенту, тот почему-то не возражал и Фарли соответственным образом с'агитировал местные партийные круги. Лишь спустя некоторое время Рузвельт вдруг выдвинул другую кандидатуру в губернаторы, сенатора Мида, и на нью-йоркской партийной конвенции произошла борьба между двумя кандидатурами, окончившаяся победой Фарли-Беннета. Ориентируясь на Рузвельта, Американская рабочая партия также выступала против кандидатуры Беннета. Так же поступала и компартия. Рузвельт попал в трудное положение. Ему предстояло либо призывать своих сторонников к голосованию против демократического кандидата Беннета и тем самым обеспечить победу республиканца Дьюи, явного реакционера и изоляциониста, дезавуированного даже Уилки, либо же пойти в Каноссу и поддержать Беннета. Президент выбрал последнее, создав крайне трудное положение для Американской рабочей партии и компартии, выдвинувших тем временем своих собственных кандидатов. Произошла страшная путаница, виновником которой справедливо считают Рузвельта, не сумевшего во время одернуть Фарли. Есть пессимисты, которые опасаются, что в результате ноябрьских выборов Рузвельт может лишиться большинства в сенате. Такая пессимистическая оценка, по моему, однако преувели-

16.
чена, но Рузвельтовское большинство, несомненно, немножко растает. После выборов Рузвельт вероятно вновь придет в себя и будет навязывать стране свою военную политику, более или менее игнорируя конгресс и сенат.

Возвращаясь к вопросу снабжения, я должен еще раз сказать, что в основном он будет определяться конвойными возможностями, поскольку основным маршрутом остается северный. Мы будем все свои старания направлять на то, чтобы максимально использовать южный и дальневосточный маршруты, но они явно не обеспечивают выполнения второго протокола, если вследствие неподачи конвоя не будет вновь активизирован северный маршрут.


(Литвинов)

Отп. 4 экз. АП
1-Молотову
2-Вышинскому
3-Лозовскому
4-дело.

**Cipher telegram from Joseph Stalin to Soviet plenipotentiary representative in the United Kingdom Ivan Maisky on Winston Churchill's failure to fulfil his duties as an ally.
October 19, 1942**

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

«All of us in Moscow have the impression that Churchill is interested in the destruction of the USSR in order to conclude a pact with Hitler's or Bruning's Germany at our country's expense. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain Churchill's stance on the second front in Europe, on deliveries of arms to the USSR that keep diminishing despite the growing production in England. and, finally, on the systematic bombing of Berlin by the British that Churchill promised during his stay in Moscow and that he did not fulfil at all, although he was certainly able to do so.»

ДЕСЯТЫЙ ОТДЕЛ НКВД

Иск. № 5225 спец. № 981 *Молотов*
 Поступила 20 ч. 40 м. 19/5 1942 г. *19/5*
 Отправ. 20.30.19 *19/5*

ЛОНДОН,
 СОВИУССЛ. *Асвабд.*

Лично для Майского. У нас у всех в Москве создается впечатление, что Черчилль держит курс на поражение СССР, чтобы потом сговориться с Германией Гитлера или Брюнинга за счет нашей страны. Без такого предположения трудно объяснить поведение Черчилля по вопросу о втором фронте в Европе, по вопросу о поставках вооружения для СССР, которые прогрессивно сокращаются, несмотря на рост производства в Англии, по вопросу о Гессе, которого Черчилль, повидимому, держит про запас, наконец, по вопросу о систематической бомбежке англичанами Берлина в течение сентября, которую провозгласил Черчилль в Москве и которую он не выполнил ни на йоту, несмотря на то, что он безусловно мог это выполнить. Прошу сообщить Ваши соображения.

И. СТАЛИН.

ДЕСЯТЫЙ ОТДЕЛ НКВД

Копий: 2 копии

№ 19/5 1942 г.

Машинопись: *Копия*

*Копии: т. Сталину
 т. Молотову
 Отт. т. М. В. Шинникова (лично)
 Асвабд.*

19/5

Frank O. Salisbury. The Signing of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty on May 26, 1942.

State Historical Museum



Dedicatory inscription: Presented by H.M. Government in the United Kingdom to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Commemoration of the Signature of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty in London on the 26th May, 1942

Sitting from left to right: A. Sobolev, counselor to the Soviet embassy in Great Britain in 1942–1945; I. Maisky, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the USSR to Great Britain in 1932–1943; V. Molotov, People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; British Foreign Secretary A. Eden; British Prime Minister W. Churchill; C. Attlee, leader of the British Labour Party; A. Cadogan, British Permanent UnderSecretary for Foreign Affairs; A. Sinclair, leader of the British Liberal Party. Standing on the left: S. Kozyrev, counselor at the Soviet Embassy to the Allied Governments in London


Source: <http://alliance.rusarchives.ru/en/nachalo-vtoroy-mirovoy-voyny-rozhdenie-antigitlerovskoy-koalicii>

Draft by Vyacheslav Molotov with a personal and secret message from Joseph Stalin to Winston Churchill on military operations on the Soviet-German front and the success of the operation for surrounding and eliminating a group of German units at Stalingrad. January 15, 1943

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Mark in red pencil by Joseph Stalin.

“Our army’s operations on the front lines against the Germans are going fairly well. We are completing the elimination of a group of German units surrounded at Stalingrad.”



Cipher telegram from Vyacheslav Molotov to Soviet ambassador in London Ivan Maisky with a personal and secret message from Joseph Stalin to Winston Churchill on the rupture of relations with the Polish government-in-exile. April 23, 1943

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History
Corrections in lead pencil by Joseph Stalin.

Господни боже!

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По поручению Пратушевского

Союза Советских Социалистических Республик

Н.К.И.Д. Я. *Исход. № 2243*

ДЕСЯТЫЙ ОТДЕЛ *Примено 1 час. 00 мин. 22.11.1943*

Снятые копии возвращаются

СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО

Отправлена 2 час. 10 мин. 22.11.1943 г.

ШИФРОВАННАЯ ТЕЛЕГРАММА

Куда **Л О Н Д О Н** Кому **СОВПОСЛУ** Экз. № **1**

~~Крутите Черчиллю нижеследующее послание г. Сталина .~~

2 ~~"Личное и секретное послание премьера И. В. Сталина премьер-министру г. У. Черчиллю.~~

Поведение Польского Правительства в отношении СССР в последнее время Советское Правительство считает совершенно ненормальным, нарушающим все правила и нормы во взаимоотношениях двух союзных государств.

Враждебная Советскому Союзу клеветническая кампания, начатая немецкими фашистами по поводу ими же убитых польских офицеров в районе Смоленска, на оккупированной германскими войсками территории, была сразу же подхвачена ~~Правительством г. Сикорского~~ *Гитлером* и всячески разжигается польской официальной печатью. ~~Правительство г. Сикорского~~ *Гитлером* не только не дало отпора подлой фашистской клевете на СССР, но даже не сочло нужным обратиться к Советскому Правительству с какими-либо вопросами или за разъяснениями по этому поводу.

Гитлеровские власти, совершив чудовищное преступление над польскими офицерами, разыгрывают следственную комедию, в инсценировке которой они использовали некоторые подобранные ими же самими польские профашистские элементы из оккупированной Польши, где все находится под пятой Гитлера и где честный поляк не может открыто сказать своего слова.

Для "расследования" привлечен как ~~Правительством г. Сикорского,~~ *Гитлером*

Копии:

1. Тов. _____ так и гитлеровским правительством международный Юраский
2. Тов. _____ Крест, который вынужден в обстановке террористического ре-
3. Тов. _____ жима с его виселицами и массовым истреблением мирного
4. Тов. _____

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Форма № 17

Н.К.И.Д. Исход. № 3228

ДЕСЯТЫЙ ОТДЕЛ

Получена _____ час. _____ мин. _____ 194 г.

Отправлена _____ час. _____ мин. _____ 194 г.

Снятие копий поспрещается
Спец. № _____

ШИФРОВАННАЯ ТЕЛЕГРАММА

Куда _____ Кому _____ Экз. № 1

- 2 -

населения принять участие в этой следственной комедии, режиссером которой является Гитлер. Понятно, что такое "расследование", осуществляемое к тому же за спиной Советского Правительства, не может вызвать доверия у сколько-нибудь честных людей.

То обстоятельство, что враждебная кампания против Советского Союза начата одновременно в немецкой и польской печати и ведется в одном и том же плане, это обстоятельство не оставляет сомнения в том, что между врагом союзников - Гитлером и ~~Правительством г. Сингапура~~ ^{Правительством г. Сингапура} имеется контакт и сговор в проведении этой враждебной кампании.

В то время, как народы Советского Союза, обливаясь кровью в тяжелой борьбе с ~~гитлеровской Германией~~ ^{гитлеровской Германией}, напрягают все свои силы для разгрома общего врага ~~авоодолющих демократических стран, нравств~~ ^{авоодолющих демократических стран, нравств} ~~твательства в Сикорского~~ ^{твательства в Сикорского} в угоду тирании Гитлера наносит вероломный удар Советскому Союзу.

Все эти обстоятельства вынуждают Советское Правительство признать, что нынешнее правительство Юльши, скатившись на путь сговора с гитлеровским правительством, прекратило на деле союзные отношения с СССР и стало на позиции враждебных отношений к Советскому Союзу.

На основании всего этого Советское Правительство ~~должно и выводу~~ ^{должно и выводу} ~~о необходимости прервать отношения с этим прави-~~ ^{о необходимости прервать отношения с этим прави-} ~~тельством.~~ ^{тельством.}

Копии: _____

1. Тов. _____

2. Тов. _____

3. Тов. _____

4. Тов. _____

Зап. № 21а


Message from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Joseph Stalin about the organisation of a private meeting in the Bering Strait. May 5, 1943

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History.

English original. Hand-signed by Franklin D. Roosevelt.

«My dear Mr. Stalin... <...> I want to get away from the difficulties of large Staff conferences or the red tape of diplomatic conversations. Therefore, the simplest and most practical method that I can think of would be an informal and completely simple visit for a few days between you and me. <...>

Therefore, I suggest that we could meet either on your side or my side of Bering Strait. <...> ...and that you and I would talk very informally and get what we call 'a meeting of the minds'».



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~~-2~~

Summer and Khartum is British territory. Iceland I do not like because for both you and me it involves rather difficult flights and, in addition, would make it, quite frankly, difficult not to invite Prime Minister Churchill at the same time.

Therefore, I suggest that we could meet either on your side or my side of Bering Straits. Such a point would be about three days from Washington and I think about two days from Moscow if the weather is good. That means that you could always get back to Moscow in two days in an emergency.

It is my thought that neither of us would want to bring any Staff. I would be accompanied by Harry Hopkins, an interpreter and a stenographer -- and that you and I would talk very informally and get what we call "a meeting of the minds". I do not believe that any official agreements or declarations are in the least bit necessary.

You and I would, of course, talk over the military and naval situation, but I think we can both do that without Staffs being present.

Mr. Davies has no knowledge of our military affairs nor of the post-war plans of this Government, and I am sending him to you for the sole purpose of talking over our meeting.

I greatly hope that our forces will be in complete control of Tunisia by the end of May, and Churchill and I next week will be working on the second phase of the offensive.


96-66

~~2~~

Our estimates of the situation are that Germany will deliver an all-out attack on you this Summer, and my Staff people think it will be directed against the middle of your line.

You are doing a grand job. Good luck!

Always sincerely,



Source: <http://alliance.rusarchives.ru/en/nachalo-vtoroy-mirovoy-voyny-rozhdenie-antigitlerovskoy-koalicii>

**Personal and secret message from Joseph Stalin
to Franklin D. Roosevelt on the dates of opening
a second front. June 11, 1943**

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History
Corrections in red pencil by Joseph Stalin.

«...In May 1943, you and Mr. Churchill took the decision to postpone the Anglo-American invasion of Western Europe to the spring of 1944... <...>

It goes without saying that this new postponement of the second front and the decision to leave our army, which has made so many sacrifices, without the expected major support from Anglo-American forces will make a highly negative and grievous impression on the Soviet people and armed forces.»

11. VI. 1945.

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ЛИЧНОЕ И СЕКРЕТНОЕ ПОСЛАНИЕ ПРЕМЬЕРА И. В. СТАЛИНА
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ г. РУЗВЕЛЬТУ


Ваше послание, в котором Вы сообщаете о принятых Вами и г. Черчиллем некоторых решениях по вопросам стратегии, получил 4 июня. Благодарю за сообщение.

Как видно, это бросилось в глаза, что эти решения находятся в противоречии с теми заявлениями, которые были сделаны Вами и г. Черчиллем в начале этого года о сроках открытия второго фронта в Западной Европе.

Вы, конечно, помните, что в Вашем совместном с г. Черчиллем послании от 26 января *сегодня* сообщалось о принятом тогда решении отвлечь значительные германские сухопутные и военно-воздушные силы с русского фронта и заставить Германию встать на колени в 1943 году.

После этого г. Черчилль от своего и Вашего имени сообщил 12 февраля уточненные сроки англо-американской операции в Тунисе и Средиземном море, а также на западном берегу Европы. В этом сообщении говорилось, что Великобританией и Соединенными Штатами энергично ведутся приготовления к операции форсирования Канала в августе 1943 года и что, если этому помешает погода или другие причины, то эта операция будет подготовлена с участием более крупных сил на сентябрь 1943 года.

5 мая 1943 года
После этого, ~~без какого-либо совместного обсуждения с нами~~, Вами вместе с г. Черчиллем принимается решение, откладывающее англо-американское вторжение в Западную



Note of the US ambassador to the USSR William Standley to Vyacheslav Molotov with a personal and secret message from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Joseph Stalin on the occasion of the Soviet victory in the Battle of Kursk. July 16, 1943

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Russian translation.

English original.

The message discusses the organisation of a private meeting.

“Although I have no detailed news, I think I can safely congratulate you on the splendid showing your armies are making against the German offensive at Kursk.

I hope to hear from you soon about the other matter which I still feel to be of great importance to you and me.”



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Moscow, U.S.S.R.
July 16, 1943.

My dear Mr. Molotov:

I have been requested by the President to transmit
the following message to Marshal Stalin:

SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT
TO MARSHAL STALIN

"Following the unfortunate sinking of one of your ships
in the North Pacific, for which I am deeply sorry, I have
directed that every possible precaution be taken in the
future.

"Although I have no detailed news, I think I can
safely congratulate you on the splendid showing your armies
are making against the German offensive at Kursk.


"I hope to hear from you soon about the other matter
which I still feel to be of great importance to you and me."

His Excellency

V. M. Molotov

The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs

Moscow, U.S.S.R.



Source: <http://alliance.rusarchives.ru/en/nachalo-vtoroy-mirovoy-voyny-rozhdenie-antigitlerovskoy-koalicii>

**Cipher telegram from Vyacheslav Molotov to the Soviet ambassador in London with a personal and secret message from Joseph Stalin to Winston Churchill on the dates of opening a second front.
June 24, 1943**

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

“I am passing over the fact that your grave decision to rescind your previous decisions on invading Western Europe was taken by you and Mr. President without the participation of the Soviet government...

It goes without saying that the Soviet government cannot reconcile itself with such disregard of the innate interests of the Soviet Union in the war against the common enemy.

I must inform you that it is not just a matter of the frustration of the Soviet government but of its trust in its allies being put to a hard test.”

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Н.К.И.Д. Исход. № 5265 Форма № 11
 ДЕСЯТЫЙ ОТДЕЛ Получена 6 час. 00 мин. 23. VII. 1943 г. СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО
Отправлена 12 час. 00 мин. 23. VII. 1943 г. Снятые копии распространяются
 Спец. № 682-685

ШИФРОВАННАЯ ТЕЛЕГРАММА

Куда **Л О Н Д О Н** Кому **СОВПОСЛУ** Экз. № _____

ВНЕ ОПЕРЕДИ
ОСОБАЯ

20 июня через Керра было получено послание Черчилля тов. Сталину от 19 июня, которое является ответом на известное Вам послание тов. Сталина от 11 июня. Черчилль в своем послании выступает против открытия второго фронта во Франции, заявляя, что в случае высадки английских сил они были бы отброшены ввиду того, что немцы будто бы уже имеют во Франции силы, превосходящие то, что англичане могли бы выставить там в этом году.

Ссылаясь на свои прежние телеграммы, Черчилль заявляет, что он никогда не позволил бы предпринять какое-либо наступление через Канал, которое по его мнению, привело бы лишь к бесполезному кровопролитию. Черчилль выражает надежду, что Италия удастся выбить из войны в этом году, что отвлечет с советско-германского фронта гораздо больше немцев, чем какое-либо другое имеющееся средство.

Передайте Черчиллю следующее послание тов. Сталина:
"ЛИЧНОЕ И СЕКРЕТНОЕ ПОСЛАНИЕ ПРЕМЬЕРА И.В. СТАЛИНА
ПРЕМЬЕР-МИНИСТРУ г-ну У. ЧЕРЧИЛЮ.

Ваше Послание от 19 июня получил.

Мне вполне понятна сложность организации англо-американского вторжения в Западную Европу, в частности, организации переброски войск

Копии: _____ через Канал. Эта сложность была также видна из Ваших

1. Тов. _____ сообщений.

2. Тов. _____

3. Тов. _____ Из Ваших сообщений прошлого и этого года я вынес уве-

4. Тов. _____ренность, что ни я и Президент отдавали себе полные отчет в трудностях организации такой операции и что

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Н.К.И.Д.
ДЕСЯТЫЙ ОТДЕЛ

Исход. № 5265

Получена _____ час. _____ мин. _____ 194 г.

Отправлена _____ час. _____ мин. _____ 194 г.

Форма № 17
СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО
Снятие копий - воспрещается
Спец. № _____

ШИФРОВАННАЯ ТЕЛЕГРАММА

Куда _____

Кому _____

Экз. № _____

- 2 -

соответствующая подготовка этого вторжения Вами совместно с Президентом ведется с полным учетом этих трудностей и со всем необходимым напряжением сил и средств. Еще в прошлом году Вы сообщили, что вторжение в Европу английских и американских войск в большом масштабе будет произведено в 1943 году. В Вашем меморандуме, переданном В.М. Молотову 10 июля 1942 г., Вы писали:

"наконец, и это является наиболее важным из всего, мы концентрируем наши максимальные усилия на организации и подготовке вторжения на континент Европы английских и американских войск в большом масштабе в 1943 году. Мы не устанавливаем никаких пределов для размеров и целей этой кампании, которая вначале будет выполнена английскими и американскими войсками в количестве свыше 1 миллиона человек при соответствующей авиационной поддержке". В начале нынешнего года Вы, от своего имени и от имени Президента, дважды сообщили о Ваших решениях по вопросу о вторжении англо-американских войск в Западную Европу с целью "отвлечь значительные германские сухопутные и военно-воздушные силы с русского фронта". При этом Вы ставили задачей поставить Германию на колени уже в 1943 году и определяли срок вторжения не позже сентября месяца.

В Вашем Послании от 26 января сего года Вы писали:

Копии:

- "Мы советовались с нашими военными советниками и приняли решения об операциях, которые должны быть предприняты американскими и британскими вооруженными силами в течение первых девяти месяцев 1943 года. Мы хотим немедленно сообщить Вам о наших намерениях. Мы полагаем, что эти операции, вместе с Вашим мощным наступлением, могут наверное заставить Германию

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Н.К.И.Д.
ДЕСЯТЫЙ ОТДЕЛ

Исход. № 5265

Форма № 17

СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО

Получена _____ час. _____ мин. _____ 194 г.

Снятые копии возвращаются

Отправлена _____ час. _____ мин. _____ 194 г.

Спец. № _____

ШИФРОВАННАЯ ТЕЛЕГРАММА

Куда	Кому	Экз. №

- 2 -

встать на колени в 1943 году".

В следующем Вашем Послании, полученном мною 12 февраля сего года, Вы, уточняя принятое Вами и Президентом сроки вторжения в Западную Европу, писали:

"мы также энергично ведем приготовления, до пределов наших ресурсов, к операции форсирования Канала, в августе, в которой будут участвовать британские части и части Соединенных Штатов. Тоннаж и наступательные десантные средства здесь будут также лимитирующими факторами. Если операция будет отложена вследствие погоды или по другим причинам, то она будет подготовлена с участием более крупных сил на сентябрь".

В феврале, когда Вы писали об этих Ваших планах и сроках вторжения в Западную Европу, трудности этой операции были более значительными, чем теперь. С тех пор немцы потерпели не одно поражение: они были отброшены на восток нашими войсками и потерпели здесь немалый урон; они были разбиты и изгнаны из Северной Африки англо-американскими войсками; в подводной войне немцы также попали в более трудное положение, чем когда-либо раньше, а превосходство англо-американских сил значительно возросло; известно также, что американцы и англичане достигли господства своей авиации в Европе, а военный и транспортный морской флот возросли в своей мощи.

Копии:

Таким образом, условия для открытия второго фронта

1. Тов. _____ в Западной Европе на протяжении 1943 года не только не
2. Тов. _____ ухудшились, а, напротив, значительно улучшились.
3. Тов. _____

4. Тов. _____ После всего этого Советское Правительство не могло предполагать, что британское и американское правительства изменят принятое в начале этого года решение о втор-

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Н.К.И.Д.
ДЕСЯТЫЙ ОТДЕЛ

Исход. № 5265

Получена _____ час. _____ мин. _____ 194 г.

Отправлена _____ час. _____ мин. _____ 194 г.

Форма № 17
СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО
Снятие копии воспрещается
Спец. № _____

ШИФРОВАННАЯ ТЕЛЕГРАММА

Куда

Кому

Экз. №

- 4 -

жении в Западную Европу в этом году. напротив, Советское Правительство имело все основания считать, что это англо-американское решение будет реализовано, что должная подготовка ведется и второй фронт в Западной Европе будет, наконец, открыт в 1943 году.

Поэтому, когда Вы теперь пишете, что "Россия не получила бы помощи, если бы мы бросили сотни тысяч человек через Канал в гибельное наступление", то мне остается напомнить Вам о следующем, во-первых, о Вашем же собственном меморандуме от июня месяца прошлого года, когда Вы заявляли о подготовке к вторжению не одной сотни тысяч человек, а о количестве англо-американских войск свыше 1 миллиона человек уже в начале операции. Во-вторых, о Вашем февральском послании, в котором говорилось о больших подготовительных мероприятиях к вторжению в Западную Европу в августе-сентябре этого года, чем, очевидно, предусматривалась операция отнюдь не с одной сотней тысяч человек, а с достаточным количеством войск.

Когда же Вы теперь заявляете: "Я не могу представить себе, каким образом крупное британское поражение и кровопролитие помогло бы советским армиям", то не ясно ли, что такого рода заявление в отношении Советского Союза не имеет под собой никакой почвы и находится в прямом противоречии с указанными выше другими Вашими ответственными решениями о проводимых широких и энергичных англо-американских мероприятиях по организации

1. Тов. _____
2. Тов. _____ вторжения в этом году, от которых и должен зависеть пол-
3. Тов. _____ ный успех этой операции.
4. Тов. _____

Я уже не распространяюсь о том, что это Ваше ответственное решение об отмене предыдущих наших решений насчет

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Н.К.И.Д. Исход. № 5265 Форма № 17
 ДЕСЯТЫЙ ОТДЕЛ Получена _____ час. _____ мин. _____ 194 г. СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО
Отправлена _____ час. _____ мин. _____ 194 г. Снятие копий воспрещается
Спец. № _____

ШИФРОВАННАЯ ТЕЛЕГРАММА

Куда	Кому	Экз. №
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- 5 -

вторжения в Западную Европу, принято Вами и Президентом без участия Советского Правительства и без какой-либо попытки пригласить его представителей на совещание в Вашингтоне, хотя Вы не можете не знать, что в войне с Германией роль Советского Союза и его заинтересованность в вопросах второго фронта достаточно велики.

Нечего и говорить, что Советское Правительство не может примириться с подобным игнорированием коренных интересов Советского Союза в войне против общего врага.

Вы пишете мне, что Вы полностью понимаете мое разочарование. Должен Вам заявить, что дело идет здесь не просто о разочаровании Советского Правительства, а о сохранении его доверия к союзникам, подвергаемого тяжелым испытаниям. Нельзя забывать того, что речь идет о сохранении миллионов жизней в оккупированных районах Западной Европы и России и о свращении колоссальных жертв советских армий, в сравнении с которыми жертвы англо-американских войск составляют небольшую величину.

24 июня 1943 года".

О передаче послания Черчиллю прошу телеграфировать немедленно.

Сообщаю для Вашего сведения, что в своем послании от 19 июня Черчилль писал также, что после того, как Италия будет выведена силой из войны, на-

1. Тов. _____ станет момент для приглашения Турции принять участие
2. Тов. _____ в войне в активной или пассивной форме. Бомбардировки
3. Тов. _____ румынских нефтяных источников можно будет проводить в
4. Тов. _____ решающем масштабе. Черчилль считает, что Англия уже

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Форма № 17

Н.К.И.Д. Исход. № 5265

ДЕСЯТЫЙ ОТДЕЛ

Получена _____ час _____ мин _____ 194 г.

Отправлена _____ час _____ мин _____ 194 г.

Снятие копий воспрещается
Спец. № _____

ШИФРОВАННАЯ ТЕЛЕГРАММА

Куда	Кому	Экз. №

- 6 -

сказывается на западе и юге Европы большую часть германских военновоздушных сил. Далее Черчилль, в частности, писал о том, что британские бомбардировки с воздуха наносят Германии существенный ущерб и что предстоящей осенью большее воздушное наступление должно будет принести солидный доход.

Ознакомьте тов. Богомолова с вышеприведенным посланием тов. Сталина. Вообще Вы должны знакомить тов. Богомолова со всеми ответами Советского Правительства на послания Черчилля и одновременно знакомить его с самими текстами посланий Черчилля.


Исполнение телеграфьте.

МОЛОТОВ

2-экз:рк 24.VI.43 г.

Копии:

1. Тов. СТАЛИНУ _____
2. Тов. МОЛОТОВУ _____
3. Тов. _____
4. Тов. _____

Верно: 

1/69
3654/мм

Лит. № 21а

Note from British ambassador Archibald C. Kerr to Vyacheslav Molotov with a personal and most secret message from Winston Churchill to Joseph Stalin on organizing a meeting in Teheran. September 27, 1943


Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Russian translation.

English original.

“I have been pondering about our meeting of Heads of Governments at Tehran. Good arrangements must be made for security in this somewhat loosely-controlled area. <...>

I suggest also that in all future correspondence on this subject we use the expression ‘Cairo Three’ instead of Tehran which should be buried and also that the code name for the operation should be ‘Eureka’...”





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PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET MESSAGE

FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr WINSTON CHURCHILL, TO MARSHAL STALIN.

I have been pondering about our meeting of Heads of Governments at Tehran. Good arrangements must be made for security in this somewhat loosely-controlled area. Accordingly I suggest for your consideration that I make preparations at Cairo in regard to accommodation, security, etcetera, which are bound to be noticed in spite of all willing efforts to keep them secret. Then perhaps only two or three days before our meeting we should throw a British and a Russian brigade round a suitable area in Tehran, including the air field, and keep an absolute cordon till we have finished our talks. We would not tell the Iranian Government nor make any arrangements for our accommodation until this moment comes. We should of course have to control absolutely all outgoing messages. Thus we shall have an effective blind for the world press and also for any unpleasant people who might not be as fond of us as they ought.

2. I suggest also that in all future correspondence on this subject we use the expression "Cairo Three" instead of Tehran which should be buried, and also that the code name for the operation should be "Eureka" which I believe is ancient Greek. If you have other ideas let me know and we can then put them to the President. I have not said anything to him about this aspect yet.

Moscow Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security. October 30, 1943

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

The governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China;

United in their determination, in accordance with the declaration by the United Nations of January, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

Conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

Recognizing the necessity of insuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

Jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations, with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

7. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

Yale Law School. Lillian Goldman Law Library in memory of Sol Goldman. The Avalon Project. URL: <https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/moscow.asp>

**Moscow Conference. Meeting of the Foreign Ministers
of the USA, USSR, and United Kingdom. October, 1943**

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History



Source: «STALIN, CHURCHILL, ROOSEVELT: The Common Struggle Against Fascism»

The Declaration on German Atrocities. October, 1943

The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new thing and all the peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating Powers and that in their desperation, the recoiling Hitlerite Huns are re-

doubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from the Hitlerites, and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid three allied Powers, speaking in the interests of the thirty-two United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows:—

At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions, will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be created therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries having regard especially to the invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France and Italy.

Thus, the Germans who take part in wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the

²⁵ The Soviet Government, in a memorandum dated October 25, agreeing to the draft statement by Prime Minister Churchill (see p. 556), requested the changes which are embodied in the text printed here, viz., adding the final sentence in the first paragraph, substituting "Soviet Union" for "Russia" in the third paragraph, omitting "regardless of expense" from the fourth paragraph, and adding the final clause in the fifth paragraph. These proposed changes were adopted.

Part 1.

The Yalta Conference

1.1. Formation of the Anti-Hitler coalition

1.2. THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE

1.3. The Yalta Conference

1.4. The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference

1.5. The End of the Second World War. The Surrender of Japan

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin. Washington, May 5, 1943

My Dear Mr. Stalin: I am sending this personal note to you by the hands of my old friend, Joseph E. Davies. It relates solely to one subject which I think it is easier for us to talk over through a mutual friend. Mr. Litvinov is the only other person with whom I have talked about it.

I want to get away from the difficulties of large Staff conferences or the red tape of diplomatic conversations. Therefore, the simplest and most practical method that I can think of would be an informal and completely simple visit for a few days between you and me.

I fully appreciate the desirability for you to stay in daily touch with your military operations; I also find it inadvisable to be away from Washington more than a short time. There are two sides to the problem. The first relates to timing. There is always the possibility that the historic Russian defense, followed by taking the offensive, may cause a crack-up in Germany next Winter. In such a case we must be prepared for the many next steps. We are none of us prepared today. Therefore, it is my belief that you and I ought to meet this Summer.

The second problem is where to meet. Africa is almost out of the question in Summer and Khartoum is British territory. Iceland I do not like because for both you and me it involves rather difficult flights and, in addition, would make it, quite frankly, difficult not to invite Prime Minister Churchill at the same time.

Therefore, I suggest that we could meet either on your side or my side of Bering Straits. Such a point would be about three days from Washington and I think about two days from Moscow if the weather is good. That means that you could always get back to Moscow in two days in an emergency.

It is my thought that neither of us would want to bring any Staff. I would be accompanied by Harry Hopkins, an interpreter and a stenographer—and that you and I would talk very informally and get what we call “a meeting of the minds”. I do not believe that any official agreements or declarations are in the least bit necessary.

You and I would, of course, talk over the military and naval situation, but I think we can both do that without Staffs being present.

Mr. Davies has no knowledge of our military affairs nor of the post-war plans of this Government, and I am sending him to you for the sole purpose of talking over our meeting.

I greatly hope that our forces will be in complete control of Tunisia by the end of May, and Churchill and I next week will be working on the second phase of the offensive¹.

Our estimates of the situation are that Germany will deliver an all-out attack on you this Summer, and my Staff people think it will be directed against the middle of your line.

You are doing a grand job. Good luck!

Always sincerely,

Source: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943cairotehran/d2>

¹ The records of the Third Washington Conference of Roosevelt and Churchill, May 12–25, 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the Foreign Relations series. Speaking before the Senate and the House of Representatives on May 19, 1943, Churchill said: “We [the President and I], both of us, earnestly hope that at no distant date we may be able to achieve what we have so long sought—namely, a meeting with Marshal Stalin and if possible with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. But how, when, and where this is to be accomplished is not a matter upon which I am able to shed any clear ray of light at the present time, and if I were I should certainly not shed it.” Congressional Record, vol. 89, pt. 4, p. 4621

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt. Moscow, May 26, 1943¹

Translation²

Dear Mr. Roosevelt: Mr. Davies has handed me your message. I agree with you that this summer, possibly as early as June, the beginning of a new large-scale offensive of Hitlerites is to be expected on the Soviet-German front. Hitler has already concentrated against us about 200 German divisions and as many as 30 divisions of his allies. We are preparing to meet the new German offensive and to launch counter attacks but we experience a shortage of airplanes and aircraft fuel. Now it is of course impossible to for[e]see all the military and other steps that we shall have to take. This will depend upon the developments at our front. Much will depend also on how speedy and active will be the anglo-american military operations in Europe.

I have mentioned these important circumstances in order to explain why my present answer to your proposal cannot be quite definite now.

I agree with you that such a meeting is necessary and that it should be not be [sic] postponed. But I ask you to appreciate duly the importance of the circumstances set forth just because the summer months will be extremely serious for our Soviet armies. As I do not know how the events will develop at the Soviet-German front in June I shall not be able to leave Moscow during this month. Therefore I would suggest that our meeting should be arranged in July or in August. If you agree to this I undertake to inform you two weeks before the date of the meeting when this meeting could take place in July or August. In case you [sh]ould upon receipt of my communication agree to the time of our meeting suggested by me I would arrive in the place of our meeting at the fixed time.

As to the place of the meeting this will be communicated to you by Mr. Davies personally³.

I agree with you as to the limitation of the number of your and my advisers.

I thank you for sending Mr. Davies to Moscow who has a knowledge of the Soviet-Union and can un-biasedly judge of things.

With sincere respect,

J. Stalin

Source: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943cairotehran/d2>

¹ The Russian-language original is unlike the translation in that the original bears the place, the month, and the year at the beginning. As printed in Stalin's Correspondence, vol. ii, p. 66, this document is dated May 26, 1943. Verbal variations occur in all three versions

² The Russian words for "Translation (copy)" are written in longhand on the source text. Apparently both the translation and the Russian-language original were delivered to Roosevelt by Davies, who returned to Washington on June 3, 1943

³ Stalin apparently indicated that he considered Fairbanks, Alaska, as a possible meeting place. See (1) the penultimate paragraph of Roosevelt's telegram 297, June 28, 1943, to Churchill, post, p. 12, and (2) Stalin's message of August 24, 1943, to Roosevelt and Churchill, post, p. 22

**Prime Minister, W. Churchill, to British Ambassador
in Moscow, A. Kerr, dated. June 29, 1943**

Copy. T 903/3. No. 786.
Personal and Secret

1. I shall be most interested to know what you can gather of the reactions to my patient reply to Stalin's offensive message. Naturally the sentence beginning "The Soviet Government will not put up with such treatment" etc. as well as the elaborate marshalling of all the grounds of complaint raises various questions in experienced minds. No doubt you will be keeping a vigilant lookout.

2. Personally I feel that this is probably the end of the Churchill-Stalin correspondence from which I fondly hoped some kind of personal contact might be created between our countries. There is certainly no use in making it a vehicle of recrimination. As you were the first to suggest my visit to Moscow I should be most glad to hear what you think.

W[inston] S. C[hurchill]
29th June, 1943

[The National Archives of Great Britain (hereafter – TNA), Premier Office (hereafter – PREM) 3/333/5].


Source: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943CairoTehran/ch1>

Moscow Declaration of Four States on the issue of universal security. October 30, 1943

Declaration of four states on the issue of universal security. – Moscow, 30 October. 1943. – 3 years. – (Memory of the Great Victory). – At the end of the signature text: V. Molotov, Cordell Hall, Anthony Eden, Fu Bin-chan .

Copy source: Russian Foreign Policy Archive

Location on map of the source: Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation



2. Что те из них, которые находятся в войне с общими врагами, будут действовать совместно во всех вопросах, относящихся к капитуляции и разоружению этих соответственных врагов.

3. Что они примут все те меры, которые они считают необходимыми, против любого нарушения условий, пред'явленных к их противникам.

4. Что они признают необходимость учреждения в возможно короткий срок всеобщей Международной Организации для поддержания международного мира и безопасности, основанной на принципе суверенного равенства всех миролюбивых государств, членами которой могут быть все такие государства - Большие и малые.

5. Что они будут консультироваться друг с другом и, по мере того, как этого потребует обстоятельства, с другими членами Объединенных Наций, имея в виду совместные действия в интересах сообщества наций в целях поддержания международного мира и безопасности, пока не будут восстановлены закон и порядок и пока не будет установлена система всеобщей безопасности.

6. Что по окончании войны они не будут применять своих вооруженных сил на территории других государств, кроме как после совместной консультации и для целей, предусмотренных в этой декларации.

7. Что они будут совещаться и сотрудничать друг с другом и с другими членами Объединенных Наций, в целях достижения осуществимого всеобщего соглашения в отношении регулирования вооружений в послевоенный период.

В. Молотов

Cordell Hull

Anthony Eden

For Mr. Sheng

Москва, 30 октября 1945 г.

Roosevelt–Stalin meeting, 3 p.m., Roosevelt’s Quarters, Soviet Embassy¹

Present²

United States
President Roosevelt
Mr. Bohlen

Soviet Union
Marshal Stalin
Mr. Pavlov

November 28, 1943, 3 p.m.

secret

The President greeted Marshal Stalin when he entered with “I am glad to see you. I have tried for a long time to bring this about.”³

Marshal Stalin, after suitable expression of pleasure at meeting the President, said that he was to blame for the delay in this meeting; that he had been very occupied because of military matters.

The President inquired as to the situation on the Soviet battlefield.

Marshal Stalin answered that on part of the front, the situation was not too good; that the Soviets had lost Zhitomir and were about to lose Koresten [Korosten]—the latter an important railroad center for which the capture of Gomel could not compensate. He added that the Germans have brought a new group of divisions to this area and were exercising strong pressure on the Soviet front.

The President then inquired whether or not the initiative remained with the Soviet forces.

Marshal Stalin replied that, with the exception of the sector which he had just referred to, the initiative still remains with the Soviet Armies, but that the situation was so bad that only in the Ukraine was it possible to take offensive operations.

The President said that he wished that it were within his power to bring about the removal of 30 or 40 German divisions from the Eastern front and that that question, of course, was one of the things he desired to discuss here in Tehran.

Marshal Stalin said it would be of great value if such a transfer of German divisions could be brought about.

The President then said that another subject that he would like to talk over with Marshal Stalin was the possibility that after the war a part of the American–British merchant fleet which, at the end of the war, would be more than either nation could possibly utilize, be made available to the Soviet Union.

Marshal Stalin replied that an adequate merchant fleet would be of great value, not only to the Soviet Union, but for the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States after the war, which he hoped would be greatly expanded. He said, in reply to the President’s question, that if equipment were sent to the Soviet Union from the United States, a plentiful supply of the raw materials from that country could be made available to the United States.

¹ The Bohlen minutes list the meeting as having begun at 3 p.m. According to the Log, ante, p. 464, the meeting began at 3:15 p.m. According to Forrest Davis (“What Really Happened at Teheran,” Saturday Evening Post, vol. 216, May 13 and May 20, 1944), Roosevelt discussed with Stalin at Tehran two additional subjects besides those covered in the official record as given here, namely, the structure of the federal system in the United States and the “good neighbor” policy of the United States toward Latin America. The Davis article was based on an “off-the-record” conversation with Roosevelt in March 1944

² The listing of those present is based on the Bohlen. Elliott Roosevelt, p. 175, appears to have misunderstood some remarks of his father respecting Bohlen’s presence at the meeting

³ Regarding Roosevelt’s efforts, beginning in 1942, to bring about a meeting with Stalin, see ante, pp. 3 ff. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943CairoTehran/pg_3

The Conference then turned to the Far East.

The President said that he had had an interesting conversation with Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo, on the general subject of China¹.

Marshal Stalin remarked that the Chinese have fought very badly but, in his opinion, it was the fault of the Chinese leaders.

The President informed Marshal Stalin that we were now supplying and training 30 Chinese divisions for operations in Southern China and were proposing to continue the same process for 30 additional divisions. He added that there was a new prospect of an offensive operation through North Burma to link up with China in Southern Yun[n]an and that these operations would be under the command of Lord Louis Mountbatten.

Marshal Stalin then inquired as to the situation in the Lebanon.

The President gave a brief description of the background and events leading up to the recent clashes, and in reply to Marshal Stalin's question said that it had been entirely due to the attitude of the French Committee and General De Gaulle².

Marshal Stalin said he did not know General De Gaulle personally, but frankly, in his opinion, he was very unreal in his political activities. He explained that General De Gaulle represented the soul of sympathetic France, whereas, the real physical France engaged under Petain in helping our common enemy Germany, by making available French ports, materials, machines, etc., for the German war effort. He said the trouble with De Gaulle was that this [his?] movement had no communication with the physical France, which, in his opinion, should be punished for its attitude during this war. De Gaulle acts as though he were the head of a great state, whereas, in fact, it actually commands little power.

The President agreed and said that in the future, no Frenchman over 40, and particularly no Frenchman who had ever taken part in the present French Government, should be allowed to return to position in the future. He said that General Giraud was a good old military type, but with no administrative or political sense, whatsoever. He added that there were approximately 11 French divisions, partly composed of Algerians and other North Africans, in training in North Africa.

Marshal Stalin expatiated at length on the French ruling classes and he said, in his opinion, they should not be entitled to share in any of the benefits of the peace, in view of their past record of collaboration with Germany.

The President said that Mr. Churchill was of the opinion that France would be very quickly reconstructed as a strong nation, but he did not personally share this view since he felt that many years of honest labor would be necessary before France would be re-established. He said the first necessity for the French, not only for the Government but the people as well, was to become honest citizens.

Marshal Stalin agreed and went on to say that he did not propose to have the Allies shed blood to restore Indochina, for example, to the old French colonial rule. He said that the recent events in the Lebanon made public service the first step toward the independence of people who had formerly been colonial subjects. He said that in the war against Japan, in his opinion, that in addition to military missions, it was necessary to fight the Japanese in the political sphere as well, particularly in view of the fact that the Japanese had granted the least nominal independence to certain colonial areas. He repeated that France should not get back Indochina and that the French must pay for their criminal collaboration with Germany.

The President said he was 100% in agreement with Marshal Stalin and remarked that after 100 years of French rule in Indochina, the inhabitants were worse off than they had been before. He said

¹ Information regarding conversations between Roosevelt and Chiang at the First Cairo Conference may be found *ante*, pp. 322, 349, 366 (https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943CairoTehran/pg_3)

² See *ante*, p. 84, footnote 2 (https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943CairoTehran/pg_3)

that Chiang Kai-shek had told him China had no designs on Indochina but the people of Indochina were not yet ready for independence, to which he had replied that when the United States acquired the Philippines, the inhabitants were not ready for independence which would be granted without qualification upon the end of the war against Japan. He added that he had discussed with Chiang Kai-shek the possibility of a system of trusteeship for Indochina which would have the task of preparing the people for independence within a definite period of time, perhaps 20 to 30 years.

Marshal Stalin completely agreed with this view¹.

The President went on to say that Mr. Hull had taken to the Moscow Conference a document which he (the President) had drawn up for the purpose of a National [International?] Committee to visit, every year, the colonies of all nations and through use of instrumentalities of public opinion to correct any abuse that they find².

Marshal Stalin said he saw merit in this idea.

The President continued on the subject of colonial possessions, but he felt it would be better not to discuss the question of India with Mr. Churchill, since the latter had no solution of that question, and merely proposed to defer the entire question to the end of the war.

Marshal Stalin agreed that this was a sore spot with the British.

The President said that at some future date, he would like to talk with Marshal Stalin on the question of India; that he felt that the best solution would be reform from the bottom, somewhat on the Soviet line.

Marshal Stalin replied that the India question was a complicated one, with different levels of culture and the absence of relationship in the castes. He added that reform from the bottom would mean revolution.

It was then 4 o'clock and time for the General Meeting.

The President, in conclusion, stated that an additional reason why he was glad to be in this house was that of affording the opportunity of meeting Marshal Stalin more frequently in completely informal and different [sic] circumstances.

Source: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943CairoTehran/d358>

¹ On March 17, 1944, in a conversation with Stettinius, Roosevelt recounted what had been said at Tehran regarding Indochina. Stettinius's notes on the conversation, prepared that night, read as follows: "Then at Teheran the President raised the question with Joseph Stalin, who said that Indo-China should be independent but was not yet ready for self-government. He said that the idea of a trusteeship was excellent. When Churchill objected, the President said, 'Now, look here, Winston, you are outvoted three to one.'" Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians; The Yalta Conference* (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1949), p. 238. The number "three" apparently refers to the concurrence not only of Roosevelt and Stalin, but also, at the First Cairo Conference, of Chiang Kai-shek; see ante, p. 325. See also F. D. R., *His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, vol. ii, p. 1489 (https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943CairoTehran/pg_325)

² Document 44 of the Moscow Conference. The records of the Moscow Conference are scheduled to be published in *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. i. For a substantially identical version of the document referred to here, see Notter, p. 470

The First Sitting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain. November 28, 1943

Opened: 16.00; Closed: 19.30

Roosevelt: As the youngest head of Government present here I should like to take the liberty of speaking first. I should like to assure the members of the new family – the members of the present conference gathered around this table – that we are gathered here for one purpose, for the purpose of winning the war as soon as possible.

I should also like to say a few words about the conduct of the conference. We do not intend to make public anything that will be said here, but we shall address each other as friends, openly and candidly. I think that this conference will be a success, and that our three nations, which united in the course of the present war, will strengthen their ties and will create the prerequisites for the close co-operation of future generations. Our staffs can discuss military matters, and our delegations, although we do not have any fixed agenda, can discuss other problems as well, such, for example, as problems of the post-war settlement. If, however, you do not wish to discuss such problems, they can be left aside.

Before beginning our work I should like to know if Mr. Churchill wishes to say a few general words on the importance of this meeting, and what this meeting means to humanity.

Churchill: This is the greatest concentration of world forces that ever existed in the history of mankind. We hold the solution of the problem of reducing the length of the war, the winning of victory, the future of mankind. I pray that we may be worthy of this remarkable opportunity granted to us by God, the opportunity of serving mankind.

Roosevelt: Would Marshal Stalin like to say anything?

Stalin: In greeting this conference of the representatives of the three Governments I should like to make a few remarks. I think we are being pampered by history. She has given us possession of very big forces and very great opportunities. I hope that we shall do everything at this conference to make due use, within the framework of our co-operation, of the power and authority that our peoples have vested in us. Let us now begin our work.

Roosevelt: May I start with a general review of the war and the requirements of the war at the present time. Of course, I shall speak of this from the standpoint of the U.S.A. We, like the British Empire and the Soviet Union, hope for an early victory. I should like to start with a review of that part of the war which concerns the United States rather than the Soviet Union and Great Britain. I mean the war in the Pacific Ocean, where the United States bears the brunt of the war, receiving help from the Australian and New Zealand forces...

Taking up the more important question, which is of greater interest to the Soviet Union – the operation across the Channel – I should like to say that we have been drawing up our plans for the last year and a half, but because of the shortage of tonnage we were unable to decide on a date for this operation. We want not only to cross the Channel, but to pursue the enemy into the heart of the territory. The English Channel is that unpleasant strip of water that excludes the possibility of starting the expedition across the Channel before May 1, that is why the plan drawn up at Quebec was based on the premise that the expedition across the Channel would be made on approximately May 1, 1944. All landing operations involve special craft. If we undertake large-scale landing operations in the Mediterranean, the expedition across the Channel will have to be postponed for two or three months. That is why we should like to have the advice of our Soviet colleagues on the matter, and also advice on how best to use the forces now in the Mediterranean area, considering that there are few ships there too. But we do not want to defer the date of the invasion across the Channel beyond May or June. At the same time there are many places where Anglo-American forces could be used. They could be used in Italy, in the Adriatic area, in the Aegean

area, and finally, to help Turkey if she enters the war. All this we must decide here. We should very much like to help the Soviet Union and to draw off a part of the German forces from the Soviet front. We should like to have the advice of our Soviet friends on how we could best ease their position.

Would Mr. Churchill like to add anything?

Churchill: May I speak and express my opinion after Marshal Stalin has expressed his. At the same time I should like to say that I agree in principle with what has been said by President Roosevelt.

Stalin: As for the first part of Mr. President's speech concerning the war in the Pacific Area, we can say the following: We Russians welcome the successes that have been and are being scored by the Anglo-American forces in the Pacific.

As for the second part of Mr. President's speech about the war in Europe, I also have several remarks to make.

First of all, a few words in the form of a report about the way we have been and are conducting operations since the July offensive of the Germans. If I am going into too great detail I could shorten my statement.

- We are prepared to hear everything you wish to say.

Stalin: I must say, in passing, that we ourselves have been lately preparing for an offensive. The Germans were ahead of us, but since we had been preparing for an offensive and had massed a great force, after we beat back the German offensive, it was relatively easy for us to go over to the offensive. I must say that although the opinion about us is that we plan everything beforehand, we did not expect the successes we scored in August and September. Contrary to our expectations the Germans proved to be weaker than we expected. At present, according to our intelligence, the Germans have 210 divisions on our front, and another six divisions on the way there. In addition, there are 50 non-German divisions, including the Finns. Thus, altogether the Germans have 260 divisions on our front, including up to 10 Hungarian, up to 20 Finnish, and up to 16 or 18 Rumanian.

- What is the numerical strength of a German division?

Stalin: The German division consists roughly of from 8,000 to 9,000 men, excluding auxiliary forces. With the auxiliary forces the division numbers from 12,000 to 13,000 men. Last year, there were 240 divisions on our front, 179 of them German. This year, there are 260 divisions on our front, 210 of them German, with six German divisions on their way to the front. From 300 to 330 divisions are operating on the Russian side. Thus, we have more divisions than the Germans together with their satellites. This surplus of forces is being used for offensive operations. Otherwise there would have been no offensive. But as time goes on the difference between the number of Russian and German divisions becomes smaller. Another great difficulty is that the Germans are barbarously destroying everything as they retreat. This makes ammunition supply more difficult. That is the reason why our offensive has slowed down. In the last three weeks the Germans launched offensive operations in the Ukraine, south and west of Kiev. They have recaptured Zhitomir, an important railway junction. This has been announced. It looks as if one of these days they will take Korosten, also an important railway junction. In that area the Germans have five new tank divisions and three old tank divisions, altogether 8 tank divisions, and also 22 or 23 infantry and motorised divisions. Their goal is to recapture Kiev. Thus, we are faced with some difficulties in the future.

That is the report part about our operations in the summer. Now a few words about the place where operations of the Anglo-American forces in Europe would be desirable in order to ease the situation on our front. I may be mistaken, but we Russians thought that the Italian theatre was important only to the extent of ensuring free navigation of Allied shipping in the Mediterranean Sea. Only in that sense is the Italian theatre of operations important. That is what we thought, and that is what we continue to think. As for the idea of launching an offensive from Italy directly against Germany, we Russians think that the Italian theatre is not suitable for such purposes. Consequently, the fact is that the Italian theatre is important for free navigation in the Mediterranean, but it is of no significance in the sense of further oper-

ations against Germany, because the Alps block the way and hinder any advance towards Germany. We Russians believe that the best result would be yielded by a blow at the enemy in Northern or North-Western France. Even operations in Southern France would be better than operations in Italy. It would be a good thing if Turkey were prepared to open the way for the Allies. After all, it would be nearer from the Balkans to the heart of Germany. There, the way is not blocked either by the Alps or the Channel. But Germany's weakest spot is France. Of course, this is a difficult operation, and the Germans in France will defend themselves desperately; nevertheless that is the best solution. Those are all the remarks I have.

Churchill: We have long since agreed with the United States to attack Germany via Northern or North-Western France, and extensive preparations for this are under way. It would be necessary to give many facts and figures to show why we were unable to carry out these operations in 1943. But we have decided to attack Germany in 1944. The place for the attack against Germany was selected in 1943. We are now faced with the task of creating the conditions for the possibility of transferring an army into France across the Channel in the late spring of 1944. The forces that we shall be able to accumulate for that purpose in May or June will consist of 16 British and 19 American divisions. But these divisions are stronger numerically than the German divisions of which Marshal Stalin spoke. These forces would be followed by the main force, and it is planned that the whole of Operation Overlord¹ will involve the transfer of about a million men across the Channel in May, June and July. Together with the armies in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean it is all we Britons can give, considering our 46-million population and the numerical strength of our air force. Remanning of the above-mentioned divisions depends on the United States. But the date I mentioned is still far off. It will arrive in six months' time. In the talks between the President and myself we asked each other how best to use our forces in the Mediterranean in order to help the Russians, without any detriment to Overlord, so that this operation could be carried out in time or, possibly, with some delay. We have already sent seven battle-wise divisions from the Mediterranean area, and also a part of the landing craft for Overlord. Taking this into account, and the bad weather in Italy besides, I must say that we are somewhat disappointed at not yet having taken Rome. Our first task is to take Rome, and we expect to wage the decisive battle in January and to win it. General Alexander, the Commander of the 15th Army Group who is under the orders of General Eisenhower, believes that it is quite possible to win the battle for Rome. In addition, it may be possible to capture and destroy more than 11 or 12 enemy divisions. We are not planning to move on into Lombardy or to cross the Alps into Germany. We merely plan to move on somewhat north of Rome up to the Pisa-Rimini line, after which we could make the landing in Southern France and across the Channel.

The next important question is to convince Turkey to enter the war. This would make possible the opening of communications through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and we could send supplies to Russia across the Black Sea. Besides, we could use the Turkish airfields to fight the enemy. It would take only a small force to occupy Rhodes and other Islands. We could then establish direct contact with the Russians and send them supplies continuously. We have been able up to now to send only four convoys to Russia's northern ports, because of a shortage of escorts but if a way is opened across the Black Sea we could regularly send supplies to southern Russian ports.

Stalin: It should be said that these convoys arrived without losses, without having met the enemy on the way.

Churchill: How can we make Turkey enter the war? What will she have to do? Will she have to attack Bulgaria and declare war on Germany? Will she have to start offensive operations or should she refrain from advancing into Thrace? What would be the Russian attitude to the Bulgarians who still remember that Russia liberated them from the Turks? What effect would that have on the Rumanians who are already looking for ways out of the war? How would that affect Hungary? Would not the result of this be

¹ Overlord – the code name for the forced crossing of the Channel

great political changes among many countries? All these are questions on which our Russian friends, naturally, have their own views.

Are our operations in the eastern part of the Mediterranean, which could cause some delay in the operation across the Channel, of any interest to the Soviet Government?

We do not as yet have any definite decision on this question, and we have come here to settle it.

Roosevelt: There is another possibility. It might be expedient to make a landing in the northern part of the Adriatic when the Soviet armies approach Odessa.

Churchill: If we take Rome and block Germany from the south, we would then commence operations in Western or Southern France, and also extend assistance to the guerrilla armies. These operations are not yet worked out in detail. A commission could be set up to study the question and draw up a document in full detail.

Stalin: I have a few questions: I understand that there are 35 divisions for invasion operations in the north of France.

Churchill: Yes, that is correct.

Stalin: Before the operations to invade the north of France it is planned to carry out the operation in the Italian theatre to take Rome, after which it is planned to go on the defensive in Italy.

Churchill: Yes. We are already withdrawing seven divisions from Italy.

Stalin: I also understand that three other operations are planned, one of which will consist of a landing in the Adriatic area.

Churchill: The carrying out of these operations may be useful to the Russians. After the seven divisions are dispatched from the Mediterranean area, we shall have up to 35 divisions for the invasion of Northern France. In addition, we shall have 20 or 23 divisions in Northern Italy.

I should like to add that the greatest problem is the transfer of the necessary forces. As I have already pointed out, Operation Overlord will be started by 35 divisions. From then on the number of troops will be increased by divisions transferred from the U.S.A.; their number will go up to 50 or 60. I want to add that in the next six months the British and American air force now in Britain will be doubled and trebled. In addition, work is being continuously carried on to accumulate forces in Britain.

Stalin: Another question. Did I understand correctly that apart from the operations to take Rome it is planned to carry out another operation in the Adriatic, and also an operation in Southern France?

Churchill: The plan is to carry out an attack in Southern France at the moment Operation Overlord is launched.

Troops that can be released from Italy will be used for this. But this operation has not yet been worked out in detail.

Stalin: Another question: if Turkey enters the war what is to be done in that case?

Churchill: I can say that it would take no more than two or three divisions to take the islands along the west coast of Turkey so as to allow the supply ships to go to Turkey, and also to open the route to the Black Sea. But the first thing we shall do is send the Turks 20 air squadrons and several air defence regiments, which can be done without detriment to other operations.

Stalin: In my opinion, it would be better to make Operation Overlord the basis of all operations in 1944. If a landing were made in Southern France at the same time as that operation, both groups of forces could join in France. That is why it would be well to have two operations: Operation Overlord and the landing in Southern France as a supporting operation. At the same time the operation in the Rome area would be a diversionary operation. In carrying out the landing in France from the North and the South there could be a build-up of forces when these forces are joined. France is Germany's weak spot. As for Turkey, I doubt that Turkey will enter the war. She will not join the war no matter what pressure we exert. That is my opinion.

Churchill: We understood that the Soviet Government is highly interested in making Turkey enter the war. Of course, we may fail to make Turkey enter the war, but we must try to do everything in this respect.

Stalin: Yes, we must try to get Turkey to enter the war.

Churchill: I agree with Marshal Stalin's considerations concerning the undesirability of dispersing the forces but if we have 25 divisions in the Mediterranean area three or four divisions and 20 air squadrons may well be set aside for Turkey, particularly since they are at present being used to protect Egypt, and they could be moved from there to the north.

Stalin: That is a big force, these 20 air squadrons. Of course, it would be a good thing if Turkey entered the war.

Churchill: I'm afraid that in this six-month period, during which we could take Rome and prepare for big operations in Europe, our army will remain inactive and will not exert pressure on the enemy. I fear that in that case Parliament would reproach me for not giving any assistance to the Russians.

Stalin: I think that Overlord is a big operation. It would be considerably facilitated and would be sure to have an effect if it were supported from the south of France. I personally would go to this extreme. I would go on the defensive in Italy, abandoning the capture of Rome, and would start an operation in Southern France, drawing off German forces from Northern France. In about two or three months I would start the operation in the north of France. This plan would ensure the success of Operation Overlord; the two armies could meet, and that would result in a build up of forces.

Churchill: I could adduce even more arguments but I wish to say only that we would be weaker if we did not take Rome. Besides, in order to carry out an air offensive against Germany it is necessary to reach the Pisa-Rimini line. I should like the military specialists to discuss this question. The struggle for Rome is already on, and we expect to take Rome in January. Refusal to take Rome would mean our defeat, and I could not explain this to the House.

Roosevelt: We could carry out Overlord on time if there were no operations in the Mediterranean. If there are operations in the Mediterranean this will defer the date of Operation Overlord. I should not like to delay Overlord.

Stalin: From the experience of our operations we know that success is gained where the blow is dealt from two sides, and that operations undertaken from one side do not yield enough effect. That is why we try to strike at the enemy from two sides to make him shuttle his forces from one side to another. I think that in this case too it would be well to carry out the operation from the south and the north of France.

Churchill: I personally quite agree with this, but I think that we might undertake diversionary acts in Yugoslavia, and also make Turkey join the war, regardless of the invasion of Southern or Northern France. I personally regard the idleness of our army in the Mediterranean as a highly negative fact. That is why we cannot guarantee that the date of May 1 will be met precisely. It would be a big mistake to fix that date. I cannot sacrifice the operations in the Mediterranean just to keep the date of May 1. Of course we must come to a definite agreement on the matter. This question could be discussed by our military specialists.

Stalin: All right. We did not expect a discussion of purely military matters, that is why we did not invite representatives of the General Staff to come along, but I think that Marshal Voroshilov and I can arrange something.

Churchill: What are we to do with the question of Turkey? Should we also refer it to the military specialists?

Stalin: It is both a political and a military question. Turkey is an ally of Great Britain and has friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Turkey should no longer play between us and Germany.

Churchill: I may possibly have six or seven questions concerning Turkey. But I should first like to consider them.

Stalin: Very well.

Roosevelt: Of course, I favour making Turkey enter the war, but if I were in the place of the Turkish President, I would ask a price that could be paid only by inflicting damage on Operation Overlord.

Stalin: There should be an effort to make Turkey fight. She has many idle divisions.

Churchill: We all have feelings of friendship for each other, but we naturally have differences. We need time and patience.

Stalin: That's right.

Roosevelt: And so, the military experts are meeting tomorrow morning, and at four o'clock there is a session of the conference.

Conference of Military Representatives

November 29, 1943, at 10.30

Admiral Leahy suggests that General Brooke should report on the Mediterranean theatre of military operations.

Gen. Brooke says that the cardinal task facing the Anglo-Americans is to exert pressure on the enemy wherever possible. At the same time it is desirable to stem the tide of German divisions that could be directed by the Germans to Northern France where their increase would be undesirable. Operation Overlord will divert a great number of German divisions. But this operation cannot take place before May 1, as the most suitable date for the landing. That is why there will be a break of five or six months before the start of this operation, during which something must be done to draw off the German divisions. Brooke says that the British have big forces in the Mediterranean, which they wish to use in the best possible way.

Addressing General Marshall, Brooke says that if he says anything that does not accord with the opinion of the Americans, he, Brooke, asks that he be interrupted.

Gen. Marshall asks Brooke to continue his review.

Brooke says that the Anglo-American plans provide for active operations on all fronts, including those in the Mediterranean. At present there are 23 German divisions in Central and Northern Italy. The Anglo-Americans have enough forces to move the front up into Northern Italy. But in view of the terrain, the Anglo-American forces are unable to exert enough direct pressure on the German troops, and that is why it will be necessary to carry out a flanking operation from the sea. It is expected that this operation will involve 11 or 12 divisions which the German Command will be forced to reman. As a result of these operations, the present number of German divisions will be kept in Italy; besides, these divisions will be considerably weakened.

On the question of Turkey Brooke says that if the purely political considerations are left aside, Turkey's entry into the war would be highly desirable from the purely military standpoint, and would yield great advantages. First, it would open the sea lanes through the Dardanelles. This would be of great significance in the sense of a possible withdrawal from the war by Rumania and Bulgaria. In addition, contact could be established with the Russians across the Black Sea and supplies sent to Russia that way. Finally, the establishment of Allied air bases in Turkey would make possible raids on key German objectives, in particular the oil fields in Rumania, etc. The shorter route for cargoes across the Black Sea instead of the roundabout way via Persia would release tonnage that could be used elsewhere. To open the way to the Black Sea it would be enough to take several islands along the Turkish coast, beginning from the island of Rhodes. That will not be a difficult operation and will not entail the use of big forces. Brooke says that in the Mediterranean the British have special landing barges which could be used for the operations he described. Operation Overlord would need to be postponed only for the period required for the use of these craft in the Mediterranean. At the same time these operations would hold up the German troops which could otherwise be used by the Germans during Operation Overlord. Brooke says that it is highly important to ensure airfields in Italy in order to start raids on industry in Southern Germany. These air operations, together with raids carried out from Britain, would be highly important

for the conduct of the war in 1944. If the proposal made yesterday were accepted, to go on the defensive in Italy before the operation there is completed, it would be necessary to maintain large forces there in order to hold back the German troops. In consequence, only a limited force could be released for operations in Southern France. Brooke says that he is in full agreement with the strategy proposed by Marshal Stalin to deal the enemy a blow in two places. But this is easier done when the operations are developed on land, than when a sea landing is concerned. In that case two such operations are not always able to support each other because it is not easy to manage the alternation of reserves between the two groupings. If we were to land six or eight divisions in the south of France at present, the Germans could easily cope with them. That is why it is necessary that the two operations should be undertaken closer in time to each other. But this will require a great number of landing facilities. Brooke says that the Allies had planned to carry out a small landing in the Mediterranean during Operation Overlord in order to draw off a part of the German forces from Overlord. But the difficulties lie in the timely reinforcement of such an auxiliary landing. The fact is that only three or four divisions could be landed right away later to be brought up to the strength of 35. It is necessary that the Germans should not be able to increase their forces while the Allied force is still insignificant. Brooke says that that is all concerning land operations and invites Air Force Marshal Portal to make a review of air operations.

Marshal Voroshilov says that it would be better to hear the American report on land operations, and then go on to air operations.

Marshall says that he wants to shed light on the military situation as it appears from the American standpoint. At present the Americans have to fight on two theatres of military operations, namely, in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The main problem is that American operations extend over two such great oceans. In contrast to ordinary conditions the Americans do not have a shortage either of troops or supplies. Marshall says that apart from: the divisions already in action there are more than 50 divisions in the U.S.A. which the Americans would like to use as soon as possible. But the problem lies in tonnage and in landing craft. Marshall says that the Americans can still say that they have achieved considerable successes and are now prepared to intensify their pressure on the enemy. It is the desire of the Americans to put into action all their available forces as soon as possible. When mention is made of landing craft it concerns above all ships for the transfer of tanks and motorised units. That is just the kind of vessels lacking for the successful realisation of the operations in the Mediterranean of which General Brooke spoke. Marshall repeats that the Americans do not have any shortage either of troops or supplies. Marshall points out that the Americans are deeply interested in reducing transportation time and the stay of ships in ports. Marshall says that the advantage of Operation Overlord is that it involves the shortest distance to be overcome at the initial moment. Subsequently, it is planned to transfer troops to France directly from the United States. About 60 American divisions are to be transferred to France. Marshall says that no definite decisions have yet been taken in respect of the Mediterranean, because the idea was to discuss this question at Tehran. The question now is what is to be done in the next three, and depending on that, the next six months. Marshall says that it is highly dangerous to undertake an operation in Southern France two months before Operation Overlord, but it is very true, at the same time, that an operation in Southern France would promote the success of Operation Overlord. Marshall thinks that the landing in Southern France should be carried out two or three weeks before Operation Overlord. It must be borne in mind that a serious obstacle to these operations will be the German destruction of all ports. For a long time the armies will have to be supplied across the open coast. American combat engineers have extensive experience in restoring ports, but Marshall nevertheless believes that there will be some delay. He says that during the landing at Salerno only 108 tons a day of supplies could be got through in the first 18 days. Altogether 189,000 men were transferred across the open coast. It must also be borne in mind that this requires strong fighter cover from the air. Marshall says that at Salerno the Anglo-American planes had only from 15 to 20 minutes of action. In Operation

Overlord the planes may have up to 30 minutes. Marshall points out once again that the problem facing the Americans is not a shortage of troops or supplies, but a shortage of landing craft. Marshall says that he would like Marshal Voroshilov to understand that in the Pacific the Americans are now carrying out five landing operations accompanied by heavy air battles. Four other landing operations are to be undertaken in the course of January. Marshall says that that is all he wished to say.

Leahy suggests that Air Force Marshal Portal should add to the reports of Brooke and Marshall.

Marshal Portal declares that he will speak only of air operations. Up to now the main raids on Germany were carried out from Britain. Now such raids are being started also from the Mediterranean area. At present, the Anglo-Americans are dropping from 15,000 to 30,000 tons of bombs on Germany a month, and their main purpose is to destroy the enemy's industry, communications and air force. In addition, considerable numbers of German fighter planes are being destroyed from the air. There is a heavy struggle ahead but it can be safely said that the Anglo-American plan of destroying the German Air Force will be crowned with success. That the plan is being successfully implemented is evident from the deployment of the enemy's forces. At present, there are from 1,650 to 1,700 fighters in Western and Southern Germany, while there are only 750 German fighters on all the other fronts. How sensitive the Germans are to the raids is evident from the fact that only one raid by the Anglo-American air force on Southern Germany, undertaken from the Mediterranean, forced the Germans to transfer 300 fighter planes from Central Germany. Portal says that he understands that Soviet aircraft is almost entirely engaged in land battles but it would be well for the Soviet command to have the possibility of setting aside a part of the air force for bombing Eastern Germany. This would have a great effect on the situation on all the other fronts. Portal says that that is all he wished to say.

Leahy says that it would be well to hear the opinion of Marshal Voroshilov.

Voroshilov says that as he understood from General Marshall's report, the Americans have from 50 to 60 divisions which they want to use in France, and the only delay is in transport and landing facilities. Voroshilov asks what is being done to solve the problem of transport and landing facilities.

Voroshilov says that he understood from General Marshall's report that the Americans regard Operation Overlord as the principal operation, and asks, whether General Brooke, as the chief of the British General Staff, also regards this operation as the principal one, and whether or not he considers that this operation could be replaced by another operation in the Mediterranean area or elsewhere.

Marshall says that he would like to reply to Marshal Voroshilov's question about the preparations for Operation Overlord. Everything is now being done to carry out Operation Overlord, but the whole question turns on transport and landing facilities. Marshall adds that while there was only one American division in Britain in August, at present there are already nine American divisions and more divisions are coming up.

Voroshilov refers to the reports made by Generals Dean and Ismey at the Moscow Conference, which said that there was large-scale construction of landing facilities in Britain and the United States, and that preparations were under way for the construction of temporary floating ports, and asks whether it can now be said that this construction will eventually ensure the necessary quantity of landing craft by the time Operation Overlord is to start.

Marshall replies that General Brooke can say more about the ports. As far as it concerns the United States, everything is being done to have all the necessary preparations completed by the start of Operation Overlord. In particular, landing barges, each to carry up to 40 tanks, are being readied.

Brooke says that he would first like to answer Marshal Voroshilov's first question as to the view taken of Operation Overlord by the British. Brooke says that the British attach great importance to this operation and regard it as an essential part of this war. But for the success of this operation there must be definite prerequisites, which would prevent the Germans from using the good roads of Northern France to bring up reserves. Brooke says that the British believe such prerequisites will exist in 1944. All British forces were reorganised for the forthcoming operations. Special divisions are being trained for the pur-

pose. At present, four divisions have already been transferred from Italy and Africa. A part of the landing ships has also been transferred from the Mediterranean. The British are doing everything to realise these operations, which must be carried out in the course of 1944. But the difficulties of the Anglo-Americans lie in landing ships. In order to be ready for May 1, the bulk of the landing ships should be transferred from the Mediterranean now. But that would result in a suspension of operations in Italy. At the same time the British would like to keep the maximum number of German divisions in continuous action. That is required not only to draw off German forces from the Russian front, but also for the success of Operation Overlord. As for the construction of temporary floating ports, Brooke says that experiments in that respect are now under way. Some of these experiments were not as successful as expected, but at any rate there is success in this matter. Brooke says that the success or failure of the forthcoming operation will depend by and large on the availability of these ports.

Voroshilov says that he wants to ask General Brooke once again whether the British regard Operation Overlord as the principal one.

Brooke says that he had expected this question. He, Brooke, must say that he would not like to see the failure of the operation either in Northern or in Southern France. But in certain circumstances these operations are doomed to failure.

Voroshilov says that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet General Staff regard the operations in the Mediterranean as of secondary significance. Marshal Stalin believes, however, that an operation in Southern France, carried out two or three months before the operation in Northern France, could be of decisive significance for the success of Overlord. The experience of the war, and the successes of the Anglo-American troops in North Africa and the landing operations in Italy, the operations of the Anglo-American air force against Germany, the organisational trim of the forces of the United States and the United Kingdom, the powerful equipment of the United States, the naval strength of the Allies and especially their superiority in the Mediterranean, show that given the will, Overlord can be a success. Will is the only thing required.

Voroshilov says that the military must plan operations in such a way that auxiliary operations, far from hindering the principal operation, should promote it in every way. Voroshilov then goes on to say that Marshal Stalin's proposal is to have the cross-Channel operation supported by the action of Allied forces in the south of France. With that aim in view he allows the possibility of going on the defensive in Italy, and of making a landing in Southern France with the forces released, so as to strike at the enemy from two sides. If the operation in Southern France cannot be carried out two or three months before Operation Overlord, Marshal Stalin does not insist on it at all. This landing can be carried out either simultaneously, or even somewhat later than Operation Overlord. But it must take place.

As for the operations of the Soviet Air Force, it is well known that it is engaged in combat operations together with the land forces. At present, there are on the Soviet German front 210 German divisions alone, there being 260 enemy divisions altogether, as Marshal Stalin reported. The intensity of the combat operations has drawn our air force to the front and rear of the enemy, and we have no possibility of using any air force for raids on Eastern Germany, but, of course, as soon as this becomes possible, our Supreme Command will take a relevant decision.

Voroshilov says that we regard the operation across the Channel as not an easy one. We realise that this operation is more difficult than the forced crossing of rivers. Still, on the basis of our experience of the forced crossing of big rivers, such as the Dnieper, the Desna, and the Sozh, whose right bank is mountainous and in addition was well fortified by the Germans, we can say that the operation across the Channel, if it is carried out in earnest, will be a success. On the right bank of the above-mentioned rivers the Germans built strong modern reinforced-concrete fortifications, armed them with powerful artillery, and were able to bring our low left bank under fire to a great depth, preventing our troops from approaching the river; still after concentrated artillery, mine-thrower fire, after powerful strikes by the air force, our troops succeeded in crossing these rivers, and the enemy was routed.

I am sure, says Voroshilov, that if well prepared, and, above all, if well supported by a strong air force, Operation Overlord will be crowned with full success. Needless to say, the Allied air force must secure full domination of the air before the land forces go into action.

Brooke says that the Anglo-Americans also regard the operations in the Mediterranean as operations of secondary importance. But since there are large forces in the Mediterranean area, these operations can and must be carried out in order to help the principal operation. These operations are closely bound up with the entire conduct of the war, and, in particular, with the success of the operation in Northern France.

Brooke says that in connection with Marshal Voroshilov's remarks about the difficulty of the operation across the Channel he would like to say that the British watched the Red Army's forcing of rivers with great interest and admiration. The British think that the Russians have achieved great successes in landing operations. But the cross-Channel operation requires special facilities and needs to be worked out in detail. For several years now the Anglo-Americans have been studying all the necessary details connected with this operation. There are considerable difficulties also in the fact that there are beaches on the shore of France, and big sand banks. That is why in many places ships find it hard to approach the shore itself. All this requires preparations.

Voroshilov says that in August or September the British held exercises in the Channel area. He, Voroshilov, would like to know how the British assess the results of these exercises.

Brooke replies that the purpose of these exercises was to bring about an air battle with the Germans. In addition, these exercises did a great deal for the training of the troops. It was not, of course, a landing exercise. Such exercises are carried out by the British on the coast of Britain.

Voroshilov asks how the Germans reacted to these manoeuvres.

Brooke replies that the Germans failed to react to these manoeuvres to the degree expected by the British.

Marshall says that he must raise an objection to Marshal Voroshilov's statements on a cross-Channel landing. He, Marshall, was trained in land operations, he also had knowledge of the forced crossing of rivers, but when he came up against landing operations across the ocean, he had to start all over again. For if a defeat of troops landed in a forced crossing of a river is only a setback, a defeat in a landing across the ocean is a disaster.

Voroshilov says that he does not agree with this. In such a serious operation as Overlord the main thing is organisation, planning and well thought-out tactics. If the tactics accord with the set task, even a setback for the advance force will be only a setback, and not a disaster. The air force must win domination of the air and must crush the enemy's artillery, and after the intensive artillery preparation only the advance force is to be sent out. After this force consolidates its positions and appears to have succeeded, the main force is to be landed.

Marshall says that another thing that must be borne in mind here is that artillery support from the sea is more complicated than from the opposite bank of a river.

Voroshilov agrees with this and asks what is the expected ratio between the German and the Anglo-American air force by the start of the invasion.

Portal replies that it will be five or six to one.

Voroshilov says that agreement should be reached on the decision to be adopted at this conference.

Brooke says that he considers that not all the questions have yet been discussed at this conference, and therefore proposes that the conference be adjourned until tomorrow.

It is agreed to adjourn the session until November 30. The talk continued for three hours.

The Second Sitting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain. November 29, 1943

Opened: 16.00; Closed: 19.40

Roosevelt: I do not know what went on at the conference of the military this morning. I suggest therefore that Marshal Voroshilov, General Brooke and General Marshall should report to us on their work.

Stalin: I agree, but it appears that the military have not yet finished.

Churchill: I think it would still be useful to hear the military.

Brooke: Our conference today was not finished. We started out by examining possible military operations and their interrelation. We examined Operation Overlord and all the ensuing consequences. We concentrated on the period intervening from the present to the date of Operation Overlord; we took into account the fact that if we do not carry out active operations in the Mediterranean in this period before Operation Overlord, we shall be giving the Germans the possibility of transferring their troops to the Soviet-German front, or transferring them to the West with the aim of counteracting Overlord. We examined the possibility of continuing our operations in Italy, where we are holding German divisions, and where we have concentrated large forces. We then turned our attention to the East and examined the desirability of Turkey's entry into the war, and the possible consequences this may have in terms of helping us to conduct the war and open the Dardanelles so as to supply the Soviet Union, and also of opening a way to the Balkans. We examined the possible operations in Southern France in combination with Operation Overlord. The Chief of Staff of the British Air Force reviewed the operations of the Anglo-American Air Force against Germany, and showed the effect of these operations on the over-all course of the war. General Marshall gave figures on the concentration of the American forces in Britain, and spoke of the preparations of the British troops for going over from the defensive to the offensive. The question of Overlord was also studied. Marshal Voroshilov asked several questions which we tried to answer. Marshal Voroshilov set forth the view expressed by Marshal Stalin at the conference yesterday in respect of the operations to be carried out next year. That is about all we had time to examine at our sitting this morning.

Would General Marshall like to add anything to my report?

Marshall: There remains little for me to add to what has been said by General Brooke. His report was sufficiently detailed. The problem facing the Americans is not man power but tonnage, special landing facilities and also the availability of air bases sufficiently close to the area of operations. When I say landing facilities, I mean special landing craft capable of carrying up to 40 tanks or vehicles. It is precisely the number of these vessels that is limited. The transfer of American troops, equipment and ammunition to Britain is proceeding according to plan. One million tons of various equipment has already been transported to Britain. But landing facilities remain the limiting factor. We have a plan for the manufacture of landing facilities, which was expanded both in the United States and in Britain. The accelerated production of landing facilities will result in an increase of their number for invasion across the Channel and for operations in the Mediterranean. In short, preparations for Overlord are proceeding according to plan, insofar as materiel and personnel are concerned. The problem is mainly transport and the distribution of landing facilities. As General Brooke has explained, several divisions have already been transferred from Italy.

Voroshilov: The reports of Generals Brooke and Marshall correspond to the talk we had this morning. My questions were intended to specify the technical preparations for Operation Overlord and they were answered in the manner now set forth by General Marshall. We made no effort to specify the dates for Operation Overlord and all the details connected with the operation considering that these questions could be dealt with at our next meeting if it is held.

Stalin: If possible I should like to know who will be appointed to command Operation Overlord.

Roosevelt: This matter has not yet been decided.

Stalin: In that case nothing will come of Operation Overlord. Who bears the moral and military responsibility for the preparation and execution of Operation Overlord? If that is unknown, then Operation Overlord is just so much talk.

- The British General Morgan is responsible for preparing Operation Overlord.

Stalin: Who is responsible for carrying out Operation Overlord?

Roosevelt: We know the men who will take part in carrying out Operation Overlord, with the exception of the commander-in-chief of the operation.

Stalin: It may happen that General Morgan will consider the operation prepared, but after the appointment of the commander responsible for the execution of the operation it may turn out that the commander will consider the operation unprepared. There must be someone who is responsible both for preparing and executing the operation.

- General Morgan was given the assignment of preliminary preparations.

Stalin: Who gave General Morgan this assignment?

Churchill: Several months ago the assignment was given to General Morgan by the Joint Anglo-American Staff with the consent of the President and with my consent. General Morgan was assigned to carry out preparations for Overlord together with the American and British staffs, but the commander-in-chief has not yet been appointed. The British Government has expressed its readiness to place its forces under the command of an American commander-in-chief in Operation Overlord, because the United States is responsible for the concentration and remanning of forces and has a greater number of forces. On the other hand, the British Government proposed the appointment of a British commander-in-chief of operations in the Mediterranean, where the British have a greater number of forces. The question of appointing a commander-in-chief cannot be solved at such a broad sitting as today's. This question should be decided by the three heads of Government among themselves, in private. As the President has just told me – and I confirm this – the decision on the appointment of a commander-in-chief will depend on the talks we are now having.

Stalin: I should like to be understood that the Russians do not claim participation in the appointment of the commander-in-chief, but the Russians would like to know who is going to be the commander. The Russians would like him to be appointed sooner, and would like to see him responsible for the preparations as well as for the carrying out of Operation Overlord.

Churchill: We fully agree with what Marshal Stalin has said and I think the President will agree with me if I say that we shall appoint a commander-in-chief in a fortnight, and shall communicate his name. One of the tasks of the conference is to appoint a commander-in-chief.

Stalin: I have no questions in connection with the reports of Brooke and Marshall.

Churchill: I am somewhat worried by the number and complexity of the problems facing us. This conference is unique. Millions of people look to this conference and place their hopes on it, and I very much wish that we should not part until we have reached agreement on political and military questions we have been trusted to solve. Today, I want to indicate several points requiring study in a subcommittee. The British Staff and I have long been studying the situation in the Mediterranean, where we have quite a big army. We want this army to be in action there in the course of the whole year and to be independent of factors that would force it to be idle. In this connection we ask our Russian allies to examine the whole problem and the various alternatives we shall propose to them as to the best use of our available forces in the Mediterranean area.

There are three questions which require detailed study. The first of these is, of course, the assistance that can be given to Operation Overlord with the use of the forces in the Mediterranean area. What I mean is the scale of the operations which are to be carried out in Southern France from

Northern Italy. The President and I spoke of this yesterday. I do not think the matter has been studied sufficiently to allow a final decision. I should welcome a study of this question by our staffs from the standpoint of its urgency. In this connection Marshal Stalin correctly stressed the importance of a flanking movement in Southern France. The date is important. If operations with smaller forces are started at one point and with bigger forces at another, the first operation will be a failure. Our staffs should discuss the operations on a broader plane. I should like to have enough landing facilities in the Mediterranean to transfer two divisions. If these two divisions are available we could undertake an operation to help the advance of the Anglo-American troops along the Italian Peninsula in order to destroy the enemy forces there. There is another possibility of using these forces. They would be sufficient for the capture of the island of Rhodes in the event Turkey entered the war. The third possibility of using these forces is that, minus their losses, they could be used in Southern France in six months to support Operation Overlord. None of these possibilities is excluded. But the matter of the date is important. The use of these two divisions, no matter for which of the three operations I have indicated they might be used in the Mediterranean, cannot be carried out without deferring Operation Overlord, or without diverting a part of the landing facilities from the area of the Indian Ocean. There is our dilemma. In order to decide which way to choose we should like to hear the view of Marshal Stalin concerning the overall strategic situation, because we are delighted and inspired by the military experience of our Russian allies. I should like to propose that the study of the question I have raised be continued by our military committee tomorrow.

The next problem I want to speak of is political rather than military, because the military forces we intend to set aside for its solution are insignificant. I have in mind the Balkans. In the Balkans there are 21 German divisions apart from garrison troops. Of this number, i.e., of the 21 divisions, 54,000 German troops are concentrated in the Aegean Islands. In addition, there are not less than 12 Bulgarian divisions in the Balkans. Altogether, there are 42 enemy divisions in the Balkans. If Turkey should enter the war the Bulgarians would be forced to withdraw their troops to the front in Thrace against Turkey. This will result in an increased danger to the German divisions in the Balkans. I give these figures to show the enormous importance of this factor in the Balkans, where we do not intend to send our regular divisions and where we intend to limit ourselves to raids by combined detachments. In the Balkans we have neither interests nor ambitions. All we want to do is to tie down the 21 German divisions in the Balkans and to destroy them, if possible. I propose, therefore, that a meeting should be held today of the two Foreign Ministers and a representative appointed by the President to discuss the political aspect of this question. We want to work concertedly with our Russian allies. If there are any difficulties they can be cleared up between ourselves. The military questions could be discussed later.

I pass now to the next question, the question of Turkey. We British are Turkey's allies, and we have assumed the responsibility of trying to convince or make Turkey enter the war before Christmas. If the President should like to join us or to assume the leadership, that will be acceptable to us, but we shall need the full help of Marshal Stalin in implementing the decision adopted at the Moscow Conference. On behalf of the British Government I can say that it is prepared to warn Turkey that if Turkey does not accept the proposal of entering the war this may have the most serious political consequences for Turkey and have an effect on her rights in respect of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. This morning, the military committee composed of our generals discussed the military aspect of the Turkish problem, but the problem of Turkey is a political rather than a military problem. We intend to set aside not more than two or three divisions for operations in the area of Turkey if she enters the war, apart from the air force that we shall also make available.

I have raised several questions which are mainly political, for example, the question of what the Soviet Government thinks about Bulgaria, whether it is inclined, in the event that Turkey declares war on Germany and Bulgaria attacks Turkey, to tell the Bulgarians that it will regard Bulgaria as its enemy.

This will have a great effect on Bulgaria. There are other political problems as well. I propose that the two Foreign Ministers and a representative appointed by the President should study this question and advise us on how to make Turkey enter the war and what the results of this will be. I think these results will be enormous with decisive possibilities. If Turkey declares war on Germany it will be a great blow for the German people. If we manage to make good use of this fact it should neutralise Bulgaria. As for the other countries in the Balkans, Rumania is already looking for a country to which she can capitulate. Hungary is also in confusion. It is time for us to reap the harvest. Now we must pay the price for this harvest, if we consider it expedient. I propose that these questions should be discussed by our three representatives, who, as a result of their discussion, may tell us what can be done to lighten Russia's burden, and to ensure the success of Operation Overlord.

Stalin: As for the two divisions which Mr. Churchill proposes to set aside for help to Turkey and the partisans, we have no disagreements on this question. We regard the assignment of two divisions and help to the partisans as important. But if we are prevailed upon here to discuss military questions, we regard Operation Overlord as the main and decisive question.

I should like the military committee to have a definite task. I propose that the committee be given a definite directive within whose framework it could work. Of course the Russians are in need of help. I should like to state that if the question is one of aid to us, we do expect aid from those who carry out the operations planned, and we expect real aid.

What should our directives to the military committee be? They should stipulate that the date of Operation Overlord should not be postponed, and that May should be the time limit for carrying out this operation. Our second directive should stipulate, in conformity with the desires of the Russians, support of Operation Overlord by a landing in the south of France. If it is impossible to land a force in Southern France two or three months before the start of Operation Overlord, it would be worth while doing this simultaneously with Operation Overlord. If transport difficulties do not allow a landing in Southern France simultaneously with Operation Overlord, the operation in Southern France could be undertaken some time after the start of Operation Overlord. I think that a landing in Southern France would be an auxiliary operation in respect of Overlord. This operation would ensure the success of Operation Overlord. Meanwhile, the operation to take Rome would be of a diverting nature. The third directive would instruct the committee to hurry the appointment of the commander-in-chief for Operation Overlord. It would be best to settle these matters during our stay here, and I see no reason why this cannot be done. We believe that until a commander-in-chief is appointed Operation Overlord cannot be expected to be a success. The appointment of a commander-in-chief is the task of the British and the Americans, but the Russians would like to know who is going to be the commander-in-chief. Those are the three directives to the military committee. If the committee works within the framework of these directives its work can be successful and can be finished earlier. I ask the conference to take account of the considerations I have put forward.

Roosevelt: I listened with interest to everything that was said, beginning from Operation Overlord and ending with the question of Turkey. I attach great importance to dates. If there is agreement on Operation Overlord, there is need to come to agreement on the date of this operation.

Operation Overlord can be carried out in the first week of May or it may be postponed somewhat. The postponement of Overlord would result from our carrying out one or two operations in the Mediterranean, which would require landing facilities and planes. If an expedition is carried out in the eastern part of the Mediterranean and fails it will be necessary to transfer additional materiel and troops to that area. In that case Overlord will not be carried out in time.

Stalin: Against Yugoslavia the Germans have eight divisions, of which five are in Greece. In Bulgaria, there are three or four German divisions, and nine in Italy.

Churchill: Our figures differ from these.

Stalin: Your figures are wrong. In France, the Germans have 25 divisions.

Roosevelt: Our staffs must work out plans in order to tie down the German divisions in the Balkans. These plans must be worked out in such a way that the operations we undertake for that purpose should not prejudice Overlord.

Stalin: That is right.

Churchill: Speaking of measures with respect to the Balkans, I did not mean the use of large forces for these purposes.

Stalin: If possible it would be good to carry out Operation Overlord in May, say the 10th, 15th, or 20th of May.

Churchill: I cannot undertake such an obligation.

Stalin: If Overlord is carried out in August, as Churchill said yesterday, nothing will come of the operation because of the unfavourable weather in that period. April and May are the best months for Overlord.

Churchill: I do not think that we differ in our views as it may seem. I am prepared to do everything that is within the power of the British Government to carry out Operation Overlord at the earliest possible date. But I do not think that the many possibilities available in the Mediterranean should be coldly rejected as being of no importance, just because their use will hold up Operation Overlord for two or three months.

Stalin: The operations in the Mediterranean of which Churchill speaks are merely diversional. I do not deny the importance of these diversions.

Churchill: In our opinion the numerous British troops must not be idle for six months. They should carry on operations against the enemy, and with the help of our American allies we hope to destroy the German divisions in Italy. We cannot remain passive in Italy, for that will spoil our whole campaign there. We must extend assistance to our Russian friends.

Stalin: According to Churchill it would appear that the Russians want the British to be idle.

Churchill: If the vessels are withdrawn from the Mediterranean, this will considerably reduce the scale of operations in that area. Marshal Stalin will recall that at the Moscow Conference conditions were specified under which Operation Overlord can be a success. These conditions stipulate that by the time of the invasion there should be not more than 12 German mobile divisions in France, and that in the course of 60 days the Germans should be unable to transfer more than 15 divisions to reinforce their troops in France. There is no mistake here, for these conditions are the basis of Overlord. We must tie down as many German divisions as possible in Italy, the Balkans, and in the area of Turkey, if she enters the war. German divisions transferred from France are fighting us at the front in Italy. If we are passive on the front in Italy, the Germans will be able to transfer their divisions back to France to the prejudice of Overlord. That is why we must tie up the enemy by action and keep our front in Italy in an active state so as to pin down a sufficient number of German divisions there.

As for Turkey, I agree to insist on her entry into the war. If she refuses to do this, nothing can be done about it. If she does agree we must make use of the Turkish air bases in Anatolia and take Rhodes. One assault division will be enough for this operation. Subsequently, the garrison in the island will be able to defend it. Having received Rhodes and the Turkish bases we shall be able to expel the German garrisons from the other islands of the Aegean Sea and open up the Dardanelles. That is not an operation that will require a great force. It is a limited operation. If Turkey enters the war and we take Rhodes we shall have secured superiority in this area and the time will come when all the islands in the Aegean Sea will be ours. If Turkey does not enter the war we shall not grieve over the matter and I shall not ask for troops to take Rhodes and the islands of the Aegean Sea. But in that case Germany will not grieve either, for she will continue to dominate the area. If Turkey enters the war, our troops stationed in Egypt for the purposes of defence, and our air force there also defending Egypt, could be advanced to the fore.

After the taking of the Aegean Islands these forces could be used in areas north of Egypt. I suggest a thorough discussion of this question. It will be a great misfortune for us, if Turkey does not join the war, from the standpoint of Germany's continued domination of that area. I want the troops and planes now idle in Egypt to be used as soon as possible if Turkey enters the war. Everything depends on the landing facilities. The difficulty lies in the transportation of troops across the sea. I am always prepared to discuss all details with our Allies. But everything depends on the availability of landing facilities. If these landing facilities are left in the Mediterranean or in the Indian Ocean to the prejudice of Overlord, then the success of Overlord and the success of the operation in Southern France cannot be guaranteed. The operations in Southern France will require a great quantity of landing facilities. I ask this to be taken into consideration.

Finally, I consider acceptable and, on behalf of the British Government, agree to the working out of directives for the military committee. I suggest that we work out our own directives to the committee together with the Americans. I think that our views coincide more or less.

Stalin: How long do we intend to stay at Tehran?

Churchill: I am prepared to stop eating until these directives are worked out.

Stalin: What I mean is when shall we end our conference?

Roosevelt: I am prepared to stay at Tehran as long as Marshal Stalin remains at Tehran.

Churchill: If it is necessary I am prepared to stay in Tehran for good.

Stalin: I should like to know how many French divisions there are at present.

Roosevelt: The plan is to arm 11 French divisions. But of this number only five are ready now, and another four divisions are to be equipped shortly.

Stalin: Are these French divisions in action or are they idle?

Roosevelt: One division is fighting in Italy, one or two divisions are in Corsica and Sardinia.

Stalin: How does the command intend to use these French divisions?

Marshall: The plan is to merge the French Corps with the Fifth Army operating on the left flank in Italy. One division is now being transferred to the front in Italy where it will be tested in action. After this a decision will be taken on the most expedient use of the French divisions. The time required to equip another four French divisions depends on the time it will take to train the personnel of these divisions.

Stalin: Are these divisions of the French type?

Marshall: These divisions are of the American type and consist of 15,000 men each. Most of the soldiers are not Frenchmen. In the armoured divisions, three-quarters of the personnel are French and the rest are Africans.

Roosevelt: I should like to say a few words. I think that if we three give instructions to our military committee it will be able to discuss these questions.

Stalin: There is no need for any military committee. We can solve all the questions here at the conference. We must decide on the date, the commander-in-chief and the need of an auxiliary operation in Southern France. We Russians are limited in time of stay at Tehran. We could stay on until December 1, but we have to leave on the 2nd. The President will recall that we agreed on three or four days.

Roosevelt: I think that my proposal will simplify the work of the staff. The military committee must take Operation Overlord as a basis. The committee must table its proposals on the auxiliary operations in the Mediterranean. It must also bear in mind that these operations may hold up Overlord.

Stalin: The Russians would like to know the date on which Overlord is to start in order to prepare their blow at the Germans.

Roosevelt: The date of Operation Overlord was determined at Quebec. Only the most serious changes in the situation can justify any changes in the date determined for this operation.

Churchill: I have just heard the directive which the President proposed to give the committee. I should like to have the opportunity of considering the President's proposals. I have no objections to

this in principle, but I should like to have time to examine the President's proposals. I am very pleased to spend December 1 at Tehran, and to leave on December 2. It is not clear to me whether or not the President proposes the establishment of a military committee, for Marshal Stalin suggests that we do without a committee. Personally, I want such a committee.

As for determining the date of Operation Overlord, if it is decided to have an examination of strategic questions in the military committee...

Stalin: We are not demanding any examination.

Roosevelt: We are all aware that the contradictions between us and the British are small. I object to the postponement of Operation Overlord, while Churchill lays emphasis on the importance of operations in the Mediterranean. The military committee could clear up these questions.

Stalin: We can solve these problems ourselves, because we have more rights than the military committee. If I may permit myself an incautious question, I should like to know whether the British believe in Operation Overlord or simply speak of it to reassure the Russians.

Churchill: Given the conditions which were indicated at the Moscow Conference, I am quite sure that we shall have to transfer all our available forces against the Germans when Operation Overlord is launched.

Roosevelt: We are very hungry now, and I propose that we adjourn to attend the dinner given for us today by Marshal Stalin. I propose that our military committee should continue its conference tomorrow morning.

Stalin: There is no need for the meeting of a military committee. That is superfluous. Only we ourselves can speed up our work.

Churchill: Would it be better for the President and myself to co-ordinate our views and then report to you our common standpoint?

Stalin: This would accelerate our work.

Churchill: And what about the committee consisting of Hopkins and the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs?

Stalin: This committee is not required either. But if Mr. Churchill insists, we do not object to its formation.

Roosevelt: Tomorrow, Hopkins, Molotov and Eden could have talk with each other at luncheon.

Stalin: What are we going to do tomorrow? 'Will the proposals of Churchill and Roosevelt be ready?

Roosevelt: The proposals will be ready, and I suggest that Churchill, Marshal Stalin and I have luncheon at one thirty and discuss all questions.

Churchill: That will be our programme for tomorrow.

Stalin: I agree.

The minutes of the second session of the Teheran Conference. November 29, 1943

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

STALIN. If possible, it would be good to implement Operation Overlord in May – say, 10–15–20 May.

CHURCHILL. I cannot promise that.

STALIN. ...April and May are the most appropriate months for Overlord. <...> How long do we plan to stay in Teheran?

CHURCHILL. I'm willing to forego on food until these directives are worked out.

STALIN. I'm asking when we are planning to finish our conference.

ROOSEVELT. I'm ready to stay in Teheran so long as Marshal Stalin is in Teheran.

CHURCHILL. I'm willing to stay in Teheran forever, if necessary. <...>

STALIN. The Russians want to know when Operation Overlord will start in order to prepare their own attack on the Germans. <...>

ROOSEVELT. As we all know, the differences between us and the British are small. I'm against postponing Operation Overlord, while Mr. Churchill is stressing the importance of the operation in the Mediterranean. The military committee should discuss this matter further.

STALIN. We can discuss this matter ourselves, as we have more rights than the military committee.

ВТОРОЕ ЗАСЕДАНИЕ КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ

ГЛАВ ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВ СССР, США и ВЕЛИКОБРИТАНИИ

Ялта, 29 ноября 1945 г.

ПРИСУТСТВУЮТ: От СССР - тов. И. В. Сталин, тов. В. М. Молотов, тов. Д. З. Ворошилов, переводчики: т. т. В. И. Павлов, В. М. Деревков.

От США - Рузвельт, генерал Маршалл, генерал Арнольд, генерал Дин, адмирал Нинг, адмирал Лейт, Гюнкин, Гуррман, секретари и переводчики: Болен, Яйер, Гойман.

От Великобритании - Черчилль, Иден, адмирал Кеннингхэм, генерал Брук, фельдмаршал Дилл, маршал авиации Кортал, генерал Мартель, генерал Исмей, бригадир Коллис, переводчик Бэр.

Начало заседания в 16 ч.

Конец заседания в 19 ч. 40 м.

РУЗВЕЛЬТ. Я не знаю, что было сегодня утром на совещании военных. Поэтому я предлагаю, чтобы Маршалл, Ворошилов, генерал Брук и генерал Маршалл сделали нам сообщение о своей работе.

СТАЛИН. Я согласен, но кажется, у военных дело не готово.

ЧЕРЧИЛЬ. Я думаю, что было бы все-таки полезно заслушать военных.

ДИН. Наше сегодняшнее совещание не было закончено. В первую очередь мы рассмотрели возможные военные операции и их связь между собой. Мы рассмотрели операцию "Сверлорд" и все вытекающие из нее последствия. Мы уделили внимание тому промежутку времени, который остается, считая от настоящего времени, до срока осуществления операции "Сверлорд"; мы приняли во внимание тот факт, что если мы не предпримем активных операций в Средиземном море в этот промежуток времени до осуществления "Сверлорда", то мы дадим немцам возможность перебросить свои войска на советско-германский фронт или перебросить их на Запад, в целях противодействия "Сверлорду". Мы рассмотрели возможность продолжения наших операций в Италии, где мы удерживаем немецкие дивизии и где у нас сконцентрированы крупные силы. Мы также рассмотрели желательности оказания помощи партизанам в Игославии в смысле предоставления им большого снабжения с тем, чтобы они сковали возможно большее немецких сил. Мы затем обратили внимание на Восток и рассмотрели

вопрос о желательности вступления Турции в войну и о том, какие последствия это может иметь, в смысле помощи нам в ведении войны и в смысле открытия Дарданелл, для снабжения Советского Союза, а также открытия пути на Балканы. Мы рассмотрели возможные операции в Южной Франции в комбинации с операцией "Оверморд". Начальник Штаба британских военно-воздушных сил сделал обзор операций англо-американских военно-воздушных сил против Германии и показал воздействие этих операций на общий ход войны. Генерал Маршалл сообщил цифры, относящиеся к концентрации американских сил в Англии, и говорил о подготовке британских войск к переходу от обороны к наступлению. Был также затронут вопрос об операции "Оверморд". Маршалл Ворошилов задал несколько вопросов, на которые мы постарались дать ответы. При этом Маршалл Ворошилов изложил точку зрения, высказанную вчера Маршаллом Сталину на совещании, в отношении операций, которые должны быть предприняты в будущем году. Вот, приблизительно, все, что мы успели рассмотреть в течение нашего заседания сегодня утром.

Может быть, генерал Маршалл имеет что-нибудь добавить к моему сообщению?

МАРШАЛЛ. Мне остается немного добавить к тому, что было сказано генералом Бруком. Он сделал достаточно подробное сообщение. Для американцев проблемой является не людские ресурсы, а тоннаж, специальные десантные средства, а также наличие авиабаз в районе, достаточно близко расположенном к району операций. Когда я говорю о десантных средствах, я имею в виду специальные десантные суда, на которых можно перевозить до 40 танков или автомобилей. Как раз именно количество этих судов является ограничительным. Перевоска в Англию американских войск, снаряжения и боеприпасов происходит по плану. В Англию уже перевезен 1 миллион тонн всякого снаряжения. Однако, лимитирующим фактором попрежнему являются десантные средства. Мы имеем план производства десантных средств, который был расширен как в Соединенных Штатах, так и в Англии. Ускорение производства десантных средств приведет к увеличению их количества для вторжения через Канал и для операций в Средиземном море. Говоря коротко, подготовка к операции "Оверморд" происходит по плану, поскольку речь может идти о материалах и людских ресурсах. Проблемой является главным образом транспорт и распределение десантных средств. Как

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генерал Брук пояснил, из Италии уже было перебронировано несколько дивизий.

БОРШИНОВ. Сообщения генералов Брука и Маршалла соответствуют той беседе, которую мы имели сегодня утром. Мои вопросы касались уточнения технической подготовки и операции "Сверлорд", и на них были даны ответы так, как это было изложено сейчас генералом Маршаллом. Что касается вопросов, поставленных генералом Бруком, а именно вопросов о Югославии и Турции, то мы не обсуждали этих вопросов в деталях на нашем совещании, и я думаю, что они будут представлять собой предмет ваших переговоров при следующей нашей встрече. Мы также не пытались уточнить сроки "Сверлорда" и всех подробностей, связанных с этой операцией, полагая, что этим вопросам можно будет уделить внимание на следующем нашем совещании, если оно состоится.

СТАЛИН. Если можно, то я хотел бы получить ответ на вопрос о том, кто будет назначен командующим операцией "Сверлорд".

БОРШИНОВ. Этот вопрос еще не решен.

СТАЛИН. Тогда ничего не выйдет из операции "Сверлорд". Кто несет моральную и военную ответственность за подготовку и выполнение операции "Сверлорд"? Если это неизвестно, тогда операция "Сверлорд" является лишь разговором.

БОРШИНОВ. Английский генерал Морган несет ответственность за подготовку операции "Сверлорд".

СТАЛИН. Кто несет ответственность за проведение операции "Сверлорд"?

БОРШИНОВ. Нам известны все лица, которые будут участвовать в осуществлении операции "Сверлорд", за исключением главнокомандующего этой операцией.

СТАЛИН. Может случиться так, что генерал Морган сочтет операцию подготовленной, но после назначения командующего, который будет отвечать за осуществление этой операции, может оказаться, что командующий сочтет операцию не подготовленной. Должно быть одно лицо, которое отвечало бы как за подготовку, так и за проведение операции.

БОРШИНОВ. Генералу Моргану были поручены предварительные приготовления.

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СТАЛИН. Кто поручил это генералу Моргану?

ЧЕРЧИЛЛЬ. Несколько месяцев тому назад это было поручено генералу Моргану Об'единенным англо-американским штабом с согласия президента и с моего согласия. Генералу Моргану было поручено вести подготовку операции "Оверлорд" совместно с американским и британским штабами, однако, главнокомандующий еще не назначен. Британское правительство выразило готовность поставить свои силы под командование американского главнокомандующего в операции "Оверлорд", так как Соединенные Штаты несут ответственность за концентрацию и пополнение войск и имеют численное превосходство в войсках. С другой стороны, британское правительство предложило назначить британского главнокомандующего операцией в Средиземном море, где англичане имеют численное превосходство в войсках. Вопрос о назначении главнокомандующего нельзя решить на таком обширном заседании, как сегодняшнее. Этот вопрос следует решить трем главам правительства между собой, в узком кругу. Как мне сейчас сказал президент, - и к это подтверждает, - решение вопроса о назначении главнокомандующего будет зависеть от переговоров, которые мы ведем здесь.

СТАЛИН. Я хочу, чтобы меня поняли, что русские не претендуют на участие в назначении главнокомандующего, но русские хотели бы знать, кто будет командующим. Русские хотели бы, чтобы он скорее был назначен и чтобы он отвечал как за подготовку, так и за проведение операции "Оверлорд".

ЧЕРЧИЛЛЬ. Мы вполне согласны с тем, что сказал Маршал Сталин, и я думаю, что президент согласится со мной в том, что через 2 недели мы назначим главнокомандующего и сообщим его фамилию. Одной из задач конференции и является назначение главнокомандующего.

СТАЛИН. В связи с сообщением Брука и Маршала у меня вопросов нет.

ЧЕРЧИЛЛЬ. Я немного обеспокоен количеством и сложностью проблем, стоящих перед нами. Это совещание является единственным в своем роде. На это совещание возлагают свои надежды и устремляют свои взоры миллионы людей, и я очень хочу, чтобы мы не раз'ехались до тех пор, пока мы не достигнем соглашения по политическим и военным вопросам, решение которых нам было

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изерено. Сегодня я намерен указать несколько пунктов, требующих того, чтобы они были изучены в подкомиссиях и британский штаб длительное время изучали положение в Средиземном море, где мы обладаем весьма значительной армией. Мы хотим, чтобы эта армия вела активную борьбу там в течение всего года и была бы независима от тех факторов, которые заставили бы ее пребывать в бездействии. В этой связи мы просим о том, чтобы наши русские соседи рассмотрели всю эту проблему и различные альтернативы, которые мы им предложили в отношении наилучшего использования наших военных сил в районе Средиземного моря.

Имеется три вопроса, которые необходимо детально изучить.

Первым из этих вопросов является, конечно, вопрос о том, какую помощь можно будет оказать операции "Оверлорд", используя те силы, которые находятся в районе Средиземного моря. Речь идет о том, какой масштаб должны принять эти операции, которые должны быть предприняты в Южной Франции из Северной Италии. Об этом вчера говорили я и президент. Я не думаю, что этот вопрос достаточно изучен, чтобы принять окончательное решение. Я призываю бы изучение этого же вопроса нашими штабами с точки зрения его срочности. В связи с этим Маршал Стаклин правильно подчеркнул важность обходной операции в Южной Франции. Срок имеет значение. Если в первом пункте будут начаты операции с меньшими силами, а во втором пункте - с более крупными, то первая операция потерпит крушение. Наши штабы должны обсудить операции в более широком плане. Я хотел бы иметь в Средиземном море достаточное количество десантных средств для переброски двух дивизий. При наличии этих сил в количестве двух дивизий мы имели бы возможность предпринять операции с целью помощи продвижению англо-американских войск вдоль полуострова Италии для уничтожения находящейся там сил противника. Имеется другая возможность использования этих сил. Их было бы достаточно для захвата острова Годо в том случае, если бы Турция вступила в войну. Третья возможность использования этих сил заключается в том, что они, за вычетом потерь, могли бы быть использованы через 3 месяца для поддержки операции "Оверлорд" в Южной Франции. Ни одна из этих возможностей не исключена. Но значение имеет вопрос о сроке. Использование этих двух дивизий, независимо от того, для какой из трех перечисленных групп операций они будут использованы в районе Средиземного моря, не может быть осуществлено без того, чтобы это не привело к отсрочке операции

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"Оверлорд" или к отвлечению части десантных средств из района Индийского океана. В этом состоит явный дилемма. Чтобы решить, какой путь нам избрать, мы хотим услышать точку зрения Маршалла Сталина по поводу общего стратегического положения, так как военный опыт наших русских союзников приводит нас в восхищение и воодушевляет нас. Я предложил бы, чтобы изучение поставленного мною вопроса было продолжено внутри нашей военной комиссии.

Следующая проблема, о которой я хочу говорить, носит скорее политический, нежели военный характер, так как военные силы, которые мы намерены выслать для ее разрешения, незначительны. Речь идет об Игославии и о Далматском побережье. На Балканах имеется 21 германская дивизия и, помимо этого, гарнизоны немецкой армии. Из этого количества, т.е. из 21-й дивизии - 54 тысячи германских войск сконцентрировано на Эгейских островах. Кроме того, на Балканах имеется также не менее 12 болгарских дивизий. Всего на Балканах насчитывается 42 дивизии противника, и эти дивизии сколачиваются и задерживаются борьбой партизан и народов балканских стран. Если бы Турция вступила в войну, то болгары вынуждены были бы отвести свои войска на фронт во Фракии против Турции. Это приведет к тому, что опасность, угрожающая германским дивизиям, находящимся на Балканах, усилится. Я привел эти цифры для того, чтобы показать громадное значение этого фактора на Балканах, куда мы не предполагаем посылать наши регулярные дивизии и где мы предполагаем ограничиться лишь рейдами комбинированных отрядов и снабжением партизан. Я думаю, что было бы весьма близоруко позволить немцам сократить Игославию так, как это они до некоторой степени делают сейчас, если мы не дадим оружия Тито. Но, конечно, балканский театр является фактором, заставляющим противника напрягать свои ресурсы, и таким образом, этот театр облегчает тяжелые бои, происходящие на огромном русском фронте. Мы не имеем ни интересов на Балканах, ни честолюбивых устремлений. Всё, что мы хотим сделать, это снова 21 германскую дивизию на Балканах и, по мере возможности, уничтожить их. Поэтому я предлагаю, чтобы сегодня состоялось встреча двух министров иностранных дел и представителя, назначенного президентом, для обсуждения политической стороны этого вопроса. Мы стремимся дружно работать с нашими русскими

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сованниками. Если будут трудности, то их можно будет выносить в узком кругу. Военные вопросы можно будет обсудить позже.

Теперь я перехожу к следующему вопросу — к вопросу о Турции. Мы, англичане, являемся союзниками Турции и мы приняла на себя ответственность постараться убедить или заставить Турцию вступить в войну до рождества. Если президент желает к нам присоединиться или пожелает взять на себя руководящую роль, то для нас это будет приемлемо, но мы будем нуждаться в полной помощи со стороны Маршалл Сталина в осуществлении решения, принятого на Московской конференции. От имени британского правительства я могу сказать, что оно готово предупредить Турцию о том, что если Турция не примет предложения о вступлении в войну, то это может иметь серьезные политические последствия для Турции и отразится на ее правах в отношении Босфора и Дарданелл. Сегодня утром военная комиссия, состоящая из наших генералов, обсуждала военную сторону турецкой проблемы, но проблема Турции — это скорее политическая, чем военная проблема. Мы думаем выделить не более 2-3 дивизий для операций в районе Турции в случае вступления ее в войну, но считаем военно-воздушными сил, которые мы также выделяем при этом.

Я поставил несколько вопросов, которые, главным образом, являются политическими вопросами, например, вопрос о том, что Советское Правительство думает по поводу Болгарии, расположено ли оно в том случае, если Турция объявит войну Германии, а Болгария нападет на Турцию, заявить болгарам, что оно будет считать Болгарию своим врагом. Это окажет огромное воздействие на Болгарию. Имеются и другие политические вопросы. Я предлагал, чтобы два министра иностранных дел и представитель, назначенный президентом, изучили этот вопрос и дали нам совет, как заставить Турцию вступить в войну и каковы будут результаты этого. Эти результаты представляют для нас громадную, а возможности решающие. Если Турция объявит войну Германии, то это будет огромным ударом для немецкого народа. Если мы сумеем как следует воспользоваться этим фактом, то это должно нейтрализовать Болгарию. Что касается других стран из Балканов, то Румыния уже сейчас идет ту страну, перед которой она может капитулировать. Венгрия также в смятении. Нам пора покидать катву. Сейчас настало время для того, чтобы уплатить цену за эту катву, если мы считаем это целесообразным. Я предлагал, чтобы эти вопросы были обсуждены нашими тремя представителями, которые могут в результате обсуждения их сказать нам, что можно сделать для облегчения бремени, которое несет Россия, и для того, чтобы обеспечить успех операции "Оверморд".

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СТАЛИН. В расчет позиции Советского Правительства в отношении Болгарии г-н Черчилль может не беспокоиться. Как только Турция объявит войну Германии, а Болгария нападет на Турцию, Советский Союз будет считать себя в состоянии войны с Болгарией.

ЧЕРЧИЛЛЬ. Можем ли мы сказать об этом туркам?

СТАЛИН. Это можно сделать, но я боюсь, что даже при этом условии Турция не вступит в войну.

ЧЕРЧИЛЛЬ. Мы сделаем все, что можно сделать для того, чтобы достичь этой цели.

СТАЛИН. Что касается двух директив, которые г-н Черчилль хочет выдать для помощи Турции и партизанам в Игсалах, то у нас нет разногласий в этом вопросе. Ассигнование двух директив и помощь партизанам мы считаем важным делом, но мы все же не считаем главными вопросами ни вопрос о вступлении Турции в войну ни помощь партизанам, ни даже занятие Гамы. Если мы здесь приравняем обсуждать военные вопросы, то основным и решающим вопросом мы считаем операцию "Оверлорд". И я хотел бы, чтобы наше внимание не отвлекалось от этого главного вопроса второстепенными вопросами. Я хотел бы, чтобы военная комиссия имела определенную задачу. Я предлагаю дать этой комиссии определенную директиву, в рамках которой она могла бы работать. Конечно, русские нуждаются в помощи. Я хотел бы сказать, что если речь идет о помощи нам, то мы ожидаем помощи от тех, кто должен выполнять намеченные операции, и мы ожидаем действительной помощи.

Каковы должны быть директивы для военной комиссии? Она должна предусматривать условия, чтобы срок операции "Оверлорд" не был отложен, чтобы май был предельным сроком для осуществления этой операции. Вторая директива должна предусматривать, в соответствии с пожеланиями русских, поддержку операции "Оверлорд" десантом на юге Франции. Если невозможно высадить десант в Южной Франции за 4-6 месяцев до начала операции "Оверлорд", то, может быть, это стоило бы сделать одновременно с операцией "Оверлорд". Если транспортные трудности не позволят осуществить десант в Южной Франции одновременно с операцией "Оверлорд", то эту операцию в Южной Франции можно было бы предпринять спустя некоторое время после начала операции "Оверлорд". Я считаю, что высадка десанта в Южной Франции представляла бы собой вспомогательную операцию

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в отношении "Оверлорда". Эта операция обеспечила бы успех операции "Оверлорда". В то же время операция по занятию Рима была бы отвлекающей операцией. Третья директива предписывала бы Комиссии поторопиться с назначением главнокомандующего операции "Оверлорд". Лучше было бы решить эти вопросы во время нашего пребывания здесь, и я не вижу причин, почему это невозможно было бы сделать. Мы полагаем, что до тех пор, пока не будет назначен главнокомандующий, нельзя ожидать успеха от операции "Оверлорд". Назначение главнокомандующего — это задача англичан и американцев, но русские хотят знать, кто будет главнокомандующим. Вот три директивы для Военной Комиссии. Если бы Комиссия поработала в рамках этих директив, ее работа могла бы быть успешной и могла бы быть скорее закончена. Я прощу конференцию считаться с этими, высказанными мною соображениями.

РУЗВЕЛТ. Мне было интересно слушать всё, что говорилось, начиная с операции "Оверлорд" и кончая вопросом о Турции. Я придаю большое значение срокам. Если имеется согласие на операцию "Оверлорд", то нужно договориться о сроке этой операции.

Можно осуществить операцию "Оверлорд" в течение первой недели мая или несколько отложить ее. Отсрочка "Оверлорда" была бы вызвана тем, что мы провели бы одну-две операции в Средиземном море, которые потребовали бы десантных средств и самолетов. Если осуществить экспедицию в восточной части Средиземного моря и если при этом не иметь успеха, то придется перебросить туда дополнительные материалы и войска. Тогда "Оверлорд" не будет осуществлен в срок.

Что касается Балкан и Югославии, то мы должны оказать возможно большую помощь партизанам, но сделать это без ущерба "Оверлорду". Задача состоит в том, чтобы держать в напряжении германские дивизии. Если мы их оставим в покое, то немцы смогут их свободно перебрасывать на тот или иной участок фронта против нас. Поэтому я думаю, что на Балканах мы должны предпринять организацию рейдов комбинированных отрядов и организовать снабжение партизан Тито, заставляя, таким образом, немцев держать свои дивизии на Балканах.

СТАЛИН. Против Югославии немцы держат 8 дивизий, из которых 5 находятся в Греции. В Болгарии имеются 3-4 немецких дивизии, в Италии — 9.

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ЧЕРЧИЛЛЬ. Наши цифры отличаются от этих цифр.

СТАЛИН. Ваши цифры неправда. Во Франции у немцев имеется 25 дивизий.

БУЗВЕИТ. Наши штабы должны разработать планы для того, чтобы сковать немецкие дивизии на Балканах. Эти планы должны быть разработаны так, чтобы операции, которые мы предпримем с этой целью, не нанесли ущерба "Оверморду".

СТАЛИН. Правильно.

ЧЕРЧИЛЛЬ. Говоря о мероприятиях в отношении Балкан, я не имел в виду использование крупных сил для этих целей.

СТАЛИН. Если возможно, то хорошо было бы осуществить операцию "Оверморд" в пределах мая, скажем 10-15-20 мая.

ЧЕРЧИЛЛЬ. Я не могу дать такого обязательства.

СТАЛИН. Если осуществить "Оверморд" в августе, как об этом говорил Черчилль вчера, то из-за неблагоприятной погоды в этот период ничего из этой операции не выйдет. Апрель и май являются наиболее подходящими месяцами для "Оверморда".

ЧЕРЧИЛЛЬ. Мне кажется, что мы не расходимся во взглядах настолько, насколько это может показаться. Я готов сделать все, что в силах британского правительства для того, чтобы осуществить операцию "Оверморд" в возможно ближайший срок. Но я не думаю, что те многие возможности, которые имеются в Средиземном море, должны быть немилосердно отвергнуты, как не имеющие значения, из-за того, что использование их задержит осуществление операции "Оверморд" на 2-3 месяца.

СТАЛИН. Операции в районе Средиземного моря, о которых говорит Черчилль, это только диверсии. И не отрицай значения этих диверсий.

ЧЕРЧИЛЛЬ. По нашему мнению, многочисленные британские войска не должны находиться в бездействии в течение 6 месяцев. Они должны вести бои против врага, и с помощью американских союзников мы надеемся уничтожить немецкие дивизии в Италии. Мы не можем оставаться пассивными в Италии, ибо это испортит всю нашу кампанию там. Мы должны оказывать помощь нашим русским друзьям.

СТАЛИН. По-Черчиллю выходит, что русские требуют от англичан того, чтобы англичане бездействовали.

ЧЕРЧИЛЛЬ. Если суда будут отправлены из района Средиземного моря, то в результате значительно сократится масштаб операций.

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в этом районе. Маршал Сталин помнит о том, что на Московской конференции были указаны условия, при которых операция "Сверморд" может быть успешной. Эти условия предусматривают, что во Франции будет находиться к моменту вторжения не более 12 германских мобильных дивизий и что в течение 60 дней немцы не смогут перебросить во Францию для пополнения своих войск более 15 дивизий. Тут нет никакой ошибки, так как эти условия являются основанием, на котором базируется "Сверморд". Мы должны сковать возможно большее количество германских дивизий в Италии, на Балканах и в районе Турции, если она вступит в войну. На фронте в Италии против нас сражаются германские дивизии, перебросенные из Франции. Если мы будем пассивны на фронте в Италии, то немцы могут снова перебросить свои дивизии во Францию в ущерб "Сверморду". Поэтому нам необходимо связать противника боями и поддерживать наш фронт в Италии в активном состоянии с тем, чтобы можно было там сковать достаточное количество германских дивизий.

Что касается Турции, то я согласен настаивать на вступлении ее в войну. Если она не согласится это сделать, то ничего не поделаешь. Если она согласится, то нужно будет воспользоваться турецкими авиабазами в Анатолии и захватить Родос. Для этой операции будет достаточно одной итурмовой дивизии. Впоследствии остров может удерживать гарнизон, находящийся на нем. Получив Родос и турецкие базы, мы сможем изгнать германские гарнизоны с других островов Эгейского моря и открыть Дарданеллы. Это не такая операция, которая потребует большого количества войск. Это операция ограниченного характера. Если Турция вступит в войну и мы захватим Родос, то за нами будет обеспечено превосходство в этом районе, и наступит время, когда все острова в Эгейском море будут нашими. Если Турция не вступит в войну, то мы не будем горевать по этому поводу и я не буду просить о выделении войск для захвата Родоса и островов Эгейского моря. Но в этом случае не будет горевать и Германия, так как она будет попрежнему господствовать в этом районе. Если Турция вступит в войну, то наши войска, находящиеся в Египте для целей обороны, и наши находящиеся там военно-воздушные силы, также обороняющие Египет, смогут быть двинуты вперед. Захватив Эгейские острова, можно было бы использовать указанные силы в районах севернее Египта. Я предлагаю основательны

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12.-

обсудить этот вопрос. Мы потерпим большое несчастье, если Турция не вступит в войну, с точки зрения того, что Германия будет господствовать в этом районе. И хочу, чтобы войска и самолеты, бездействующие в Египте, были бы как можно быстрее использованы в случае вступления Турции в войну. Все зависит от десантных средств. Трудности заключаются в транспортировке войск через море. Я всегда готов обсудить все подробности с союзниками. Но все зависит от количества десантных средств. Если эти десантные средства будут оставлены в районе Средиземного моря или в Индийском океане в ущерб "Оверлорду", тогда не может быть гарантирован успех "Оверлорда" и успех операции в Южной Франции. Для операций в Южной Франции потребуются большое количество десантных средств. И прому это учесть.

Наконец, я считаю приемлемыми и от имени Британского правительства два согласия на то, чтобы были выработаны директивы для Военной Комиссии. Я предлагаю, чтобы мы совместно с американцами разработали свои предложения о директивах Комиссии. Я думаю, что наши взгляды более или менее сходятся.

СТАЛИН. Сколько времени мы намерены оставаться в Тегеране?

ЧЕРЧИЛЛЬ. Я готов не есть, пока эти директивы не будут разработаны.

СТАЛИН. Речь идет о том, когда мы намерены закончить нашу конференцию.

РУЗВЕЛТ. Я готов находиться в Тегеране до тех пор, пока в Тегеране будет находиться Маршал Сталин.

ЧЕРЧИЛЛЬ. Если будет необходимо, то я готов навсегда остаться в Тегеране.

СТАЛИН. Я хотел бы спросить, сколько имеется в настоящее время французских дивизий?

РУЗВЕЛТ. Предполагается вооружить 11 французских дивизий. Но из этого числа готовы в настоящее время лишь 5 дивизий и в ближайшее время будут оснащены еще 4 дивизии.

СТАЛИН. Находятся ли эти французские дивизии в действии или они ничего не делают?

РУЗВЕЛТ. Одна дивизия сражается в Италии, одна или две дивизии находятся на Корсике и Сардинии.

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18.-

СТАЛИН. Как командование предполагает использовать эти французские дивизии?

МАРШАЛЛ. Предполагается влить французский корпус в состав 5-й армии, действующей на левом фланге в Италии. Одна дивизия в настоящее время находится в процессе переброски на фронт в Италию, где она пройдет боевое испытание. После этого будет решен вопрос о наиболее целесообразном использовании французских дивизий. Время, которое потребуется для оснащения еще 4-х французских дивизий, зависит от времени, которое потребуется для обучения личного состава этих дивизий.

СТАЛИН. Являются ли эти дивизии дивизиями французского типа?

МАРШАЛЛ. Эти дивизии американского типа и состоят из 15.000 человек каждая. Большинство солдат не являются французами. В броне-танковых дивизиях 3/4 личного состава являются французами, остальные африканцы.

РУЗВЕЛТ. Я хочу сказать несколько слов. По-моему, если мы втроем дадим директивы нашей Военной Комиссии, то она сможет обсудить все вопросы.

СТАЛИН. Не нужно никакой Военной Комиссии. Мы можем решить все вопросы здесь на совещании. Мы должны решить вопрос о дате, о главнокомандующем и вопрос о необходимости вспомогательной операции в Южной Франции. Я думаю также, что Комиссия, состоящая из министров иностранных дел и представителя, названного президентом по вопросам Балкан, также не нужна, ибо все вопросы о Балканах мы можем решить здесь быстрее. Мы, русские, ограничили сроком пребывания в Тегеране. Мы могли бы пробыть здесь в течение 1 декабря, но 2-го мы должны уехать. Президент помнит о том, что мы с ним условились о 3-4 днях.

РУЗВЕЛТ. Я думаю, что мое предложение упростит работу штаба. Военная Комиссия должна принять за основу операцию "Оверлорд". Комиссия должна представить свои предложения в отношении вспомогательных операций в районе Средиземного моря. Она должна иметь также в виду, что эти операции могут задержать осуществление "Оверлорда".

СТАЛИН. Русские хотят знать дату начала операции "Оверлорд", чтобы подготовить свой удар по немцам.

РУЗВЕЛТ. Срок операции "Оверлорд" был определен в Квебеке. Только самые серьезные изменения в обстановке могут оправдать изменение намеченного срока этой операции.

ЧЕРЧИЛЬ. Я сейчас услышал директиву, которую Президент предлагает дать Комиссии. Я хотел бы иметь возможность обдумать то, что предложил Президент. Я не вижу принципиальных разногласий в этом вопросе, но я хотел бы иметь время для рассмотрения предложений Президента. Я очень рад провести в Тегеране 1 декабря и выехать 2 декабря. Мне не ясно, предлагает ли Президент создать Военную Комиссию или она не должна существовать, ибо Маршал Сталин предлагает обойтись без Комиссии. Лично я за такую Комиссию. В отношении Политической Комиссии я хотел бы сказать, что, конечно, Маршал Сталин облегчил дело своим открытым заявлением о Болгарии. Дело упрощается также благодаря тому соглашению, которое было достигнуто здесь на совещании, о необходимости оказания помощи партизанам в Югославии. Но все-таки я думаю, что хорошо было бы создать Политическую Комиссию из двух министров иностранных дел и г-на Гопкинса. Эта Комиссия выяснила бы стоящие перед ней проблемы. Я очень благодарен Маршалу Сталину за его немедленный ответ по трудному вопросу в отношении Болгарии.

Что касается определения срока операции "Оверлорд", то если будет решено провести расследование стратегических вопросов в Военной Комиссии...

СТАЛИН. Мы не требуем никакого расследования.

РУЗВЕЛТ. Нам всем известно, что разногласия между нами и англичанами небольшие. Я возражаю против отсрочки операции "Оверлорд", в то время, как г-н Черчилль больше подчеркивает важность операций в Средиземном море. Военная Комиссия могла бы разобратся в этих вопросах.

СТАЛИН. Мы можем решить эти вопросы сами, ибо мы больше имеем прав, чем Военная Комиссия. Если можно задать неосторожный вопрос, то я хотел бы узнать у англичан, верят ли они в операцию "Оверлорд" или они просто говорят о ней для того, чтобы успокоить русских.

ЧЕРЧИЛЬ. Если будут налицо условия, которые были указаны на Московской конференции, то я твердо убежден в том, что мы будем обязаны перебросить все наши возможные силы против немцев, когда начнется осуществление операции "Оверлорд".

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РУЗВЕЛТ. Мы очень голодни сейчас. Поэтому я предложил бы прервать наше заседание, чтобы присутствовать на том обеде, который нас сегодня угощает Маршал Сталин. Я предлагаю, чтобы завтра утром наша Военная Комиссия продолжила свое совещание.

СТАЛИН. Совещания Военной Комиссии не требуется. Это лишнее. Совещание военных не ускорит нашей работы. Мы можем ускорить нашу работу только сами.

ЧЕРЧИЛЬ. Может быть, лучше мне и Президенту согласовать свои точки зрения и затем доложить Вам о нашей общей точке зрения?

СТАЛИН. Это ускорит нашу работу.

ЧЕРЧИЛЬ. А как насчет Комиссии в составе Гопкинса и двух министров иностранных дел?

СТАЛИН. И этой Комиссии не нужно, но если г-н Черчилль настаивает, то мы не возражаем против ее создания.

РУЗВЕЛТ. Завтра Гопкинс, Молотов и Иден могли бы иметь беседу друг с другом за завтраком.

СТАЛИН. Что мы будем делать завтра? Готовы ли будут предложения Черчилля и Рузвельта?

РУЗВЕЛТ. Предложения будут готовы, и я предлагаю завтра мне, Черчиллю и Маршалу Сталину позавтракать половина второго и обсудить все вопросы.

ЧЕРЧИЛЬ. Это будет нашей программой на завтрашний день.

СТАЛИН. Согласен.

BB-4

**Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Churchill
pose for photographs at the Teheran Conference. November 29, 1943**



Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, USA

Source: <http://alliance.rusarchives.ru/teheran-conference-29-november-1943>

The Third Sitting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain. November 30, 1943

Opened: 16.30; Closed: 17.20

Roosevelt: The decision of the British and American staffs was communicated to Marshal Stalin and has satisfied him. It would be desirable for General Brooke to announce this decision to the conference if Marshal Stalin has no objections.

Stalin: I agree.

Churchill: General Brooke will make this announcement on behalf of both the Americans and the British.

Brooke: The chiefs of the Joint Staffs have advised the President and the Prime Minister to inform Marshal Stalin that Operation Overlord will be started in May. This operation will be supported by an operation against Southern France, with the scale of this operation depending on the number of landing craft available at the time.

Churchill: Needless to say the Joint British and American Staffs will be in close contact with Marshal Stalin in order to permit the co-ordination of operations by all the allies, so that a blow is dealt at the enemy simultaneously from both sides.

Stalin: I am aware of the importance of the decisions adopted by the staffs of our allies, and the difficulties in implementing these decisions. There may be a danger not at the start of Overlord but when the operation is unfolded, when the Germans try to transfer a part of their troops from the Eastern Front to the Western to hamper Overlord. In order to prevent the Germans from manoeuvring their reserves and transferring any sizable forces from the Eastern Front to the West, the Russians undertake to organise a big offensive against the Germans in several places by May, in order to pin down the German divisions on the Eastern Front and to prevent the Germans from creating any difficulties for Overlord. I informed President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of this today, but I wish to repeat my statement before the conference.

Roosevelt: I am highly satisfied with Marshal Stalin's statement that steps will be taken to co-ordinate the blows at the enemy. I hope that our nations have now realised the need of joint action, and that the forthcoming operations of our three countries will show that we have learned to act together.

The United States has not yet appointed a commander in-chief for Operation Overlord, but I am sure that a commander-in-chief will be appointed in the next three or four days, as soon as we return to Cairo.

I have only one proposal to make, namely, that our staffs should without delay start elaborating the proposals adopted here. That is why I suppose they could return to Cairo tomorrow, if Marshal Stalin has no objections to this.

Stalin: I agree with this.

Churchill: I want to say that today we adopted a serious decision. Now the President and I and our staffs must work out this question in detail and decide where we are to find the necessary landing craft. We have ahead of us five months, and I think that we shall be able to obtain the required number of landing craft. I have already given an assignment to study this matter and a detailed report will be submitted as soon as our staffs return home. For Operation Overlord to succeed we must have a considerable superiority of forces, and I hope that our staffs will be able to assure this. By June, we shall already be in bitter action against the enemy. I believe that we have finished discussing military matters. We could now discuss political questions. For this we could use December 1 and 2, and could leave on December 3. We have scored a great success and it would be well if we left after solving all questions, and announced to the public that we have reached complete agreement. I hope that the President can stay until December 3, as I can, if Marshal Stalin agrees to stay.

Stalin: I agree.

Roosevelt: I am very happy to hear that Marshal Stalin has agreed to stay for another day. I also wanted to say about the communiqué: our staffs could give us a draft of this communiqué.

Stalin: In the part relating to military matters?

Churchill: Of course. The communiqué must be brief and mystifying.

Stalin: But without any mysticism.

Churchill: I am sure that the enemy will shortly learn of our preparations because he will be able to discover them by the great accumulation of trains, by the activity of our ports, etc.

Stalin: A big operation cannot be hidden in a sack.

Churchill: Our staffs will have to think how to camouflage these preparations and to mislead the enemy.

Stalin: In such cases we mislead the enemy by building dummies of tanks, planes, and mock airfields. Then we set the dummies of the tanks and planes in motion with the aid of tractors. Intelligence reports on these movements to the enemy, and the Germans believe that the blow is being prepared in that very place. Meanwhile, there is absolute quiet where the offensive is really being staged. All transportation takes place at night. We set up in several places from 5,000 to 8,000 dummies of tanks, up to 2,000 dummies of planes, and a great number of dummy airfields. In addition, we mislead the enemy with the aid of the radio. In areas where no offensive is planned, radio stations exchange messages. These stations are monitored by the enemy, and he receives the impression that a great force is deployed there. Enemy planes often bomb these places night and day although they are absolutely empty.

Churchill: Sometimes truth has to be safeguarded with the aid of untruth. In any case, steps will be taken to mislead the enemy.

Source: <https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/Stalin/tehran.htm#T1>

The Fourth Sitting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain. December 1, 1943

I. Sitting During Luncheon

Opened: 13.00; Closed: 15.00

Hopkins: The question of inviting Turkey to enter the war is connected with the question of how much support Turkey can get from Great Britain and the United States. In addition, it is necessary to co-ordinate Turkey's entry into the war with the over-all strategy.

Roosevelt: In other words, İnönü is going to ask us whether we shall support Turkey. I think this question must be further worked out.

Stalin: Churchill said that the British Government was making available 20 or 30 squadrons and 2 or 3 divisions for aid to Turkey.

Churchill: We gave no consent in respect of two or three divisions. In Egypt, we have 17 squadrons which are not used at present by the Anglo-American command. These squadrons, in the event of Turkey's entry into the war, would serve for the purpose of her defence. In addition, Britain agreed to make available to Turkey three anti-aircraft defence regiments. That is all the British promised Turkey. The British did not promise Turkey any troops. The Turks have 50 divisions. The Turks are good fighters, but they have no modern weapons. As for the two or three divisions mentioned by Marshal Stalin the British Government has set these divisions aside for the capture of the Aegean Islands in the event Turkey enters the war, and not for aid to Turkey.

Roosevelt: (addressing Churchill): Isn't it a fact that the operation against Rhodes will require a great quantity of landing facilities.

- This operation will require no more facilities than are available in the Mediterranean.

Roosevelt: My difficulty is that the American Staff has not yet studied how many landing craft will be required by the operations in Italy, the preparations of Overlord in Britain, and for the Indian Ocean. That is why I must be careful in respect of promises to Turkey. I'm afraid these promises may hamper the fulfilment of our agreement of yesterday.

Stalin: Apart from entering the war, Turkey will also make her territory available to the allied air force.

Churchill: Of course.

- I think that we have finished with this question.

Churchill: We have not offered anything we are unable to give. We offered the Turks three new squadrons of fighters to bring the total number of squadrons, including those in Egypt, up to 20. Perhaps, the Americans could add anything to this number? We promised the Turks some anti-aircraft defence units, but we did not promise them any troops, for we haven't any. As for landing facilities, these will be needed in March, but I believe we shall be able to find them in the period between the taking of Rome and the start of Operation Overlord.

Roosevelt: I want to consult with the military. I hope Churchill is right, but my advisers say that there may be difficulties in the use of landing craft between the taking of Rome and the start of Overlord. They believe that it is absolutely necessary to have the landing craft for Operation Overlord by April 1.

Churchill: I do not see any difficulties. We have not made any proposals to Turkey, and I don't know if İnönü will accept them. He will be in Cairo and will acquaint himself with the situation. I can give the Turks 20 squadrons. I won't give the Turks any troops. Besides, I don't think they need troops. But the point is that I don't know whether or not İnönü is coming to Cairo.

- He might fall ill?

Churchill: Easily. If İnönü does not agree to go to Cairo to meet the President and myself, I am prepared to go on a cruiser to see him in Adana. İnönü will go there, and I shall paint for him the unpleasant picture that will face the Turks if they refuse to enter the war, and the pleasant picture in the opposite case. I shall then inform you of the results of my talks with İnönü.

Hopkins: The question of supporting Turkey in the war was not discussed by the American military, and I doubt the expediency of inviting İnönü to Cairo before the military have studied this matter.

Stalin: Consequently, Hopkins proposes not to invite İnönü.

Hopkins: I am not proposing not to invite İnönü but I stress that it would be useful to receive information beforehand on the aid we could give the Turks.

- I agree with Hopkins. We must agree on the possible aid to the Turks.

Stalin: Can't this be done without the military?

Churchill: Together with the military we must study the question of landing facilities. We may be able to get more than we hope by taking them from the Indian or Pacific oceans or building them. If that is impossible we should abandon the idea. However, in any case, it has been decided that Overlord must not suffer.

Roosevelt: I think that it would be useful if I outlined the situation in the Pacific in connection with the possible withdrawal of landing facilities from there, as Churchill suggests. I must point out, first, that the distance from the Pacific to the Mediterranean is enormous. Second, in the Pacific we are moving northwards so as to cut Japanese communications, and we need landing facilities in that area.

Hopkins: Is it true that Churchill and Eden have not spoken to the Turks about the taking of the Aegean Islands?

Eden: No, I have not spoken of this. I only asked the Turks to make available air bases and did not touch upon the question of landing facilities.

Roosevelt: If I see the Turkish President I shall make the offer to take Crete and the Dodecanese Islands because they are rather close to Turkey.

Churchill: I want the Turks to give us air bases in the area of Smyrna, which the British helped the Turks to build. When we get these air bases we shall expel the German air force from the Islands. For this purpose we are prepared to pay with one of our planes for every destroyed German plane. The task of expelling the German garrisons from the Islands will be feasible if we ensure air superiority in that area. There is no need to storm the island of Rhodes where there are 8,000 Italians and 5,000 Germans. They can be starved out. If we get bases in Turkey our ships with air support will be able to cut German communications and the goal will be reached.

Stalin: That is correct. It seems that the 20 squadrons now in Cairo are idle. If they go into action nothing will be left of the German air force. But a certain number of bombers should be added to the fighter squadrons.

Roosevelt: I agree with Churchill's proposal to make available for Turkey's defence 20 squadrons with a certain number of bombers.

Churchill: We are offering Turkey limited air cover and anti-aircraft defence. It is winter now, and an invasion of Turkey is improbable. We intend to continue supplying Turkey with arms. Turkey is receiving mainly American weapons. At the present time we are offering Turkey the invaluable opportunity of accepting the Soviet Government's invitation to take part in a peace conference.

- What kind of weapons is Turkey short of?

Churchill: The Turks have rifles, pretty good artillery, but they have no anti-tank artillery, no air force, no tanks.

We organised military schools in Turkey, but attendance is low. The Turks have no experience in handling radio equipment. But the Turks are good fighters.

Stalin: It is quite possible that if the Turks give airfields to the allies, Bulgaria will not attack Turkey, and the Germans will be expecting Turkey's attack. Turkey will not attack the Germans, but will simply be in a state of war with them. But this will give the allies airfields and ports in Turkey. If events took such a turn, that would not be bad either.

Eden: I told the Turks that they could make air bases available to the allies without fighting, for Germany would not attack Turkey.

- In this respect Portugal could serve as an example for Turkey.

Eden: Numan would not agree with my standpoint. He said Germany would react, and that Turkey prefers to enter the war of her own free will, instead of being dragged in.

Churchill: That is true. But I must say the following. When you ask Turkey to stretch her neutrality by giving us air bases, the Turks reply that they prefer a war in earnest; when you tell the Turks about entering the war in earnest, they reply that they have not got the arms. If the Turks give a negative reply to our proposal we must let them know our serious considerations. We must tell them that in that case they will not participate in the peace conference. As for Britain, we shall tell them on our part that we are not interested in Turkish affairs. In addition, we shall stop supplying Turkey with arms.

Eden: I should like to specify the demands we are to present to Turkey in Cairo. I understand that we must demand of the Turks entry into the war against Germany.

Stalin: Precisely, against Germany....

II. Round-Table Sitting

Opened: 16.00; Closed: 19.40

Roosevelt: At this sitting I should like us to discuss the questions of Poland and Germany.

Stalin: And also the question of a communiqué.

Roosevelt: The Communiqué is already being prepared.

Molotov: Can we receive an answer now concerning the transfer to us of a part of the Italian merchant fleet and navy?

Roosevelt: The answer to this question is very simple. We have received a great number of Italian ships. They should, I think, remain in the temporary use of the United Nations and should be used in the best way. After the war they should be distributed among the United Nations.

Molotov: If these ships cannot be conveyed into our ownership we ask that they be given to us for temporary use. We shall use them in the interests of the allies and all the United Nations.

Stalin: If Turkey does not enter the war, the Italian ships transferred to us cannot be sailed into the Black Sea, and we should then like to have them in the North Sea. We are aware that Great Britain and the United States are in need of ships, but we are not asking for many.

Churchill: I am for it.

Roosevelt: I am also for it.

Churchill: I should like to see these ships in the Black Sea.

Stalin: We also prefer to have them in the Black Sea.

Churchill: It may be well to send the Italian ships handed over to the Soviet Union into the Black Sea with the British ships to help the Soviet Navy.

Stalin: All right, please.

Churchill: We must settle the matter of transferring the ships with the Italians, because they are helping us with their fleet. Some Italian ships are fighting, others are patrolling. The submarines are being used for supply. Of course, it is desirable to put the Italian fleet to the best possible use instead of having it against us. That is why I request two months in which to settle with the Italians the question

of transferring the Italian ships to the Soviet Union: This is a delicate matter and it is necessary to go about it like a cat with a mouse.

Stalin: Can we then receive these ships by the end of January of next year?

Roosevelt: I agree.

Churchill: I agree.

Stalin: Our crews will man these ships.

Churchill: We should like to help the Russian Navy in the Black Sea with our own ships. In addition, we should be happy to help in repairing the Soviet naval bases in the Black Sea, for instance, Sevastopol. We should also be happy if the Soviet Government considers it useful to send four or five submarines into the Black Sea to sink the Rumanians and Germans there. I must say that we have neither claims nor interests in the Black Sea.

Stalin: Very well, we shall be grateful for any assistance extended to us.

Churchill: There is one point we could make use of in the event Turkey joins the war. If Turkey is afraid to enter the war but will agree to stretch her neutrality, Turkey may permit several submarines to pass through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles into the Black Sea with supply ships for them. American submarines are sinking many Japanese ships in the Pacific Ocean; our submarines sank a great number of German and Italian ships in the Mediterranean; now our submarines could help in the Black Sea.

Stalin: Have we finished with this question?

Churchill: Yes.

Roosevelt: I should like to discuss Poland. I wish to express the hope that the Soviet Government will be able to start talks and restore its relations with the Polish Government.

Stalin: The agents of the Polish Government, who are in Poland, are connected with the Germans. They are killing partisans. You cannot imagine what they are doing there.

Churchill: That is a big issue. We declared war on Germany because Germany attacked Poland. I was surprised when Chamberlain failed to fight for the Czechs in Munich, but suddenly in April 1939 gave Poland a guarantee. I was surprised when he rejected more favourable opportunities and returned to the policy of war. But at the same time I was also pleased with this fact. For the sake of Poland and in pursuance of our promise we declared war on Germany, although we were not prepared, with the exception of our naval forces, and played a big part in inducing France to enter the war. France has collapsed. But we turned out to be active fighters thanks to our insular position. We attach great importance to the reason for which we entered the war. I understand the historical difference between ours and the Russian standpoint on Poland. But at home we pay a great deal of attention to Poland, for it was the attack on Poland that prompted us to undertake the present effort. I was also very well aware of the Russian position at the start of the war, and considering our weakness at the beginning of the war, and the fact that France went back on the guarantees she gave in Munich, I understand that the Soviet Government could not at the time risk its life in that struggle. But now the situation is different, and I hope that if we are asked why we entered the war we shall reply that it happened because we gave Poland a guarantee. I want to return to my example of the three matches, one of which represents Germany, another Poland, and the third, the Soviet Union. All these three matches must be moved to the West in order to settle one of the main problems facing the allies: to ensure the Soviet Union's Western borders.

Stalin: Yesterday there was no mention of negotiations with the Polish Government. Yesterday it was said that the Polish Government must be directed to do this and that. I must say that Russia, no less than the other Powers, is interested in good relations with Poland, because Poland is Russia's neighbour. We stand for the restoration and strengthening of Poland. But we draw a line between Poland and the émigré Polish Government in London. We broke off relations with that Government not out of any whim on our part, but because the Polish Government joined Hitler in slandering the Soviet Union. All that was published in the press. What are the guarantees that the émigré Polish Government in London will not do

the same thing again? We should like to have a guarantee that the agents of the Polish Government will not kill partisans, that the émigré Polish Government will really call for struggle against the Germans, instead of engaging in machinations. We shall maintain good relations with any Government that calls for active struggle against the Germans. But I am not at all sure that the present émigré Government in London is such as it should be. If it sides with the partisans and if we are given a guarantee that its agents will not have ties with the Germans in Poland, we shall be prepared to start talks with it.

Churchill mentioned three matches. I should like to ask him what it means.

Churchill: It would be a good thing now at the round table to hear the views of the Russians on Poland's borders. I think Eden or I could then make them known to the Poles.

We believe that Poland unquestionably should be satisfied at the expense of Germany. We are prepared to tell the Poles that this is a good plan, and that they cannot expect a better one. After this we could raise the question of restoring relations. But I should like to emphasise that we want a strong independent Poland, friendly to Russia.

Stalin: The question is that the Ukrainian lands should go to the Ukraine, and the Byelorussian, to Byelorussia, i.e., the 1939 border established by the Soviet Constitution should exist between us and Poland. The Soviet Government stands for this border and considers that this is correct.

What other questions are there for discussion?

Roosevelt: The question of Germany.

Stalin: What are the proposals on this matter?

Roosevelt: The partition of Germany.

Churchill: I am for partitioning Germany. But I should like to consider the question of partitioning Prussia. I am for separating Bavaria and the other provinces from Germany.

Roosevelt: In order to stimulate our discussion on this question, I want to set forth a plan for partitioning Germany into five states, which I personally drew up two months ago.

Churchill: I should like to stress that the root of evil in Germany is Prussia.

Roosevelt: I should like us to have a picture of the whole before we speak of the separate components. In my opinion, Prussia must be weakened as far as possible, and reduced to size. Prussia should constitute the first independent part of Germany. The second part of Germany should include Hannover and the north-western regions of Germany. The third part – Saxony and the Leipzig area. The fourth part – Hessen Province, Darmstadt, Kassel and the areas to the south of the Rhine, and also the old towns of Westphalia. The fifth part – Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg. Each of these five parts would be an independent state. In addition the regions of the Kiel Canal and Hamburg should be separated from Germany. These regions would be administered by the United Nations, or the four Powers. The Ruhr and the Saar must be placed either under the control of the United Nations or under the trusteeship of the whole of Europe. That is my proposal. I must add that it is merely exploratory.

Churchill: You have said a mouthful. I think there are two questions: one – destructive, the other – constructive. I have two ideas: the first is to isolate Prussia from the rest of Germany; the second is to separate Germany's southern provinces – Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, the Palatinate, from the Saar to Saxony inclusive. I would keep Prussia in strict conditions. I think it would be easy to sever the southern provinces from Prussia and include them in a Danubian federation. The people who live in the Danube basin are not the cause of war. At any rate, I would give the Prussians harsher treatment than the other Germans. The southern Germans will not start a new war.

Stalin: I do not like the plan for new associations of states. If it is decided to partition Germany, no new associations need be set up. Whether it is five or six states, and two regions into which Roosevelt proposes to divide Germany, this plan of Roosevelt's to weaken Germany can be examined. Like us, Churchill will soon have to deal with great masses of Germans. Churchill will then see that it is not only the Prussians who are fighting in the German Army but also Germans from the other provinces of

Germany. Only the Austrians, when surrendering, shout "I'm Austrian", and our soldiers accept them. As for the Germans from Germany's other provinces they fight with equal doggedness. Regardless of how we approach the partitioning of Germany there is no need to set up some new association of Danubian states lacking vitality. Hungary and Austria must exist separately. Austria existed as a separate state until it was seized.

Roosevelt: I agree with Marshal Stalin, in particular, that there is no difference between Germans from the various German provinces. Fifty years ago there was a difference but now all German soldiers are alike. It is true that this does not apply to the Prussian officers.

Churchill: I should not like to be understood as not favouring the partition of Germany. But I wanted to say that if Germany is broken up into several parts without these parts being combined then, as Marshal Stalin said, the time will come when the Germans will unite.

Stalin: There are no steps that could exclude the possibility of Germany's unification.

Churchill: Does Marshal Stalin prefer a divided Europe?

Stalin: Europe has nothing to do with it. I don't know that there is need to set up four, five or six independent German states. This question must be discussed.

Roosevelt: Should a special committee be set up to study the question of Germany, or should it be referred to the London Commission?

Stalin: This question could be referred to the London Commission, in which there are representatives of our three states.

Churchill: I should now like to return to the Polish question, which appears to me to be more urgent because the Poles can make a great deal of noise. I should like to read out my following proposals on the Polish question. I am not asking you to agree with it in the form in which I have drawn it up, because I have not yet taken a final decision myself.

My proposal says:

«It was agreed in principle that the hearth of the Polish state and people must be situated between the so-called Curzon line and the line of the Oder River, including Eastern Prussia and the Oppeln Province as part of Poland. But the final drawing of the boundary line requires thorough study and possible resettlement in some points.»

Stalin: The Russians have no ice-free ports on the Baltic. That is why the Russians would need the ice-free ports of Königsberg and Memel and the corresponding part of the territory of Eastern Prussia, particularly since these are age old Slav lands. If the British agree to the transfer of the said territory to us, we shall agree to the formula proposed by Churchill.

Churchill: This is a very interesting proposal which I will make a point of studying.

Source: <https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/Stalin/tehran.htm#T1>

Declaration of the three powers. December 1, 1943

We-The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past, in this, the Capital of our Ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war-our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south.

The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace-we are sure that our concord will win an enduring Peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

With our Diplomatic advisors we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of Democratic Nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U Boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

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DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS REGARDING IRAN

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U.S.S.R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

J. STALIN

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Source: <https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431201c.html>


Summary of matters discussed at the Teheran Conference. December 10, 1943

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Corrections in red pencil by Joseph Stalin.

As a result of the discussion of this matter and after some pressure from our side, Churchill and Roosevelt declared that Operation Overlord would be undertaken in a precisely set month in the spring of 1944 and that a similar operation would be conducted in Southern France. Mr. Stalin, in turn, declared that the Soviet army would mount an offensive at about the same time in order to prevent the transfer of German forces from the eastern to the western front. <...>

At Roosevelt's initiative, the issue of the post-war fate of Germany was discussed. Roosevelt proposed dividing Germany, describing his draft scheme of dividing Germany into five independent states. Mr. Stalin expressed his approval of Roosevelt's plan without specifying the exact number of states into which Germany should be divided. Mr. Stalin said that Austria and Hungary should be separate states.



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нено, чтобы Черчилль, Рузвельт и тов. Вичинский, в качестве представителя СССР, встретились в Кане с турецким президентом Инени, которому будет сделано предложение о том, чтобы Турция вступала в войну еще в этом году.

Было также решено, что югославские партизаны должны поддерживаться снабжением и вооружением.

По военным решениям был составлен протокол, который был завязан тов. Сталиным, Рузвельтом и Черчиллем.

2. При обсуждении вопроса о Финляндии Рузвельт признал неудовлетворительной советско-финскую границу 1939 года, как не обеспечивающую безопасность СССР. Он признал необходимость отодвинуть границу от Ленинграда. Черчилль заявил, что он придает значение обеспечению безопасности Ленинграда, а также обеспечению позиций СССР как доминирующей державы на Балтийском море. При этом он сказал, что в Англии считали бы большим несчастьем, если бы Финляндия вопреки своей воле была подчинена другой стране. Черчилль высказывался против заключения Советским Союзом репарационных соглашений с Финляндией после войны и вообще намекал на нежелательность подобных условий мира с Финляндией.

Тов. Сталин ответил, что мы считаем, что должно быть восстановлено действие советско-финского мирного договора 1940 года но допускаем, что СССР вместо аренды Ханко может согласиться на присоединение района Петсамо к СССР. Кроме того, Финляндия должна возместить в натуре в половинном размере причиненный СССР ущерб, повредить с Германией и изгнать немцев со своей территории, демобилизовать свои армии и выполнить некоторые другие условия. Однако, тов. Сталин высказал свое мнение о том, что внешние правители Финляндии не хотят серьезных переговоров о мире с Советским Союзом, ибо среди них преобладают элементы, все еще верящие в победу Германии.

Рузвельт согласился с этим мнением тов. Сталина и сказал, что для выхода Финляндии из войны лучше всего добиваться изменений в составе правительства Финляндии.

3. Рузвельт и Черчилль подняли вопрос о восстановлении отношений СССР с Польшей в Лондоне, и поставили вопрос о новых границах с Польшей. В беседе с тов. Сталиным Рузвельт заявил, что он лично не возражает против того, чтобы границы Польши бы-

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ли урезаны на востоке и расширены на западе вплоть до Одера. Однако, он не в состоянии участвовать в разрешении вопроса о советско-польских границах, так как на предстоящих президентских выборах он не хочет потерять голоса поляков, проживающих в США. Черчилль высказался за то, чтобы Польша занимала территорию между линией Керзона и линией Одера с включением в ее состав Восточной Пруссии. Черчилль сказал, что если это предложение приемлемо Совпра, то он был бы готов обратиться с ним к полякам и требовать от них принять это предложение.

Тов.Сталин ответил, что СССР - за восстановление и усиление Польши за счет Германии. Но мы отделим Польшу от эмигрантского польшира в Лондоне, агенты которого в Польше связаны с немцами и убивают польских партизан. Мы хотим иметь гарантию в том, что эмигрантское польшира не будет убивать партизан в Польше, будет призывать польский народ к активной борьбе с немцами. Если эмигрантское польшира в Лондоне солидаризируется с партизанами, если мы будем иметь гарантию, что оно не будет связано с немецкими агентами, то мы готовы начать переговоры с ним о восстановлении отношений. Касаясь предложения Черчилля о границах Польши, тов.Сталин сказал, что он согласится с этим предложением, если Англия согласится на передачу СССР германских незамерзающих портов на Балтийском море - Кенигсберга и Мемеля с соответствующей частью территории Восточной Пруссии.

4. Касаясь вопроса о Литве, Латвии и Эстонии, Рузвельт заявил, что желательно было бы в соответствующий момент времени опубликовать сообщение о том, что населению этих территорий будет предоставлена возможность выразить свое отношение к вхождению этих республик в СССР.

Тов.Сталин ответил, что у нас будут случаи дать народам Литвы, Латвии и Эстонии возможность свободно выразить свое воле, но, конечно, не под какой-либо формой международного контроля.

5. В процессе обмена мнениями Черчилль заявил, что Россия должна иметь выход к внешним портам и что если раньше со стороны Англии были против этого возражения, то сейчас таких возражений нет. Тов.Сталин сказал, что это правильная мысль, но что вопрос о внешних портах можно будет обсудить когда-либо позднее. В этой связи тов.Сталин указал, что такая большая страна, как

Договор о портах с Кенигсбергом и Мемелем между СССР и Польшей как обязательный для обеих стран

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СССР, не должна быть заперта в Черном море и что поэтому необходимо пересмотреть режим Проливов. Черчилль согласился с этим, но заявил, что поскольку сейчас решено предложить Турции вступить в войну, он считает несвоевременным поднимать в настоящее время вопрос о Проливах. Тов. Сталин оставил за собой право вернуться к этому вопросу.

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6. По инициативе Рузвельта был поставлен вопрос о послевоенном устройстве Германии. Рузвельт выступил с предложением о расчленении Германии, изложил разработанную им предварительную схему разделения Германии на пять самостоятельных государств. Кроме того проект Рузвельта предусматривает выделение района Кильского канала и Гамбурга, который, по его мнению, должен быть поставлен под контроль 60° независимых наций, а также, согласно его плану, над Рурской и Саарской областями должен быть установлен контроль 60° независимых наций или попечительство всей Европы. Черчилль был настроен менее решительно в этом вопросе. Он выступил за отделение Пруссии, существование которой в составе Германии всегда было, по его словам, "корнем зла". С другой стороны, он предлагал отделить от Германии ее западные провинции, в том числе Баварию, и включить их в дунайскую федерацию, в которую должны войти также Австрия и Венгрия. Тов. Сталин предпочитает расчленить ее. Тов. Сталин положительно отнесся к плану Рузвельта, не предвещая вопроса о количестве государств, на которое следует раздробить Германию. Он выступил против плана Черчилля о создании после раздробления Германии новых нежизнеспособных объединений государств вроде дунайской федерации. Тов. Сталин высказался за то, чтобы Австрия и Венгрия были отдельными государствами.

После обмена мнениями вопрос о Германии было решено передать для изучения в Лондонскую Консультативную Комиссию.

7. Во время обмена мнениями о Франции тов. Сталин заявил, что в настоящее время существует две Франции: символическая, которую представляет де Голль, и физическая, которая помогает немцам, а лице Лавалля, Петзена и других. Некоторые слои французского народа и руководящие круги во Франции хотят быть умнее всех и думают обмануть союзников. Они, видимо, думают, что союзники преподнесут им Францию в готовом виде, и не хотят воевать на стороне союзников, а предпочитают сотрудничать с немцами. Что является французского народа, то его обманывает нечто вроде мира, в со-

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Копия утверждена за тов. Сталина

стоянии которого находится Франция. Финансовая Франция, сокрушенная немцами, должна быть наказана. Что касается французской империи, то тов. Сталин указал, что не представляет себе, чтобы союзники проливали кровь за освобождение Индо-Китая и чтобы потом Франция получила Индо-Китай и восстановила там старый колониальный режим. Представители союзных держав во Франции встали на ту точку зрения, что Франция должна идти не вместе с Англией и США, ее союзниками во прошлой мировой войне, а ~~во-первых, против и прошлой мировой войны, а во-вторых~~ с Германией. При этих условиях нельзя гарантировать, что стратегически важные пункты Французской империи, если они останутся в руках Франции после мировой войны, не будут использованы против союзников Германии и Японией в случае их попытки развязать новую войну. Чтобы этого не случилось, такие стратегические пункты должны быть ~~сохранены~~ ^{переданы под контроль} международной организации, созданной для поддержания мира. Тов. Сталин положительно отнесся также к предложению Рузвельта об организации международного попечительства над Индо-Китаем.

Рузвельт заявил, что пройдет много лет, прежде чем Франция возродится как великая держава. Он сочувственно отнесся и мысли тов. Сталина о ~~нецелесообразности оккупации силами руководящих союзных держав стратегически важных пунктов Французской империи.~~ Черчилль ~~предложил Франции, что Франция должна возродиться и скоро станет великой державой.~~ ^{не согласился с этим предложением и указал, что Франция никогда не станет великой державой.} Что касается оккупации стратегически важных пунктов Французской империи, то Черчилль заявил, что для Англии это трудный вопрос, ибо Франция была союзником Англии.

В беседе с тов. Сталиным Рузвельт изложил свои соображения относительно международных организаций, которые следовало бы, по его мнению, создать после войны. Рузвельт предложил создать три организации: 1) общий орган, в который входили бы все Объединенные нации; 2) исполнительный комитет, который состоял бы из 10 или 11 стран, в том числе СССР, США, Англии и Китая, 2 европейских стран, 1 азиатской страны, 1 английского доминиона, 1 страны Среднего Востока, 1 латиноамериканской страны. Этот комитет занимался бы всеми вопросами, кроме военных; 3) полицейский комитет, который состоял бы из 4 стран: СССР, США, Англии и Китая и следил бы за тем, чтобы не возникало опасности нарушения мира.

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~~не Возвращать~~

Тов. Сталин ~~считал, что он означает охому Рузвельта в принципе~~
~~прямой, но поскольку Китай не имеет почти реальной силы для~~
~~того, чтобы поддержать требование и какой-либо европейской стране,~~
 тов. Сталин предложил создать 2 организации: одну - для Европы, в
 которую входили бы США, Англия, СССР и, возможно, еще одна из
 европейских стран, и вторую - для дальнего Востока, в которую
 мог бы входить и Китай.

~~Рузвельт вообще одобрил это предложение.~~

Тов. Сталин указал далее, что одного создания таких организа-
 ций недостаточно. Нужно, чтобы созданная организация имела право
 занимать вышнее в стратегическом отношении пункты для того, чтобы
 не дать возможности Германии или Японии начать новую агрессию.

Рузвельт согласился с этим предложением тов. Сталина. Черчилль
 не поддерживал ~~эти предложения, как не наш и план~~ Рузвельта о
 международной организации.

9. На наш вопрос, не могут ли Рузвельт и Черчилль дать ответ
 относительно передачи нам части итальянских военных и торговых
 кораблей, о чем говорилось еще на Московской конференции, если
 не в собственность, то в пользование, - Черчилль и Рузвельт дали
 ответ, что они за передачу нам итальянских кораблей и что кораб-
 ли будут переданы нам в конце января 1944 г., так как это дело им
 нужно предварительно урегулировать с итальянцами. Кроме того,
 Черчилль добавил, что если переданные нам итальянские корабли
 пойдут в Черное море, то для помощи нам он хотел бы ввести туда
 также британские корабли и 4 - 5 подводных лодок с британскими
 экипажами. Мы дали свое согласие на это.

Сообщается только для Вашего личного сведения.

The Tehran Conference. December 1, 1943

(a) Declaration of the Three Powers, December 1, 1943

We the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past, in this, the Capital of our Ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow..

As to war-our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south.

The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace-we are sure that our concord will win an enduring Peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the goodwill of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.

With our Diplomatic advisors we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of Democratic Nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U Boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

ROOSEVELT, CHHRCHILL and STALIN

Signed at Tehran, December 1, 1943

(b) Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran, December 1, 1943

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U. S. S. R. and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations, and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

J. STALIN

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

(c) Military Conclusions of the Tehran Conference

The Conference:-

(1) Agreed that the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando operations:

(2) Agreed that, from the military point of view, it was most desirable that Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the year:

(3) Took note of Marshal Stalin's statement that if Turkey found herself at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey or attacked her, the Soviet would immediately be at war with Bulgaria. The Conference further took note that this fact could be explicitly stated in the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war:

(4) Took note that Operation OVERLORD would be launched during May 1944, in conjunction with an operation against Southern France. The latter operation would be undertaken in as great a strength as availability of landing-craft permitted. The Conference further took note of Marshal Stalin's statement that the Soviet forces would launch an offensive at about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western Front:

(5) Agreed that the military staffs of the Three Powers should henceforward keep in close touch with each other in regard to the impending operations in Europe. In particular it was agreed that a cover plan to mystify and mislead the enemy as regards these operations should be concerted between the staffs concerned.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

JOSEPH V. STALIN

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

TEHRAN, December 1, 1943.

Source: A Decade of American Foreign Policy : Basic Documents, 1941-49

Prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

By the Staff of the Committee and the Department of State.

Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1950


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Scroll from US President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the city of Stalingrad. May 17, 1944

Museum-Reserve «Battle of Stalingrad»

English original.

"In the name of the people of the United States of America, I present this scroll to the City of Stalingrad to commemorate our admiration for its gallant defenders whose courage, fortitude and devotion during the siege of September 13, 1942, to January 31, 1943, will inspire forever the hearts of all free people. Their glorious victory stemmed the tide of invasion and marked the turning point in the war of the Allied Nations against the forces of aggression."



Record of the meeting at the Kremlin, Moscow, between the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, I.V. Stalin and British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. October 9, 1944¹

The PRIME MINISTER gave Marshal Stalin a signed photograph of himself in return for the one sent to him some weeks ago by the Marshal².

The PRIME MINISTER hoped they might clear away many questions about which they had been writing to each other for a long time. As time had passed many things had arisen, but they were unimportant compared with the common struggle. By talking to each other he and Stalin could avoid innumerable telegrams and letters.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that he was ready to discuss anything.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested beginning with the most tiresome question – Poland. He said that they should have a common policy in regard to Poland. At present each had a game cock in his hand.

MARSHAL STALIN said (with a laugh) that it was difficult to do without cocks. They gave the morning signal.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that the question was settled as agreed. He would like presently to check up on the frontier with a map.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that if the frontier was agreed on the Curzon Line it would help their discussion.³

THE PRIME MINISTER said he wanted to explain what was in his and the Secretary of State's mind as they understood the situation. The time would come when they would meet at the armistice table, which might also be the place where the peace was settled. The Americans would find it easier to settle at an armistice table, because there the President could decide, whereas at a peace table the Senate would have to be consulted. At the armistice table the Prime Minister would support the frontier line as fixed at Tehran and he thought it likely that the United States would do the same. That decision had been endorsed by the British War Cabinet and he felt it would be approved by his country. He would say it was right, fair and necessary for the safety and future of Russia. If some General Sosnkowski objected it would not matter, because Britain and United States thought it right and fair. He and Mr. Eden had for months been trying to get Sosnkowski sacked. He had now been sacked and as for General Bor⁴, the Germans were looking after him.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that the Poles were now without a Commander-in-Chief.

¹ Present at the meeting: Eden, Kerr, translator A. Birse – on the British side; Molotov and Pavlov – on the Soviet side. The Soviet record of the interview published in: Rzheshhevskiy O.A. Stalin i Cherrhill'. p. 418–428. Discrepancies between the British and the Soviet versions are specified in the notes. For Churchill's version of the conversation, see: Churchill W.S. The Second World War. Vol. VI. Boston, 1985. p. 197–198.

² Stalin's photo portraits with his handwritten inscription – "in memory of the day of the Allied invasion of American and British liberation forces in northern France", signed "friend – Joseph Stalin" – were sent as gifts to Roosevelt and Churchill through the Allies' embassies in Moscow immediately after Stalin's meeting with Harriman and Kerr on 10 June (Pechatnov V.O., Magadeyev I.E. Peregiska. T. 2. p. 192). In a letter dated 2 July, Churchill responded warmly to the present: "I have received your great photograph with the inscription, which brings me great pleasure. I am very grateful to you".

³ Omitted exchange of remarks, inserted in the Soviet version: "Churchill replied that these were the exact views of the British government. Comrade Stalin remarked that the Poles, however, don't understand it as it is such".

⁴ Komorowski, Tadeusz (according to one of his wartime codename "Bór", also known as Bór-Komorowski) (1895 – 1966) – Polish Brigadier-General, Deputy Commander (1941 – 1943), Commander of Polish Armia Krajowa (Home Army) (1943 – 1944), Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces of the Polish Government-in-Exile (1944). In October 1944 surrendered to Germans.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that some colourless man had been left. He could not remember his name. The Prime Minister went on to ask whether Marshal Stalin thought it worth while to bring Mikolajczyk and Romer to Moscow. It would take only 36 hours to Moscow¹.

MARSHAL STALIN asked whether they had authority to settle questions with the Polish Committee for National Liberation.

THE PRIME MINISTER was not sure. If, however, they were in Moscow they might, with British and Russian agreement, be persuaded to settle.

MARSHAL STALIN had no objection to making another attempt, but Mikolajczyk would have to make contact with the Committee. The latter now had an army at its disposal and represented a force.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the other side also thought they had an army, part of which had held out in Warsaw. They also had a brave army corps in Italy, where they had lost seven or eight thousand men. Then there was the armoured division, one brigade of which was in France. A Polish division which had gone to Switzerland when France fell was coming out in dribbles. They were well equipped and they had many friends in England. They were good and brave men. The difficulty about the Poles was that they had unwise political leaders. Where there were two Poles there was one quarrel.²

MARSHAL STALIN added that where there was one Pole he would begin to quarrel with himself through sheer boredom.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that Marshal Stalin and he himself as well as M. Molotov and Mr. Eden between them had more chance of bringing the Poles together. The British would bring pressure to bear on their Poles, while the Poles in the East were already in agreement with the Soviet Government.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed to try.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked if there was any objection to M. Grabski³'s coming to Moscow.

MARSHAL STALIN had no objection⁴.

THE PRIME MINISTER then referred to the armistice terms for the satellites who had been coerced by Germany and had not distinguished themselves in the war⁵. If Marshal Stalin agreed, the Prime Minister thought that M. Molotov or Mr. Eden might discuss these terms. The terms for Hungary were important. He hoped the Russians would soon be in Budapest.

MARSHAL STALIN said it was possible⁶.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that there were two countries in which the British had particular interest. One was Greece. He was not worrying much about Romania. That was very much a Russian affair and the terms which the Soviet Government had proposed were reasonable and showed much statecraft in the interests of general peace in the future.⁷ But in Greece it was different. Britain must be the leading Mediterranean Power and he hoped Marshal Stalin would let him have the first say about Greece

¹ Churchill's omitted remark: "They are confined to a plane in Cairo".

² In the Soviet record, Stalin's speech is presented in a more extended form, while Churchill's is more condensed.

³ Grabski, Stanisław (1871 – 1949) – Polish statesman and politician, President of National Council of Poland in exile (1942 – 1944), Vice-President of State National Council (1945 – 1947).

⁴ By all appearances, Moscow considered Grabski as a representative of the Polish émigré circles with whom it would be possible to attempt a compromise. This was evident from the attempts to strike up negotiations in May 1944, during which Lebedev held meetings specifically with Mikolajczyk and Grabski.

⁵ Churchill's omitted phrase: "The English are not fond of some of these satellites, just as the Russians [are not] of others".

⁶ In October 1944, it seemed as though Budapest would very soon be taken by the forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, (the order to attack the city was given on 28 October). However, the operation was seriously delayed and Budapest would not be liberated until 13 February 1945.

⁷ The truce with Romania (12 September 1944), as well as the statement made earlier by the Soviet government on the occasion of the Soviet forces entry into Romanian territory (2 April 1944), was positively received by the Western allies, as a sign of Moscow's lack of intentions to Sovietize Romania.

in the same way as Marshal Stalin did about Romania. Of course, the British Government would keep in touch with the Soviet Government.

MARSHAL STALIN understood that Britain had suffered very much owing to her communications in the Mediterranean having been cut by the Germans. It was a serious matter for Britain when the Mediterranean route was not in her hands. In that respect Greece was very important. He agreed with the Prime Minister that Britain should have the first say in Greece.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it was better to express these things in diplomatic terms and not to use the phrase “dividing into spheres”, because the Americans might be shocked. But as long as he and Marshal understood each other he could explain matters to the President.¹

MARSHAL STALIN interrupted to say that he had received a message from President Roosevelt. The President wanted Mr. Harriman to attend their talks as an observer and desired that the decisions reached between them should be of a preliminary nature².

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed. He had told the President – he and the President had no secrets – that he would welcome Mr. Harriman to a good number of their talks, but he did not want this to prevent intimate talk between Marshal Stalin and himself. He would keep the President informed. Mr. Harriman might come in for any formal talks as an observer. Mr. Harriman was not quite in the same position as they were.

MARSHAL STALIN said he had only sent a reply to the effect that he did not know what questions would be discussed, but as soon as he did know he would tell the President. He had noticed some signs of alarm in the President’s message about their talks and on the whole did not like the message. It seemed to demand too many rights for the United States leaving too little for the Soviet Union and Great Britain, who, after all, had a treaty of common assistance³. He had, however, no objection to Mr. Harriman’s attending the formal talks.

THE PRIME MINISTER referred to the Conference at Dumbarton Oaks⁴. The President had not wanted this to be discussed in Moscow but only when the three heads got together. The President had not said so, but he must have had in mind the coming election. The President would be more free to talk in about a month’s time. It was fair to say that while at first His Majesty’s Government had inclined to the American view they now saw a great deal of force in the other point of view. Supposing China asked Britain to give up Hong Kong, China and Britain would have to leave the room while Russia and the United States settled the question. Or, if the Argentine and the United States had a quarrel they would object if England, China and Russia had to settle it. The Prime Minister pointed out that all this was “off the record”. The wise thing was not to refer in Moscow to this question, but to wait until the meet-

¹ The last sentence in the Soviet minutes is omitted.

² Roosevelt wrote about his expectations in his letter of 4 October

³ The Soviet minutes also note: “Such a mutual assistance treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union does not exist”.

⁴ Conference held at Dumbarton Oaks mansion in Washington, DC (21 August – 7 October 1944), which laid the foundation of the United Nations Organization.

ing of the three heads, when it could be settled¹. He then raised the question of the interests of the two Governments in the various Balkan countries and the need to work in harmony in each other them².

After some discussion, it was agreed that as regards Hungary and Yugoslavia each of the two Governments was equally interested; that Russia had a major interest in Romania; and that Great Britain was in the same position with regard to Greece.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that where Bulgaria was concerned the British interest was greater than it was in Romania. This led to some discussion about the crimes committed by Bulgaria.

MARSHAL STALIN recalled the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, where the Bulgarians had been on the German side and three divisions had fought against the Russians in the last war.

THE PRIME MINISTER declared that Bulgaria owed more to Russia than to any other country. He said that in Romania Britain had been a spectator. In Bulgaria she had to be a little more than a spectator³.

M. MOLOTOV asked whether the Turkish question related to this matter.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he had not touched upon Turkey. He was only saying what was on his mind. He was glad to see how near it was to the Russian mind.

M. MOLOTOV remarked that the Convention of Montreux⁴ still remained.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that was a Turkish question and not a Bulgarian.

MARSHAL STALIN replied that Turkey was also a Balkan country. Under the Convention of Montreux, Japan had equal rights with Russia. Everything had been adjusted to the League of Nations and the League of Nations no longer existed. If Turkey were threatened she could close the Straits and Turkey herself had to decide when she was faced with a real threat. All the paragraphs in the Montreux Convention were controlled by Turkey. This was an anachronism. Marshal Stalin had put this question in Tehran and the Prime Minister had expressed his sympathy⁵. Now that they were discussing the Balkan question and Turkey was a Balkan country, did the Prime Minister think it appropriate to discuss it?

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed.

MARSHAL STALIN pointed out that if Britain were interested in the Mediterranean then Russia was equally interested in the Black Sea.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that Turkey had missed her chance after the Tehran conference. The reason she was frightened was because she had no modern weapons, she thought she had a good army, whereas nowadays an army was not everything. Turkey was not clever.

MARSHAL STALIN remarked that Turkey had 26 divisions in Thrace and asked against whom they were directed.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied they were directed against Bulgaria, because Bulgaria was armed with French weapons taken by the Germans. The Prime Minister went on to say that, taking a long view of the

¹ In the Soviet minutes this phrase is followed by: "He, Churchill, thinks that Marshal Stalin verify, when necessary, that this issue was not discussed in Moscow. Comrade Stalin, smiling, says that, of course, he will not do this".

² Soviet record is much more detailed and colourful: "Churchill declared that he had prepared a rather dirty and rough paper, which shows the distribution of Soviet Union and Great Britain's influence in Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. A chart was compiled for them in order to see what are the British's thoughts on this issue. The Americans will be amazed by this document. But Marshal Stalin – as a realist, just as Churchill, is not distinguished by sentimentality, whereas Eden – a very flawed man. He, Churchill, did not show this document to the British Cabinet, but the British Cabinet generally agrees with what Churchill and Eden are offering. With regard to Parliament, the parliamentary majority in the Cabinet, but if they show this document to Parliament, the Parliament will still be unable to grasp it".

³ Discussion on Bulgaria in the Soviet minutes differs somewhat.

⁴ The Montreux convention, signed in 1936, returned control of the Bosphorus Straits and Dardanelles to Turkey. The straits had previously been demilitarised and control given to an international commission under the Straits Convention of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Steiner, *Lights that Failed*, 120-123.

⁵ See: "Tehran Conference...", pp. 141, 147, 157.

future of the world, it was no part of British policy to grudge Soviet Russia access to warm-water ports and to the great oceans and seas of the world. [...]¹.

M. MOLOTOV asked what was the Prime Minister's opinion of the Morgenthau plan².

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the President and Mr. Morgenthau were not very happy about its reception. The Prime Minister went on to say that as he had declared in Tehran, Great Britain would not agree to mass execution of Germans, because one day British public opinion would cry out. But it was necessary to kill as many as possible in the field. The others should be made to work to repair the damage done to other countries. They might use the Gestapo on such work and the Hitler Youth should be re-educated to learn that it was more difficult to build than to destroy³.

MARSHAL STALIN thought that a long occupation of Germany would be necessary.

THE PRIME MINISTER did not think that the Americans would stay very long.

MARSHAL STALIN said France should provide some forces.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed.

MARSHAL STALIN suggested the use of the small countries.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought United Poland could be employed.

MARSHAL STALIN said Silesia would go to the Poles and part of East Prussia. The Soviet Union would take Königsberg and the Poles would be very interested in the occupation of Germany.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought the population might be moved from Silesia and East Prussia to Germany. If seven million⁴ had been killed in the war there would be plenty of room for them. He suggested that M. Molotov and Mr. Eden, with Mr. Harriman, should talk this over and get a picture of the general proposals for Marshal Stalin and himself to think about, and thus when the end came they would not be without something un-probed. They should also decide what role should the European Advisory Commission play⁵.

MARSHAL STALIN agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER turned to the Anglo-American war against Japan. He pointed out that here again the utmost secrecy was required. Secrecy had been well maintained considering the declaration made by Marshal Stalin at Tehran about Japan. The Prime Minister had asked the President to give a statement for use as an outline of the American plan for 1945 in the Pacific. Plans were moving quickly and the position was changing very much as island after island was taken, but the President had given Mr. Harriman and General Deane⁶ an outline of the plan which he (the Prime Minister) was to be shown and it was to be discussed with the Soviet Generals. He suggested that conversations should begin with Mr. Harriman and his General and that afterwards they might go away and talk separately, technically.

¹ The discussion on the situation in the Balkans is omitted. Churchill insisted on the need not to impose regimes on Balkan countries, and Stalin agreed. As for Northern Italy, Churchill spoke about the need to prevent a civil war, hinting at activities of the Italian Communists and Stalin sought to demonstrate the limitations of Soviet influence on the Italian situation.

² The plan initially prepared by the US Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau for the treatment of post-war Germany. Germany would be stripped of Silesia and East Prussia, Saar, and the area north of the Kiel Canal. The Ruhr and the Kiel Canal would be placed in an international zone and not allowed to trade with Germany proper. The remaining state would be divided in two. The proposal, with some modification, was presented at the Second Quebec Conference. Churchill was initially opposed to the proposal, but ultimately put his signature to it (Feis, 366-373). See also Warren Kimball, *Swords or ploughshares?: the Morgenthau plan for defeated Nazi Germany, 1943-1946*. Philadelphia, 1976.

³ In the Soviet minutes, Churchill's response is more elaborate. It notes Churchill's emphasis on his readiness to treat Germany harshly after the war.

⁴ In the Soviet minutes it is 8 million.

⁵ The Soviet minutes omit the last two sentences.

⁶ Deane, John Russell (1896 – 1982) – US Major-General, Head of the American Military Mission in Moscow (1943 – 1945).

MARSHAL STALIN said that the Soviet military leaders had been informed of the existence of the President's plan and General Deane was to have had a talk with the Soviet High Command, but the latter were awaiting information from the Far East about Japanese strength. Marshal Stalin did not know details of the plan just as the Prime Minister did not know them, but he was prepared to acquaint himself with it. If they could all meet and examine the plan that would be better¹.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he thought that Mr. Harriman and General Deane had been authorized to tell Marshal Stalin in broad outline about the plan, but he thought it should be discussed with Field-Marshal Brooke², who was ready to give an account of the operations in the West, in France and Italy and to tell how the affairs stood. He would like Marshal Stalin to know that the British had as many divisions fighting against Germany in Italy and France as the United States, and nearly as many as the United States fighting against Japan: altogether 60 divisions of 40,000 men each, including a heavy backing of commissariat, artillery, &c.³

¹ Discussions on the situation in the Far East were held on 15 October, with military representatives of the USSR, the USA and the UK partaking (published in: Rzheshhevskiy O.A. Stalin i Cherrhill'. p. 466–468).


² Brooke, Alan Francis (1883 – 1963) – British Field Marshal, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (1941 – 1946).

³ The Soviet minutes omit the last phrase.

Alexander Gerasimov. Teheran Conference of the Three Powers. 1945

State Tretyakov Gallery

Oil on canvas. 308x403 cm



1 – K. Mikhailov, Soviet ambassador to Iran; 2 – V. Pavlov, Soviet diplomat and interpreter; 3 – J. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR; 4 – V. Molotov, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; 5 – A. Cunningham, First Sea Lord (Head of the Royal Navy); 6 – E. King, Chief of Staff, US Fleet; 7 – G. Marshall, US Secretary of Defense; 8 – F. Roosevelt, US President; 9 – H. Hopkins, US statesman and politician, adviser to F. Roosevelt; 10 – H.H. Arnold, Commander, US Army Air Forces; 11 – C. Portal, Marshal of the Royal Air Force; 12 – A. Kerr, British ambassador to the USSR; 13 – A. Harriman, US ambassador to the USSR; 14 – W. Leahy, admiral, Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief; 15 – A. Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; 16 – W. Churchill, British Prime Minister; 17 – A. Eden, British Foreign Secretary; 18 – H.L. Ismay, Prime Minister's representative on the Chiefs of Staff Committee; 19 – K. Voroshilov, member of the Soviet State Defence Committee.

Part 1.

The Yalta Conference

1.1. Formation of the Anti-Hitler coalition

1.2. The Tehran Conference

1.3. THE YALTA CONFERENCE

1.4. The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference

1.5. The End of the Second World War. The Surrender of Japan



Potsdam Conference of the Three Powers. From left to right: Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Joseph Stalin, US President Harry S. Truman, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. July 1945

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History



Source: <http://alliance.rusarchives.ru/potsdam-conference-three-powers-july-1945>

First Sitting. July 17, 1945

Churchill: Who is to be chairman at our Conference?

Stalin: I propose President Truman of the United States. *Churchill:* The British delegation supports this proposal.

Truman: I accept the chairmanship of this Conference. Let me put before you some of the questions that have accumulated by the time of our meeting and that require urgent examination. We can then discuss the procedure of the Conference.

Churchill: We shall have the right to add to the agenda.

Truman: One of the most acute problems at present is to set up some kind of mechanism for arranging peace talks. Without it, Europe's economic development will continue to the detriment of the cause of the Allies and the whole world.

The experience of the Versailles Conference after the First World War showed that a peace conference can have very many flaws unless it is prepared beforehand by the victor Powers. A peace conference without preliminary preparations takes place in a tense atmosphere of contending sides, which inevitably delays the working out of its decisions.

That is why I propose, considering the experience of the Versailles Conference, that we should here and now set up a special Council of Foreign Ministers, consisting of the Ministers of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., the United States, France and China, that is, the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations set up at the San Francisco Conference. This Council of Foreign Ministers for preparing a peace conference should meet as soon as possible after our meeting. It is in this spirit and on these lines that I have drawn up a draft for the setting up of a Council of Foreign Ministers for preparing a peace conference which I now put before you.

Churchill: I propose that we refer the matter for consideration to our Foreign Ministers, who will report to us at our next sitting.

Stalin: I agree, but I am not quite clear about the participation of China's Foreign Minister in the Council. After all, this is a question of European problems, isn't it? How appropriate is the participation of China's representative

Truman: We can discuss this question after the Foreign Ministers report to us.

Stalin: All right.

Truman: About a Control Council for Germany. This Council should start its work as soon as possible, in accordance with the agreement reached. With that end in view I submit for your consideration a draft containing the principles which, in our opinion, should govern the work of this Control Council.

Churchill: I have had no chance to read this document, but I shall read it with full attention and respect, and it then could be discussed. This question is so broad that it should not be referred to the Foreign Ministers, but we should study and discuss it ourselves, and then, if need be, refer it to the Ministers.

Truman: We could discuss this matter tomorrow.

Stalin: Indeed, we could discuss the question tomorrow. The Ministers could acquaint themselves with it beforehand; that would be advisable, because we ourselves will be studying the question at the same time.

Churchill: Our Ministers already have enough to do on the first document. Tomorrow we could refer this second question to them as well, couldn't we?

Stalin: Good, let's do that tomorrow.

Truman reads the content of a memorandum which says that under the decisions of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe the three Powers undertook certain obligations in respect of the liberated peoples of Europe and Germany's former satellites. These decisions provided for an agreed pol-

icy of the three Powers and their joint action in the solution of the political and economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles.

Since the Yalta Conference, the obligations undertaken by us in the Declaration on Liberated Europe remain unfulfilled. In the opinion of the U.S. Government, continued failure to fulfil these obligations will be regarded all over the world as indicating lack of unity between the three Great Powers and will undermine confidence in the sincerity and unity of purpose among the United Nations. That is why the U.S. Government proposes that the fulfilment of the obligations of this Declaration should be fully co-ordinated at this Conference.

The three great Allied states must agree to the need for an immediate reorganisation of the present Governments of Rumania and Bulgaria in strict conformity with Paragraph 3, Point "c" of the Declaration on Liberated Europe. Consultations must be held immediately to work out the procedure necessary for the reorganisation of these Governments so that they include representatives of all important democratic groups. After these Governments are reorganised, there may be diplomatic recognition of them on the part of the Allied Powers and conclusion of corresponding treaties.

In conformity with the obligations of the three Powers, set forth in Paragraph 3, Point "d" of the Declaration on Liberated Europe, the Governments of the three Powers must discuss how best to help the work of the provisional Governments in holding free and fair elections. Such help will be required in Rumania, Bulgaria, and, possibly, in other countries too.

One of the most important tasks facing us is to determine our attitude to Italy. In view of the fact that Italy recently declared war on Japan, I hope that the Conference will deem it possible to agree to support Italy's application to become a member of the United Nations. The Foreign Ministers could work out an appropriate statement on this matter on behalf of the United Nations Governments.

Is it necessary to read the whole of this document? Do we have the time?

Churchill: Mr. President, these are very important problems and we must have time to discuss them. The point is that our positions on these issues differ. We were attacked by Italy at the most critical moment, when she stabbed France in the back. We had been fighting Italy in Africa for two years, before America entered the war, and we suffered great losses. We even had to risk the forces of the United Kingdom, and to reduce our defences in the United Kingdom in order to send troops to Africa. We had big naval battles in the Mediterranean. We have the best of intentions in respect of Italy, and we have proved this by letting them keep their ships.

Stalin: That is very good, but today we must confine ourselves to drawing up an agenda with the additional points. When the agenda is drawn up any question can be discussed on its merits.

Truman: I fully agree.

Churchill: I am very grateful to the President for having opened this discussion, thereby making a big contribution to our work, but I think that we must have time to discuss these questions. This is the first time I see them. I am not saying that I cannot agree with these proposals, but there must be time to discuss them. I propose that the President should complete making his proposals, if he has any more, so that afterwards we could draw up the agenda.

Stalin: Good.

Truman: The aim of the three Governments in respect of Italy is to promote her political independence and economic rehabilitation and to ensure the Italian people the right to choose their form of government.

The present position of Italy, as a co-belligerent and as a Power that had surrendered unconditionally, is anomalous and hampers every attempt both of the Allies and of Italy herself to improve her economic and political position. This anomaly can be finally eliminated only through the conclusion of a peace treaty with Italy. The drafting of such a treaty should be one of the first tasks set before the Council of Foreign Ministers.

At the same time, an improvement of Italy's internal situation can be achieved by creating an atmosphere in which Italy's contribution to the defeat of Germany will be recognised. That is why it is recommended that the brief terms of Italy's surrender, and the comprehensive terms of Italy's surrender should be annulled and replaced by the Italian Government's obligations flowing from the new situation in Italy.

These obligations must stipulate that the Italian Government refrains from hostile action against any member of the United Nations; the Italian Government must not have any naval or air forces and equipment, except those that will be established by the Allies, and will observe all the instructions of the Allies; pending the conclusion of a peace treaty, control over Italy should be exercised as the need arises; simultaneously, there must be a decision on how long the Allied armed forces are to remain on the territory of Italy; finally, a fair settlement of territorial disputes must be ensured.

Because I was unexpectedly elected Chairman of this Conference, I was unable to express my feelings at once. I am very glad to meet you, Generalissimo, and you, Mr. Prime Minister. I am well aware that I am now substituting for a man whom it is impossible to substitute, the late President Roosevelt. I am glad to serve, even if partially, the memory which you preserve of President Roosevelt. I want to consolidate the friendship which existed between you.

The matters which I have put before you are, of course, highly important. But this does not exclude the placing of additional questions on the agenda.

Churchill: Do you have anything to say, Generalissimo, in reply to Mr. President, or will you allow me to do so?

Stalin: Please do.

Churchill: On behalf of the British delegation I should like to voice our sincere gratitude to the President of the United States for having accepted the chairmanship of this Conference, and I thank him for having expressed the views of the great republic which he represents and of which he is the head, and wish to tell him: I am sure the Generalissimo will agree with me that we welcome him very sincerely and it is our desire to tell him at this important moment that we shall have the same warm feelings for him that we had for President Roosevelt. He has come at a historic moment, and it is our desire that the present tasks and the aims for which we had fought should be attained now, in peacetime. We have respect not only for the American people but also for their President personally, and I hope this feeling of respect will grow and serve to improve our relations.

Stalin: Let me say on behalf of the Russian delegation that we fully share the sentiments expressed by Mr. Churchill.

Churchill: I think we should now pass on to the ordinary items of the agenda and elaborate some kind of programme for our work to see whether we are able to cope with this agenda ourselves, or whether we should refer a part of the items to the Foreign Ministers. I do not think we should lay down the whole of the agenda at once, but can confine ourselves to an agenda for each day. For instance, we should like to add the Polish question.

Stalin: Still it would be well for all the three delegations to set forth all the questions they consider necessary to put on the agenda. The Russians have questions on the division of the German navy and others. On the question of the navy the President and I had an exchange of letters and had reached an understanding.

The second question is that of reparations.

Then we should discuss the question of trust territories.

Churchill: Do you mean the territories in Europe or all over the world?

Stalin: We shall discuss that. I do not know exactly what these territories are but the Russians would like to take part in the administration of trust territories.

We should like to raise as a separate question the resumption of diplomatic relations with Germany's former satellites.

It is also necessary to examine the question of the regime in Spain. We Russians consider that the present Franco regime in Spain was imposed on the Spanish people by Germany and Italy. It is fraught with grave danger for the freedom-loving United Nations. We think it would be good to create conditions for the Spanish people to establish a regime of their choice.

Churchill: We are still discussing the items to be put on the agenda. I agree that the question of Spain should be put on the agenda.

Stalin: I was merely explaining the idea behind the question. Then we should also raise the question of Tangiers.

Churchill: Mr. Eden has told me that if we got to the Tangiers question we could reach only a temporary agreement because of the absence of the French.

Stalin: Still it is interesting to know the opinion of the three Great Powers on this matter.

Then there should be a discussion of the question of Syria and the Lebanon. It is also necessary to discuss the Polish question with a view to solving the questions which arise from the fact that the Government of National Unity has been formed in Poland and the consequent necessity to disband the émigré Polish Government.

Churchill: I consider it necessary to discuss the Polish question. The discussion of this question which took place after the Crimea Conference undoubtedly resulted in a satisfactory solution of the Polish question. I quite agree to have the question examined as also the corollary question of the disbandment of the Polish Government in London.

Stalin: That's right, that's right.

Churchill: I hope that the Generalissimo and the President will understand that we have the London Polish Government which had been the basis for the maintenance of the Polish Army which fought against Germany. This produces a number of secondary questions connected with the disbandment of the Polish Government in London. I think that our aims are similar, but we certainly have a more difficult task than the other two Powers. In connection with the disbandment of the Polish Government we cannot fail to provide for the soldiers. But we must solve these questions in the spirit and in the light of the Yalta Conference. In connection with the Polish question we attach very great importance, in Poland's interests, to the matter of elections, which should be an expression of the Polish people's sincere desire.

Stalin: For the time being, the Russian delegation has no more questions for the agenda.

Churchill: We have already presented our agenda to you. If you will allow me, Mr. President, I should like to make a proposal concerning the procedure to be followed at the Conference. I propose that the three Foreign Ministers should meet today or tomorrow morning to select the questions which could best be discussed by us here tomorrow. We could follow the same procedure for the subsequent days of the Conference. The Ministers could draw up a better agenda by selecting three, four or five items. They could meet tomorrow morning and draw up an agenda for us.

Stalin: I have no objections. Truman: Agreed.

Churchill: I think we have a general outline of our task and an idea of the volume of our work. I think the Foreign Ministers should now make their choice and put it before us, and then we can start working.

Stalin: I agree. What shall we do today? Shall we continue our sitting until the Ministers let us have five or six questions? I think we could discuss the setting up of the Council of Foreign Ministers as a preparatory institution for the coming peace conference.

Truman: All right.

Churchill: All right.

Stalin: We should discuss the question of the participation of China's representative in the Council of Foreign Ministers, if the idea is that the Council will deal with European questions.

Truman: China will be one of the permanent members of the Security Council set up at San Francisco.

Stalin: Is the decision of the Crimea Conference, under which the Foreign Ministers are to meet periodically to examine various questions, to be dropped?

Truman: We propose to set up the Council of Foreign Ministers for a definite purpose: to work out the terms of a peace treaty and to prepare a peace conference.

Stalin: It was established at the Crimea Conference that the Foreign Ministers are to meet every three or four months to discuss separate questions. This seems to be no longer necessary, doesn't it? In that case, the European Advisory Commission seems to be no longer necessary either? That is how I see it, and I should like to know whether or not I am taking the correct view.

Truman: The Council of Foreign Ministers is being set up only for a definite purpose – to work out the terms of the peace treaty.

Stalin: I have no objection to setting up the Council of Foreign Ministers, but then the meetings of Ministers laid down by the decision of the Crimea Conference are apparently called off and one should think that the European Advisory Commission is also no longer necessary. Both these institutions will be replaced by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Churchill: The three Foreign Ministers, as was laid down at the Crimea Conference, were to meet every three or four months in order to give us advice on a number of important questions relating to Europe. I think if we add the representative of China to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the three Great Powers, this will only complicate matters, because the Council is to discuss questions relating to European countries. When we discuss the peace treaty relating to the whole world, and not only to Europe, the representative of China can be invited. Our three Ministers will be able to do their work more fruitfully and with greater ease. The participation of China's representative in the day-to-day activity of the Council would merely complicate its work. It is very easy to create organisations on paper, but if they produce nothing in reality, I think they are superfluous. In fact, are we not able to solve the question of the future administration of Germany without the participation of China? Let us confine ourselves to the three Ministers in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Truman: I propose that we should postpone the discussion of the question of terminating the periodic meetings of the Ministers as laid down by the decision of the Yalta Conference. We are now discussing the setting up of a Council of Ministers to draft a peace treaty, and this is quite a different matter. I should like to submit to you the U.S. draft on the Council of Foreign Ministers setting forth the principles of its organisation.

This draft calls for a Council of Foreign Ministers consisting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great Britain, China and France. The Council is to meet periodically, and its first meeting is to take place on such and such a date.

Each of the Foreign Ministers is to be accompanied by a high-ranking deputy duly authorised and able to work independently in the absence of the Foreign Minister. He should also be accompanied by a limited staff of technical advisers. A joint secretariat is also to be set up.

The Council is to be empowered to draw up, with the aim of submitting to the Governments of the United Nations, peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Council is also to propose ways of settling territorial questions remaining open since the end of the war in Europe. The Council is to prepare comprehensive terms for a peace treaty with Germany which are to be accepted by the future Government of Germany, when a German Government suitable for that purpose is set up.

When the Council of Foreign Ministers deals with matters having a direct bearing on a state not represented on the Council, that state is to be invited to attend the Council meetings to take part in discussing the given question.

That does not mean that invariable rules are being laid down for the work of the Council. The Council shall lay down a procedure in conformity with a given problem. In some cases the Council may be convened for preliminary discussion with the participation of other interested states; in other cases it may be desirable to convene the Council before inviting interested sides.

Stalin: Will it be a Council preparing questions for the future international peace conference?

Truman: Yes.

Churchill: The peace conference which will end the war.

Stalin: In Europe the war is over. The Council will determine and suggest the date for the convocation of a peace conference.

Truman: We think the conference should not be called before we are duly prepared for it.

Churchill: It seems to me there is no difficulty in concerting the aim we are striving for. We must set up a Council of Foreign Ministers to draft a peace treaty. But this Council should not substitute the organisations which already exist and deal with day-to-day matters – the regular meetings of the three Ministers and the European Advisory Commission, in which France is also taking part. The Council of Foreign Ministers is a broader organisation. There one can establish to what extent the European Advisory Commission and the regular meetings of the Ministers may deal with the questions of the peace treaty.

Stalin: Who in that case is to be subordinate to whom?

Churchill: The Council of Foreign Ministers is to exist parallel to the Security Council, in which China is also taking part, and parallel to the regular meetings of Foreign Ministers and the European Advisory Commission. Until victory over Japan, China will find it hard to take part in discussing European questions. We cannot benefit in any way from China's taking part in discussing European questions at present. Europe has always been a great volcano, and its problems should be regarded as being highly important. It is possible that at the time when the peace conference will be convened we shall have better news from the Far East and we could then invite China too.

I propose that in principle the peace treaty should be drafted by the five principal Powers, but as for Europe, its problems should be discussed only by the four Powers which have a direct interest in these matters. In this way we shall not disrupt the work of the European Advisory Commission and the regular meetings of Foreign Ministers. Both these organisations will be able to continue their work simultaneously.

Stalin: Perhaps we should refer this question to the Ministers for discussion?

Truman: I agree and do not object to China being excluded from the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Churchill: I think it would be possible to arrange things in such a way that some members would not take part in all the sittings, although they would enjoy full rights, as all the other members, but they would attend the sittings only when there was an examination of questions they were interested in.

Truman: As I see it, this question should be referred to the Foreign Ministers for discussion.

Stalin: Yes, that's right.

Truman: Can we discuss anything more today?

Stalin: Since all the questions are to be discussed by the Foreign Ministers, we have nothing else to do today.

Churchill: I propose that the Foreign Ministers should examine the question of whether there should be four or five members. But that this Council should deal exclusively with preparations for the peace treaty first for Europe and then for the whole world.

Stalin: A peace treaty or a peace conference?

Churchill: The Council will prepare a plan which it will put before the Heads of Government for examination.

Stalin: Let the Foreign Ministers discuss how necessary it is to keep alive the European Advisory Commission in Europe and how necessary it is for the regular meetings of the three Ministers, established in accordance with the Yalta decision, to continue their functions. Let the Ministers also discuss these questions.

Churchill: That depends on the situation in Europe and on what headway these organisations make in their work. I propose that the three Foreign Ministers should continue their regular meetings and that the European Advisory Commission should also continue its work.

Truman: We must specify the concrete questions for discussion at tomorrow's sitting.

Churchill: We should want to have something definite in the bag every night as we return home.

Truman: I should like the Foreign Ministers to give us something definite for discussion every day.

Stalin: I agree.

Truman: I also propose that we should start our sittings at four o'clock instead of five.

Stalin: Four? Well, all right.

Churchill: We submit to the Chairman.

Truman: If that is accepted, let us postpone the examination of questions until 4.00 p.m. tomorrow.

Stalin: Yes, let's do that. There is only one other question: why does Mr. Churchill deny the Russians their share of the German navy?

Churchill: I have no objections. But since you have asked me this question, here is my answer: this navy should be either sunk or divided.

Stalin: Do you want it sunk or divided?

Churchill: All means of war are terrible things.

Stalin: The navy should be divided. If Mr. Churchill prefers to sink the navy, he is free to sink his share of it; I have no intention of sinking mine.

Churchill: At present, nearly the whole of the German navy is in our hands.

Stalin: That's the whole point. That's the whole point. That is why we need to decide the question.

Truman: Tomorrow the sitting is at 4 o'clock.

Source: <https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/Stalin/potsdam.htm>

Second Sitting. July 18, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.

Churchill: I should like to mention one question outside the agenda which is not especially important from the standpoint of international relations and which is of temporary significance. During our meeting at Tehran, members of the press found it very hard to obtain any information on the work of the Conference, and altogether impossible at the Yalta Conference. There are almost 180 correspondents in Berlin who are roaming the environs in a state of fury and indignation.

Stalin: That's a whole company. Who let them in?

Churchill: They are not here, in the zone, of course, but in Berlin. Of course, we can work calmly only if there is secrecy, and we are duty bound to ensure this secrecy. If both my colleagues agree with me, I could, as an old journalist, have a talk with them and explain to them the need for secrecy at our meeting; I could tell them that we sympathise with them, but are unable to tell them what is going on here. I think we should stroke their wings to calm them.

Stalin: What do they want, what are their demands?

Truman: Each of our delegations has special press officers, and it is their duty to protect us from the claims of the correspondents. Let them do their job. We can authorise them to talk to the journalists.

Churchill: Of course, I don't want to be a lamb led to the slaughter. I could talk to them if the Generalissimo guarantees to rescue me with troops in case of need.

Truman: Today our Foreign Ministers have prepared an agenda and recommend it for our consideration. By agreement between the Ministers, Byrnes is to report on the agenda.

Byrnes: Our Foreign Ministers have agreed to propose the following items for inclusion in today's agenda:

1. The question of the procedure and mechanism for peace negotiations and territorial claims.
2. The question of the powers of the Control Council in Germany in the political sphere.
3. The Polish question, specifically, the disbandment of the émigré Polish Government in London.

As for the first item, the procedure and mechanism for peace negotiations and territorial claims (the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers), the draft proposed by the U.S. delegation was in principle approved by the Foreign Ministers' conference. The conference adopted a new reading of Clause 3 of the draft on setting up the Council of Foreign Ministers. The first and most important task of the Council of Ministers is to draft peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and also to prepare a peace treaty with Germany.

An equally important task of the Council is to prepare and submit to the Governments of the United Nations detailed terms of organisation and holding of the peace conference.

The Council must also be used for preparing the question of a peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. For the fulfilment of all these tasks, the Council shall consist of the same members who are permanent members of the Security Council.

When the Council of Foreign Ministers examines questions which have a direct bearing on the interests of states not represented on the Council, these states shall be invited to send their representatives to take part in the discussion of the matter. In some cases, the Council could have a preliminary discussion of the question by itself before inviting representatives of the interested states.

The Soviet delegation has made the reservation that it retains the right to introduce an amendment and make remarks on Clause 1 of the draft of the U.S. delegation on the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers.¹

The conference agreed that the periodic conferences of the three Ministers established by the decision of the Crimea Conference would not be affected by the work of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

As for the powers of the European Advisory Commission the conference of Ministers decided to transfer these powers to the Allied Control Councils for Germany and Austria. Thus, the draft proposed by the American delegation for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers was in the main approved, with the exception of the Soviet delegation's reservation on Clause 1.

Stalin: The Soviet delegation withdraws its reservation on Clause 1 of the draft. As for the rest, the Soviet delegation is in agreement and accepts the draft.

Truman: Consequently, the draft on the institution of the Council of Foreign Ministers is adopted without objections.

Stalin: It is possible to accept this text: the three Great Powers represent the interests of all the United Nations and they can take the responsibility upon themselves

Truman: Let us pass to the second item.

Churchill: Our Foreign Ministers have worked well.

Stalin: To be sure, to be sure.

Truman: The next question is on the political powers of the Control Council in Germany. 1 Clause 1 envisaged that there should be set up a Council consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States.

Byrnes: The Foreign Ministers discussed the question of the political powers of the Control Council in Germany and of its economic powers. Some of the differences which arose in the discussion of this matter were referred to sub-commissions which were set up. These sub-commissions have not yet completed their work, but the Ministers have agreed that it would be desirable for the Heads of Government to have a preliminary discussion of the political powers of the Control Council in Germany at today's sitting. The Ministers also agreed that the economic questions connected with Germany are so difficult and complicated that they must be referred to a sub-commission of experts. These sub-commissions will report to the Ministers on the matters on which they fail to reach agreement. The Foreign Ministers will then decide which of these questions are to be submitted for the examination by the Heads of Government.

The Foreign Ministers have also agreed that although they would not recommend today a discussion on the question of the German navy and merchant marine, this question would be discussed somewhat later.

Churchill: I want to raise only one question. I note that the word "Germany" is being used here. What is now the meaning of "Germany"? Is it to be understood in the same sense as before the war?

Truman: How is this question understood by the Soviet delegation?

Stalin: Germany is what she has become after the war. There is no other Germany. That is how I understand the question.

Truman: Is it possible to speak of Germany as she had been before the war, in 1937?

Stalin: As she is in 1945.

Truman: She lost everything in 1945; actually, Germany no longer exists.

Stalin: Germany is, as we say, a geographical concept. Let's take it this way for the time being. We cannot abstract ourselves from the results of the war.

Truman: Yes, but there must be some definition of the concept of "Germany", I believe the Germany of 1886 or of 1937 is not the same thing as Germany today, in 1945.

Stalin: She has changed as a result of the war, and that is how we take her.

Truman: I quite agree with this, but some definition of the concept of "Germany" must be given.

Stalin: For example, is there any idea of establishing a German administration in the Sudeten part of Czechoslovakia? That is an area from which the Germans had expelled the Czechs.

Truman: Perhaps we shall speak of Germany as she had been before the war, in 1937?

Stalin: That could be taken formally, but actually that is not so. If a German administration should put in an appearance at Königsberg, we shall expel it, we shall most certainly expel it.

Truman: It was agreed at the Crimea Conference that territorial questions should be settled at a peace conference. How are we then to define the concept of “Germany”?

Stalin: Let us define the western borders of Poland, and we shall then be clearer on the question of Germany. I find it very hard to say what Germany is just now. It is a country without a Government, without any definite borders, because the borders are not formalised by our troops. Germany has no troops, including frontier troops; she is broken up into occupation zones. Take this and define what Germany is. It is a broken country.

Truman: Perhaps we could take Germany’s 1937 borders as the starting point?

Stalin: We can start anywhere. We have to start somewhere. In that context, we could take 1937 too.

Truman: That was the Germany after the Versailles Treaty.

Stalin: Yes, we could take the Germany of 1937, but only as a point of departure. It is merely a working hypothesis for the convenience of our work.

Churchill: Only as a starting point. That does not mean that we shall confine ourselves to this.

Truman: We agree to take the Germany of 1937 as a starting point. We have not yet finished with the second question but shall agree on that.

Stalin: Is the political aspect prepared?

Byrnes: The political aspect is prepared and can be discussed.

Stalin: The Russian delegation in the main accepts all the clauses of the political section of this question. There is only one amendment to Clause 5: it would be well to delete the last four lines, for they leave a loophole for the Nazis which they can use.

Truman: I agree that these four lines should be deleted.

Stalin: Very good. We are agreed on all the rest. I should like the drafting commission to edit this text.

Byrnes: A special sub-commission has been appointed for this purpose at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting.

Stalin: Good. There are no objections.

Eden: It would be good if the Ministers once again went over this document at their meeting tomorrow morning, after it is submitted by the drafting commission.

Stalin: That will, of course, be better.

Churchill: This draft, Clause 2 (b), speaks of the destruction of armaments and other instruments of war, and of all specialised means for their manufacture. However, there are several highly valuable experimental installations in Germany. It would be undesirable to destroy these installations.

Stalin: The draft says: to seize or destroy.

Churchill: We could use them all together or divide them among ourselves.

Stalin: Yes, we could.

The Soviet delegation has a draft on the Polish question in Russian and in English. I would ask you to study this draft.

Truman: I propose that we should hear out Byrnes’s report on the meeting of the Foreign Ministers and then acquaint ourselves with your draft.

Byrnes: The Foreign Ministers agreed to recommend to the Heads of Government that they should discuss the Polish question from two aspects: the disbandment of the émigré Polish Government in London and the fulfilment of the Crimea Conference decisions on Poland in the part relating to the holding of free and unhindered elections in Poland.

[The draft of the Soviet delegation on Poland is then read out:

Statement of the Heads of the Three Governments on the Polish Question

“In view of the setting up on the basis of the decisions of the Crimea Conference of the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity and in view of the establishment by the United States of America and by Great Britain of diplomatic relations with Poland, which previously already existed between Poland and the Soviet Union, we agreed that the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America should sever all relations with the Government of Arciszewski and render to the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity the necessary assistance in the immediate transmission to it of all stock, assets and all other property belonging to Poland, which still is at the disposal of the Government of Arciszewski and of its organs, in whatever form this property may be and no matter where or at whose disposal this property may prove to be at the present moment.

“We also found it necessary that the Polish armed forces, including the navy and merchant marine, now subordinated to the Government of Arciszewski, should be subordinated to the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity, which will determine the further measures to be taken in respect of these armed forces men of war and merchant ships.”

Churchill: Mr. President, I should like to explain that the burden in this matter falls on the British Government because when Hitler attacked Poland we welcomed the Poles and gave them sanctuary. The London Polish Government has no assets to speak of, but there is £20 million worth of gold in London which we have blocked. This gold is an asset of the Central Polish Bank. The question of where the gold is to be blocked and its transfer to some other central bank should be settled in the ordinary way. But this gold does not belong to the London Polish Government.

Stalin: Did you say £20 million sterling?

Churchill: Approximately. I must add that the Polish Embassy in London has now been vacated and the Polish Ambassador no longer lives there. That is why the Embassy is open and can accommodate an Ambassador of the Provisional Polish Government, and the sooner it appoints one the better.

The question arises, how the Polish Government in London had been financed for five and a half years? It was financed by the British Government. We let them have about £120 million in that period to enable them to maintain their army, maintain diplomatic relations and exercise other functions and also maintain a considerable number of Poles who had found refuge from the Germans on our shores, the only refuge that was at their disposal.

When the London Polish Government was disavowed it was decided to pay all employees a three-month salary and then dismiss them. We believed it would be unjust to dismiss them without giving them some compensation.

Mr. President, this is a very important matter, and I ask you to allow me to speak on it. Our position is an exceptional one. We now have to engage in disbanding or transferring the Polish troops who had fought against the Germans by our side. These troops made their appearance from France in 1940. Some of them got to Italy via Switzerland, and continued to trickle in in small parties. We evacuated the Poles who had found themselves in France when she surrendered. They numbered 40,000 or 50,000.

Thus, we set up a Polish Army, consisting of five divisions, which was based in Britain. About 20,000 Poles are now in Germany and are highly alarmed. There is a Polish Corps of three divisions in Italy, which is also in great agitation.

Altogether, the Polish Army consists of 180,000 to 200,000 men. Our policy is to induce the greatest number of Poles to return to Poland. That is why I was very angry when I read the statement of General Anders, whom the Generalissimo knows. Anders told his troops in Italy that if they returned to Poland they would be sent to Siberia. We have taken disciplinary measures against this general, to prevent him from making such statements in the future.

It will take time to overcome all these difficulties. But it is our policy to induce the greatest possible number of Poles to return to Poland. This also applies to the civilians. Of course, the better the

state of things in Poland, the sooner will the Poles return there. I should like to take this opportunity to say that I am glad the situation in Poland has improved in the last two months.

I should like to express my wishes of further success to the new Polish Government which will play its positive part, and although it does not give everything we should like to see, it signifies progress thanks to the patient efforts of the Governments of the three Powers. Mikolajczyk should also be given credit for his part in improving the situation in Poland.

I hope that as the situation in Poland improves, an ever growing number of Poles will return home. I have promised Parliament that Polish soldiers who do not wish to return to Poland would be given British citizenship and enrolled into the army. It would be desirable that the new Polish Government of National Unity should give assurances that the Poles returning to Poland would have complete freedom and economic security. Such an assurance of the Polish Government would considerably promote the return of the Poles home, to the land liberated by the Red Army.

Stalin: Have you read the draft of the Russian delegation on Poland?

Churchill: Yes, I have. My speech is a reply to the draft of the Russian delegation in proof of the fact that I am fundamentally in agreement, provided what I have just said is taken into account.

Stalin: I realise the difficulty of the British Government's position. I know it gave sanctuary to the Polish émigré Government. I know that in spite of this, the former Polish rulers have caused the Government of Great Britain much trouble. I understand the British Government's difficult position. But I ask you to bear in mind that our draft is not designed to complicate the British Government's position and takes account of the difficulty of its position. Our draft has only one purpose: to put an end to the indefinite situation which still continues to exist in this question, and to dot all the "i"s.

In practice, the Arciszewski Government exists, it has its ministers, and continues its activity; it has its agents and has its base and its press. All this creates an unfavourable impression. Our draft is designed to put an end to this indefinite situation. If Mr. Churchill points out the clauses in this draft which tend to complicate the British Government's position, I am prepared to delete them. Our draft is not aimed at making the British Government's position more difficult.

Churchill: We quite agree with you. We want to eliminate this question, but when a Government is no longer recognised and is not given any grants, it no longer has any possibility for existence. At the same time, you cannot prevent individuals, in Britain at any rate, from living and talking. These people meet with members of Parliament and have their supporters in Parliament. But we, as Government, have no relations with them at all. Mr. Eden and I myself have never met them, and since Mr. Mikolajczyk left I do not even know what to do with them, and never meet them. I don't know what to do when Arciszewski walks about London and chats with journalists. As for us, we consider them to be non-existent and eliminated in the diplomatic sense, and I hope that they will be completely ineffective soon. But, of course, we must be careful in respect of the army.

The army may mutiny and we may suffer losses as a result. We have a sizable Polish army in Scotland. But our aim is similar to those of the Generalissimo and the President. We merely ask for trust and time and also your help in creating conditions in Poland which would attract these Poles. We would agree to refer the draft of the Soviet delegation for examination by the three Foreign Ministers, with an eye to the discussion that has taken place today, and to the document which had been presented by our Foreign Minister. But I think we have one and the same aim, and the sooner we finish with this question, the better.

Truman: I do not see any essential differences between the Generalissimo and the Prime Minister. Mr. Churchill merely asks for trust and time to eliminate all the difficulties of which he spoke here. That is why I think it will not be too hard to settle this question, especially in view of the fact that Mr. Stalin has said that he is prepared to delete all the controversial points. The Yalta Conference de-

cisions provided that after the establishment of the new Government general elections on the basis of universal suffrage should be held as soon as possible.

Churchill: Perhaps the Foreign Ministers would examine the whole question, including elections?

Stalin: The Government of Poland does not refuse to hold unhindered elections. Let us refer this draft to the Foreign Ministers.

Truman: That is all Mr. Byrnes had to place before the Heads of Government for discussion today. Am I to ask the Foreign Ministers to prepare an agenda for tomorrow?

Stalin: That would be fine.

Churchill: I realise the great importance of the question of political principles to be applied in respect of Germany. I realise that we are unable to discuss this question today, but I hope we shall discuss it tomorrow. The main principle which we should examine is whether we should apply a uniform system of control in all the four zones of occupation of Germany or whether different principles are to be applied to the different zones of occupation.

Stalin: This is the very question that is dealt with in the political part of the draft. It is my impression that we stand for a single policy.

Truman: Quite right.

Churchill: I should like to emphasise this, because it is highly important.

Stalin: That's right.

Truman: Tomorrow we meet at 4 o'clock.

Source: <https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/Stalin/potsdam.htm>

Third Sitting. July 19, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.

Churchill: At the very beginning of yesterday's sitting, the Generalissimo raised the question of the incident on the Greco-Albanian border. We have made due inquiries but have not heard of any fighting there. There may have been small exchanges. There's no love lost between the peoples there.

There is no Greek field division in that area. We know this because our men are there. There are 7,000 men of the National Guards, which are on the border with Albania and Yugoslavia. They are armed and equipped for the purposes of internal protection. On the other side of the border there are 30,000 Albanian troops, 30,000 Yugoslav troops and 24,000 Bulgarian.

I mention this because I believe the Great Power Conference must insist that no such attacks should take place across the borders of any Power. The frontiers will be laid down at a peace conference, and we must let it be known that those who try to determine their frontiers beforehand may find themselves worse off.

Stalin: There is some misunderstanding here. We must not discuss this question here, at this Conference. I did not raise it at the Conference, but spoke of it privately.

Churchill: I agree with the Generalissimo that the question was not raised at a sitting, but if it is placed on the agenda we are prepared to discuss it.

Truman: We are not going to discuss this question but will go on to a discussion of those which will be reported to us on behalf of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

[The British delegation then reported that in view of the fact that the American delegation had made an amendment in Article 3 of the draft to set up a Council of Foreign Ministers, the Ministers agreed to refer the article to the drafting committee.

The Foreign Ministers then examined the political section of the agreement on political and economic principles which are to serve as a guide in dealing with Germany in the initial control period. The British delegation recalled that the Heads of Government had examined the draft agreement the previous day and had instructed the Ministers to present their report that day.

The delegation said that the Foreign Ministers had examined the draft, and had made some additions to it, and were now submitting the new draft of the political section of the agreement for the consideration of the Heads of Government. It said the Foreign Ministers believed that when the discussion and co-ordination of the economic section of the draft was over, the Conference would have to consider the publication of the agreement as a whole.

The British delegation then said that the Ministers had gone into the question of Poland; they had a very important and useful discussion of the question, which was then referred to the drafting committee. The Ministers expressed the hope that it would be possible to report to the Conference on the question the next day if the drafting committee was ready.

The Ministers also agreed to submit for the consideration of that day's plenary sitting the questions of the German Navy and merchant fleet, Spain, the fulfilment of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, Yugoslavia, etc.]

Truman: The first question is that of the German Navy. I think that before tackling this question it is necessary to solve another one, namely, what is to be regarded as the spoils of war and what as reparations. If the merchant marine is an object of reparations, the question should be solved when the question of reparations is considered. We should ask the Reparations Commission to define the range of values that are to be classed as reparations. I show a special interest in Germany's merchant fleet because it might be used in the war against Japan.

Stalin: The Navy, like any other armament, must be taken as spoils of war. Troops laying down their arms must hand in their armaments to those to whom they surrender. The same may be said of the Navy. The proposals of the military representatives of the three Powers make it explicit that the Navy must be disarmed and surrendered. Those are the terms of Germany's surrender. In respect of the merchant fleet it may be asked whether it is to be classed as spoils of war or as reparations; as for the Navy it is part of the spoils of war and is subject to surrender. If you recall the case of Italy you will see that both the Navy and the merchant marine fell into the class of spoils of war.

Churchill: I should not like to take a purely legalistic attitude to this question and use precise terminology. But I want to have a fair and amicable solution of the question, and reach an agreement between the three Great Powers as a part of the general agreement on all questions arising from this Conference. At this point, I should like to consider only the German Navy. In effect, we have all the seaworthy German ships in our hands. I think a general amicable solution of the questions arising from this Conference will be reached – I am sure of this – and that is why we have no objection in principle to a division of the German Navy.

I am not now speaking of the Italian Navy. I think we should discuss this question separately, having in mind our general policy on Italy. Of course, there also arises the question of indemnification. As for Great Britain, she has suffered very heavy losses, she has lost about 10 capital ships, that is, battleships, heavy cruisers and aircraft carriers and besides, at least 20 cruisers and several hundred destroyers, submarines and small craft.

I think submarines should be classed in another category than the rest of the German Navy. These submarines have a special part to play; according to the convention signed also by Germany they were to be used on a limited scale. However, Germany violated the convention and made use of submarines on a rather extensive scale, that is, Germany made illegal use of them, and so during the war we too were forced to abandon the legitimate use of submarines. It is my opinion that these submarines should be either destroyed or scuttled.

I am aware however, that the latest German submarines, especially the best of them, are of definite scientific and technical interest, and they should be left for study. Information about these submarines must be made available to all three Great Powers. I do not view this matter from the purely naval standpoint and fully recognise the losses suffered by the Red Army during the war. I do not think we should take any final decision here, but after the Conference most of these vessels should be destroyed, while a part may be equally divided between us all.

As for surface ships, they should be divided equally between us provided we reach a general agreement on all other questions and leave here on the best of terms. I have no objection to Russia's receiving one-third of the German Navy, but only with the proviso I have just mentioned. I recognise that such a great and mighty nation as the Russians who have made such a great contribution to the common cause must be given a warm reception on the high seas. We shall welcome the appearance of the Russian flag on the seas. I am aware that it is very hard to build a great fleet in a short time. That is why these German ships may be used for study and the creation of a Russian fleet. There is nothing more I can add.

If it is desirable to speak of the merchant marine, I could say a few words here.

Truman: Please.

Churchill: I feel that so long as the war against Japan continues the German merchant navy could play a considerable part in that war. The possibility of cutting short the war largely depends on the merchant navy. We have all the men we need for the Army, Air Force and the Navy. But we are short of the means of conveyance for these men, and for the transfer of materiel.

Besides the merchant navy is needed for supplying the British Isles with food, and also for supplying food to the liberated European countries which cannot be fully supplied as it is. Every ton is of great value. America and we have given all our merchant navy to the common effort. I should be

very sorry if the 1.2 million tons of Germany's merchant navy did not go into this common effort so as to end the war against Japan as soon as possible.

I should also like to mention the following. Finland has a merchant navy consisting of about 400,000 tons. This navy has passed into the hands of our Russian Ally. The Russian Ally has also taken over some Rumanian ships, including two important transports, which are very necessary for troop transportation. If there is to be a division of the navy into three parts between the Powers, I think the merchant navies of Rumania and Finland should also go into the pool for distribution.

Stalin: We have taken nothing from Finland's merchant navy, and only one vessel from Rumania.

Churchill: I should only like to mention the principles on which we could have a distribution of the merchant navy.

Finally, we should bear in mind that there are other countries besides our three Powers. Norway, for instance, has suffered very heavy losses in her merchant fleet. Norwegian tonnage, especially Norwegian tankers, was a great force. They put their whole navy at our disposal, and it has suffered great damage. Other countries have also lost a great part of their navies. I think it is necessary to raise the question of dividing the merchant navy into four instead of three parts, to set aside the fourth part to satisfy the interests of certain other countries which are not represented here. I merely propose the question for examination and discussion.

Truman: For my part, I want to make a remark on this question. I should be very glad to divide the German Navy into three parts, with the exception of the submarine fleet. But I want the solution of this question to be postponed in the interests of the war against Japan. We would find all these ships very useful, because we shall use them not only for troop transportation but also for the supply of Europe. The present situation is such that we find the available ships altogether inadequate. That is why I very much want to retain all this German surface fleet for the war against Japan. I think it right to say here that when the war against Japan is over, we in the United States will have a great number not only of warships but a great number of merchant ships which could be sold to interested countries. I would be very glad if all the ships of the German merchant navy were made available for the conduct of the war against Japan.

Stalin: What if the Russians fight Japan?

Truman: It goes without saying that the Russians could claim one-third of the fleet, which would then be handed over to them. An agreement could be reached on this.

Stalin: It is the principle we think important.

Churchill: Mr. President, I think we can reach an agreement. I suppose these ships could now be earmarked for each participant, and when the war against Japan is over, these ships could be handed over where they belong.

Stalin: Which ships?

Churchill: I mean the merchantmen. But I think the principle is the most important thing here. It should be borne in mind that the Red Army's offensive along the Baltic coast forced the Germans to abandon their ports, so that the German fleet was expelled from the Baltic Sea. I must admit that I am a supporter of Generalissimo Stalin's proposal concerning the Russian desire to obtain a part of Germany's Navy and merchant fleet, and believe that the only alternative would be to sink the whole navy, but that would be unwise, considering that our Ally wants to have a part of this navy.

Stalin: The Russians should not be depicted as people who are intent on hampering the successful operation of the Allied navy against Japan. But this should not lead to the conclusion that the Russians want to receive a present from the Allies. We want no gifts, but wish to know whether or not the principle is recognised, whether or not the Russian claim to a part of the German navy is considered legitimate.

Churchill: I said nothing of gifts.

Stalin: I did not say you did.

I want a clarification of the question of whether the Russians have a right to one-third of Germany's Navy and merchant marine. I think the Russians have this right and what they will receive they will receive by right. I only want clarity in this matter. If my colleagues think differently I should like to know what they actually think. We shall be satisfied if there is recognition of the principle that the Russians have a right to receive one-third of Germany's Navy and merchant fleet.

As for the use of Germany's merchant fleet, specifically that third which would be recognised as being Russia's by right, we shall of course have no objections to that third being put to the best use by the Allies in their struggle against Japan. I also agree that this question should be settled at the end of the Conference.

I should like to deal with yet another question. Our men have been deprived of access to Germany's Navy and merchant fleet, they were prevented from inspecting the ships. The bulk of the navy is known to be in the hands of our Ally, but our men were deprived of access to these ships and they have no possibility of inspecting the ships of that navy. They should at least be given a chance to study the list of these ships. Is it not possible to lift this ban and give the members of the Russian naval commission an opportunity to inspect the ships of this navy and to find out how many ships there are?

Churchill: We are also in possession of facts when our men were not allowed to inspect some war trophies on the Baltic Sea.

Stalin: Only submarines were seized on the Baltic, but that is an absolutely useless, destroyed submarine fleet. But if there is a desire to inspect it, the opportunity can be given at any time.

Churchill: Our principle is equality and fairness. Therefore I consider your proposal acceptable, but we only ask whether it could be arranged to give our men an opportunity to inspect some highly interesting German property, for instance, on the Baltic Sea, notably some submarines?

Stalin: You are welcome.

Truman: I want to say here on behalf of the United States that you have access to all our zones and you can see anything you want to. But we should like to obtain the same possibility of inspecting what we may find of interest.

Churchill: I spoke here of the difference between submarines and surface ships. Generalissimo Stalin will understand us when we say that as islanders we are highly sensitive on this point. Our island provides us with less than two-thirds of our food. During this war, we have suffered a great deal from submarines. More, in fact, than anyone else. Twice we stood on the brink of disaster. That is why the submarine is not a popular type of warship in Britain. I favour the sinking of the bulk of the submarines.

Stalin: I do too.

Churchill: And I want the rest of the submarines be shared equally between us for scientific and technical purposes, because they are of considerable interest. Twice we stood on the brink of disaster because of the operations of enemy submarines. I agree, therefore, that we should sink the bulk of the submarines and divide the rest among the three Powers. I ask the Generalissimo and the President to excuse me, but in this respect we are in a special position. Our military might has suffered greatly from these submarines. In accepting this principle I merely stipulate that the question of the number of submarines to be sunk and the number to be divided should be settled at the end of the Conference.

Stalin: Good, I agree.

Truman: We have discussed this question sufficiently, and can go on to the next one.

Eden: The next question deals with Spain.

Truman: Does the Generalissimo wish to speak on the question?

Stalin: The proposals have been circulated. I have nothing to add to what is said there.

Churchill: Mr. President, the British Government – the present one and the previous one – have a feeling of hatred for Franco and his Government. I have been misunderstood, and it has been said that I take a friendly attitude to this gentleman. All I said was that there is more to Spanish politics than anti-Fran-

co cartoons. I think that the continued destruction of people thrown into prison for what they did six years ago, and various other circumstances in Spain are, by our British standards, totally undemocratic.

When Franco sent me a letter saying that he, I and certain other Western countries should unite against the threat of the Soviet Union, I sent him, with the permission of my Cabinet, a very cool reply. The Soviet Government may remember this reply, because I sent it a copy of my letter, as I did to the President. So there are no great differences between us concerning the feelings we have for the present regime in Spain.

Where I do see some difficulty in adopting the draft proposed by the Generalissimo is in Point One, which speaks of the rupture of all relations with the Franco Government, which is the Government of Spain. I think that, considering that the Spaniards are proud and rather sensitive, such a step by its very nature could have the effect of uniting the Spaniards around Franco, instead of making them move away from him. That is why I do not think that the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Spanish Government would be a satisfactory way of solving the question.

This may give us some satisfaction but we shall then be deprived of any contact we may need in hard times. I believe such a step would only strengthen Franco's position, and if his positions are strengthened we shall have to stand his abuse or use our forces against him. I am against the use of force in such cases. I do not think we should interfere in the internal affairs of a state with whom we differ in views, with the exception of cases when this or that state attacks us. Concerning the countries we have defeated, there we should establish our own control. As for the countries that have been liberated in the course of the war, we cannot allow the establishment there of a fascist or a Franco regime. But here we have a country which did not take part in the war and that is why I am against interfering in its domestic affairs. His Majesty's Government will need to have a long discussion of this question before it decides to break off relations with Spain.

I think Franco's power is now jeopardised and I hope that his downfall may be speeded up by diplomatic means. Rupture of relations is, in my opinion, a very dangerous way of tackling the question. Besides, there is always the danger of a possible resumption of the civil war in Spain, which cost her 2 million dead out of a total population of 17 or 18 million. And it would be a pity to interfere actively in this matter at this point, because I believe that there are forces operating there to change the situation for the better. That is my view of the question.

The world organisation set up at San Francisco takes a negative attitude to interference in the affairs of other countries. It would therefore be wrong for us to take an active part in settling this matter. This would run counter to the Charter of the international organisation adopted at San Francisco.

Truman: I have no sympathies for the Franco regime, but I have no desire to take part in a Spanish civil war. I've had enough of the war in Europe. We should be very glad to recognise another government in Spain instead of the Franco Government, but that I think is a question for Spain herself to decide.

Stalin: Is that to say that there will be no change in Spain? I personally think that the Franco regime is being strengthened and it is a regime that fosters semi-fascist regimes in certain other countries of Europe. It should be borne in mind that the Franco regime was imposed on the Spanish people from outside, and is not a regime that has taken shape in internal conditions.

You are very well aware that the Franco regime was imposed by Hitler and Mussolini, and is their legacy. By destroying the Franco regime we shall be destroying the legacy of Hitler and Mussolini. Nor must we lose sight of the fact that the democratic liberation of Europe implies certain obligations.

I am not proposing any military intervention; I am not proposing that we should unleash a civil war there. I should only like the Spanish people to know that we, the leaders of democratic Europe, take a negative attitude to the Franco regime. Unless we declare this in one form or another, the Spanish people will be justified in thinking that we are not against the Franco regime. They may say that since we have left the Franco regime alone, it means that we support it.

What are the diplomatic means that could show the Spanish people that we are not on the side of Franco but of democracy? Assuming that such a means as the rupture of diplomatic relations is too strong, can't we consider other, more flexible means of a diplomatic order? This must be done to let the Spanish people know that we sympathise with them and not with Franco.

In my opinion it would be dangerous to leave the Franco regime in its present state. The public opinion of the European countries, as the press shows, and also of America, has no sympathy with the Franco regime. If we by-pass this question, people will assume that we have sanctioned, or given our tacit blessing to the Franco regime in Spain. That is a great charge against us. I should not like to be among the accused.

Churchill: You have no diplomatic relations with the Spanish Government, and no one can accuse you of this.

Stalin: But I do have the right and the possibility of raising the question and settling it. How will people know that the Soviet Union sympathises or does not sympathise with the Franco regime? It is the accepted view that the Big Three can solve such questions. I am a member of the Big Three, like the President and the Prime Minister. Do I have the right to say nothing about what is going on in Spain, about the Franco regime and the great danger it presents to the whole of Europe? It would be a great mistake for us to ignore this question and say nothing about it.

Churchill: Every government is quite free to make known its views individually. That is the freedom also enjoyed by the press, as Generalissimo Stalin has mentioned here. The Soviet and a part of the American press have very freely expressed themselves on the state of affairs in Spain. As for the British Government, although we have frequently said this to Franco and his Ambassador, we should not like to discontinue our relations with the Spanish Government.

We have long had trade relations with Spain; they supply us with oranges, wine and certain other products, in exchange for our own goods. If our interference does not bring the desired results, I should not like this trade to be jeopardised. But at the same time I fully understand the view taken by Generalissimo Stalin. Franco had the nerve to send his Blue Division to Russia, and I quite understand the Russian view.

But Spain has not done anything to hinder us; she did not do it even when she could have done so in the Bay of Algeciras. There is no doubt in anyone's mind that Generalissimo Stalin hates Franco, and I think that the majority of Britons share his view. I merely wish to stress that we have not suffered from him in any way.

Stalin: It is not a matter of injury. Incidentally, I think that Britain has also suffered from the Franco regime. For a long time Spain placed her coast at Hitler's disposal for use by his submarines. You can say, therefore, that Britain has suffered from the Franco regime in one way or another.

But I should not want this matter to be viewed from the standpoint of some injury. It is not the Blue Division that matters but the fact that the Franco regime is a grave threat to Europe. That is why I think that something should be done against this regime. If rupture of diplomatic relations is unsuitable, I do not insist on it. Other means can be found. We have only to say that we do not sympathise with the Franco regime and consider the Spanish people's urge for democracy just, we have only to say this and nothing will be left of the Franco regime. I assure you.

I propose: the Foreign Ministers should discuss whether some other, milder and more flexible, form could be found to make it known that the Great Powers do not support the Franco regime.

Truman: That suits me; I agree to refer the matter to the Foreign Ministers.

Churchill: I should oppose this. I think that this is a matter that should be settled in this hall.

Stalin: Of course, we shall settle it here, but let the Ministers examine it beforehand.

Truman: I too have no objection to refer this matter for a preliminary examination by our Foreign Ministers.

Churchill: I consider this to be undesirable because that is a matter of principle, namely, interference in the domestic affairs of other countries.

Stalin: This is not a domestic affair, the Franco regime is an international threat.

Churchill: Anyone can say this of the regime of any other country.

Stalin: No, there is no such regime in any other country as the one in Spain; there is no regime like that left in any country of Europe.

Churchill: Portugal could be condemned for having a dictatorial regime.

Stalin: The Franco regime was set up from outside, by way of Hitler's and Mussolini's intervention. Franco behaves in a most provocative manner, and gives asylum to Nazis. I raise no question about Portugal.

Churchill: I cannot advise Parliament to interfere in Spain's domestic affairs. That is a policy we have been conducting for a long time. At the same time, I should be glad to see a change of regime in Spain, but only in a natural way. I should personally be very happy to see a revolution in Spain, and, say, a constitutional monarchy established there with an amnesty for political prisoners.

But I believe that if I or the British Government were to exert an influence on Spain in that sense, the feelings of the Spaniards would turn against us and in favour of Franco. In my opinion, Franco is now on the way out.

If we here were to take any concerted action, we should only be reinforcing his position. On the other hand, the British Government will in no way support Franco, the present Spanish Government, with the exception of continued trade with Spain, of which I have already spoken here.

Truman: I should be very glad if we agreed to refer the matter for preliminary examination by the Foreign Ministers so that they could find an acceptable formula on this point.

Stalin: I am aware of the difficulties faced by Mr. Churchill in connection with interpellations in Parliament. But this matter can be toned down. What about settling the question like this: no question of the Franco regime is to be raised separately, it being agreed that the question never came up and was never examined separately as a question of the Franco regime.

The three Foreign Ministers are to be asked, considering the exchange of opinion on the question of the Franco regime, to find a suitable formula for the question, including, in particular, Mr. Churchill's formulation that the Franco regime is on the way out and that his regime does not enjoy the sympathies of the democratic Powers that this regime is not given a high rating by public opinion. Such a formula could be inserted as a point in one of our declarations on Europe. We shall of course have some general declarations, and the formula worked out by the Foreign Ministers could be inserted in there.

This will not put the British Government under any obligation, but the point will contain a brief assessment of the Franco regime, and this will let public opinion know that we are not on the side of the Franco regime. I think we should adopt such a decision. Let the Foreign Ministers give some thought to the form in which it is to be clothed.

Churchill: I have not yet agreed in principle that we should make such a joint declaration on this question.

Stalin: It's not about Spain, but we shall be giving a general evaluation on Europe, and this could be included there as one of the points. Look at what happens: in all our documents we speak of all countries with the exception of Spain.

Churchill: The line I am adhering to is as follows: Spain is a country which had not been involved in the war and is not a satellite country; nor was she liberated by the Allies; that is why we cannot interfere in her domestic affairs. That is a matter of principle.

Take Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and other countries: there are many issues there which we do not like and which we could criticise. But these countries were involved in the war and were liberated by the Allies.

If you wish we could draw up a declaration on the general principles underlying democratic governments. That is something we could discuss. I have in mind for instance the U.S. Constitution. Franco is undoubtedly a very far cry from this Constitution. Countries differ from one another and that is why if we start interfering, we shall have no end of trouble.

I don't know the mind of the Spaniards, but I think that some are of one mind, others of another; I am sure that many Spaniards would like to be rid of Franco but without outside pressure. I don't see what the Foreign Ministers could do on the question. I feel that this would give them a lot of hard work, while the discussion of the question would prove to be fruitless.

Truman: I see very little likelihood of an agreement being reached on this question at the present sitting. Wouldn't it be better to return to it later?

Stalin: Maybe, after all, we should refer this matter to the Foreign Ministers so that they should try to find a suitable formula?

Churchill: That's the very point on which we have failed to agree.

Truman: I think we'd better pass on to the next question and return to the question of Spain later.

Churchill: I do not propose a negative solution, I merely propose that we now pass on to a discussion of other matters, and discuss this question later.

Truman: We pass on to the next question.

Eden: The Declaration on Liberated Europe.

Truman: I submitted a document on this question on July 17.

Stalin: I propose that we should now postpone this question; we may table another proposal on this question.

Truman: I have no objection to postponing this question at this time.

Eden: The next question is that of Yugoslavia. We have already submitted a small draft on this question.

Stalin: I think that we are unable to solve this question without hearing representatives from Yugoslavia.

Eden: It should be noted that we reached an agreement in respect of Yugoslavia at the Crimea Conference without the presence of Yugoslav representatives.

Stalin: This is now an Allied country with a legitimate government. The question cannot now be solved without the participation of Yugoslav representatives. At that time, there were two governments, and they could not come to terms. We interfered in that matter. And now there is one legitimate government there. Let us invite representatives from Yugoslavia and hear them, and then adopt a decision.

Churchill: Is it to be Subasić and Tito?

Stalin: Yes.

Churchill: But they don't see eye to eye, there are hard feelings on both sides.

Stalin: I know nothing about this. Let's verify this, let's invite them over here and let them speak their mind.

Truman: Is this matter serious enough for them to be invited over here? I find this inconvenient.

Churchill: We put our signatures to the agreement at the Crimea Conference, but we now find that this Declaration on Yugoslavia is not being fulfilled: there is no election law, the Assembly of the Council has not been enlarged, legal procedure has not been re-established, the Tito administration is under the control of his party police, and the press is also controlled as in some fascist countries.

We find that the situation in Yugoslavia does not justify our hopes as expressed in the Declaration of the Crimea Conference. We supplied Yugoslavia with a considerable quantity of arms at a time when we ourselves were weak and that is why we are disappointed and regret that events have taken such a turn there. Our proposal is a very modest one. It is that what was said in the Yalta Declaration should be fulfilled.

Stalin: Mr. Churchill has commenced the discussion instead of answering the President's question as to whether the question is serious and important enough for us to discuss at the Conference and invite representatives from Yugoslavia. If the President will allow me I will follow in Mr. Churchill's footsteps and also start discussing this question.

You see, the information which Mr. Churchill has given here concerning the violation of the well-known decisions of the Crimea Conference, this information, according to our sources, is unknown to us. I should think it right to hear the Yugoslavs themselves and give them an opportunity of refuting these charges or admitting that they are correct.

Churchill: I want you to substitute the word "complaint" for the word "charge".

Stalin: It is not a question of words, and I can, of course, substitute "complaint" for "charge". But it is not right to judge a whole state without hearing its representatives.

Churchill: We have now had an opportunity of thinking over this question, and I think it would be advisable for the two sides, namely, Tito and Subasić, to meet here. These difficulties could then be possibly obviated and we could reach an agreed decision. But do you think Marshal Tito will agree to come here?

Stalin: I don't know, we should ask if they can come.

Truman: Before going on to the final stage I should like to make a statement. I have come here as the representative of the United States, and I have come here to discuss world problems with you. But I have not come here to judge each separate country in Europe or examine the disputes which should be settled by the world organisation set up at San Francisco.

If we are going to examine political complaints against anyone, we shall merely be wasting our time. Nothing good will come of it if we start inviting Tito, Franco or other leaders over here. We are not a judicial organ to look into complaints against individual statesmen. We should deal with questions on which we could reach agreement.

Stalin: That is a correct remark.

Truman: We should discuss questions which are of interest to each of us.

Churchill: This, Mr. President, is a question which is also of interest to the United States, because it involves the fulfilment of the decisions which had been adopted at the Crimea Conference. It's a question of principle. Of course, it is quite obvious that the situation in Yugoslavia, the position of Marshal Tito, should be taken into account. Not much time has passed since peace set in in the country. But all we had in mind in our draft was the wish that what was said at the Crimea Conference should be fulfilled.

Stalin: In my opinion, the decisions of the Crimea Conference are being fulfilled by Marshal Tito in their entirety.

Truman: It is true that not all the decisions of the Crimea Conference are being fulfilled by Yugoslavia. We also have complaints to make. This should be pointed out to the Yugoslav Government. But we could postpone this question to the next sitting.

Churchill: I should like to thank Generalissimo Stalin for his patience in discussing this question. If we cannot speak of the differences which sometimes arise between us, if we cannot discuss them here, where can they be discussed?

Stalin: We are discussing them here. But the question cannot be settled without the accused. You have accused the head of the Yugoslav Government. I ask that he be heard and a decision adopted after that. As for discussion we can have any amount of it.

Churchill: I agree with this, but the President is opposed to inviting Tito here.

Stalin: In that case the question will have to be withdrawn.

Truman: Today's agenda has run out. Tomorrow's sitting is at 4.00.

Fourth Sitting. July 20, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.

[The Soviet delegation reported that that day's meeting of the three Foreign Ministers dealt with the following questions.

1. Economic principles in respect of Germany.

It was stated that the commission entrusted with the preparation of this question had not yet completed its work and therefore the substance of the question had not been discussed. It was decided to ask the commission to finish its work by July 21.

2. The Polish question.

It was reported that the commission dealing with this question had not yet completed its work, as a result of which the substance of the question had not been discussed. It was decided to ask the commission to finish its work by July 21.

3. On the peaceful settlement.

In view of the fact that the commission entrusted with drafting the text on the question of a peaceful settlement had been unable to fulfil its task because the members of this commission had been busy in other commissions, it was decided that the Foreign Ministers would meet additionally at 15.45 that day to prepare the question for submission at the sitting of the three Heads of Government. At their meeting the Foreign Ministers adopted an amendment to Point 3 of the draft on this question, as a result of which the point would read as follows:

“3. As its immediate important task, the Council would be authorised to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilised for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

“For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be comprised of the members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy state concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy.

“Other members should be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.”

4. The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe.

The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. handed Soviet draft proposals on the question to the Foreign Minister of Great Britain and the U.S. Secretary of State. In connection with the submitted draft there was a discussion of the question of the situation in Rumania and Bulgaria on the one hand, and in Greece, on the other. As a result of the discussion it transpired that the Foreign Ministers took different views of the situation in these countries.

In particular, the U.S. Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of Great Britain declared that there were restrictions on the press in Rumania and Bulgaria. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs pointed out that there had been some inevitable restrictions on the press in wartime conditions. At present, in view of the war being ended, the possibilities for members of the press to work in these countries could be considerably extended.

The U.S. Secretary of State proposed the conclusion of an agreement between the three Powers on the supervision of elections by the three Powers in Italy, Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary and on free access to these countries for members of the press of the U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and Great Britain,

and on the possibility for them to move freely about and freely dispatch their reports. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. declared that he saw no necessity for the dispatch of special observers to Rumania and Bulgaria. As for Greece, the Soviet Government's standpoint was set forth in the document submitted. If the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and the U.S.A. submitted written proposals on this question, they could be discussed at a meeting of the three Ministers.

5. On Italy.

The U.S. Secretary of State submitted a draft decision of the three Heads of Government saying that they would support Italy's entry into the United Nations, but that they would not support Spain's entry into the United Nations so long as Spain remained under the control of the regime existing in the country. The Foreign Minister of Great Britain declared his support for this proposal and said that if any declaration was drafted on this question he considered it advisable to mention in it that the three Powers would also support the admission to the United Nations of certain neutral countries, such as Sweden, Switzerland and Portugal.

The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. raised the question as to whether this proposal could be applied to countries which had ceased to be hostile and had become co-belligerents against Germany. The Foreign Minister of Great Britain declared that the question could be discussed, but that he personally thought that such countries could be admitted to the United Nations after peace treaties had been signed with them. A sub-commission was set up to work out the question.

In this connection it was decided to ask the commission dealing with questions of reparations to study the question of reparations from Italy and Austria.

6. On Poland's western frontier.

The Foreign Ministers of the United States and Great Britain were handed the Soviet Government's proposals concerning the establishment of Poland's western frontiers together with the relevant map. It was decided to bring up the question at the sitting of the three Heads of Government on July 20.

7. On trust territories.

The Foreign Ministers of the United States and Great Britain were handed the Soviet Government's proposals concerning measures for establishing territorial trusteeship. It was decided to bring this question up at the sitting of the three Heads of Government on July 20.

8. On the agenda of the sitting of the three Heads of Government on July 20.

The Ministers agreed to recommend the following agenda to the three Heads of Government:

1. On the peaceful settlement.

2: The U.S. President's memorandum of July 17 on policy in respect of Italy.

3. The situation in Austria, particularly in Vienna (communication by the Prime Minister of Great Britain).

4. On Poland's western frontier.

5. On trust territories.]

Churchill: Allow me, Mr. President, to raise a small question concerning the procedure of our work for the good of the cause. Our Ministers have been meeting every day to prepare an extensive programme for our afternoon sittings. Today, for instance, they completed their work only by 14.00. This leaves us very little time to go through and discuss the documents they prepare. Wouldn't it be better for us to begin our afternoon sittings at 17.00?

Truman: I have no objection. We now go on to a discussion of the items on the agenda. We discuss the first question.

Churchill: I understand that the Soviet delegation has an amendment to the draft on the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers.

Truman: The amendment was read out. I agree with the amendment.

Churchill: (Having read the text of the amendment.) I also agree with this amendment.

Truman: It is necessary to establish the time and place for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. I am prepared to let the Foreign Ministers decide this matter themselves.

Churchill: I quite agree that the question should be discussed, but it is my opinion that London must be the place; that is where the secretariat should have its permanent seat, but sittings may also take place elsewhere, if that is desirable. In confirmation of my view I should like to recall that London is the capital which was under enemy fire during the war more than the others. As far as I am aware, It is the world's biggest city and one of its most ancient. Besides, it is mid-way between the United States and Russia.

Stalin: That is most important. [Laughter.]

Churchill: What is more, it is London's turn.

Stalin: Right.

Churchill: I should only like to add that I flew across the ocean six times to have the honour of conferring with the President of the United States, and twice visited Moscow. However London is not being used at all as a place for our meetings. There is strong feeling on this point in Britain, and I think Mr. Attlee also has a few words to say about it.

Attlee: I quite agree with what the Prime Minister has said here, and wish to add that our people have a right to see these outstanding personalities visit them. They would be very glad of this. They have gone through a great deal. I think, moreover, that London's geographical situation also has a great part to play. I second the Prime Minister's wish.

Truman: I also agree with the Prime Minister's proposal and agree that geographical location plays a big part.

Stalin: Good, I have no objection.

Truman: But I want to reserve the right to invite the Heads of Government to visit the United States.

Churchill: May I express my gratitude to the President and the Generalissimo for their kind acceptance of our proposal.

Truman: I think that in due time our three Foreign Ministers will be joined by the Foreign Ministers of China and France. I also think that we could let the Foreign Ministers decide on the date the Council is to meet.

[Stalin and Churchill agree with Truman's proposals.]

Truman: The second question is on policy in respect of Italy. Our proposals on policy in respect of Italy were submitted at the first sitting. The essence of my proposal is as follows.

I believe that Italy's position would be considerably improved if we recognised her services as a participant in the war against Germany. I propose that the terms of surrender should be replaced by the following obligations on the part of the Italian Government: 1) The Italian Government shall refrain from any hostile action against any of the United Nations until the conclusion of a peace treaty; 2) The Italian Government shall not maintain any army, naval or air forces or equipment except what it is authorised by the Allies, and shall abide by all the instructions concerning such forces and equipment.

While this agreement is in force, control over Italy should be retained only insofar as is necessary: a) to ensure Allied military requirements so long as the Allied forces remain in Italy or operate from there; and b) to ensure a just settlement of territorial disputes.

Stalin: It would be well for the Ministers to discuss the question of policy in respect of Italy. I have no objections in principle but some amendments in the drafting may be necessary. It would be well to refer this memorandum to the three Ministers for a final reading and to ask them, at the same time, to discuss, along with the question of Italy, the question of Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland.

There is no reason why we should set apart the question of Italy from those pertaining to other countries. Italy was, of course, the first to surrender, and subsequently helped in the war against Germany. It is true that the force was small, only 3 divisions, but she did help none the less. She is planning to enter the war against Japan. That is also a plus. But there are similar pluses to the credit of such countries as Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. They, these countries, moved their troops against Germany on the next day after surrender. Bulgaria had 8-10 divisions against Germany, Rumania had about 9. These countries should also be given some relief.

As for Finland she did not render any serious help in the war, but she is behaving well, honestly fulfilling her obligations. Her position could also be eased.

That is why it would be well, while giving relief to Italy, to give some to these countries as well and to examine all these questions together. If my colleagues agree with my proposal we could ask the three Foreign Ministers to examine these questions as one.

Truman: Italy was the first country to surrender, and, as far as I am aware, the terms of her surrender were somewhat harder than those of the other countries. But I agree that the position of the other satellite states should also be reviewed. I am in full agreement with Generalissimo Stalin on this point.

Churchill: Our stand on the question of Italy is not quite identical with that taken by my two colleagues. Italy attacked us in June 1940. We had serious losses in the Mediterranean and also during the defence of Egypt, which we had to organise at a time when we ourselves were threatened with invasion. We lost many warships and merchantmen in the Mediterranean. We had heavy losses on land, on the coast of North Africa. And these sacrifices increased when Germany moved her troops to Africa. Without support from anyone we had to undertake the campaign in Abyssinia, which ended in the Emperor of Abyssinia being restored to his throne. Special squadrons of Italian air force were dispatched to bomb London.

It should also be mentioned that Italy undertook an absolutely unwarranted attack against Greece, and just before the start of the war she made a similarly unwarranted attack against Albania. All that took place when we were absolutely alone.

I am saying all this because I think that all the losses that we have suffered from Italy should not be forgotten. We cannot justify the Italian people just as we do not justify the German people because it was under Hitler's yoke. In spite of this we have tried to entertain the idea of restoring Italy as one of the major Powers in Europe and the Mediterranean. When I was there a year ago I made a number of proposals to President Roosevelt, and most of these proposals were included in the declaration which was subsequently published.

I don't want it to be thought that I have any feeling of revenge in respect of Italy. I objected to reports appearing in various newspapers saying that we were antagonistic to Italy. I declared on behalf of His Majesty's Government that we viewed the matter with an open heart and wished to obtain the best results. I should like all these considerations to be taken into account.

I want to join the President and the Generalissimo in principle in making a gesture in respect of the Italian people, which suffered a great deal during the war and made efforts to expel the Germans from its territory. That is why the British delegation does not object in principle to concluding peace with Italy. This work will undoubtedly require a few months for the preparation of the peace terms.

I also note that the present Italian Government has no democratic basis arising from free and independent elections. It merely consists of political figures who call themselves leaders of various political parties. I understand that the Italian Government intends to hold elections before the winter. That is why, although I agree that the Council of Foreign Ministers should start work on drafting the peace treaty, I do not consider it desirable that it should complete this work before the Italian Government is based on democratic principles.

Meanwhile, I must say that I do not quite agree with the U.S. memorandum concerning provisional terms under which the existing armistice terms should be replaced by certain undertakings on the part of the present Italian Government. I think that no Italian Government can give guaranteed assurances unless it rests on the Italian people. If the existing rights stipulated by the surrender are abolished and replaced by obligations on the part of the Italian Government – and it will be a considerable time before the peace treaty is concluded – we shall be deprived of every possibility, except the use of force, to make Italy fulfil our terms. As it is none of us wants to use force to achieve such aims.

Take Point 1 of the American memorandum: it says nothing about the future of the Italian fleet, Italian colonies, reparations and other important matters. Thus we shall be losing the rights we have under the surrender document.

Finally, I must say that the terms of surrender were signed not only by Great Britain, but also by other states within the British Empire; they were signed by the dominions – Australia, New Zealand and others, who suffered losses during the war. This question will have to be discussed with them. Besides Greece was the victim of an Italian invasion. I do not want to go further today than to agree in principle that the Council of Foreign Ministers should start to draft the peace terms.

As for the other countries mentioned here, I must say that Bulgaria has no right to make any claims on Great Britain. Bulgaria dealt us a cruel blow and did everything to harm us in the Balkans. Of course, it is not for me to talk of Bulgaria's ingratitude towards Russia. The Russian Army once liberated Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke after many years of savage oppression. In this war, Bulgaria hardly suffered at all, she was Germany's handmaiden, and on her orders attacked Greece and Yugoslavia, doing them a great deal of damage. But nothing is said about disarming Bulgaria. I think she is just as strong as before; she has 15 divisions. Nothing is said about reparations from Bulgaria. I must admit that I am not greatly inclined to an early conclusion of peace with Bulgaria, at any rate less so than to a conclusion of such a peace with Italy.

I am very grateful to my colleagues for having listened to my considerations with such patience. I must say in conclusion that on some points I differ with the President and the Generalissimo.

Stalin: It seems to me that the question of Italy is one of high politics. The task of the Big Three is to dissociate the satellites from Germany, as the main force of aggression. There are two ways of doing this. First, the use of force. This method has been successfully applied by us, and the Allied forces are in Italy, and also on the territory of other countries. But this method alone is inadequate for dissociating Germany's accomplices from her. If we continue to limit ourselves to the use of force towards them, there is the danger that we shall be creating an environment for future German aggression. It is therefore advisable to supplement the force method with that of easing the position of these countries. This, I believe, is the only means, if we view the question in perspective, of rallying these countries round us and dissociating them from Germany for good.

Such are the considerations of high politics. All other considerations, such as those of revenge and injury, no longer arise.

That is the standpoint from which I view the U.S. President's memorandum. I believe it is in line with such a policy, the policy of finally dissociating Germany's satellites from her by easing their position. That is why I have no objections in principle to the proposals put forward in the President's memorandum. They may require some drafting improvements.

Now there is the other side of the question. I have in mind Mr. Churchill's speech. Of course, Italy has also greatly wronged Russia. We had clashes with Italian troops not only in the Ukraine, but also on the Don and the Volga, that is how deeply they had penetrated into our country. But I think it would be wrong to be guided by memories of injury or feelings of retribution and to base one's policy on that. Feelings of revenge or hatred or a sense of compensation received for injury are very poor guides in politics. In politics, I believe, one should be guided by an estimation of forces.

This is how the question should be posed: do we want to have Italy on our side so as to isolate her from the forces which may once again rise against us in Germany? I think we do, and that should be our starting point. We must dissociate Germany's former accomplices from her.

A great many hardships and sufferings were inflicted on us by such countries as Rumania, which put many divisions into the field against the Soviet forces, and Hungary, which had 20 divisions against the Soviet troops in the final stages of the war. Finland inflicted great damage on us. Without Finland's help, Germany could not, of course, have blockaded Leningrad. Finland had 24 divisions against our troops.

Bulgaria has caused us fewer hardships and less injury. She helped Germany to attack and conduct offensive operations against Russia, but she herself did not enter the war against us and sent no troops against the Soviet troops. The armistice agreement provides that Bulgaria is to make her troops available for the war against Germany. This agreement was signed by the representatives of the three Powers – the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. The agreement says that after the war against Germany ends, Bulgaria's army is to be demobilised and stepped down to peace-time strength. This we shall have to do, and it will be done. Bulgaria cannot resist fulfilment of the agreement, she will have to fulfil it.

Such are the sins of the satellites against the Allies and the Soviet Union in particular.

If we begin to avenge ourselves on them for having caused us great damage, that will be one kind of policy. I am not a supporter of that policy. Now that these countries have been defeated and the control commissions of the three Powers are there to see that they carry out the armistice terms, it is time we went over to another policy, the policy of easing their position. And easing their position means prying them away from Germany.

Now here is a concrete proposal. As far as I have understood, President Truman does not propose the immediate drafting of a treaty with Italy. President Truman merely proposes that the way be paved for the conclusion of such a treaty, in the near future; he proposes for the time being the creation of some kind of intermediate state between the surrender terms accepted by Italy and the future peace treaty.

I think it is hard to object to such a proposal. It is quite practicable, and it is timely. As for the other satellites, I believe that we could start by re-establishing diplomatic relations with them. There may be the objection that they do not have freely elected government. But neither is there such a government in Italy. However, diplomatic relations with Italy have been restored. Nor are there such governments in France and Belgium. But there is no doubt in anyone's mind on the question of diplomatic relations with these countries.

Churchill: They were Allies.

Stalin: I understand. But democracy is democracy everywhere, among allies as well as among satellites.

Truman: I understand the situation to be as follows. I have made a concrete proposal concerning Italy. The armistice terms were signed by all three of our states.

Eden: We did not sign on behalf of the dominions.

Truman: The dominions did not sign in respect of the other satellites either. But let us return to the question under discussion. The question of policy in respect of Italy has been placed on the agenda. The Soviet side raised the question of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. I understand that the Generalissimo has proposed that the question of Italy and of the other satellite countries should be referred to our Foreign Ministers.

It is a matter of working out provisional terms before the conclusion of a peace treaty. I fully agree with the Generalissimo that these treaties must not be based on a feeling of revenge, hatred or injury, but on a sense of justice, so as to create the possibility of peaceful existence for all mankind. And I think that we can fully achieve this here.

I must say a few words on reparations from Italy. Italy's present position is such that we are faced with the question of giving Italy assistance worth from \$700 million to \$1,000 million. But I must say that we cannot render similar aid to other countries without getting anything in return. I think that we should here try to prepare the conditions in which these countries could live on their own resources.

I think that both these questions could be referred to the Foreign Ministers, and that they will be able to find the basis of an agreement to enable us to arrive at a common view in respect of all these countries.

Churchill: I think that we are all agreed that the question of Italy should be referred to the Foreign Ministers. I only objected to the rescission of the existing surrender terms, which would deprive us of very substantial rights. I agree with the President that the terms must be eased and that a corresponding gesture should be made in respect of Italy. I have no objection to declaring here that a peace treaty is being prepared for Italy.

I fully agree with everything said by the Generalissimo and the President about it being wrong to determine the future in the spirit of revenge for injuries caused. I heard with great satisfaction this statement by the leaders of the great peoples whom they here represent. I have great sympathy for Italy, and the Government of Great Britain will act in that spirit. I used the word "reparations" in respect of Italy, but we do not of course seek any reparations for ourselves; we had Greece in mind.

Truman: I would propose that the question of Italy and the other countries should be referred to the three Foreign Ministers.

Churchill: I agree that the preparatory work in drafting the peace treaty with Italy should be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Stalin: Which Council?

Churchill: The future Council of Foreign Ministers. I only made a reservation concerning provisional measures. This could be discussed at the daily conferences of our Foreign Ministers.

Stalin: I would propose that the Foreign Ministers should also discuss the question of Germany's other accomplices. I ask Mr. Churchill not to object to this. [General laughter.] I ask that the three Foreign Ministers should discuss, alongside the question of Italy, that of the other countries.

Churchill: I have never objected. [Laughter.] *Truman:* I also agree.

Let us go on to the next question. It is the communication of the Prime Minister concerning the situation in Austria, particularly in Vienna.

Churchill: I very much regret that during today's discussion I have had to disagree with the opinion of the Soviet delegation a number of times. But I consider that the situation in Austria and in Vienna is unsatisfactory. It was agreed that we were to have different sectors, different zones in Austria. This business has been going on for a long time.

Over two months ago I asked that British officers be allowed into Vienna to inspect the premises we shall need, the airports, and the quarters for our troops. All this had been agreed in principle beforehand. Our officers went to Vienna but the results of their visit turned out to be unsatisfactory; our missions were forced to leave the city and return empty-handed. We have now been prohibited not only entry into Vienna but also the dispatch of our troops into the zone on which agreement had been reached.

Three or four months have already passed since Austria's liberation by the Soviet troops. I don't see why there are such difficulties in this simple matter, and that after an agreement had been concluded on this point. I have been receiving unsatisfactory reports from Field-Marshal Alexander. We still have no place where we could stay. I believe that in view of the signed agreement we should be given such permission.

Yesterday I was asked to find out whether a Russian delegation could visit German ships in British hands. I replied to this question as follows: meet us half-way. If German ships in Britain can be in-

spected by Russian representatives, I think we should be given access to enemy towns which are under Russian occupation. We have withdrawn our troops from the Russian Zone of Occupation in Northern Germany, and the American troops have also withdrawn from that zone; yet we have no right to send our troops to our zone in Austria.

Stalin: There is an agreement on zones in Austria, but there was no agreement on any zones in Vienna. Some time was naturally required to implement the agreement. This agreement has now been reached, it was reached yesterday. An agreement had to be reached on which airfields were to go to whom. This also takes time. An agreement on this question has also been reached. We received the French reply only yesterday. A day has now been set for the entry of your troops into Vienna, and for the withdrawal of our troops. This could begin today or tomorrow.

Mr. Churchill is highly indignant, but the case is not quite like that. You should not say: they're not letting us into our zone. [Laughter.] That is not the expression to use. We were kept out of our zone in Germany for a month. We did not complain, we knew how hard it was to withdraw one's troops and to prepare everything for the entry of the Soviet troops. The Soviet Government has no intention to violate the agreement reached. If that is all there is to the question of the situation in Austria, Vienna in particular, then it has already been settled. The actions in the Berlin area were more reasonable, and there the question was solved sooner.

Field Marshal Alexander is acting less skilfully, and this has also been a factor of delay. He behaves as if the Russian forces were under his command. This has merely served to retard the solution of the question. The British and American military leaders in the zone of Germany did not act that way. There are no obstacles at present to each army entering its own zone, whether it is a question of Vienna or Styria, and that is because an agreement has now been reached.

Churchill: I am very happy that this business has finally been settled and we shall be allowed to enter our zone. As for Field Marshal Alexander, I don't think there is any cause to complain about him.

Stalin: There were no complaints about Eisenhower, no complaints about Montgomery, but there are complaints about Alexander.

Churchill: We beg you to let us have these complaints.

Stalin: I do not want to testify against Alexander, I was not preferring a charge. [Laughter.]

Churchill: I feel bound to say that in view of the absence of specific complaints against Alexander, the British Government will continue to have full confidence in him. We shall support all the measures he undertakes.

Stalin: I personally have no complaints, I was merely conveying what the commanders had reported, pointing to this as one of the reasons for delay in the settlement of the question.

Churchill: We are not alone in having an interest in this matter. The American commanders also have an interest in it.

Truman: I consider that complete agreement has been reached on this question.

The next question is that of Poland's western frontier. I understand that the Soviet delegation has considerations on this question.

Stalin: If my colleagues are not ready to discuss this question, perhaps we could pass on to the next one, and discuss this question tomorrow?

Truman: It is better to discuss it tomorrow. This question will be the first one on tomorrow's agenda. The next question is territorial trusteeship.

Stalin: Perhaps we shall discuss this question tomorrow as well?

Truman: I agree. Our agenda has run out. Tomorrow's sitting is at 17.00.

Fifth Sitting. July 21, 1945

Truman: Mr. Byrnes will report on today's sitting of the Foreign Ministers.

Byrnes: The Foreign Ministers discussed the date of the official establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers and agreed that the Council should be set up not later than September 1. They also agreed that telegrams should be sent to the Government of China and the Provisional Government of France inviting them to take part in the work of the Council before the public announcement of its establishment. At the request of the British delegation, the drafting commission which is dealing with this question was authorised to make certain small amendments to the text of the proposal submitted.

The next question is that of the economic principles in respect of Germany. Since the sub-commission's report on the question has just been submitted and our delegations have not had the possibility of making a proper study of it, they agreed to postpone discussion of this question until tomorrow.

Next was the Polish question – the dissolution of the London Government and the fulfilment of the Yalta Declaration. A report on behalf of the sub-commission dealing with the question was given by its chairman. In view of the fact that the sub-commission was unable to reach complete agreement, the outstanding questions were thoroughly discussed by the Foreign Ministers. They reached agreement on some of these points, but the following are being referred to the Heads of Government for a final decision. I think that the differences referred to you for decision will be clearer if you have before you the report of the sub-commission's chairman. The questions referred to you for decision are: (a) the point relating to the transfer of assets to the Polish Government and the recognition by the Polish Government of obligations towards the Governments of Great Britain and the United States; (b) the point relating to the holding of elections and freedom of the press.

Concerning the first point of the differences, regarding the transfer of assets to the Polish Government and its recognition of obligations towards the British and American Governments, the chairman of the sub-commission reported the following. The British Government and the Government of the United States have already taken steps to prevent the transfer of Polish property to third persons, property situated on the territory of Great Britain and the United States and under the control of their Governments, whatever the form of that property. They are prepared immediately to take steps to transfer this property to the Polish National Government in accordance with the requirements of the law. For this purpose they are prepared to discuss means and dates for the transfer of this property with the corresponding representatives of the Polish Provisional Government.

The wording of this proposal was the object of differences. The U.S. Government's stand is that the question of the assets must be the subject of discussions between the Government of the Polish State and the Government of the United States. At the same time, they should discuss the question of the Polish Government's obligations. The U.S. Government is sure that the Polish Provisional Government has no doubt that we are prepared to place at its disposal all the property belonging to it, in accordance with our laws.

That is why we proposed the following formulation of the point relating to this question: "The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interests of the Polish Provisional Government as a recognised government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located on their territory and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property of the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated."

Shall we discuss these points of differences or shall we go on?

Stalin: Let us first hear the report and then go on to the discussion.

Byrnes: There were no differences on the following point:

“The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland, as soon as practicable, of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens.”

There are differences on the following point: “The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government in conformity with the Crimea decisions has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. It is the confident hope of the Three Powers that the elections will be conducted in such a way as to make it clear to the world that all democratic and anti-Nazi sections of Polish opinion have been able to express their views freely and thus to play their full part in the restoration of the country’s political life.

“The Three Powers will further expect that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon the developments in Poland before and during the elections.”

The difference is over the Soviet delegation’s proposal to delete the last two sentences from the point. Mr. Eden has agreed to this, provided the sentence on the free access of members of the Allied press to Poland is retained.

Thus, the first point at issue is the one concerning the transfer of assets without any mention of liabilities.

Truman: Under our laws it is impossible to speak of assets without saying anything about liabilities. I said as much yesterday. The United States has no intention of shouldering that kind of burden. We cannot undertake the obligation of handing over all the assets to the Polish Government without a discussion of obligations on its part.

Churchill: We agree with the President’s proposal concerning the transfer of assets to the Polish Government provided simultaneous mention is made of the obligations undertaken by the Polish Government.

Byrnes: Our wording, which was proposed in the hope of finding a compromise, says nothing either of assets or liabilities. We say that the British Government and the U.S. Government have already taken steps to protect the Polish Government’s interests in respect of any property belonging to the Polish State which is located on their territories, whatever the form of that property. The draft also says that both Governments have already taken steps to prevent the transfer of this property to third persons. Besides, it also says that the Polish Government will be given every opportunity to take the usual legal steps to restore any property which may have been unlawfully alienated.

Churchill: Nothing is said here either of assets or of liabilities.

Byrnes: I have already spoken of the points contained in our draft.

Churchill: Nothing is said there of the transfer to the Polish Provisional Government of obligations towards Great Britain, namely, the £120 million which we advanced to the former Polish Government in London. In other words our position is similar to yours.

Byrnes: If the Soviet Government had any property belonging to the Polish Government this question could also be settled through diplomatic channels. I think there is no need to make public mention of the fact that we are going to transfer to the Polish Government the property belonging to it and which is to be handed over as a result of the U.S. Government’s recognition of the Government of Poland.

Churchill: I understand that we now leave aside the idea of assets and liabilities. This question is, of course, more important to us than to the United States owing to our having given bigger advances to the former London Polish Government.

Truman: I don't like the idea being proposed here of making a public announcement of the fulfilment of these obligations.

Churchill: I agree with you.

Stalin: Does the British Government intend to make full recovery from Poland of the advances which it made for the maintenance of the Polish troops?

Churchill: No. That is something we shall discuss with the Poles.

Stalin: We gave the Sikorski Government some funds and also some for organising the army of the Provisional National Government. But we believe that the Polish people have redeemed this debt with their blood. I consider the U.S. Government's compromise proposal acceptable, with the exception of that part of it which says that the Polish Provisional Government will be given every opportunity to take the usual legal steps. I propose that we say instead: The Polish Provisional Government will be given every opportunity in accordance with the requirements of the law. With this amendment, the compromise proposal of the American delegation could be adopted.

Churchill: What's the difference?

Stalin: The difference is that this will obviate the usual red tape which is practised under "the usual legal steps". It will be simpler to say "on the basis of the law". But that is, after all, a small thing, and the proposal of the American delegation can be adopted in its formulation.

Byrnes: The next point on which there were differences regards the following formulation: "The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government in conformity with the Crimea decisions has agreed to the holding ... " etc. Mr. Eden has objected to this formulation.

Eden: I proposed a compromise formula, against which the Soviet delegation objected, namely, to delete everything from the words "It is the confident hope of the Three Powers" to the words "their views freely", leaving the last sentence concerning access of members of the Allied press.

Stalin: It is a good thing that Mr. Eden has made a step towards the interests and dignity of Poland. That is to be welcomed. And if he makes another step in that direction, I think we shall all agree with this proposal. [Laughter.] The preceding line says that the Polish Government must observe the Crimea Declaration. Why repeat the idea once again? The foreign correspondents will be going to Poland, and not to the Polish Government; they will enjoy complete freedom, and there will be no complaints on their part against the Polish Government. Why need this be repeated again? The Poles will take offence at this, for they will see it as a sign of suspicion that they may refuse to admit any correspondents. Let us end this point on the words: "democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and put forward candidates", and delete the rest.

Churchill: There's no compromise there. [Laughter.]

Stalin: That is a compromise in respect of the Polish Government. [Laughter.]

Churchill: I half expected to have the formula strengthened rather than weakened.

Stalin: Why do that?

Truman: We are very much interested in the elections in Poland because we have six million citizens of Polish origin at home. If the elections in Poland are quite free and our correspondents are quite free to send in their reports on the holding and results of the election, this will be very important for me as President. I think that if the Polish Government is aware beforehand that the Three Powers expect it to hold free elections and give free access to members of the Allied press, the Polish Government will, of course, quite painstakingly fulfil the demands contained in the decisions of the Crimea Conference.

Stalin: I think – Mr. Eden, you will note that I am making a compromise – of proposing the following: after the words "put forward candidates" insert a comma, and then go on to say "and representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world on the progress and results of the elections".

Truman: That suits me.

Churchill: The word “note” at the beginning of the paragraph is important in this case. I also agree.

Byrnes: The next question concerns the fulfilment of the Yalta Agreement on Liberated Europe and the satellite countries. The U.S. delegation has submitted two papers on the question, but the Foreign Ministers decided to postpone discussion in order to have the opportunity of studying them. The Foreign Ministers agreed to pass these documents on to the drafting commission. But differences arose on whether the commission should deal with each of these documents separately or as a single document. The Soviet delegation favoured the single-document approach, and the American delegation, the two-document approach. It was agreed that in view of the fact that the question of the policy in respect of Italy and the other satellites had been referred to the Foreign Ministers by the Heads of Government, the Heads of Government would be requested at today’s sitting to decide on the instructions for the drafting commission: should it draw up a single document for all these countries or two documents on the basis of the American draft.

Truman: At the first sitting, the American delegation submitted two documents: the first, on the policy in respect of Italy (this question was discussed at length yesterday and the day before), and the second, on the policy in respect of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. We think that these two questions should be dealt with separately, because Italy was the first country to surrender and then take part in the war against Germany. Besides, there are diplomatic relations between the U.S. Government and Italy, and none between the U.S. Government and the Governments of the above-mentioned countries. But that does not mean that we think the question of Italy should be solved earlier than that of the other countries. I repeat, we believe that these two questions should be examined separately.

Stalin: I have an amendment to the American proposals on the question of the policy in respect of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. I do not object to these proposals in principle, but I want to make an addition to the second point. It says: “The Three Governments will make a statement” on so and so, and after that I propose to add the following words: “And at the present moment they declare that they consider it possible to re-establish diplomatic relations with them.”

Truman: I cannot agree to this.

Stalin: Then the discussion of both drafts – on Italy and on these countries – will have to be postponed.

Truman: We are not prepared to establish diplomatic relations with the Governments of these countries. What is more, we have never been in a state of war with Finland. But, as I have said, when the Governments of these countries are transformed on the basis of free elections, we shall be prepared to establish diplomatic relations with them.

Stalin: I cannot agree without the addendum I have proposed.

Churchill: Time is passing: we have been sitting here for a week now, and have been putting off a great number of questions.

On this question, the British Government’s stand is similar to that of the U.S. Government.

Byrnes: The next question concerns the agenda for today’s sitting of the Heads of Government. We have agreed that the Foreign Ministers will recommend to the Heads of Government the inclusion in today’s agenda of the two above-mentioned questions which were earlier referred to the Foreign Ministers by the Heads of Government and on which the Foreign Ministers would now like to receive further instructions, and also the three questions carried forward from yesterday’s agenda of the Heads of Government sitting. Accordingly the proposed agenda for today’s sitting will be the following:

1. The Polish question: dissolution of the London Government and fulfilment of the Yalta Agreement.

2. The question of whether the drafting commission, in working out the question of the policy in respect of Italy and the other satellites, should draw up a separate recommendation for Italy or prepare a single recommendation for all the countries concerned.

3. Poland's western border. The Soviet delegation submitted a document on the question yesterday.

4. Trusteeship. The Soviet delegation also submitted a document on the question yesterday.

5. Turkey. It is considered that the British delegation desires to raise this question orally.

Truman: Allow me to make a statement concerning Poland's western border. The Yalta Agreement established that German territory is to be occupied by the troops of the four Powers – Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and France – each of whom is to have its zone of occupation. The question of Poland's borders was touched upon at the conference, but the decision said the final solution of the question was to be made at a peace conference. At one of our first sittings we decided that as the starting point of a discussion of Germany's future borders we take Germany's borders as of December 1937.

We have delineated our zones of occupation and the borders of these zones. We have withdrawn our troops to our zones as had been established. But it now appears that another Government has been given a zone of occupation and that has been done without consulting us. If the intention was to make Poland one of the Powers which is to have a zone of occupation, this should have been agreed upon beforehand. We find it hard to accept such a solution of the question because we had not been consulted about the matter in any way. I take a friendly attitude to Poland and will possibly fully agree to the Soviet Government's proposals concerning her western borders, but I do not want to do this now, because there will be another place for doing this, namely, the peace conference.

Stalin: The decisions of the Crimea Conference said that the Heads of the Three Governments agreed that Poland's eastern border was to run along the Curzon line, which means that Poland's eastern border was established at the conference. As for her western border, the conference decisions said that Poland was to receive substantial accretions to her territory in the north and the west. It was further stated: they, that is, the Three Governments consider that at the appropriate time the new Polish Government of National Unity will be asked for its opinion on the question of the size of those accretions and that the final decision on Poland's western borders would then be put off until the peace conference.

Truman: That is how I understood it myself. But we did not have and do not have any right to give Poland a zone of occupation.

Stalin: The Polish Government of National Unity has expressed its opinion on the western border. Its opinion is now known to all of us.

Truman: No official statement has ever been made on this western border.

Stalin: I am now speaking of the Polish Government's opinion. Now we all know what it is. We can now agree on Poland's western border, and the peace conference is to take the final formal decision on it.

Truman: Mr. Byrnes received the Polish Government's statement only today. We have not yet had any time to study it.

Stalin: Our proposal boils down to expressing our opinion concerning the Polish Government's desire to have a western border running along a certain line. It makes no difference whether we express our opinion today or tomorrow.

As for the question that we have granted the Poles an occupation zone without having the consent of the Allied Powers, it has not been stated correctly. In their notes, the American Government and the British Government have repeatedly suggested that we should not allow the Polish administration to enter the western regions until the question of Poland's western border is finally settled. We could not do this because the German population had gone to the west in the wake of the retreating German troops. The Polish population, for its part, advanced to the west, and our army needed a local administration in its rear, on the territory which it occupied. Our army cannot simultaneously set up an ad-

ministration in the rear, fight and clear the territory of the enemy. It is not used to doing this. That is why we let the Poles in.

That was the spirit in which we replied to our American and British friends at the time. We were also inclined to do this in the knowledge that Poland was getting an accretion of land to the west of her former border. I don't see what harm there is for our common cause in letting the Poles set up their administration on a territory which is to be Polish anyway. I have finished.

Truman: I have no objections to the opinion expressed concerning Poland's future border. But we did agree that all parts of Germany must be under the control of the four Powers. And it will be very hard to agree to a just decision of the question of reparations if important parts of Germany are under an occupying Power other than one of these four Powers.

Stalin: Is it for reparations that you are apprehensive? In that case, we can waive reparations from these territories.

Truman: We have no intention of receiving them.

Stalin: As for these western territories, there has been no decision on this, and it is a matter of interpreting the Crimea decision. There has been no decision on the western border, the question has remained open. There was only the promise of extending Poland's borders to the west and north.

Churchill: I have quite a lot to say about Poland's western border line but, I understand, the time for it has not yet come.

Truman: It is up to the peace conference to determine the future borders.

Stalin: It is very hard to restore the German administration in the western strip, everyone has run away.

Truman: If the Soviet Government wants to have help in re-establishing the German administration in these territories, this question could be discussed.

Stalin: Our concept, the Russian concept during a war, in the occupation of enemy territory, is as follows. The army fights, it goes forward and has no worries except winning the fighting. But if the army is to move on it must have a tranquil rear. It cannot fight with the enemy at the front and simultaneously in the rear. The army fights well if the rear is tranquil and if the rear sympathises with it and helps it. Consider for a moment the situation in which the German population is either on the run behind the retreating troops, or is engaged in shooting our troops in the back. Meanwhile, the Polish population follows in the wake of our troops. In such a situation the army naturally desires to have an administration in its rear which sympathises with it and helps it. That is the whole point.

Truman: I understand this and sympathise.

Stalin: There was no other way out. This does not mean, of course, that I lay down the borders myself. If you do not agree to the line which the Polish Government has proposed, the question will remain open. That is all.

Churchill: But can this question be left without solution?

Stalin: It has to be solved at some time.

Churchill: There is also the question of supplies. The question of food supplies is a highly important one, because these areas are the chief sources of foodstuffs for the German population.

Stalin: Who in that case will work there and raise the grain? There's no one to do this except the Poles.

Truman: We can reach an agreement. I think the substance of the question before us, with which we are concerned, is the kind of administration that will be set up in these areas. We are also interested in whether these areas are to be part of Germany or part of Poland in the period of occupation. Here is the question. We have an occupation zone. France has an occupation zone, the British and the Soviet Union have an occupation zone each. I want to know whether the areas now being dealt with are a part of the Soviet zone of occupation. I think that at the appropriate time we shall be able to reach

agreement concerning Poland's future borders, but now I am interested in the question of these areas during the occupation period.

Stalin: On paper they are still German territory; actually, de facto, they are Polish territory.

Truman: What has happened to the local population? There must have been some three million of it.

Stalin: The population has gone.

Churchill: If that is so, it means that they will have to obtain food in the areas to which they have gone, if the areas the Germans have abandoned are not handed over to Germany and are not at Germany's disposal. I understand that according to the Polish Government's plan, which I understand is supported by the Soviet Government, a quarter of all the cultivated land in 1937 Germany is to be taken away from her.

As for the population, it turns out that three or four million Poles are to be moved from the east to the western areas. According to Russian data, Germany's pre-war population in these areas totalled eight and a quarter million. This means that apart from the serious hardships connected with the displacement of such a great number of people, a disproportional burden will be laid on other parts of Germany, and still the food problem will not be solved.

Truman: France will want to have the Saar and the Ruhr, and if we let France have the Saar and the Ruhr, what will be left of Germany?

Stalin: There is no decision on this, but in respect of Poland's western border there is a decision, and it is that the territory of Poland must receive an accretion in the north and the west.

Churchill: There is another remark concerning Generalissimo Stalin's statement that all Germans have left these areas. There is other information to the effect that two or two and a half million Germans have after all stayed behind. Of course, these figures should still be checked.

Stalin: Of course, they should be checked. We have been discussing the border question and have now come to the question of Germany's food supplies. If you want to discuss the question, let's do so, I don't mind.

Churchill: That's true; we were speaking of the border and have now switched to the question of Germany's food supplies. But I only mentioned it because the border question creates some great difficulties for us in the solution of certain other questions.

Stalin: I agree that there are some difficulties with Germany's supply, but the Germans themselves are chiefly to blame for it. The war has brought about a situation in which virtually none of the 8 million Germans have remained there. Take Stettin: It had a population of 500,000, but when we entered Stettin, there were only 8,000 left.

In East Prussia the Germans did the following: the greater part went to the west, into the rear of their troops, and the rest went to the Königsberg area, to the Russians. When we got to the zone earmarked for accretion to Polish territory, there were no Germans there, there were only Poles. That is how things worked out.

In the area between the Oder and the Vistula, the Germans abandoned their fields, and the Poles are cultivating and harvesting them. The Poles will hardly agree to give the Germans what they have cultivated. That is the situation that has arisen in these areas.

Truman: I wish to re-emphasise: in my opinion the zones of occupation should be made available to the Powers on which a decision had been reached. I have no objections to a discussion of Poland's borders, but I believe we cannot solve the question here.

Churchill: We agreed to compensate Poland at Germany's expense for the territory which has been taken from her east of the Curzon line. But the one must balance the other. Poland is now demanding much more than she is giving away in the east. I do not think this is being done for the benefit of Europe, to say nothing of the Allies. If three or four million Poles are moved from east of the Curzon line, three or

four million Germans could be moved to the west to make place for the Poles. But the present displacement of 8 million men is something I cannot support. Compensation must be equal to the losses, otherwise it would not be good for Poland herself either. If, as Generalissimo Stalin has said, the Germans have abandoned the lands east and west of the Oder, they should be encouraged to return there.

At any rate, the Poles have no right to create a disastrous situation in the food supply for the German population. I want to re-emphasise this standpoint. I want the Generalissimo to understand our difficulties just as, I hope, we shall understand his.

We don't want to be saddled with a large German population without any food resources. Take the vast population of the Ruhr basin, in the area of the coal mines. This population is in the British zone of occupation. Unless they are provided with enough foodstuffs, the situation in our own zone will be similar to that in the German concentration camps.

Stalin: Anyhow, Germany cannot do, and has never done, without grain imports.

Churchill: Of course, but she will be even less able to feed herself if the eastern lands are taken away from her.

Stalin: Let them buy grain from Poland.

Churchill: We do not consider this territory to be Polish territory.

Stalin: The Poles live there, and they have cultivated the fields. We can't demand of the Poles that they should work the fields and let the Germans have the grain.

Churchill: Besides, I must point out that the conditions in the areas occupied by the Poles are very strange in general. I have been told, for instance, that the Poles are selling Silesian coal to Sweden. They are doing this when we in Britain have a shortage of coal and are faced with the coldest and harshest winter without fuel. We start from the general principle that the supply of Germany within her 1937 borders with foodstuffs and fuel must be shared proportionally to the size of her population, regardless of the zone in which this food and fuel is located.

Stalin: And who is to mine the coal? The Germans are not doing it, it is the Poles who are, they are working.

Churchill: But they are working in Silesia.

Stalin: The masters have all run away from there.

Churchill: They have gone because they were afraid of military operations, but now that the war is over they could return.

Stalin: They don't want to, and the Poles have not much sympathy with the idea.

Churchill: Yesterday I was deeply touched by the Generalissimo's words when he said that it was undesirable to deal with current and future problems while being guided by a sense of revenge. I believe therefore that what I am saying today will meet with his sympathy because it would be unjust to send such a great number of Germans to us, while Poles had all the advantages.

Stalin: I am speaking of the industrialists who have run away from the coal basin. We ourselves are buying coal from the Poles, like the Swedes, because we are also short of coal in some areas, for instance, the Baltic area.

Truman: It seems to be a fait accompli that a considerable part of Germany has been handed over to Poland for occupation. What in that case remains for the exaction of reparations? Even we in the United States are short of coal. However, in spite of this, we are sending 6.5 million tons of coal to Europe this year. I think this part of Germany namely, the coal basin, should be regarded as remaining with Germany both in respect of reparations and in respect of food supplies. I think the Poles have no right to take over that part of Germany. We are now discussing the question of Poland's future borders. But I believe we are in no position to solve the question here and that it must be settled at a peace conference.

Stalin: Who, in that case, is going to mine the coal there? We Russians are short of hands for our own enterprises. All the German workers went into the army; Goebbels's propaganda attained its aim.

It remains either to stop all production or to hand it over to the Poles. There is no other way out. As for coal, I must say that within the old borders the Poles had their own coal basin, a very rich one. To this coal basin has been added the Silesia coal basin, which was in German hands. The Poles are working there. We can't take the coal mined by the Poles.

Churchill: The pits in Silesia, I understand, are being worked by Polish workers. There is no objection to the pits being operated as an agency of the Soviet Government in the Soviet zone of occupation, but not of the Polish Government in a zone that has not been granted to Poland for occupation.

Stalin: This would disrupt all relations between two friendly states. I also ask Mr. Churchill to consider the fact that the Germans themselves are short of manpower. The greater part of the enterprises we found in the course of our advance were manned by foreign workers – Italians, Bulgarians, Frenchmen, Russians, Ukrainians, etc. All of these workers had been forcibly driven from their homeland by the Germans. When the Russian troops arrived in these areas, the foreign workers considered themselves free, and went home. Where are the German workers? It turns out that most of them were drafted into the German army and were either killed during the war or taken prisoner.

This produced a situation in which the big German industry was operating with the most insignificant number of German workers, and a great number of foreign workers. When these foreign workers were liberated, they went away, and the enterprises were left without workers. The situation today is such that either these enterprises have to be closed down or the local population, that is, the Poles, must be allowed to work there. You can't drive out the Poles now. This situation has taken shape spontaneously. There is simply no one to blame for this.

Attlee: I want to say a few words concerning the present situation from the standpoint of the Powers occupying Germany. Leaving aside the question of the final border between Poland and Germany, we see before us a country which is beset by chaos but which was once an economic entity. We have before us a country which depended for its food and partly its coal supplies on its eastern areas, partially settled by the Poles. I believe the resources of the whole of 1937 Germany should be used to maintain and supply the whole of the German population, and if a part of Germany is cut off beforehand, this will create great difficulties for the occupying Powers in the western and southern zones.

If there is need of manpower for the eastern areas, it must be found among the population of the rest of Germany, among the part of the German population which has been demobilised or is exempt from work in military industry. This manpower should be sent where it can do the most good to prevent the Allies from being placed in a difficult situation over the next few months.

Stalin: Will Mr. Attlee also take into account the fact that Poland is herself suffering from the aftermath of war and is also an Ally?

Attlee: Yes, but she has found herself in a privileged position.

Stalin: Vis-à-vis Germany. That is how it should be.

Attlee: No, in respect of the other Allies.

Stalin: That is far from being the case.

Truman: I want to say frankly what I think on this question. I cannot agree to the alienation of the eastern part of 1937 Germany in as far as it bears upon settling the reparations question and supplies of food and coal for the whole German population.

Churchill: We have not yet done with this question. Besides, we do have, of course, much more pleasant questions. [Laughter.]

Truman: I propose that we now adjourn and perhaps think these questions over. That suits me.

Stalin: All right, that also suits me.

Truman: Tomorrow the sitting is at 5.00 p.m.

Sixth Sitting. July 22, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.

Stalin: I want to inform you that today the Soviet troops in Austria started withdrawing, and in some places they will have to withdraw 100 kilometres. The withdrawal is to be completed by July 24. The advance units of the Allied troops have already entered Vienna.

Churchill: We are very grateful to the Generalissimo for having so swiftly started implementing the agreement.

Truman: The American Government also expresses its gratitude.

Stalin: There is no cause for thanks; it is our duty to do this.

[The British delegation then reported that the Foreign Ministers, at their morning sitting, discussed the following questions.

First question: the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. The Ministers examined a memorandum tabled by the U.S. delegation on July 21. It dealt with three questions: first, supervision of elections in some European countries; second, creation of favourable conditions for members of the world press in the liberated areas and the former satellite countries; and third, procedures governing the work of the control commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

The British delegation expressed agreement with the U.S. memorandum. The Soviet delegation did not agree with the proposal concerning supervision of the elections.

As for the second and third questions – concerning members of the press and the procedures for the control commissions in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, it was decided to refer these proposals for discussion to a subcommittee composed as follows: Cannon and Russell from the United States; Sobolev from the U.S.S.R.; and Hayter from Great Britain.

The Soviet delegation decided to submit a memorandum showing the recent improvements in the status of British and American representatives in the control commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Soviet delegation also agreed to draw up a memorandum concerning the changes it considered necessary and desirable in connection with the procedure governing the work of the Allied commission in Italy.

Second question: economic principles in respect of Germany.

A report was submitted by the Economic Subcommittee.

The U.S. delegation asked for a postponement of the discussion of the reparations question until the next sitting. The Soviet delegation proposed that there should be discussion of the economic principles which had been agreed in the Subcommittee. Accordingly, the Foreign Ministers decided to discuss only the agreed principles and not to go into the controversial principles or the reparations question. It was decided that the reparations question would be the first item on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers sitting on July 23.

Paragraphs 11, 12, 14, 15 and 17 were adopted, subject to agreement on the rest of the paragraphs which remain in dispute.

As for the other paragraphs, it was agreed that the last sentence in Paragraph 10 should be amended to read as follows:

“Production capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on reparations and approved by the Governments concerned, or if not removed, shall be destroyed.”

Paragraphs 13, 16 and 18 were set aside for further discussion.

The Ministers decided to recommend the following agenda for the day's sitting of the Heads of Government:

1. Poland's western frontier – resumption of discussion.
2. Trusteeship – question carried over from the previous day's sitting of the Heads of Government.
3. Turkey – question also carried over from the previous day's sitting.
4. Partial alteration of the western frontier of the U.S.S.R. – proposal of the Soviet delegation.
5. Iran – memorandum submitted by the United Kingdom delegation on July 21.

It was decided to transfer several other questions to the next day's sitting of the Foreign Ministers. These questions were the following:

1. Co-operation in solving urgent European economic problems – proposal of the U.S. delegation.
2. Directive of the Heads of Government concerning control over Germany in accordance with the principles agreed by them – proposal of the U.S. delegation.
3. Tangier – proposal of the Soviet delegation.
4. Syria and the Lebanon – proposal of the Soviet delegation.]

Truman: Do you agree to refer these questions for discussion to the Foreign Ministers at their sitting of tomorrow?

Churchill: I do not know what these proposals concerning Syria and the Lebanon are. This question affects us more than any other state. My colleagues are not affected by this question because only British troops are involved there. Of course, we had difficulties with France on this matter. We are prepared to leave Syria and the Lebanon, we do not seek anything there. But it is impossible to do so now, because a British withdrawal would be followed by the killing of Frenchmen. I should like to know what the matter is before I can take any decision. Perhaps, this may be done here?

Stalin: Certainly. The matter is as follows. The Government of Syria appealed to the Soviet Government to intervene in this affair. It is known that at the time we addressed a note on the question to the French, British and American Governments. We should like to receive the relevant information on this matter, because we are also interested in it. Of course, the question could be examined beforehand at a sitting of the Foreign Ministers.

Churchill: I should prefer to have the first three questions referred for examination to the Foreign Ministers, but to have the question of Syria and the Lebanon discussed here.

Stalin: By all means.

Truman: My proposal is that the first three questions should be referred to the Foreign Ministers and that the question of Syria and the Lebanon should be examined by the Heads of Government after we have discussed the questions on our agenda.

We go on to the first item of the agenda – Poland's western frontier.

As for the U.S. Government's view of this question, it was set forth by me yesterday.

Churchill: I heard you say, Mr. President, that your standpoint was set forth yesterday. I too have nothing to add to the views I have already expressed.

Truman (to Stalin): Have you anything to add?

Stalin: Have you studied the Polish Government's statement?

Truman: Yes, I have read it. *Churchill:* Is it Bierut's letter?

Stalin: It is a letter from Bierut and Osobka-Morawski.

Churchill: Yes, I have read it.

Stalin: Are all the delegations of their old opinion? *Truman:* That's obvious.

Stalin: The question remains open.

Truman: Can we go on to the next question?

Churchill: What does it mean: remains open? Does that mean that nothing will be done about it?

Truman: If a question remains open, we can discuss it once again.

Churchill: It is to be hoped that the question will mature for discussion before our departure.

Stalin: Possibly.

Churchill: It would be a pity for us to depart without settling this question, which will surely be discussed in the parliaments of the whole world.

Stalin: In that case let us comply with the Polish Government's request.

Churchill: That proposal is absolutely unacceptable to the British Government. Yesterday, I gave a number of reasons why the proposal is unacceptable. Having such a territory will not benefit Poland. It will tend to undermine Germany's economic position and saddle the occupying Powers with an excessive burden in respect of supplying the western part of Germany with food and fuel. In addition, we have some doubts of a moral order concerning the desirability of such a great displacement of population. We are in principle agreed to a resettlement but in the proportion in which the population is resettled from east of the Curzon Line. But when it comes to resettling 8 or 9 million persons, we consider it incorrect. The information on this question is highly contradictory. According to our data there are 8 or 9 million persons; according to Soviet data, all these people have gone from there. We believe that until this information is verified we can adhere to our figures. So far we have had no possibility of checking what is actually going on there. I could also give other reasons, but should not like to bother the Conference.

Stalin: I do not undertake to object to the reasons given by Mr. Churchill, but I have in mind a number of reasons that are most important.

Concerning fuel. It is said that Germany is left without fuel. But she still has the Rhineland and there is fuel there. Germany will not experience any special difficulties if she is deprived of Silesian coal; Germany's principal fuel base is situated in the west.

The second question, concerning the resettlement of the population. There are no 8, or 6, or 3, or 2 millions of population in these areas. The people there were either drafted into the army and were killed or taken prisoner, or have left these areas. Very few Germans remain on this territory. But this can be verified. Is it possible to arrange to hear the opinion of the Polish representatives concerning Poland's frontier?

Churchill: I am unable to support this proposal at the present time, because of the view expressed by the President concerning the invitation of Yugoslavia's representatives.

Stalin: Let the representatives of Poland be invited to the Foreign Ministers' Council in London and be heard there.

Truman: I have no objections to that.

Churchill: But, Mr. President, the Foreign Ministers' Council will meet only in September.

Stalin: Well, that's when the Council will invite the Polish Government's representatives to London.

Churchill: In order to verify the information?

Stalin: By the time information will have been collected by the three sides.

Churchill: But that will only mean transferring the difficult question from this Conference to the Foreign Ministers' Council, whereas this Conference is able to settle the question.

Stalin: I, too, think that it is able to do so. On the strength of the decisions of the Crimea Conference it is our duty to hear the Polish Government's opinion on the question of Poland's western frontier.

Truman: That is right. I think the Soviet proposal that the Foreign Ministers' Council invite the Polish Government's representatives to London should be adopted. But that does not, of course, rule out the possibility of the question being discussed at the present Conference.

Stalin: I propose that the Polish Government's representatives should be invited to the Foreign Ministers' Council in London in September and that their opinion should be heard there.

Churchill: That is another question. I thought it was a matter of verifying the data concerning the number of Germans in those areas.

Stalin: It is a matter of Poland's western frontier.

Churchill: But how can the question of the frontier be decided there when the question must be settled at a peace conference?

Truman: I think it will be useful to hear the Poles at the Foreign Ministers' Council in London.

Stalin: That's right.

Churchill: I regret that such an important and urgent question is being referred for solution to a body with less authority than the present Conference.

Stalin: In that case, let us invite the Poles over here and hear what they have to say.

Churchill: I should prefer that because the question is urgent. But it is not hard to foresee just what the Poles will demand. They will, of course, demand much more than we can agree to.

Stalin: But if we invite the Poles they will not accuse us of having settled this question without hearing them. What I want is that no such accusation should be levelled at us by the Poles.

Churchill: But I have not made any accusations against them.

Stalin: It is not you, but the Poles who will say: they have settled the question of the frontier without having heard us.

Churchill: I understand now.

Truman: Is it necessary to settle the question so urgently? I repeat, I think that the final solution of this question should be referred to a peace conference; we ourselves are not able to solve this question. But I think that the discussion of this question here was highly useful and it does not rule out any further discussions. What I do not know is how urgent the question is.

Stalin: If it is not urgent, let us refer the question to the Foreign Ministers' Council. That would not be superfluous.

Truman: But that does not exclude the possibility of further discussing the question here.

Churchill: Mr. President, with all due respect to you, I should like to note that there is a certain urgency about the question. If the settlement of the question is deferred, the status quo will be fixed. The Poles will start exploiting this territory, they will settle down there, and if the process continues, it will be very difficult to adopt any other decision later. That is why I still hope that we shall come to some agreement here, so as to know in what state the Polish question is.

I do not imagine how this question can be settled by the Foreign Ministers' Council in London, when we over here have failed to reach agreement. Unless we settle this question, the problem of food and fuel remains open and the burden of supplying the German population with food and fuel will be imposed on us, above all the British, because their zone of occupation has the smallest food resources. If the Foreign Ministers' Council, after hearing the Poles, also fails to reach agreement, the question will be postponed indefinitely. Meanwhile, winter will set in and there will still be no agreement.

I should very much like to meet the Generalissimo Stalin half way in solving the practical difficulties of which he spoke yesterday, the difficulties which arose in the course of events. We should be prepared to submit for your examination a compromise solution which would operate in the intervening period – from the present time until the peace conference. I propose that we draw a provisional line east of which the territory would be occupied by the Poles as a part of Poland until the final settlement of the question at a peace conference; to the west of the line, the Poles, if they find themselves there, could act as representatives of the Soviet Government in the zone made available to the Soviet Union.

I have had several talks with the Generalissimo since the Tehran Conference and I think we were agreed in general terms that the new Poland should move her borders west to the Oder River. But this is not such a simple question. The difference in views between the Generalissimo and myself is that the British Government, while allowing that Poland should extend her territory, does not wish to go as far as the Soviet Government does. When I speak of the line along the Oder River I have in mind the line of which we spoke two years ago at Tehran, when there was no question of any precise demarcation of the frontier. We are now prepared to propose that the Conference examine a provisional Polish frontier line. If the question is postponed until September, and the Foreign Ministers are made to discuss it with the Poles, this will mean that the question will not be settled before the winter. I shall be

sorry if we do not reach an agreement in principle on this question here. In my view, if the question is postponed and referred for discussion by the Foreign Ministers' Council with the participation of the Poles, we shall not benefit in any way from such a settlement.

Our position in respect of the territory and the line is quite clear. Here I should like to find a practical way out of the situation. But if the question is referred to the Foreign Ministers' Council, its solution will be dragged out far too long. I do not regard the question as being quite hopeless of solution here. I am sure that we could find a compromise solution. We could let the Poles have everything that we decide to let them have, and the rest of the territory would be left under the Soviet Government's administration.

I think there is no sense in leaving this question unsolved until September. If we do not settle this question, it will mean a failure for our Conference.

I repeat once again that when we used the expression "the Oder line" we had in mind only an approximate line. The line we propose should be traced on the map; in one place it even goes across the Oder.

I appeal to the Conference to continue its efforts to reach agreement on this question, if not today, then some other day, because if the Foreign Ministers meet in September and have a discussion with the Poles, say, in the course of a fortnight, with the Soviet side again holding one view, and the United States and Great Britain, another, the question may again be left outstanding or we may achieve its settlement far too late. What will be the position of, say, Berlin? Berlin receives some of its coal from Silesia.

Stalin: Berlin does not receive its coal from Silesia but from Torgau (Saxony), as it did in the past.

Churchill: The question of coal for Berlin is very important, because the city is under our common occupation.

Stalin: Let them take it from the Ruhr, from Zwickau.

Churchill: Is that so-called brown coal?

Stalin: No, it is good hard coal. Brown coal is good for use in briquettes, and the Germans have good briquette factories. They have all sorts of possibilities.

Churchill: I merely say that part of the coal for Berlin was received from Silesia.

Stalin: Before the British troops occupied the Zwickau area the Germans got their coal for Berlin from there. Following the departure of the Allied troops from Saxony to the west, Berlin got its coal from Torgau.

Truman: Allow me to restate the U.S. position on this question.

Stalin: By all means.

Truman: I should like to give some extracts here from the Crimea Conference decision.

"The three Heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with some digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course of the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference."

This agreement was reached by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. I agree with this decision; I well understand the difficulties of which Generalissimo Stalin spoke yesterday. I also well understand the difficulties in respect of food and fuel supplies of which Prime Minister Churchill spoke yesterday. But I think that these difficulties do not in any way alter the substance of the matter.

Stalin: If you are not bored with this question, I am prepared to speak once again. I, too, start from the decision of the Crimea Conference from which the President has just quoted. It follows

from the precise meaning of this decision that with the formation of the Government of National Unity in Poland, we should have obtained the opinion of the new Polish Government on the question of Poland's western frontier. The Polish Government has communicated its opinion. We now have two possibilities: either to endorse the Polish Government's opinion on Poland's western frontier, or, if we are not in agreement with the Polish proposals, to hear the Polish representatives here and only then decide the question.

I consider it expedient to settle the question at our Conference and, since there is no unity of opinion with the Polish Government, to invite its representatives and hear them. But the opinion was expressed here that the Poles should not be invited to this Conference. If that is so, we can refer this question to the Foreign Ministers' Council.

I should like to remind Mr. Churchill and others who were present at the Crimea Conference of the opinion which was then expressed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill and with which I did not agree. Mr. Churchill spoke of Poland's western frontier line along the Oder beginning from its mouth, then running along the Oder all the time, until the confluence of the Oder with the River Neisse, east of it. I stood for a line west of the Neisse. According to the scheme of President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, Stettin and also Breslau and the area west of the Neisse were to remain with Germany. (Indicates on the map.)

What we are examining here now is the question of frontiers and not of a provisional line. This question cannot be evaded. If you were in agreement with the Poles, it would be possible to adopt a decision without inviting the Polish Government's representatives here. But since you are not in agreement with the Polish Government's opinion and wish to make amendments, it will be well for us to invite the Poles here and hear their opinion. This is a matter of principle.

Churchill: On behalf of the British Government I should like to withdraw my objection to inviting the Poles here, in order to try to achieve the adoption of some kind of practical decision which would remain in force until the final settlement of the question at the peace conference.

Truman: I have no objection to inviting the Polish Government's representatives here. They could have talks here with our Foreign Ministers.

Stalin: That's right.

Churchill: And then the results of the talks with them could be placed before the Heads of Government.

Stalin: That's right. That's right.

Churchill: Who is to send them an invitation? *Stalin:* The Chairman, I think.

Truman: Good. We now pass to the next question. I think that the Soviet delegation has proposals concerning trusteeship.

[Setting forth its proposals on the question of trusteeship, the Soviet delegation declared that what had been formulated in its proposals, submitted in written form, followed from the decisions of the San Francisco Conference. It said furthermore that inasmuch as the main question of trusteeship had been decided by the United Nations Charter, the Conference of the Heads of Government was faced with the concrete question of territories. The Soviet delegation expressed the opinion that the Conference could hardly expect to examine the question in detail but it could, first, discuss the question of Italy's colonial possessions in Africa and the Mediterranean, and second, discuss the question of the League of Nations mandated territories. The Soviet delegation pointed out that its proposals contain two variants of a possible solution of the question of former Italian colonies. It has proposed that the question should be referred for examination to the Foreign Ministers' meeting.]

Churchill: Of course, it is possible to have an exchange of opinion on any question, but if it turns out that the sides differ in their views, the only result will be that we shall have had a pleasant discussion. I think the question of the mandates was decided at San Francisco.

Truman: Allow me to read the article of the United Nations Charter dealing with the question of trusteeship.

“1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

“(a) Territories now held under mandate;

“(b) Territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and

“(c) Territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

“2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.”

I believe the Soviet proposals apply to the second paragraph of this article. I agree with the proposal of the Soviet delegation that the question should be referred for discussion to the Foreign Ministers.

Churchill: We agreed with what was adopted at San Francisco but no more than that. Since the question of trusteeship is in the hands of an international organisation, I doubt the desirability of an exchange of opinion on the question here.

Truman: I think it will be quite in order to examine the question here like the question of Poland or any other question.

Churchill: The question of Poland has not been examined by an international organisation.

We expressed our standpoint on the question of trusteeship secretly at Yalta and openly at San Francisco. Our stand is clear and cannot be altered.

Truman: Great Britain’s stand is fully ensured by another article of the United Nations Charter, and I see no reason why this question cannot be examined here.

Stalin: We learn from the press, for instance, that Mr. Eden, in a speech in the British Parliament, declared that Italy has lost her colonies forever. Who has decided that? If Italy has lost them, who has found them? [Laughter.] That is a very interesting question.

Churchill: I can answer it. By steady effort, at the cost of great losses and through exceptional victories, the British Army alone conquered these colonies.

Stalin: And the Red Army took Berlin. [Laughter.]

Churchill: I want to finish my statement, because Mr. President has questioned the words “the British Army alone conquered”. I have in mind the following Italian colonies: Italian Somaliland, Eritrea, Cyrenaica and Tripoli, which we conquered alone and in very difficult conditions.

However, we do not seek territorial gains. We do not want to derive any advantages from this war, although we have suffered great losses. Of course, as regards human losses they are not as great as those suffered by the Soviet Union and its gallant troops. However: we have emerged from this war in great debt to the United States. We can never expect to have the same strength at sea as the United States. During the war we built only one battleship, and lost ten. But despite all these losses we have no territorial claims. That is why we approach the question of trust territories without any ulterior motives.

Now about the statement made by Eden in Parliament, in which he said that Italy has lost her colonies. This does not mean that Italy has no right to claim these colonies. This does not exclude any discussion, during the preparation of the peace treaty with Italy, of the question of whether a part of her former territories should be returned to Italy. I do not support such a proposal, but we do not object to the question of colonies being discussed either in the Foreign Ministers’ Council, when it deals with the preparation of the peace treaty with Italy, or, of course, at a peace conference on the final settlement.

I must say that when I visited Tripoli and Cyrenaica, I saw the work that had been done by the Italians in ploughing and cultivating the land; it was remarkable, in spite of the difficult conditions. What I want to say is that although we do not favour a return of her African colonies to Italy, we do

not, at the same time, rule out the possibility of discussing the question. At present, all these colonies are in our hands. Who wants to have them? If there are any claimants to these colonies round this table, it would be well for them to speak out.

Truman: We have no use for them. We have enough poor Italians at home who need to be fed.

Churchill: We examined the question as to whether some of these colonies could be used to settle Jews. But we consider that it would be inconvenient for the Jews to settle there.

Of course, we have great interests in the Mediterranean and any change in the status quo in that area would require a long and thorough study on our part.

We do not quite understand what our Russian Allies want.

Stalin: We should like to know whether you consider that Italy has lost her colonies for good. If you consider that she has lost those colonies, which states are we to hand them over to for trusteeship? We should like to know that. If it is too early to speak of this, we can wait, but it will have to be said some time.

Churchill: Of course, we must decide the question of whether we should detach her colonies from Italy, which we have a perfect right to do.

Stalin: That is a question which still has to be decided.

Churchill: And if they are taken away, which we have every right to do, we shall have to decide who is to have trusteeship over them. It is up to the peace conference to decide which colonies are to be taken away from Italy, but the question of the further administration of those territories is within the competence of an international organisation.

Stalin: Are we to understand Mr. Churchill in the sense that the present Conference is not empowered to examine the question?

Churchill: Our Conference cannot settle the question: it must be settled by a peace conference. But, of course, if this troika reaches agreement, this will be of great importance.

Stalin: I do not propose to decide, but to examine the question. I think that our Conference is, of course, empowered to examine the question.

Churchill: We are examining the question just now. I have no objection to the Generalissimo saying what he wants and I agree to study the question immediately.

Stalin: It is not a matter of the Generalissimo but of the fact that the question has not been examined and should be.

Churchill: Which question specifically?

Stalin: The question tabled by the Soviet delegation.

Truman: I agree with the proposal of the Soviet delegable to refer the question for discussion by the Foreign Ministers.

Stalin: That's another matter.

Truman: We have no objections to that proposal.

Churchill: We have no objections either, except that we have been referring all the questions to our Ministers.

Truman: That is quite natural.

Churchill: I think there are many more urgent questions which ought to be settled while we are here. We have decided that the question of a peace treaty with Italy will be examined by the Foreign Ministers' Council in September as a matter of first priority, and this will automatically raise the question of what is to be done with these Italian colonies. I am against burdening our Foreign Ministers with this question as well. But the question could be placed on the agenda if the Ministers find they have time to deal with the question.

Stalin: Let's refer it to the Ministers.

Truman: I support that proposal.

Churchill: Let us refer the question to the Foreign Ministers, provided that does not slow down their work on more urgent matters.

Stalin: Now, let's not have such reservations. You can't refer a question with that kind of reservation. Either we refer it, or we do not.

Churchill: If you insist, I give in.

Truman: We refer the question for examination by the Foreign Ministers. [...]

[The Soviet delegation then handed its proposals concerning the Königsberg region to the delegations of the United States and Britain.]

Truman: I should like to propose that we refer this question for discussion by the Foreign Ministers.

I have one more question. We have already agreed on inviting the Polish Government's representatives over here. I think the correspondents will want to know why the Polish Government's representatives are being summoned and I think it would be proper to issue a communiqué on the matter.

Stalin: Before the Poles arrive?

Truman: Yes, before their arrival. *Stalin:* I suppose we could.

Churchill: That runs counter to the principle we have adhered to until now.

Stalin: It's all the same whether we issue a communiqué or not. I don't mind which way we have it.

Churchill: Shall we state the purpose of their coming here?

Stalin: I don't think we should state the purpose.

Churchill: I request that the purpose of their visit should not be stated.

Truman: Accepted without statement of purpose.

Stalin: Good.

(The Soviet delegation then read a communication on the Soviet POW camp in Italy. It said that this was Camp No. 5 in the vicinity of the town of Celsinatca, under the control of the British authorities, in which mainly Ukrainians were kept. The Soviet delegation stated that initially the British authorities said that the camp contained 150 men, but when a Soviet representative visited the camp it proved to contain 10,000 Ukrainians, of whom the British command had formed a whole division. Twelve regiments were organised, including a signals regiment and a battalion of engineers. The officer corps was made up chiefly of former Petlyura men, who previously had commands in the German Army. The Soviet delegation stated in conclusion that when the Soviet officer made his appearance at the camp, 625 men at once declared their desire to return to the Soviet Union.)

Churchill: We welcome every manner of observation on your part. I shall demand a special report by telegraph. There may be many Poles there.

Stalin: No, there were only Ukrainians, Soviet citizens.

Churchill: When approximately did all this happen?

Stalin: We got the telegram today, and it happened over the last few months.

Churchill: I've not heard anything of this until now. [Truman closes the sitting and sets the next one for 17.00 the next day.]

Seventh Sitting. July 23, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.

[Reporting on the Foreign Ministers' sitting, the Soviet delegation said the agenda of the day's sitting of the Ministers included the following questions:

1. Reparations from Germany, Austria and Italy.

The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. handed to the U.S. Secretary of State and the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain the Soviet delegation's drafts on reparations from Germany and on advance deliveries from Germany on account of reparations.

It was decided to instruct the Economic Commission to make a preliminary examination of both drafts, and then to discuss them at the next meeting of the three Foreign Ministers.

2. Economic principles in respect of Germany.

There was a discussion of Clauses 13, 18 and the new Clause 19, which was proposed by the Soviet delegation. The Soviet delegation announced that it was withdrawing its amendment to Clause 13, and proposed the removal of Clause 18 so that the questions dealt with in the clause would be discussed by the Allied agencies in Germany and then settled by the Control Council, or, in the event of no agreement being reached in the Control Council, by agreement between the Governments. No agreement was reached and it was decided to refer the question of Clause 18 for settlement by the three Heads of Government.

As regards the new Clause 19, proposed by the Soviet delegation, the U.S. Secretary of State declared it to be unacceptable to the United States. The Soviet delegation proposed an alternative draft of Clause 19, according to which priority over all other deliveries was to be given to exports from Germany, as approved by the Control Council, to cover imports. In all other cases, priority was to be given to reparations. No agreement was reached, and it was decided to refer the question for settlement by the three Heads of Government.

3. About the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The draft submitted by the Drafting Commission was adopted without amendments.

4. About Trust Territories.

There was a discussion of the Soviet delegation's draft.

The Foreign Secretary of Great Britain declared that the first thing to be settled was whether any Italian colonies were to be taken away from Italy, and which. The question should be settled in drafting the peace treaty with Italy. The question of who was to be given the trusteeship of all the former Italian colonies which it might be decided to take away from Italy should be settled by the international United Nations organisation. The U.S. Secretary of State proposed that the settlement of this question should be postponed until the conclusion of a peace treaty with Italy, when all the territorial questions relating to Italy would be up for solution. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. proposed that the Soviet memorandum should be referred for examination by the first sitting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London this September. The British Minister declared that he believed there was no need to refer the Soviet memorandum to the Council of Foreign Ministers, as the question of the Italian colonies would automatically arise during the drafting of the peace treaty with Italy. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. asked that it be noted that the Soviet Government would raise the questions dealt with in the Soviet memorandum at the September sitting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

5. About the directives to the Allied commanders-in-chief in Germany.

It was decided to inform all commanders-in-chief of Allied occupation troops in Germany of the relevant decisions of the Conference after these decisions had been agreed with the Provisional Government of the French Republic.

For that purpose it was decided to set up a commission consisting of: Murphy and Riddleberger of the United States; Strang and Harrison of Great Britain, and Gusev and Sobolev of the U.S.S.R.

6. About co-operation in settling urgent European economic problems.

To examine the memorandum submitted by the U.S. delegation it was decided to set up a commission consisting of: Clayton and Pawley of the United States; Brand and Cowlson of Great Britain, and Arutyunyan and Gerashchenko of the U.S.S.R.

7. About Tangier.

There was a discussion of the Soviet draft. It was decided:

(1) To adopt the first paragraph of the Soviet delegation's draft, namely, the following:

“Having examined the question of the Zone of Tangier, the three Governments have agreed that this zone, which includes the City of Tangier and the area adjacent to it, in view of its special strategic importance, shall remain international.”

(2) The whole question of Tangier is to be discussed at a meeting of the representatives of the Four Powers – the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great Britain and France – in Paris in the near future.

8. Approval of the text of a message to the Governments of China and France.

It was decided to send a message 48 hours before the publication of the communiqué on the results of the Conference.

9. About the agenda for the sitting of the three Heads of Government on July 23.

It was agreed to recommend to the three Heads of Government the following agenda:

(1) About the Black Sea Straits and other international inland waterways.

(2) About the Königsberg area.

(3) About Syria and the Lebanon.

(4) About Iran.]

[...] *Truman*: Allow me to set forth my views on the Black Sea Straits and international inland waterways in general.

Our position on this question is as follows: We believe that the Montreux Convention should be revised. We believe the Black Sea Straits should become a free waterway open to the whole world, and the right of free passage for all ships through the Straits should be guaranteed by all of us. I have thought a great deal about the question. What has been the cause of all these wars? In the last 200 years, they have all started in the area between the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea, between France's eastern frontiers and Russia's western frontiers. The last time again peace was broken above all by Germany. I think it is the task of this Conference, and also of the coming peace conference, to prevent a repetition of such events.

Stalin: That's right.

Truman: I believe we shall be largely helping to achieve this aim by establishing and guaranteeing that waterways are free for all nations.

Stalin: Which, for instance?

Truman: I have a proposal on freedom of ways of communication, and I think we should try to bring about a situation in which Russia, Britain, and all other states have free access to all the seas of the world. Here is the proposal. [Hands in draft proposal.]

Our draft provides for the establishment of free and unrestricted navigation along all the international inland waterways. The U.S. Government believes that such free and unrestricted navigation should be established for internal waterways running through the territory of two or more states, and that it should be regulated by international agencies on which all the interested states are represented.

We think that such agencies should be set up as soon as possible. The first that should be set up are provisional navigation agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. These provisional agencies should have the functions of restoring and developing the navigation facilities on the said rivers, supervis-

ing river shipping to ensure equal opportunities for the citizens of various nationalities and establishing standard rules for the use of these means, and also rules of navigation, and customs and sanitary formalities and other similar matters. Among the members of these agencies should be the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France and the sovereign littoral states recognised by the Governments of these Powers.

I think the same procedure should be applied to the Kiel Canal and that the Montreux Convention should be revised in the same spirit. In that way we shall have free exchange in these areas.

I have tabled these proposals because I do not want in the next 25 years to take part in another war which may break out over the Straits or the Danube.

Our desire is to see a free and economically viable Europe, which would promote the prosperity of the Soviet Union, Britain, France and all other states, and with which the United States could trade on an equal footing and to mutual advantage. I believe our proposal can be a step forward in this direction.

Churchill: I vigorously support the proposal for a revision of the Montreux Convention in order to assure Soviet Russia free and unhindered passage through the Straits for her merchant fleet and Navy both in peace and wartime. I fully agree with the President and with his proposal that the free regime in these Straits should be guaranteed by all of us. The guarantee of the Great Powers and the interested states will undoubtedly be effective.

As for the other waterways mentioned by the President, we in principle agree with the general lines of the President's statement. We also agree with the President's proposal to have the Kiel Canal free and open and guaranteed by all the Great Powers. We also attach great importance to freedom of navigation along the Danube and the Rhine.

Truman: There is no doubt that we take a common view on the question of amending the Montreux Convention.

Churchill: And also on the purposes for which it should be amended.

Stalin: The President's proposals should be given a closer reading; it is hard to catch everything by mere listening. Perhaps we could go on to other questions for the time being?

Truman: The next question on the agenda is the question of transferring the Königsberg area in East Prussia to the Soviet Union. The Soviet document on the question was handed in yesterday.

Stalin: President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill gave their consent to this at the Tehran Conference, and the question was agreed between us. We should like this agreement to be confirmed at this Conference.

Truman: I agree in principle. I merely ask to be allowed to study the terms, but I am sure that there will be no objections on our side. I agree that Russia should receive certain areas in that territory.

Stalin: Good.

Churchill: The Generalissimo was quite right in noting that the question was raised at the Tehran Conference, and we discussed it again in October 1944.

Stalin: In Moscow.

Churchill: Yes, it was in Moscow, and it was in connection with the talk on the Curzon Line.

Stalin: That's right.

Churchill: I addressed Parliament on this matter on December 15, 1944. I explained that the British Government sympathised with the Soviet standpoint. The only question that arises is the legal side of the transfer of this area. The Soviet draft tabled here seems to demand that we should recognise that East Prussia no longer exists and that the Königsberg area is not under the control of the Allied Control Council in Germany.

As for the British Government, we support the Soviet Government's desire to incorporate this territory into the Soviet Union. I state this in principle. We have not yet, of course, examined the exact

line on the map. But I assure the Soviet Government once again of our constant support of the Russian position in that part of the world.

Stalin: We do not propose anything more than that. We are satisfied if the American Government and the Government of Great Britain approve the proposal in principle.

Churchill: I agree.

Truman: I agree.

Churchill: A slight amendment of the document will be required. If it is to be a part of the communiqué at the end of the Conference, I propose a more general wording of the document.

Stalin: I do not object.

Truman: Thus, we are in principle agreed with the draft proposal of the Soviet delegation.

The next item on the agenda is the question of Syria and the Lebanon.

Churchill: At present the burden of maintaining law and order in Syria and the Lebanon has fallen entirely on us. We have neither the intention nor the desire to obtain any advantages in these countries, with the exception of those enjoyed by other countries. When we entered Syria and the Lebanon to throw out the Germans and the Vichy troops, we reached an agreement with France under which we were to recognise the independence of Syria and the Lebanon. In view of the long historical ties between France and these countries, we declared that we would not object to France having a preferential position there, provided agreement was reached with the new independent Governments of these countries.

We informed de Gaulle that as soon as France concluded with Syria and the Lebanon a treaty satisfactory to these countries, we would withdraw our troops at once. If we were to withdraw our troops now, there would be a massacre of French citizens and the small number of French troops now stationed there. We should not like that to happen, as this would cause great unrest among the Arabs and would probably upset law and order in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The outbreak of such disorders in that part of the world would lead to disorders in Egypt as well. There could be no worse moment for such disorders among the Arabs than the present one, because the communication line with the Suez Canal would be placed in jeopardy, and the arms and reinforcements for the war in the Far East are moving along that line. The line of communication for conducting the war against Japan is of great importance not only for Great Britain but also for the United States.

General de Gaulle acted very unwisely in that area; contrary to our advice and our requests, he sent a shipload of 500 men to that area, and their appearance caused disorders which have not stopped until now. How stupid that was, for what could these 500 men have done. However, their arrival sparked off disorders.

These disorders aimed against the French at once caused unrest in Iraq, whose Government and people wanted to come to the aid of Syria. The whole Arab world was agitated over the event. However, General de Gaulle has now agreed to transfer the so-called special troops to the Syrian Government.

I hope that we shall reach, if not an agreement, at least a settlement of this question with the French, which would guarantee the independence of Syria and the Lebanon and would assure France of some recognition of her cultural and commercial interests.

Allow me to repeat once again here that Great Britain has no desire to stay there a day longer than is necessary. We shall be very glad to be rid of this thankless task which we undertook in the interests of the Allies.

In view of the fact that this question concerns France and us only, and also, of course, Syria and the Lebanon, we do not welcome the proposal for a conference which would be attended by the United States and the Soviet Union besides Great Britain and France, and would adopt a 'joint decision. The whole burden was on us, we acted on our own without any assistance, with the exception of some help

from France, but we acted in the interests of all. That is why we should not like to have the question discussed at a special conference. Of course if the United States wished to take our place we should only welcome it.

Truman: No, thanks. [Laughter.]

When this dispute arose between France and Syria and the Lebanon, the Prime Minister and I had an exchange of letters on the question. When the Prime Minister informed me that Great Britain had enough troops at her disposal to maintain peace in that area, I asked him to do everything he could to maintain peace because we are also interested in the communication line with the Far East running through the Suez Canal. We may have some slight difference with the Prime Minister on this point.

We believe that no state should be given any privileges in these areas. These areas should be equally accessible to all states. We also believe that France should not have any special privileges vis-à-vis other states.

Stalin: Do I understand that the United States does not recognise any French privileges in Syria and the Lebanon?

Truman: Yes.

Churchill: Our position is such that we should like France to have privileges there because we promised her that when our state was weak and we had to fight the Germans there. But that is our own business, and we do not, of course, have any possibility or right to involve others. Besides, we did not undertake to make any great efforts for France to retain her privileges there. If France manages to obtain any privileges we shall not object, and shall even look kindly on her achievements.

Stalin: From whom can the French secure these privileges?

Churchill: From the republics of Syria and the Lebanon.

Stalin: Only from them?

Churchill: Only from them. The French have their schools, archaeological institutes, etc., there. Many Frenchmen have been living there for a long time, and they even have a song, "Let's Go to Syria". They say that their claims date back to the time of the Crusades. But we do not intend to quarrel with the Great Powers on that account.

Truman: We want all states to have equal rights in these areas.

Churchill: And you, Mr. President, will you prevent Syria from granting any special rights to the French?

Truman: Of course I won't prevent it if the Syrians want to do so. But I doubt that they have such a desire. [Laughter.]

Stalin: The Russian delegation thanks Mr. Churchill for his information and withdraws its proposal.

Churchill: I thank the Generalissimo.

Truman: I am also grateful.

We now go on to the next question. It is the question of Iran. Mr. Churchill has a proposal on the question.

Churchill: We have handed the delegations a document on the question and would be glad to know the position of the Great Powers.

Truman: We, for our part, have long been prepared to withdraw our troops from Iran, but we have a great quantity of various materials there which we would like to use for conducting the war in the Pacific.

Stalin: The Russian delegation believes that Tehran, at any rate, could be evacuated.

Churchill: I should also like to deal with the other two points to have done with the draft altogether. About the date specified in the treaty. The treaty says that the troops are to be withdrawn from

Iran not later than six months after the end of hostilities. By now only two and a half months have passed since the end of the war. But we promised the Iranians to withdraw the troops as soon as the war against Germany was over.

Here is what I propose: immediate withdrawal of the troops from Tehran, and discussion of further troop withdrawals at the Council of Foreign Ministers in September.

Stalin: I have no objection.

Truman: We shall continue withdrawing our troops from Iran, because there are troops there that we are going to need in the Pacific.

Stalin: That is, of course, your right. We, for our part, promise that our troops will not undertake any action against Iran.

Truman: I have no objection to referring the matter for examination by the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

Churchill: We also have the question of Vienna. I should like to speak here about the occupation zones, which have been allotted to the British and American troops in Vienna. As regards the British Zone, it turns out that it has a population of 500,000, and because Vienna's sources of food supplies are to the east of the city, we are unable to undertake the feeding of these half million persons. We propose therefore that a provisional agreement be reached for the Russians to supply this population with food pending a permanent agreement. Field Marshal Alexander will make a statement about the actual state of affairs.

Alexander: The situation is such as the Prime Minister has just stated. There are half a million people in our zone. I have no food to send over from Italy. There are small stocks in Klagenfurt, but these would last for three weeks or a month at the outside. That is why if we undertook to feed this population, the food would have to be brought over from the United States.

Truman: There are about 375,000 people in our zone. Our ships are now engaged in transporting cargoes for military operations against Japan, the delivery of food to Europe and certain materials to the U.S.S.R. We are short of transport facilities, so that we should find it hard to keep even our own zone supplied.

Stalin: And what about the French Zone? *Alexander:* That is something I don't know.

Stalin: Let me speak to Marshal Konev. I think we could postpone for a month the transfer to our Allies of responsibility for supplying the Vienna population. For how long will this supply need to be organised, till the new harvest, or what?

Churchill: The difficulty is that these 500,000 people in our zone and the 375,000 in the American Zone have always received their foodstuffs from the country's eastern areas.

Stalin: We have an agreement with the Austrian Government under which we allow them some food in return for goods until the new harvest. I think this could be extended until September. But I must still have a preliminary talk with Marshal Konev. Tonight or tomorrow morning I think I shall be able to do that and shall give you my reply.

Churchill: The situation is that Field Marshal Alexander has entered Styria with his troops but hesitates to enter Vienna until the food supply question is settled.

Stalin: Is Vienna's food situation as bad as that now?

Churchill: We don't know, we've not been there.

Stalin: The situation there for the population is not a bad one.

Alexander: If you can help us in this matter we are, of course, prepared to go forward and take over our share of the work.

Stalin: I shall be able to tell you tomorrow.

Churchill: Thank you.

Stalin: It would be a good thing if the British and American authorities agreed to extend the agreement with the Renner Government to their zones as well. That would not signify recognition of the Renner Government or resumption of diplomatic relations, but would put the Renner Government in a position similar to that of the Government of Finland. Its competence would be extended to these zones as well, and that would facilitate the solution of the question.

Truman: We are prepared to discuss this question as soon as our troops enter Vienna.

Churchill: We also agree.

I should like to raise a question of procedure. Mr. President must be aware, like the Generalissimo, that Mr. Attlee and I are interested in visiting London on the Thursday of this week. [Laughter.] That is why we shall have to leave here on Wednesday July 25, together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. But we shall be back by the afternoon sitting on July 27, or at least some of us will. [Laughter.] For that reason, could we have our Wednesday sitting in the morning?

Stalin: All right.

Truman: I think so.

Churchill: I propose that the Foreign Ministers should continue to meet as usual, but in the absence of Mr. Eden he would be replaced by Mr. Cadogan.

Stalin: All right.

Truman: Let's agree to have the July 25 sitting at 11.00.

Tomorrow's sitting is at 17.00.

Source: <https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/Stalin/potsdam.htm>

Eighth Sitting. July 24, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.

[Reporting on the sitting of the Foreign Ministers of the three Powers, the American delegation said the following:

It was established at the sitting of the three Foreign Ministers that the commission dealing with economic matters and questions of reparations had not yet prepared its report. The Soviet delegation proposed that the question of reparations from Italy and Austria should also be referred to this commission. It handed in two short documents on reparations from these two countries.

It was decided to postpone till tomorrow consideration of the question of economic principles in respect of Germany and reparations from Germany, and also of reparations from Italy and Austria. The Foreign Ministers were informed that the commission on economic questions would meet that night to complete its work.

On July 20, the U.S. delegation handed in a document concerning oil supplies for Europe. It was decided to refer this question also to the commission on economic questions; but in view of the fact that the commission had not dealt with the question, the Foreign Ministers agreed to postpone its discussion.

The next question the Foreign Ministers discussed was that of fulfilling the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and the satellite states. It was admitted that the commission dealing with this question had not yet completed its work, and the discussion of the question was also postponed.

Next came the question of admitting Italy and other countries to the United Nations Organisation. The U.S. delegation suggested that, as the commission dealing with the question had failed to reach agreement, the question should be examined at a sitting of the Foreign Ministers on the basis of the document on which the commission had been working.

The Soviet delegation declared that it would not take part in this discussion because the document did not contain any mention of admitting Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland to the United Nations Organisation.

The British delegation suggested to omit the last sentence in Clause 1 of the document.¹ The U.S. delegation agreed with this. The British delegation proposed a new wording for Clause 2 of the document to take into account the interests of other Allied countries concerned with the peace treaty with Italy. The American delegation agreed to include the British proposal in the amended document on the question of admission to the United Nations Organisation.

The U.S. delegation suggested including in the document an additional clause to meet the desires of the Soviet delegation. The clause reads: "The three Governments also hope that the Council of Foreign Ministers may, without undue delay, prepare peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. It is also their desire, on the conclusion of the peace treaties with responsible democratic governments of these countries, to support their application for membership in the United Nations Organisation."

The Soviet delegation insisted that Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland should not be placed in worse condition

¹ The sentence read: "She (Italy) gives promise of becoming a firm supporter of a policy of peace and resistance to aggression." than Italy concerning the question of entering the United Nations Organisation. The American delegation expressed the hope that the additional clause proposed by it would satisfy the Soviet delegation.

As the Foreign Ministers failed to reach complete agreement on this question, it was decided to refer it for solution to the Heads of Government. The question was included in the agenda of the present sitting of the Heads of the three Governments.

It was agreed to recommend to the Heads of Government the following questions for discussion at the preset sitting.

1. Admission to the United Nations Organisation. The document submitted by the Foreign Ministers that morning could serve as a basis for a discussion by the three Heads of Government.

2. The Black Sea Straits and free and unrestricted navigation on international inland waterways. The discussion at the previous day's sitting of the Heads of Government was postponed to allow a study of the President's proposals.

The Foreign Ministers also agreed to recommend to the Heads of the three Governments to include the following questions in their agenda for next morning's sitting:

1. The German Navy and merchant marine.
2. Reparations from Germany.

The American delegation then announced that a delegation of representatives of the Polish Provisional Government, led by President Bierut, had arrived at Potsdam in response to an invitation of the U.S. President sent on July 22, in accordance with a decision of the three Heads of Government. At the sitting of the Foreign Ministers the Polish delegation expressed its opinion concerning Poland's western frontier, which can be reduced to the following.

The Polish delegation believes that Poland's western frontier should run from the Baltic Sea through Swinemünde, including Stettin as a part of Poland, and further on along the Oder River to the Western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak border.

Poland's territory in its new form would allow her to discontinue the expatriation of the Polish population to other countries, and would permit full use to be made of the labour of those Poles who had earlier been forced to go to other countries.

From the standpoint of security, great importance attaches to the fact that the frontier line proposed by the Polish delegation is the shortest possible frontier between Poland and Germany and will be easier to defend.

The Germans tried to exterminate the Polish population and destroy Polish culture. From the historical standpoint, it would be fair to set up a powerful Polish state which could defend itself against any German aggression.

These areas were one of the most powerful bases of Germany's arms industry and a base of German imperialism. The proposed solution would deprive Germany of a staging area in the east and a base for the manufacture of armaments.

Poland would become a state without any national minorities.

Before the war, Poland had an excess of rural population, which could not be used for work in industry because industry was not sufficiently developed. Acquisition of these territories would enable Poland to use her rural inhabitants for work in the towns, and those who had emigrated from Poland could return home and find work.

The Polish representatives further said that the Oder River basin should be transferred to Poland in toto for the Oder River itself was not deep enough and drew on waters in the area of the Western Neisse River.

The Polish delegation declared in conclusion that in its opinion, a decision should be taken and agreement on this question reached as soon as possible to enable the Polish Government to resettle the Poles from abroad as early as possible, to give them an opportunity to take part in the rehabilitation of Poland.)

Truman: The first question on the agenda is that of admitting Italy and other satellite countries, including Finland, to the United Nations Organisation.

Byrnes: The British and American delegations are agreed on this point.

Eden: We fully agree with your initial document, but we have some doubts as regards the second wording. The new wording leaves the impression that we are demanding that the Italian Government should be reconstructed before we start concluding the peace treaty with Italy.

Byrnes: I proposed the new wording in the hope of finding a compromise solution on this question, and also to meet the desire of the Soviet delegation that the other satellites should not be placed in worse conditions as compared with Italy on the matter of admission to the United Nations Organisation. But I should like to draw the attention of the British delegation to the fact that the new wording does not raise any doubts concerning the present Italian Government.

The wording merely provides for the conclusion of peace treaties with responsible democratic governments. That is a matter of the future. The fact alone that the U.S. Government had established diplomatic relations with the present Italian Government is sufficient indication of our attitude to this Government.

Eden: We feel that we have almost agreed with your standpoint, and the question is only one of wording.

Stalin: If it is a matter of making things easier for the satellite states, the present decision should mention that. Things are made easier for Italy, and it is hard to object to this. But at the same time this easing for Italy is not accompanied by a simultaneous easing for the other countries, Germany's former accomplices.

One gets the impression of an artificial division: on the one hand, Italy, whose position is eased, and on the other, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, whose position is not to be eased. There will be a danger of our decision being discredited: in what way is Italy more deserving than the other countries? Her only "merit" is that she was the first to surrender. In all other respects Italy behaved worse and inflicted greater harm than any other satellite state.

There is no doubt that any of the four states – Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland – inflicted far less damage on the Allies than did Italy. As regards the Government in Italy, can it be said that it is more democratic than the Governments in Rumania, Bulgaria or Hungary? Of course not. Has Italy a more responsible Government than Rumania or Bulgaria? No democratic elections have been held either in Italy or any of the other states. In this respect they are equal. That is why I fail to see any reason for this benevolent attitude to Italy and this negative attitude to all the other states, Germany's former accomplices.

Things were first made easier for Italy by the restoration of diplomatic relations with her. A second step is now being proposed, namely, Italy's inclusion in the United Nations Organisation. Good, let us take this second step in respect of Italy, but then I propose that in respect of the other mentioned countries we should also take the first step that was made in respect of Italy some months ago, namely, that we should restore diplomatic relations with them. This would be just and the gradation would be observed: Italy in the first place, and the rest in the second.

Otherwise, it turns out that in respect of Italy a first step had been made and a second step is being proposed, all because the Italian Government surrendered first, although Italy inflicted more damage on the Allies than all the other states, accomplices of Germany. That is the proposal of the Soviet delegation.

Churchill: In the main lines we are in agreement with the United States' standpoint on this question.

Truman: I should like to say that the difference in our views of the Government of Italy, on the one hand, and the Governments of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, on the other, is due to the fact that our representatives have not had an opportunity to obtain the necessary information in respect of the latter countries. There was no such situation in Italy, where all our Governments – the United States Great Britain and the Soviet Union – were given an opportunity of freely obtaining information.

We cannot say this about Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, where we have not had an opportunity to obtain free information. In addition, the nature of the present Governments of these countries does

not allow us to establish diplomatic relations with them at once. But in the document submitted we have tried to meet the Soviet delegation's desire and not to place the other satellites in a worse position than that of Italy.

Stalin: But you have diplomatic relations with Italy and not with the other countries.

Truman: But the other satellites too can obtain our recognition if their Governments satisfy our requirements.

Stalin: Which requirements?

Truman: Concerning freedom of movement and freedom of information.

Stalin: None of these Governments hinders or can hinder free movement and free information for members of the Allied press. There must be some misunderstanding. With the ending of the war the situation there has improved. Restrictions were also introduced for Soviet representatives in Italy.

Truman: We want these Governments reorganised, and we shall give them our recognition when they become more responsible and democratic.

Stalin: I assure you that the Government of Bulgaria is more democratic than the Government of Italy.

Truman: To meet the Soviet desires we proposed the same formulation in respect of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary as in respect of Italy.

Stalin: But this proposal does not include the resumption of diplomatic relations.

Truman: I have said many times already that we cannot resume diplomatic relations with these Governments until they are reorganised as we consider necessary.

Byrnes: The only thing we have proposed for easing Italy's position is support for her application for membership of the United Nations Organisation. I should like to draw your attention to the point of our proposal which speaks in the same words about the other satellites. Thus, the easing of Italy's position will be accompanied by an easing of the position of the other satellites. We have tried here to meet the desires of the Soviet delegation.

Stalin: I propose that the word "responsible", as used in respect of the Italian Government, be deleted wherever it is used. This word tends to belittle the Italian Government's position.

Truman: We are unable to support Governments' application for membership of the United Nations Organisation if they are not responsible and democratic.

Stalin: In Argentina the Government is less democratic than in Italy, but Argentina is nevertheless a member of the United Nations Organisation. If it is a government, it is a democratic government, but if you add "responsible", it turns out that this is some other kind of government. And besides, there should be an addition concerning the resumption of diplomatic relations.

I propose adding to the clause dealing with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland a sentence to the effect that in the near future each of our three Governments will examine the question of resuming diplomatic relations with these countries. That does not mean that they will do this simultaneously and will resume diplomatic relations at one and the same time, but that each of the three Governments will examine the question of resuming diplomatic relations sooner or later. Let me give an example. At present, there are diplomatic representatives in Italy from the United States and the Soviet Union, but no diplomatic representatives either from Great Britain or from France; there are no ambassadors there from these Governments.

Churchill: We consider that our representative in Italy is fully accredited. In virtue of the fact that we are still formally in a state of war with Italy, the status of that representative cannot be fully equated with that of an ambassador; under the British Constitution we cannot, in these conditions, have normal diplomatic relations. But we do call him ambassador.

Stalin: But not of the kind as those of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Churchill: Not quite. About 90 per cent.

Stalin: Not quite, that's true.

Churchill: But the reason is a formal and technical one.

Stalin: That's the kind of ambassador that should be sent to Rumania – such a not-quite ambassador. [General laughter.]

Churchill: We have not done that yet.

Truman: We want to do everything we can to achieve a situation in which we could resume diplomatic relations with these Governments. I have already explained the difficulties in solving this problem.

Stalin: The difficulties were there before, but they are no longer there. We find it very hard to adhere to this resolution in its present form. We do not want to adhere to it.

Churchill: We do not want to use words which could cast a shadow on any of us. I only wish to intercede for Italy, and not just because she was the first to drop out of the war. A great deal of time has passed since she dropped out of the war, two years have passed already, if I'm not mistaken. But only a short time – four or five months – has passed since the other countries stopped fighting; Rumania stopped fighting somewhat earlier.

Stalin: First Rumania, and then Finland. But diplomatic relations were resumed with Italy some 7 or 8 months after her surrender.

Churchill: Italy's position is as follows. Two years ago she dropped out of the war, and has since been fighting on our side to the best of her abilities. Besides, it should be borne in mind that we were in Italy and know everything about the political conditions there. That cannot be said of Bulgaria, Rumania and the other countries. In addition, Italy was not a uniform country: the northern part of Italy was under the yoke of the enemy and was liberated only two months ago. There we fought side by side with Italy, who gave us great support.

But it was always recognised that Italy could not have a fully democratic government until her northern part was liberated. Meanwhile we recognised the Italian Government, we worked with it. I had an understanding with the Soviet Government concerning support for the Government of General Badoglio. At that time I disagreed with our American friends, I wanted to support that Government until the north was liberated, when it would have been possible to form a Government of Italy on a broader base. But the course of events entailed other actions.

We have established friendly relations with Italy. There is no political censorship there. The Italian press frequently attacked me only a few months after Italy's unconditional surrender. There is evidence of a considerable growth of freedom in Italy. Now that the north has been liberated, the Italians are getting ready to stage democratic elections. That is why I see no reason why we should not now discuss the question of a peace treaty with Italy.

I must say that we know nothing concerning Rumania, not to mention Bulgaria. Our mission in Bucharest was placed in conditions of isolation reminiscent of internment.

Stalin: How can you say such things without verifying them?

Churchill: We know this from our own representative there. I am sure the Generalissimo would be surprised to learn of some of the facts which have taken place in respect of our mission in Bucharest.

Stalin: Fiction!

Churchill: Of course, you are free to call our statement fiction, but I have full confidence in our political representative and Air Force Marshal Stevenson. I have known him personally for many years. The conditions for the work of our mission were difficult. There were great delays with planes for our mission. There were complaints from our Soviet friends about the numerical strength of our mission, which was not so great after all. The Control Commission, which should have consisted of three members, nearly always met as two. The Soviet Commander-in-Chief, who is the chairman of the Control Commission, sometimes met the American representative, and sometimes the British, but rarely the two together. As for Italy, many Soviet representatives have been there.

Stalin: Nothing of the kind, we have no rights in Italy.

Churchill: But at any rate the situation there is such that you are quite free to come to Italy. That is why I don't think the situation in Italy can be compared with the situation in Rumania, Bulgaria and the other countries.

Truman: We must say that our missions in those countries also came up against great difficulties. But we should not like to speak of that here.

Byrnes: In the hope of reaching agreement, I propose that the words "responsible government" should be replaced by the words "recognised government".

Stalin: That is more acceptable. But I think we should also adopt a decision that the three Governments are willing to examine the question of establishing diplomatic relations with these four countries. I propose that at the end of the clause proposed by Mr. Byrnes on the four countries, we should add the following: "The three Governments agree to examine, each separately, in the near future, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland."

Churchill: But will that not clash with what we have just said here?

Stalin: It will not clash because if we decide to prepare the question of peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria and the other countries – and we have not even recognised these countries – it is clear that each Government takes up the question of recognition on its own.

Truman: I have no objections.

Stalin: In that case, we have none either.

Churchill: I think there is a contradiction. I understood the President to say here that he does not now want to recognise the Governments of Rumania, Bulgaria and the other satellite countries.

Truman: It says here that we undertake only to examine the question.

Churchill: This tends to mislead public opinion.

Stalin: Why?

Churchill: Because it follows from the meaning of the statement that we shall soon recognise these Governments; as it is, I am aware that this does not reflect the stand either of the Government of the United States or the Government of the United Kingdom.

Stalin: I agree with the President and want to object to Mr. Churchill. We have already all accepted that we instruct the Council of Foreign Ministers to prepare peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. We all believe that a peace treaty can be concluded only with a recognised government. Consequently, we must mention this recognition in some way, and then there will be no contradiction. If we fail to say that the three Governments intend to raise the question of recognition in the nearest future, we shall have to delete the clause about preparing peace treaties with these countries.

Churchill: I should like to ask the President whether he believes that this autumn the representatives of the present Governments of Rumania, Bulgaria and the others will come to the Council of Foreign Ministers and that we shall discuss the peace treaties with them there?

Truman: The only government that can send its representatives to the Council of Foreign Ministers will be the government which is recognised by us.

Stalin: That's right.

Churchill: The present Governments will not be recognised and that is why it will be impossible to prepare the peace treaties with them.

Stalin: What makes you think so? *Churchill:* It follows logically.

Stalin: No, it does not.

Churchill: I may be thinking on wrong lines but it seems to me that it does.

Stalin: These Governments may be recognised or may not be recognised. No one knows whether they will or will not be recognised. That is just how the wording should be understood: "examine the question of recognition". And there will be a peace treaty with them when they are recognised.

Churchill: Anyone reading this clause will not understand that the U.S. Government does not wish to recognize the present Governments of Rumania and Bulgaria. But if other Governments we can recognise are formed, we shall proceed to draw up peace treaties with them. You must excuse me for insisting on the point in this way, but I ask you to bear in mind that if the document is published, it will have to be explained, especially by me, in Parliament. We say that we shall conclude peace treaties with Governments to which we accord recognition, but we have no intention of recognising these Governments. I find this almost absurd.

Truman: I propose that we refer this question back to the Foreign Ministers for a fresh examination.

Stalin: Mr. Churchill is not right; nothing is said here at all about the conclusion of peace treaties; it says here about preparation. Why cannot a treaty be prepared, even if the government is not recognised?

Churchill: Of course, we can prepare the peace treaty ourselves. In that case, I propose that we replace the preposition "with" by the preposition "for", so that it should read not "peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria", etc., but "peace treaties for Rumania, Bulgaria", etc.

Stalin: I have no objection to "for".

Churchill: Thank you.

Stalin: Don't mention it. [General laughter.]

Churchill: It would be desirable for the Foreign Ministers to go over the document once again.

Stalin: I have no objection.

Truman: They must take into account the discussion which has taken place here today.

Stalin: Good.

Truman: The next question is the one of the Black Sea Straits and free navigation on international inland waterways. The American delegation has tabled its proposals on the question.

[...] *Stalin:* There are probably more urgent questions than that of the Straits, and this question could be postponed.

Churchill: This question was raised by Great Britain as flowing from the desire to amend the Montreux Convention. I am willing to have it postponed if the Soviet delegation so desires.

Stalin: It would be better to postpone this question. Turkey must be consulted.

Truman: Our proposal on international control means that the Straits will not be in anyone's hands. We shall try to convince the Turks that we are taking a correct stand on this question.

Stalin: All right, let's do that.

Truman: I want to make a suggestion to the Conference. I think it is time we thought about drawing up a communiqué on the work of the Conference. I suggest, therefore, that we appoint a special committee to draw up such a communiqué.

Stalin: All right.

Truman: We must come to an agreement on the membership of the committee.

Stalin: All right.

Truman: We shall ask the Foreign Ministers to submit candidates for the committee.

Stalin: Good. Shall we have a sitting at 11.00 tomorrow?

Truman: Yes.

Stalin: Mr. Churchill expressed doubt on that point.

Eden: At lunch today we expressed the assumption that there may not be enough questions for a sitting tomorrow. But since today's agenda is not exhausted, the undiscussed items will be transferred to tomorrow's sitting.

Truman: As soon as we find that we have no more work we shall go home. [Laughter.] But so far we have work.

Churchill: Mr. Attlee and I must be back in London for the opening of Parliament on August 8. At any rate, I am unable to stay here until later than August 6.

Stalin: The question of Poland's western frontier – the last item on today's agenda – has not yet been exhausted.

Churchill: Besides, there is the question raised by the Soviet side concerning the camp in Italy. I should like to give an explanation on this question now.

Stalin: Have we the time and the desire to discuss the question of Poland's western frontier now?

Churchill: We are meeting the Poles and shall have a talk with Mr. Bierut tomorrow morning.

Stalin: Then let's postpone it.

Churchill: In brief, the position in the camp is as follows. In fact, there are 10,000 persons in that camp. But it should be borne in mind that we have just taken 1,000,000 prisoners. A Soviet mission in Rome is now dealing with these 10,000 men, and this mission has free access to the camp. It is reported that the persons in the camp are predominantly Ukrainians but not Soviet citizens. There are also some Poles in the camp, who, as far as we could ascertain, lived in Poland within her 1939 borders. Six hundred and sixty-five persons wish to return to the Soviet Union at once, and steps are being taken to send them. We are also prepared to hand over all others who wish to return.

These 10,000 men surrendered to us almost as an entire military unit, and we have retained it in that form, under the command of its own officers, out of purely administrative considerations. We should be glad if General Golikov would address his complaints to Field Marshal Alexander or his H.Q.

Alexander: I have little to add to what the Prime Minister has said. I should like all those present here to know that I have always given the Russian representatives in Italy complete freedom of movement and also every opportunity to see what they wished. And I think that it is expedient to act in this way because in cases when large numbers of Russian soldiers happen to fall into our hands, the advice of responsible Russian representatives could prove very useful to us. I think, if the Generalissimo agrees, I shall go on acting in the spirit I had acted until now.

Stalin: In such cases we are duty bound by treaty to give each other assistance and not to prevent citizens from returning home, but, on the contrary, to help them return home.

Churchill: If your representative sends a general or goes to the H.Q. himself in connection with this matter, everything necessary will be done.

Stalin: All right. I consider the question settled.

I spoke to Marshal Konev in Vienna today. He has not stopped issuing rations to the population of Vienna, irrespective of zones, and will go on doing so until the Americans and the British find a possibility of undertaking something else.

Truman and Churchill: We are very grateful.

Churchill: There was the question of extending the Renner Administration to the British and American zones.

Stalin: It would be good to extend his competence to all the zones.

Churchill: We believe that is one of the first questions we shall have to study when we enter Vienna. We agree in principle that it is desirable to work with a single Austrian administration.

Stalin: Of course, it is better.

Churchill: We have no intention of hampering the local authorities.

Stalin: That will be better.

Truman: Until 11.00 tomorrow.

Ninth Sitting. July 25, 1945

Truman: There was a suggestion yesterday to continue discussion of Poland's western frontiers today.

Stalin: All right.

Truman: I remember that Mr. Churchill had an additional proposal.

Churchill: I have nothing to add. I have had a talk with the Polish delegation, and this morning had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Bierut once again. Mr. Eden had a talk with the Polish delegation yesterday. The Poles agree that there are 1.5 million Germans in the area which they have occupied in the west. I consider that this question is also connected with that of reparations and also with the question of the four Powers' zones of occupation in Germany.

Truman: I consider Mr. Churchill's remark correct. Mr. Byrnes also met the Polish delegation and intends to do so again. Allow me to make a suggestion on a point of procedure. Since these talks of Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Eden will continue, I think it will be better to postpone our discussion on this question until Friday.

Stalin: All right.

Truman: The next question on our agenda is that of the German Navy and merchant marine. I think we have already reached agreement on this question.

Churchill: Of course, concrete proposals on this question must be considered. I think we could tackle these concrete proposals.

Truman: State Secretary Byrnes told me that Assistant Secretary of State Clayton and Admiral Land have dealt with this question, they have been working on concrete proposals. I am prepared to examine the question at any time, but would prefer to hear Mr. Byrnes first and study the documents on this question which I have just received.

[It was decided to postpone discussion of this question.]

Churchill: There is another question which, while not on the agenda, should be discussed, namely, that of transfers of population. There are a great number of Germans who have to be resettled from Czechoslovakia to Germany.

Stalin: The Czechoslovak authorities have evacuated those Germans, and they are now in Dresden, Leipzig and Chemnitz.

Churchill: We think there are 2.5 million Sudeten Germans who must be resettled. In addition, the Czechoslovaks are in a hurry to get rid of 150,000 German citizens, who had earlier been resettled in Czechoslovakia from the Reich. According to our information, only 2,000 of these 150,000 Germans have left Czechoslovakia. This is a great job, moving 2.5 million men. But where are they to be moved to? To the Russian Zone?

Stalin: Most of them are going to the Russian Zone.

Churchill: We don't want them in our zone.

Stalin: But that is not what we suggest. [Laughter.]

Churchill: They will bring their mouths with them. I think the real resettlement has not yet started.

Stalin: From Czechoslovakia?

Churchill: Yes, from Czechoslovakia. So far the displacement has been on a small scale.

Stalin: I have information that the Czechs warn the Germans and then evict them. As for the Poles, they have detained 1.5 million Germans to use them on the harvesting. As soon as the harvesting is over in Poland, the Poles will evacuate the Germans from Poland.

Churchill: I don't think this should be done in view of the problems of food supplies, reparations, etc., that is, questions which are still to be settled. We now find ourselves in a situation in which the

Poles have the food and the fuel and we have the population. The supply of this population falls as a heavy burden on us.

Stalin: You must see the Poles' side of it. For five and a half years the Germans made them suffer all sorts of wrongs.

Truman: Yesterday, I listened very attentively to President Bierut's statement on this question. I sympathise with the Poles and the Russians and understand the difficulties facing them. I have already set forth my position with sufficient clarity.

I should like to explain to my colleagues what my powers are in respect of the questions relating to a peaceful settlement. When we discuss here questions which should go into the peace treaty, I am sure everyone will understand that under our constitution the treaty can be concluded only with the consent of the U.S. Senate. There is no doubt that when I support some proposal put forward at the Conference, this means that I shall do everything I can to ensure that the decision is sanctioned by the Senate. But there is of course no guarantee that it will be adopted for sure.

I must tell you that political feelings in America are such that I am unable to support here any proposals unless I obtain support from our public opinion. I am not making this statement in order to change the basis on which the discussion of questions with my colleagues is taking place but merely to explain my possibilities in respect of constitutional power. I want to say that in concluding any peace treaties I have to take into account the fact that they must be approved by the U.S. Senate.

Stalin: Does the President's statement refer only to peace treaties or to all questions discussed here?

Truman: This refers only to agreements and treaties which the Constitution says must be sent for approval by the U.S. Senate.

Stalin: That means all the other questions can be settled?

Truman: We can settle any question here unless it must have the ratification of the Senate.

Stalin: That means that only the question of peace treaties requires ratification by the Senate?

Truman: That's right. I have wide powers but I don't want to abuse them.

Churchill: I propose that we return to the question of the Polish movement westward.

Stalin: We did not prepare for this question, it has been raised by chance. Of course, I agree to have an exchange of opinion, but it is extremely hard to settle it now.

Churchill: I don't want to discuss the question today. I should only like to say that the success of the whole Conference depends on this question. If the Conference ends its work, say, within 10 days, without adopting any decision on Poland, and if the question of an equitable distribution of food over the whole of German territory is not settled, all this will undoubtedly mean failure for the Conference. We shall then have to return to Mr. Byrnes's proposal that everyone will have to make do with what he has in his zone. I hope that we shall reach agreement on this group of questions which lie at the root of all our work. We must admit that we have not achieved any progress until now.

Truman: I agree with the Prime Minister's opinion that we have not had any progress on these questions.

Stalin: I think that the supply of the whole of Germany with coal and metal is of much greater importance. The Ruhr gives 90 per cent of the metal and 80 per cent of the hard coal.

Churchill: If coal is supplied from the Ruhr to the Russian Zone, it will have to be paid for with food deliveries from that zone.

Stalin: If the Ruhr remains a part of Germany it must supply the whole of Germany.

Churchill: Why then can't we take food from your zone?

Stalin: Because that territory goes to Poland.

Churchill: But how can workers in the Ruhr produce the coal if they have nothing to eat, and where can they obtain the food?

Stalin: It has long been known that Germany has always imported foodstuffs, notably grain. If Germany is short of grain and food she will buy it.

Churchill: Then how will she be able to pay the reparations?

Stalin: She will be able to. Germany still has a lot of some things.

Churchill: It is true that Ruhr coal is in our zone, but I cannot take the responsibility for any settlement which may result in famine in the zone this winter, while the Poles have all the food to keep for themselves.

Stalin: That's not quite right. They recently asked for assistance in grain; they are short of grain, they asked for grain until the new crop.

Churchill: I hope the Generalissimo will recognise some of our difficulties as we recognise his. In Britain, this year, we shall have the most coalless winter because we are short of coal.

Stalin: Why? Britain has always exported coal.

Churchill: That's because the miners have not yet been demobilised, there's a labour shortage in the coal industry.

Stalin: There are enough POWs. We have POWs working on coal, it would be very hard without them. We are rehabilitating our coal basins and are using POWs for that purpose. You have 400,000 German soldiers in Norway, they are not even disarmed, and I don't know what they're waiting for. There you have manpower.

Churchill: I didn't know they had not been disarmed. At any rate, our intention is to disarm them. I am not aware of the exact situation there, but this question was settled by the Supreme Command of the Allied Expeditionary Force. In any case, I shall inquire.

I want to repeat and draw your attention to the fact that we are short of coal because we are exporting it to France, Belgium and Holland. And while we are short of coal for this winter, we fail to understand why the Poles have the possibility to sell coal from a territory which does not yet belong to them.

Stalin: They have sold coal from the Dabrowa area. It is their area.

I am not in the habit of complaining but must say that our position is even worse. We have lost several million killed, we are short of men. If I began to complain, I am afraid you'd shed tears, because the situation in Russia is so grave. But I do not want to worry you.

Churchill: We are in control of the Ruhr, and we are prepared to exchange Ruhr coal for food.

Stalin: This question needs thinking about.

Churchill: I did not at all expect us to reach any decision today, but I should like the members of the Conference to think during this short break about the great problem they will have to solve.

Truman: If we have nothing else to discuss today, I suggest that we refer the question to the Foreign Ministers.

Churchill: We shall meet again at 5.00 on Friday.

Eden: We have received a notification from Dr. Beneš asking us to discuss here the question of transferring Germans from Czechoslovakia. Can the Foreign Ministers deal with this question?

Stalin: I think the transfer has been made.

Churchill: We don't think that a great number of Germans have already departed from there, and we are still faced with the problem of how to solve this question.

Stalin: Please continue.

Churchill: Let the Foreign Ministers deal with this question and establish the facts.

Stalin: All right.

Truman: I agree.

Before the break, I want to draw your attention once again to the proposal I made concerning international inland waterways. I think the Foreign Ministers could also discuss this proposal of mine.

[Stalin and Churchill express agreement. The Soviet delegation then hands to the U.S. President and the Prime Minister of Britain a memorandum concerning the hindrances being raised to the return home of Soviet citizens from Austria and Germany, and also a memorandum concerning the German troops not yet disarmed in Norway, mention of which was already made at the sitting of the Heads of Government.]

Churchill: But I can assure you that it is our intention to disarm those troops.

Stalin: I have no doubt. [Laughter.]

Churchill: We are not keeping them up our sleeve so as later to release them all of a sudden. I shall demand a report on this question at once.

Truman closes the sitting and announces that the next sitting is to take place at 5.00 p.m. on Friday, July 27.

Source: <https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/Stalin/potsdam.htm>

Tenth Sitting. July 28, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.

[Reporting on the sitting of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain on July 25, 1945, the Soviet delegation said the following:

1. The American delegation proposed a discussion at the Ministers' sitting on the question of waterways. It expressed the wish that this question should be discussed in commission beforehand. The British and Soviet delegations agreed to this proposal, and as a result the following commission was set up:

From the U.S.A.: Russel and Riddleberger; from Great Britain: Ward; from the U.S.S.R.: Gerashchenko and Lavrishchev.

2. The American delegation then touched upon the question of resettling the German population from Czechoslovakia.

The British delegation declared that it was not only a matter of resettling the Germans from Czechoslovakia, but also from Western Poland and Hungary. It expressed the opinion that the question of resettling this population would be under the control of the Allied Control Council acting in collaboration with the Governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

The Soviet delegation proposed that the question should be referred for preliminary examination to a commission so that a meeting of the three Ministers could then examine its draft.

The delegations of the U.S.A. and Britain agreed to this proposal. The following commission was set up:

From the U.S.A.: Cannon; from Great Britain: Harrison; from the U.S.S.R.: Sobolev and Semyonov.

3. The British delegation tabled a proposal to appoint a commission to draw up a draft communiqué on the work of the Conference and a commission to draft a general protocol of the Conference decisions.

The delegations of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. agreed to the proposal. It was decided to set up the following commissions:

a) To draft a communiqué on the work of the Conference:

From the U.S.A.: Walter Brown and Wilder Foot; from the U.S.S.R.: Sobolev and Golunsky.

b) To draft a general protocol on the Conference decisions:

From the U.S.A.: Dunn, Mathews and Cohen; from the U.S.S.R.: Gromyko, Kozyrev and Gribanov; from Great Britain (for both commissions): Bridges, Brooke, Hayter and Dean.

Reporting further on the sitting of the Foreign Ministers on July 27, 1945, the Soviet delegation said that the following items were on the agenda of the sitting of the three Ministers:

I. Outstanding questions.

It was stated that the following questions remain outstanding:

1. The economic principles in respect of Germany.

2. Reparations from Germany.

3. Reparations from Italy and Austria.

4. Oil supplies to Europe.

5. Admission of Italy and other former satellite countries into the United Nations Organisation.

6. Fulfilment of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe.

7. Easing of the armistice terms for Italy and other countries.

8. Poland's western frontier.

9. Co-operation in settling urgent European economic problems.

10. War criminals.

11. Resettlement of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

12. Supplementing the political principles on the treatment of Germany with two points from Point 13 of the draft economic principles.

13. The German Navy.

14. International inland waterways.

II. Admission of Italy and other countries, which have concluded an armistice and have become co-belligerents on the side of the Allies into the United Nations Organisation.

The U.S. delegation declared that if the Soviet and the British delegations were unable to reach agreement on the wording of a document on this question, it was prepared, with the consent of the U.S. President, to withdraw the question from the Conference agenda altogether. The American delegation added that, in its opinion, it was necessary to examine first of all the vital questions, namely, the questions of reparations, the German Navy and Poland's western frontier.

The British delegation proposed that the formulation of the last sentence of the third paragraph, tabled by the Soviet delegation, should be replaced by the following sentence: "The conclusion of peace treaties with the responsible democratic Governments in the states will permit the three Governments to resume normal diplomatic relations with them and to support proposals on their side to become members of the United Nations Organisation."

The Soviet delegation declared the amendment unacceptable.

Insofar as no agreement on this question had been reached at the meeting of the three Ministers, it was decided to submit it for settlement by the Heads of the three Governments.

III. Reparations from Germany.

The Soviet delegation declared that it considered the work of the Reparations Commission unsatisfactory and proposed that the question of reparations from Germany should be examined directly at the meeting of the three Ministers. There were no objections to this proposal. The Soviet delegation then read out Clause 4 of the Crimea Protocol on Reparations and, referring to a statement by the American representative in the Reparations Commission to the effect that he withdrew the U.S. Government's endorsement of the decision set forth in the said clause, asked the American delegation whether the U.S. Government continued to adhere to the Crimea decisions on this question or had altered its position.

The American delegation replied that this was a misunderstanding. In the Crimea the U.S. Government agreed to accept the figure of \$20,000 million as a basis for discussion, but since then the Soviet and the Allied armies had wrought great destruction in Germany, some areas had been separated from Germany and it was now impossible for practical purposes to start from the over-all figure which the American delegation had accepted at Yalta as a possible basis for discussion.

The British delegation declared that it abstained from making any proposals.

On the proposal of the American delegation it was recognised advisable to postpone this question until the next conference of the three Ministers, after which they would report to the Heads of the three Governments.

IV. Reparations from Austria and Italy.

The Soviet delegation proposed that its proposals on reparations from Austria and reparations from Italy should be taken as a basis for further discussion on this question.

The American delegation declared that it did not consider it possible to levy reparations from Austria and Italy in the form of deliveries from current production. In the opinion of the American delegation, it was possible only to make lump withdrawals of war industry equipment which could not be used for peacetime purposes. The British delegation declared that it supported the opinion of the U.S. delegation.

In view of failure to reach agreement it was decided to report the differences that had been revealed to the Heads of the three Governments.

V. Economic principles in respect of Germany.

On the proposal of the U.S. delegation, the discussion of this question was postponed.

VI. Oil supplies to Europe.

The discussion of the question was postponed in view of the fact that the commission had not completed its work.

VII. Economic co-operation in Europe.

It was decided to approve the report of the commission on this question and to report this to the Heads of the three Governments.]

Truman: Which question are we going to discuss now: that of Poland's western frontier or some other?

Stalin: We could discuss this one, or the question of Italy and the other countries. How much time do you have today? Could we work for an hour?

Truman: That suits me. Let's work until 12.00.

Stalin: I want to inform you that we, the Russian delegation, have received a new proposal from Japan. Although we are not duly informed when a document on Japan is compiled, we believe nevertheless that we should inform each other of new proposals. [Japan's note on mediation is read out in English.] The document does not contain anything new. There is only one proposal: Japan is offering to co-operate with us. We intend to reply to them in the same spirit as the last time.

Truman: We do not object. Attlee: We agree.

Stalin: I have nothing more to add.

Truman: There are two questions to which the Soviet delegation wants to draw our attention in the first place. The first question is about Italy and the other satellite countries, and the second, about reparations from Austria and Italy.

Stalin: In addition it would be desirable to raise the question of the German Navy and the question of Poland's western frontier.

Truman: I think that we can discuss any question here and I am prepared to hear any proposal and then state my opinion on these questions.

Attlee: I want to say that I agree to discuss all these questions. At the same time I should like to express regret that the events which have taken place in Britain have hampered the work of the Conference, but we are prepared to stay here as long as need be and deal with any questions.

Stalin: The question of admitting Italy and the other countries into the United Nations Organisation was discussed at the previous sitting of the Big Three. However, as was stated here, the Foreign Ministers had a different impression of the results of this discussion. The Soviet delegation was under the impression that the question had in the main been agreed between the Heads of the three Governments after the amendment made by the Prime Minister in respect of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Wherever there was reference to the peace treaties, it was decided to replace the words "with Bulgaria, Rumania", etc., by the words for Bulgaria, Rumania, etc. The question was then referred for final drafting by the three Foreign Ministers. But at the Ministers meeting the British delegation tabled another amendment to the draft, which was not adopted.

At the Conference of the Heads of Government the question was of how the Governments of the said countries were to be called: responsible or recognised. The Russian delegation believes that if we say "responsible" this will be an affront to the Governments because they might think that they are now regarded as being irresponsible. If we say recognised, as we agreed here at the Conference of the three Heads of Government, there will be no offence. Each of our Governments is free to recognise the Governments of these states when it deems them to be democratic. There will be no offence for the Governments and the meaning, the content, will remain the same. We here adopted a decision and then the Ministers got together and reversed it. That is wrong. This was agreed in principle.

Truman: I ask Mr. Byrnes to speak on this point.

Byrnes: At the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers the Soviet delegation declared that, as far as it remembered, the U.S. delegation had accepted its proposal. On behalf of the American delegation I said that the President accepted the proposal of the Soviet delegation in principle and added that these proposals should be referred for drafting by the Foreign Ministers: the President had in mind the replacement of only one word, namely, the word “to discuss” by the word “to examine” (which makes a difference in English). That means that there were no differences between the American and the Soviet delegation on this matter.

But I told the Foreign Ministers at the time that, as far as I recalled, Mr. Churchill had objected to the Soviet delegation’s proposal concerning the study of the question of recognising the Governments of the satellite countries. At the conclusion of the Conference of the three Heads of Government, Mr. Churchill informed me that he was not in agreement with this proposal. I also told the Foreign Ministers that the American delegation had initially made its proposal on Italy to grant her some relief. The proposal merely said that the three Powers would issue a declaration to the effect that they would support Italy’s entry into the United Nations Organisation.

The British delegation proposed that we include certain neutral countries among those whose entry into the United Nations Organisation we would support. We agreed with that. The Soviet delegation proposed the inclusion in the document of a clause on the Franco regime and, to meet the Soviet delegation half-way, we added a clause concerning the negative attitude taken by the three Powers to Spain’s becoming a member of the United Nations under the Franco regime.

The Soviet delegation then proposed the inclusion of a clause concerning the Governments of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland. We agreed to that clause with certain amendments. After that there was a proposal to change the wording of the clause on these countries. We agreed to that as well.

Unfortunately, one gets the impression that when we agree with our Soviet friends, the British delegation withholds its agreement, and when we agree with our British friends, we do not obtain the agreement of the Soviet delegation. [Laughter.] Once again, if the Soviet and British delegations could reach agreement concerning the Soviet proposal we would be prepared to accept the document, but if they are unable to reach agreement, we are prepared to withdraw our modest proposal on Italy.

Attlee: Mr. President, I ask permission for Mr. Cadogan to set forth our position on this question.

Cadogan: The document we are examining relates to the question of admitting Italy and the other satellite countries, and also, possibly, certain neutral countries, into the United Nations Organisation. As far as I am aware, the text of the document could be approved with the exception of two points. Generalissimo Stalin has already spoken about one of these points, namely, the replacement of the words “responsible Governments” by the words “recognised Governments”. It seems to me that two days ago, when we discussed this question, we agreed to this substitution.

The other question, which is much more complex, relates to Clause 3, which says that the three Governments agree to examine, in the near future, the question of resuming diplomatic relations with Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. Mr. Churchill explained that although he was willing to examine the question of resuming diplomatic relations with these countries, the inclusion of this clause in the declaration could be misleading, because under the constitution the British cannot establish full diplomatic relations with countries with whom they are technically still in a state of war. A compromise proposal was made to the effect that after the signing of the peace treaties we could resume full diplomatic relations with these countries. But it appears that this proposal of ours met with objections on the part of the Soviet delegation.

Stalin: I understood Mr. Cadogan to say that he agrees to say “recognised Governments” instead of “responsible Governments.”

Cadogan: Yes.

Byrnes: We find this acceptable: “recognised” instead of “responsible”

Stalin: There is no distinction here between the situation of the Allies and Italy, on the one hand, and the Allies and other countries, on the other. There is no freely elected Government in Italy, or in Rumania, or in Hungary, or in Bulgaria. There is such a Government only in Finland. In all these countries, as in Italy, the Governments have been formed by agreement between the main parties.

If Italy has been recognised by the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, and to the extent of 90 per cent by the British Government, why is it not possible to raise the question of examining the problem of establishing diplomatic relations, say, with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary? From the standpoint of democracy, the situation there is the same as in Italy. But Italy has been recognised by the three Powers. It does not say here: to establish full diplomatic relations. I must say I fail to understand the meaning of the amendment of which Mr. Cadogan has spoken. Why make such a distinction between Italy, which does not have a freely elected Government, and the other countries, which, with the exception of Finland, have no freely elected Governments either?

Bevin: Does not the difference lie in the fact that in respect of Italy we know what the situation there is, and we know nothing about the situation in the other countries?

Stalin: You are not being asked to commit yourself to a recognition of these Governments. While you discuss the question of recognition you will have the opportunity of studying the situation, in these countries.

Bevin: But why should we undertake this obligation before we know what the situation is in these countries?

Stalin: We also knew little about Italy when we established diplomatic relations with her, possibly even less than you now know about these countries. The question is to open for these countries, beginning with Italy and ending with Bulgaria, some ways of easing their position. For Italy there is the prospect of entry into the United Nations Organisation. This is the second step in easing her position, the first having been the fact that diplomatic relations were resumed with her six or eight months after her surrender. The second step towards relief of Italy’s position consists in the fact that two years after her surrender we give her an opportunity of joining the United Nations Organisation.

The task now is to make the first step in respect of the other countries: to ensure the discussion of the question of their recognition by the three Powers. It is proposed to do this ten months after their surrender. If we agreed to ease Italy’s position, we must do something in this respect for the other countries as well. That is the point.

Attlee: I think it was explained here that we find it impossible to resume full diplomatic relations with these countries until the signing of the peace treaties. The difficulty lies in the fact that the adoption of the Soviet proposal creates the impression that we intend to do something in respect of these countries which it is impossible for us to do. The amendment proposed by the British delegation, consisting in the statement that full diplomatic relations with these countries will be resumed after the conclusion of the peace treaties with them, states what is possible.

Stalin: Why not put it this way: the three states will examine, each separately, the question of establishing full or partial diplomatic relations. Diplomatic relations will have to be resumed with Finland in any case, it is not nice to drag out the solution of this question, since a freely elected Government has been formed there. The question concerns the other countries.

Attlee: It seems to me that this proposal does not correspond with reality.

Stalin: Good, in that case, let us adopt the American formula: instead of “to discuss” say “to examine”.

Attlee: It seems to me that a change of words does not alter the substance of the matter. One question put in Parliament will give the whole thing away.

Stalin: But we are not concealing anything. What is there to give away? It is one thing to discuss, and another, to examine. You will have to examine the question in any case. It would be strange if we failed to examine the question of recognising these Governments. What is so terrible or new in this? I think the British could accept the American wording. You do not stand to lose anything, but only to gain from the public opinion in these countries.

Bevin: When we return we shall be asked in Parliament about the meaning of what we have done. I want to give the people an absolutely honest answer. If I recognise a Government, I really recognise that Government. And I have no wish to cover up with words things which could be misconstrued. I would prefer to adopt the very latest American proposal and postpone the settlement of the question.

Stalin: Let's put it off.

Truman: Which question shall we discuss now, that of Poland's western frontier or reparations from Italy and Austria?

[It was decided to discuss the question of reparations.]

Truman: In that case, I want to make a statement on reparations from Italy. As I said on the first day of the discussion on the question of Italy, rather, the question of easing the terms of the armistice with Italy, we and the British Government have had to give Italy about \$500 million to restore her economic situation. We expect to give Italy another \$500 million for the same purpose. The U.S. Government is prepared to make this money available for a specified purpose, of which I have already spoken, but not to enable Italy to pay reparations to Allied and other countries. If Italy has armaments plants with heavy equipment which the Soviet Union needs, we agree to have the Soviet Union take that equipment. But the money we intend to give Italy must be covered mainly by exports from Italy.

Stalin: It could be accepted that no reparations are to be taken from Austria since Austria was not an independent state. But our Soviet people find it very hard to understand the absence of any reparations from Italy, which was an independent state and whose troops reached the Volga and took part in devastating our country. Austria did not have any armed forces of her own, reparations from her may be waived. Italy had her own armed forces and she must pay reparations.

Truman: If there are objects for reparations in Italy, I absolutely agree to hand them over to the Soviet Union. But we are not prepared and do not agree to give money to Italy for her to use to pay reparations to Allied and other countries.

Stalin: I see the President's point, but I want the President to see mine as well. What gives the Soviet people the moral right to speak of reparations? It is the fact that a sizeable part of the Soviet Union's territory was occupied by the enemy forces. For three and a half years the Soviet people were under the heel of the invader. But for the occupation, perhaps the Russians would not have the moral right to speak of reparations. I say perhaps.

Truman: I fully sympathise with you.

Stalin: The President says that Italy may have equipment which the Russians need and that this equipment might go to meet the reparations: Good, I do not want to ask a great deal, but I should like to set a rough figure for these reparations. Italy is a big country. What amount could be got from Italy, what would be the value of these reparations? If the President is not prepared to answer this question, I am willing to wait, but some figure for reparations must be established.

Truman: I cannot answer that question just now.

Bevin: In establishing the amount of reparations I propose that what America and Great Britain are now giving Italy should not be taken into account; what should be taken into account is what Italy has at the present time.

Stalin: Of course, I have no intention of ignoring the interests of America or Britain.

Attlee: I want to say that I fully agree with what the President has said. At the same time, I have complete sympathy with the Russian people for what they have suffered. But we have also suffered a great deal from the attack by Italy. We also have devastated lands, and the feelings of the British people can be easily imagined if Italy had to pay reparations from the money actually made available to her by America and Great Britain. Of course, if Italy has any equipment which could be withdrawn, that is another matter, but our people will never agree to have reparations paid from the money given by us and America.

Stalin: We agree to take the equipment. *Attlee:* Military equipment.

Stalin: Military equipment.

Attlee: These are to be lump withdrawals of military equipment and not reparations withdrawals from current production?

Stalin: These are to be lump withdrawals.

Bevin: I want to ask: is it a question of military equipment for the manufacture of military items?

Stalin: No, why? It is a question of equipment at war plants which will be used to make peace-time goods; we are withdrawing the same kind of equipment from Germany.

Attlee: What I had in mind was equipment that cannot be used for civilian production.

Stalin: Every kind of equipment can be used for civilian production. We are now switching our war plants to civilian production. There is no military equipment that cannot be used to make civilian goods. For example, our tank plants have started to make cars.

Bevin: It will be very hard to determine what you will take.

Stalin: Of course, we cannot now specify the equipment. We only want a decision adopted here in principle, and then we shall formulate our demands.

Truman: As I understand it you want it agreed in principle here that Italy must pay reparations?

Stalin: Yes, that is correct. It is necessary to determine the amount of reparations, and I am willing to receive a small amount.

Truman: I don't think there are great differences of principle between us on this question. The only thing I want is that this should not affect the advances we have given to Italy.

Stalin: I do not have these advances in mind.

Bevin: The following question arises: what is to be taken in the first place? The primary claims in respect of Italy are those of Great Britain and the United States, which have granted her a loan; reparations are secondary.

Stalin: We cannot encourage Italy and other aggressors in letting them emerge from the war scot free, without paying for at least a part of what they have destroyed. To waive this is to pay them a bonus for the war.

Truman: I absolutely agree with you.

Bevin: I can't hear, it's that plane. [Stalin's statement is repeated to Bevin.]

Truman: I agree with the Generalissimo's statement that the aggressor must not receive a bonus, but must suffer punishment.

Stalin: The British were especially hard hit by Italy.

Attlee: We are not forgetting it.

Truman: Shall we fix the time for our sitting tomorrow? Let's say five, as usual.

Stalin: All right.

Truman: Perhaps we could start our work at four? With everyone's consent, we shall start our sitting tomorrow at four o'clock.

Eleventh Sitting. July 31, 1945

Truman: Mr. Bevin will report on yesterday's meeting of the Foreign Ministers.

Bevin: I propose that no special report be made, because almost all the items on yesterday's agenda of the Foreign Ministers have been included on today's agenda of the Big Three sitting.

[Bevin's proposal is adopted.]

Truman: The first item on our agenda is the U.S. proposals on German reparations, on Poland's western frontier, and on admission to the United Nations Organisation. Mr. Byrnes will now report on these proposals.

Byrnes: Our proposals on reparations were tabled as part of the general proposals relating to three outstanding questions. These questions are: the question of reparations, the question of Poland's western frontier, and the question of admission to the United Nations Organisation. These three questions are interconnected. The U.S. delegation said at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers that it is prepared to make concessions on Poland's western border and admission to the United Nations Organisation, provided agreement is reached on all three questions.

Stalin: They are not connected with each other. They are different questions.

Byrnes: That is true, the questions are different, but they have been before us for a fortnight and we have failed to reach any agreement on them. The U.S. delegation has tabled its proposals on all three questions in the hope of reaching agreement. But we declare here once again that we shall not make any concession in respect of the Polish border, unless agreement is reached on the other two questions.

Our proposals on reparations, which were discussed at yesterday's meeting of the Ministers, provided that 25 per cent of the capital equipment of the Ruhr area which is not required for the maintenance of a peace-time economy would be handed over to the Soviet Union in return for food, coal, zinc, potassium, oil products, timber, etc., from the Soviet zone. In addition, we proposed that 15 per cent of such capital equipment which is considered unnecessary for the maintenance of a peace-time economy should be handed over from the Ruhr to the Soviet Union without any payment or exchange.

During yesterday's discussion, the British delegation declared that it could not agree to have all this handed over from the Ruhr area only, but it could agree to the transfer of equipment to the Soviet Union from all the Western zones. We agreed that the only difference between the British and American proposals consisted in the percentage, and that if the percentage is applied to all three Western zones of occupation, it should be halved as compared with that established for the Ruhr area, namely, 12.5 per cent instead of 25, and 7.5 per cent instead of 15.

The Soviet delegation did not agree with this proposal, but the American and British delegations believed that this would be simpler in administrative terms. We also believed that withdrawals from all three Western zones would be to the greater advantage of the Soviet Union.

Stalin: We also consider it correct that withdrawals should be made not only from the Ruhr, but from all Western zones.

Byrnes: This will give you a wide choice of equipment, since it could come from the American, British and French zones.

There was a proposal at the Foreign Ministers' meeting that the question be solved who is to decide which equipment is not required for the maintenance a peace-time economy and is available for reparations. The Soviet delegation believed that it should be precisely specified who is to determine the quantity and nature of the industrial equipment not required for a peace-time economy and available for reparations. I proposed that the relevant decision should be made by the Control Council on

directions from the Allied Reparations Commission and should be subject to the final approval of the Commander-in-Chief of the zone from which the equipment is to be withdrawn. I proposed that the decision should be taken by the Control Council, because all the four Powers are represented on the Control Council and because it is an administrative organ vested with executive functions, while the Reparations Commission is an organ which elaborates general policy on reparations.

I repeat here the proposal I made yesterday, namely, that the withdrawal of capital equipment should be completed within two years, and that deliveries to the Soviet Union in exchange for deliveries from its zone of occupation should continue for five years. I also proposed that the reparations claims of other countries should be met from the Western zones of occupation.

The two other questions of which I spoke, and which in our proposals are treated as one, are the question of Poland's western border and the question of admission to the United Nations Organisation. We agree to the settlement of these questions provided agreement is reached on the main question, that of reparations.

Under our proposal on Poland's western frontier, the Polish Government is given the right to establish a provisional administration on the whole territory the Poles have demanded.

As for the question of admission to the United Nations Organisation, three days ago we withdrew our proposals. However we now make another proposal on the question whose wording, we hope, should satisfy the Soviet Union.

The wording of the proposal we discussed four days ago was: "The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary." The British delegation declared that that was unacceptable to it, since the British Government could not agree to establish full diplomatic relations with countries with which it was in a state of war. The head of the Soviet Government then asked whether the British Government was prepared to accord full or partial recognition to the Governments of these countries. That is why I now table a proposal with the following wording: "The three Governments express the desire to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the question of establishing diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with these countries."

I hope that our Soviet and British friends are prepared to accept our proposal in this wording.

Stalin: I have no objection in principle to this wording.

Byrnes: We also proposed to add another clause, to the effect that the three Governments express the desire that, in view of the change of conditions as a result of the ending of the war in Europe, members of the Allied press should enjoy complete freedom in reporting to the world the events in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland. This is almost the same wording which we agreed upon when discussing Poland.

Stalin: This can be accepted, but there should be a change in the wording to say, instead of "The three Governments express the desire", "The three Governments do not doubt that ...", etc.

Byrnes: As regards the United States, this is acceptable to us. I think we should now adopt the document as it is.

Thus, we have tabled three proposals, and I very much hope that all three will be adopted here.

Stalin: We have proposals on reparations.

(The following proposals of the Soviet delegation on reparations from Germany are then read out:

"1. Reparations shall be levied by each Government in its own zone of occupation. They shall have two forms: lump withdrawals from the national property of Germany (equipment, materials), which shall be made during two years after surrender, and annual commodity deliveries from current production, which are to be made during 10 years after surrender.

“2. The reparations are designed to promote the earliest economic rehabilitation of the countries which have suffered from the German occupation, with an eye to the need for the utmost reduction of Germany’s military potential.

“3. Over and above the reparations levied in its own zone, the U.S.S.R. is to receive additionally from the Western zones:

“a) 15 per cent of the basic industrial equipment, in complete sets and good repair – primarily in the field of metallurgy, chemistry and machine-building – which, as specified by the Control Council in Germany on a report of the Reparations Commission, is subject to withdrawal in the Western zones by way of reparations; this equipment shall be handed over to the Soviet Union in exchange for an equivalent quantity of foodstuffs, coal, potassium, timber, ceramic goods and oil products in the course of five years;

“b) 10 per cent of the basic industrial equipment levied in the Western zones by way of reparations, without any payment or exchange of any kind.

“The amount of equipment and materials subject to withdrawal in the Western zones by way of reparations is to be established not later than within three months.

“4. In addition, the U.S.S.R. is to receive by way of reparations:

“a) \$500 million worth of shares in industrial and transport enterprises in the Western zones;

“b) 30 per cent of German investments abroad;

“c) 30 per cent of the German gold which the Allies have at their disposal.

“5. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle Poland’s reparations claims from its share of the reparations. The United States and Great Britain are to do the same thing in respect of France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland and Norway.”)

Stalin: Mr. Byrnes proposed here that these three questions should be bound up into a single whole. I understand his standpoint: he proposes the tactics which he considers expedient. It is the right of each delegation to make such proposals, but the Soviet delegation will nevertheless vote separately on each of these questions.

The Russian delegation has put forward its proposals. The question of reparations from Germany is the chief one causing disputes and differences. Our considerations have been set forth here. You may have noticed that the Russian delegation took the standpoint of the American delegation, for it gave up the idea of stating a definite figure and quantity, and went over to percentages.

Digressing somewhat from the main subject, I should like to speak of the withdrawals which the British made from the Russian zone before its occupation by Soviet troops. What I mean is the removal of goods and equipment. In addition, there is a note from the Soviet military command to the effect that the American authorities drove away 11,000 railway cars from the same territory. I do not know what is to be done with this property. Is this property to be returned to the Russians or compensated for in some other manner? In any case, the Americans and the British are taking equipment not only from their zones, but have also taken some from the Russian zone, whereas we did not drive away a single car and did not take any equipment from the plants in your zones. The Americans had promised not to remove anything, but they did.

Now on the substance of the matter. I think we have a possibility of reaching agreement on the question of reparations from Germany. What are the main propositions of the American plan? The first is that each makes withdrawals from his own zone of occupation. We agree to this. Second: equipment is to be removed not only from the Ruhr, but from all the Western zones. We have accepted this second proposal. Third proposal: a part of the reparations taken from the Western zones is to be covered with a corresponding equivalent from the Russian zone over a period of 5 years. Then there is the fourth proposition: it is that the Control Council is to determine the volume of the withdrawals from the Western zones. That is also acceptable.

What in that case are the differences? We are interested in the question of the time limit, the question of the final calculation of the volume of reparations. Nothing is said of this in the American draft. We should like to establish a period of three months.

Byrnes: The question of time should be agreed.

Stalin: It is a question of the time limit for determining the volume of reparations. Some period has to be proposed. We propose three months. Is that enough?

Truman: I think it is.

Attlee: That is a short period. I must think a little.

Stalin: It's worth thinking about, of course. It may be three, four or five months, but some time limit should be laid down.

Attlee: I propose six months.

Stalin: Right, I agree.

Then there is the percentage of withdrawal. Here again agreement can be reached. One per cent either way does not make much difference. I hope that in this matter of establishing the withdrawal percentage the British and the Americans will meet us half way. We have lost a great deal of equipment in this war, a terrible quantity of it. At least one-twentieth part of it should be restored. And I expect Mr. Attlee to support our proposal.

Attlee: No, I cannot do that.

Stalin: Think a little and support us.

Attlee: I thought of this all day yesterday. [Laughter.]

Stalin: What have we got then? I think we must try to reach a general agreement on this question.

Bevin: The Soviet document does not contain the words used yesterday, namely, "equipment not needed for peacetime economy.

[The Soviet delegation once again reads out the relevant section, of its proposals on the question of reparations.]

Bevin: I propose that you accept this phrase of mine, which expresses my idea quite precisely.

Stalin: What is the gist of it?

Bevin: The Control Council is first of all to determine the quantity of equipment which is to remain for the maintenance of Germany's peace-time economy.

Stalin: That is the same thing.

Bevin: In that case, you will perhaps accept my phrase?

Stalin: But what's the difference?

Bevin: There is a great deal of difference. I don't want there to be any misunderstandings later. Your text may be interpreted in a different way, namely, as 15 per cent of all equipment.

Stalin: No, we have in mind 15 per cent of the equipment subject to withdrawal, that is, equipment which is not required for the maintenance of Germany's peace-time economy.

Bevin: I would propose that this should be inserted in the document, so that everything would be quite clear.

Stalin: But what is not clear? The Control Council is to determine which equipment is required for the peace-time economy of Germany. What is left is to constitute the total volume for reparations.

Byrnes: Our wording expresses the common view of the British and American delegations.

Stalin: What do you propose?

Byrnes: The quantity of industrial equipment which is recognised as unnecessary for peace-time economy and is therefore available for reparations is determined by the Control Council on the directives of the Allied Reparations Commission and is subject to final approval by the Commander of the zone from which the equipment is removed.

Stalin: I do not object.

Byrnes: Consequently, the only question which remains open is that of percentage. You want 15 per cent and 10 per cent, instead of 12.5 and 7.5 per cent?

Stalin: Yes.

Byrnes: But in addition you want to receive by way of reparations \$500 million worth of shares of industrial enterprises in the Western zones, 30 per cent of Germany's investments abroad, and 30 per cent of the German gold which is at the disposal of the Allies. About the gold, as far as I am aware of the opinion of our Staff, I can say that there is some gold which once belonged to other countries. It would be unfair to reject those countries' claims.

Stalin: This applies to German gold.

Byrnes: According to our information, there is no German gold, because all this gold was plundered by the Germans during the war. We must return this gold to the countries to which it once belonged. If the Soviet delegation insists that the Soviet Union should receive in addition to these percentages \$500 million worth of shares of industrial enterprises, as the Soviet proposals state, 30 per cent of Germany's investments abroad, and 30 per cent of the gold, this question should be discussed here.

Stalin: We should like to have this if it is possible.

Byrnes: What do you have in mind when you speak of Germany's investments abroad?

Stalin: The investments the Germans had in other countries, including America.

Byrnes: As for the investments in America, we have blocked them, and legislation is required to lay claim to these funds. Congress appears to have done that already. I have no doubt that there will be all sorts of claims to these funds also from refugees who are in America. This question calls for a legal settlement.

Besides, I am sure that if, for instance, there is a certain quantity of German investments in the countries of Latin America, the Governments of those countries will have claims to these resources.

Stalin: That may be.

Bevin: We agreed yesterday that France should be included in the Reparations Commission so as to take part in deciding on the equipment subject to withdrawal by way of reparations. I should like to have France included in this commission.

Stalin: I do not object.

Bevin: Concerning the percentages. I thought that at yesterday's sitting of the Foreign Ministers we met you half way by agreeing to 12.5 per cent.

In addition, I should like to know: will not the reparations question hinder the ordinary exchange of goods over the whole of Germany, considering that we have agreed on the economic principles and normal exchange of goods in Germany?

Stalin: Well, we shall discuss that question when we come to the economic principles.

Bevin: The settlement of the gold question presents great difficulties. As for Germany's assets abroad, would you agree to confine yourself to the assets in neutral territories?

Stalin: I think that could be accepted.

Byrnes: We cannot agree to any addition to our main proposal. I have in mind Clause 4 of the Soviet proposals.

Stalin: In that case the percentage will have to be raised. On Clause 3 let us raise the percentage, considering that you have removed much equipment from our zone. [Laughter.] A vast amount of equipment was destroyed in our country, and at least a small part of that equipment should be covered.

Truman: I should like to make the following remark concerning withdrawals from your zone. We learned of this three days ago, when we got a list of this equipment. I wrote to General Eisenhower asking him to look into the matter and report. If such a withdrawal did take place, I assure you that it was not made on the orders of the U.S. Government. I assure you that we shall find possibilities for compensation.

Stalin: I propose that we return to the discussion of the question of percentages.

Truman: If you are prepared to withdraw Clause 4 I am prepared to accept 15 per cent and 10 per cent.

Stalin: Good, I withdraw it.

Bevin: We shall find it hard to satisfy France, Belgium and Holland from the quantity of equipment left. I should propose 12.5 per cent and 10 per cent. In addition, we ask the withdrawal of Clause 4.

Stalin: We have already agreed to that. The United States has shown understanding of our position, how is it that you do not wish to do the same?

Bevin: We are responsible for the zone from which the greatest quantity of equipment is to be withdrawn, and in addition there will be large claims on the part of France, Belgium and Holland.

Byrnes: The final phrase in our proposals says that the reparations claims from other countries entitled to reparations are to be covered from the Western zones of occupation. I request that our wording concerning the claims of other countries be discussed.

Stalin: All right, I agree not to name the countries and state this in general terms.

Byrnes: I think that would be more expedient, for it has already been mentioned that Greece is not in the list. We also think that it is expedient to state this in general terms.

Stalin: Good.

Bevin: It has occurred to me that if you receive the percentages you demand, then, with what you receive from your own zone, you will have more than 50 per cent of all German reparations.

Stalin: Much less. What is more, we give an equivalent for the 15 per cent, which is actually an exchange of reparations and not fresh reparations. We receive only 10 per cent reparations from the Western zones. Those are the reparations proper; as for the 15 per cent, they are given for a definite equivalent. Our demands are minimal. We receive from you 10 per cent, and on the rest we exchange and pay an equivalent. You have the 90 per cent. If we receive 7.5 per cent instead of 10 per cent reparations, that will be unfair. I agree that it should be 15 per cent and 10 per cent. That is fairer. The Americans agree. What about you, Mr. Bevin?

Bevin: All right, I agree.

Truman: We also agree.

Byrnes: Thus, our draft proposals with the new percentages, plus the establishment of a time limit for determining the amount of reparations, are accepted.

Stalin: We seem to have exhausted all our differences on the question of reparations. Can we refer this draft for final editing?

[The proposal is accepted, and a commission is set up to edit the adopted decision.]

Truman: The next question is on Poland's western frontier.

Byrnes: We handed in our proposals yesterday, and they were discussed yesterday. I do not think we should read them out again. If there are any remarks or amendments, I am ready to hear them, but I hope that our Soviet and British friends will accept our proposals.

Bevin: As for the position of the British Government, I have instructions to keep to the frontier along the Eastern Neisse. That is why I should like to know precisely the substance of the new proposal. Does the whole of this zone pass into the hands of the Polish Government and will the Soviet troops all be pulled out of there, as was the case in other zones, where the troops of one side fell back and the other side took over the zone?

I met the Poles and asked them about their intentions concerning the fulfilment of the declaration mentioned in the U.S. document. I asked them about their intentions concerning the staging of free and unhampered elections by secret ballot. They assured me that they intend to carry out these elections as soon as possible and expect to do so in early 1946. But this will, of course, depend on some conditions enabling them to carry out these elections.

They also agreed on freedom of the press in Poland and on access of foreign correspondents to Poland and the possibility of sending their dispatches without censorship. They gave me assurances concerning freedom of religion all over the country.

But there is still one other very important question, namely, that of the repatriation not only of civilians, but of the troops which are under Allied command in various countries. I asked the Poles to make a statement on this question so that we could be sure that these men, upon their return to their homeland, would be placed in the same conditions as all the other citizens.

The next question, which especially concerns the Soviet Government and the British Government, and which the Polish Government is now unable to settle, is the question of a military air line between Warsaw, Berlin and London, to enable the British Government to maintain constant contact with its ambassador in Warsaw. I should like to have an agreement on this point at once. The document tabled by the United States says that this zone is to be under the administration of the Polish Government and will not constitute a part of the Soviet zone. As Mr. Byrnes put it, this zone will be under the responsibility of the Poles. However, I take it that although we have placed this zone under a Polish administration, it remains under the military control of the Allies.

Byrnes: We have found ourselves in a situation in which Poland, with the consent of the Soviet Union, is actually administering the territory. In view of this, the three Powers have agreed to leave the administration of this territory in Poland's hands, to obviate any further disputes concerning the status of this territory. There is, however, no need for Poland to have a representative on the Control Council.

Bevin: I do not insist. If we all understand what it is all about, I do not object. I shall be asked various questions upon my return, and I should like to know what is to happen in this zone. Will the Poles take over the whole zone, and the Soviet troops pull out?

Stalin: The Soviet troops would pull out if this territory did not constitute the Red Army's communications, along which the Red Army's units are kept supplied. There are two roads there: one running to Berlin from the north, and the other, south of Krakow. These two lines are the Soviet Army's supply lines. It is the same thing that you have in Belgium, France and Holland.

Bevin: Is the number of troops limited to these objectives?

Stalin: Yes, indeed. We have already pulled out from over there four-fifths of the troops that were there during the war against Germany. We also intend to reduce the number still there. As for the zone that is going to Poland, according to the proposal that has been made, Poland is actually administering that zone already and has its own administration there; there is no Russian administration there.

Bevin: Could you now help us with this military air line? We tried to reach agreement on this matter with the Polish Government but it cannot agree at present.

Stalin: Why can't it?

Bevin: I take it that this question concerns the Soviet military command because we have to fly over a part of the Russian zone.

Stalin: But you are already flying across the Russian zone to Berlin.

Bevin: Can you agree to us flying to Warsaw?

Stalin: We shall agree to it if an arrangement can be made for us to fly to London over France. [Laughter.] Besides, agreement must be reached with the Poles. Here is the way I see it: an air line is to be established between Berlin and Warsaw, and British or Polish planes will fly it, according to a treaty between Britain and Poland. As regards an air line to Moscow along this route, Russian flyers will take over from the point where the border with Russia begins. As regards the satisfaction of the needs of the Russians for flights to Paris and London, British or French planes will apparently fly there. We shall then have a London-Paris-Moscow line. That is how I see it.

Bevin: Of course, this whole question of air communications is much too big to be solved here now, but we shall always be prepared to discuss this question concerning an air line between London and Moscow. What I ask you now is to help us establish a line between London and Warsaw, which we need for our convenience.

Stalin: I understand. I shall do all I can.

Bevin: Thank you.

Truman: Have we finished with the Polish question?

Stalin: Is the British delegation in agreement?

Bevin: It is.

Stalin: As I see it, it is up to the Poles now. All right, we have finished with that matter.

Bevin: We must inform the French about the change to Poland's frontier.

Stalin: Yes, of course.

Byrnes: Our next proposal concerns the entry of Italy and the other satellites into the United Nations Organisation. We have already handed in our document on this question.

Bevin: The British delegation agrees.

Stalin: Our amendment has already been stated. It concerns the new Clause 4, or rather the phrase in it which starts with the words: "The three Governments express the desire that", etc. We propose to say: "The three Governments do not doubt that", etc.

[Truman and Attlee agree to this amendment of the wording.]

Truman: A decision on economic principles in respect of Germany was deferred until the solution of the reparations question. I think there will now be no difficulty in solving this question.

Byrnes: I have two proposals concerning the document on economic principles which I wish to announce. The first concerns Clause 13, which deals with general policy in respect of the monetary and banking system, centralised taxes and tariffs. (He reads out a drafting amendment which is accepted.) In addition, I propose to add to this clause another sub-clause "g" concerning transport and communications. This should also be centralised.

Stalin: This calls for some kind of centralised German administrative machinery. It is hard to conduct overall policy in respect of Germany without some kind of centralised German machinery.

Byrnes: That is correct.

The second proposal concerns sub-clause "d" of Clause 14. I propose an amendment of the last phrase to read as follows: "Except where determined by the occupying power concerned to be required for necessary imports, no grant or credit to Germany or Germans by any foreign persons or governments can be permitted."

Bevin: Perhaps it is better to leave out this phrase altogether?

Byrnes: I agree. I have another remark. As a result of our agreement on reparations, we consider that Clause 18 is superfluous.

[Stalin and Bevin express their agreement to drop the clause.]

Bevin: There is also the question of priority payments for imports, something we spoke about at yesterday's sitting of the Foreign Ministers. The British delegation yesterday proposed the inclusion of the following phrase in the economic principles: "Payment for approved imports into Germany shall be a first charge against the proceeds of exports out of current production and out of stocks of goods."

The Soviet delegation proposed the addition of the following phrase: "As regards the rest, priorities should be given to reparations, as compared with the satisfaction of other economic needs." The British and American delegations were unable to accept this Soviet proposal. The British delegation requests that its proposal be adopted.

Stalin: We think this question no longer arises.

Truman: That is how I understand it.

Bevin: I think this contradicts the treatment of Germany as a single whole in respect of export, import, etc. This will divide Germany into three zones, and we shall not be able to deal with Germany as a single entity in matters such as the levying of taxes, etc.

Stalin: This requires a centralised German administrative machinery through which the German population could be influenced. This question will be discussed in the section “Political Principles in Respect of Germany”.

Bevin: We agreed in principle to the establishment of such a centralised machinery, but tabled some amendments. Perhaps we could leave this question and go on to the political principles, and we shall then see what can be done on this question as well.

[Stalin and Truman express their agreement. The Soviet delegation recalls that in connection with the discussion of the question of economic principles, it tabled a proposal on the question of the Ruhr area which says that the Ruhr industrial area should be regarded as a part of Germany and that four Power control should be established in respect of the Ruhr area, for which purpose an appropriate Control Council should be set up consisting of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union.]

Bevin: As I said yesterday, I am unable to discuss this question in the absence of the French. This is a major question of principle, and the French are closely concerned with it.

Stalin: Perhaps we could put off the question of control over the Ruhr area, but the idea that the Ruhr area remains a part of Germany should be reflected in our document.

Truman: It is undoubtedly a part of Germany.

Stalin: Perhaps we could say this in one of our documents?

Bevin: Why is the question being raised?

Stalin: It is being raised because at one of the conferences – at the Tehran Conference – there was a question of separating the Ruhr from the rest of Germany and making it a separate area under the control of the Council. A few months after the Tehran Conference, when Mr. Churchill came to Moscow, this question was also discussed during an exchange of views between the Russians and the British, and once again the idea was expressed that it would be a good thing to set the Ruhr apart as a separate area. The idea of separating the Ruhr area from Germany arose from the thesis of the dismemberment of Germany. Since then, there has been a change of view on this question. Germany remains a united state. The Soviet delegation asks: do you agree to have the Ruhr area remain a part of Germany? That is why the question was raised here.

Truman: My opinion is that the Ruhr area is a part of Germany and remains a part of Germany.

Stalin: It would be a good thing to say this in one of our documents. Does the British delegation agree that the Ruhr remains a part of Germany?

Bevin: I cannot agree because I do not now have a picture of the foregoing discussion of this question. I know that the internationalisation of the Ruhr had been suggested in order to reduce Germany’s war potential. This idea was discussed. I agree that pending a solution of this question the Ruhr remains under the administration of the Control Council. But I should like to have an opportunity to talk this over with my Government and propose to refer the question to the Council of Foreign Ministers so as to have time to study it thoroughly.

[Stalin and Truman agree to Bevin’s proposal.]

Truman: The next question is that of political principles.

Bevin: The Soviet delegation has tabled a draft on the question of organising a centralised German administration, which is to help the Control Council. We propose the adoption of our draft on this question which is shorter. We propose that no central German Government should be set up for the time being.

I move the adoption of our short draft instead of the draft of the Soviet delegation.

Stalin: It can be adopted. Truman: I have no objections.

Bevin: As for Clause 19 of the economic principles, I suggest that we refer this clause to the Economic Commission. Let it discuss this question now, while we are here.

Stalin: Let it discuss it.

Truman: The next question is that of resettling the German population from Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Byrnes: The report of the commission dealing with this question was adopted in toto, with the exception of the last phrase, which says: "The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsion, pending an examination by the Governments concerned" of this question. I think this last point is very necessary, then the decision will be effective.

Stalin: But I am afraid such a decision will not yield serious results. The point is not that the Germans are expelled from these countries. Things are not quite so simple. They are placed in a position where it is better for them to level these areas. The Czechs and the Poles can say that there is no formal ban on Germans living there, but in fact the Germans are placed in such a position that it is impossible for them to live there. I am afraid that if we adopt such a decision it will not yield any serious results.

Byrnes: This clause says that these Governments will be requested to temporarily suspend the eviction of the German population pending the discussion of the question in the Control Council. If these Governments are not expelling the Germans and are not making them leave Poland or Czechoslovakia, then the document will not, of course, yield any results. But if they are doing so, we can request them to stop this for a time. According to our information they are making the Germans leave Poland and Czechoslovakia. The resettlement of Germans in other countries increases our burden. We want these Governments to collaborate with us in this case.

Stalin: The Poles and the Czechs will tell you that they have no orders to evict the Germans. If you insist I can agree to this proposal, but I am afraid it will yield no great result.

Truman: If you agree, we shall be thankful. This proposal may not alter the existing situation, but it will give us an opportunity of addressing these Governments.

Stalin: Good, I do not object.

Bevin: We should like to inform the French of this.

[*Stalin* and Truman agree.]

Stalin: We should like to finish discussing the question of the German Navy.

Truman: This question is not yet ready today.

Stalin: Let us agree to prepare it for tomorrow.

Truman: All right, I agree. I was going to leave tomorrow, but I could stay.

Stalin: In principle a decision on the German Navy was adopted, but it was not finally drawn up. This question has been decided by the three Heads of Government, and the decision should be drawn up.

Truman: The commission could report tomorrow morning.

Stalin: Good. Perhaps we should refer the matter to the Ministers, since the question has been decided in principle.

Bevin: Perhaps an agreement will be reached.

Byrnes: According to our information, the commission hopes to reach agreement today. Their sitting is fixed for tonight.

Stalin: It was decided in principle that the Soviet Union is to receive one-third of the Navy, with the exception of submarines, most of which are to be sunk, and one-third of the merchant fleet. I ask you not to postpone the question, but to settle it tomorrow.

[Truman and Attlee express agreement.]

Truman: The delegation of the United States has tabled a document concerning a review of the procedure in the Allied Control Commissions in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary.

Byrnes: Our proposals concerning the fulfilment of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe were tabled and examined. We were unable to reach agreement on some sections of the proposal. But agreement was reached on two clauses relating to a review of the procedure in the Allied Control Commissions in the three countries. Clause 1 says:

“The three Governments have taken note that the Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased. These proposals include provisions for regular and frequent meetings of the three representatives, improved facilities for British and American representatives, and prior joint consideration of directives.”

Clause 2 reads:

“The three Governments agree that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries will now be undertaken, using as a basis of discussion the above-mentioned proposals, and taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries.”

We ask you to examine these clauses and hand you a document entitled “Revised Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary”, dated July 31, 1945.

Stalin: This question was not on the agenda. Perhaps we shall not object once we have examined the question.

Byrnes: It could be examined tomorrow.

Stalin: Good, let us examine it tomorrow.

Truman: The next question is that of Yugoslavia. There are the British proposals.

Stalin: We have just circulated a draft on the Greek question. As for Yugoslavia, we handed in a draft on Trieste and Istria yesterday.

Bevin: I think we have presented a rather reasonable proposal on Yugoslavia. The Soviet delegation has tabled two other proposals. I propose that we refrain from examining all three proposals.

Stalin: Good.

Truman: The last question is that of war criminals. [The Soviet delegation declared that it was prepared to adopt the British delegation’s draft as a basis on this question with one small amendment. It proposed that in the last phrase of the draft, which said that the three Governments considered it a matter of great importance to have the trial of the chief criminals begin as soon as possible, there should be an addition after the words “chief criminals” of the words: “such as Goring, Hess, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Keitel, and others”.]

Attlee: Our difficulty in selecting the war criminals lies in the fact that we have submitted the draft agreement to the prosecutor and he may include a number of other persons. We believe therefore that it would be best to confine ourselves to our earlier proposal, without naming the chief war criminals.

Stalin: Our amendment does not propose that only these men alone should be put on trial, but we propose that men like Ribbentrop and others should be tried. It is no longer possible to avoid mentioning certain persons who are known as the chief war criminals. A great deal has been said of the war criminals, and the peoples expect us to give some names. Our silence on this question harms our prestige. I assure you that is so. That is why we shall gain politically and satisfy European public opinion if we name some persons. I do not think the prosecutor will take offence if we name them as examples. The prosecutor can say that some persons have been wrongly named. But there is no reason for the prosecutor to take offence. We shall only gain politically if we name some of these men.

Byrnes: When we discussed this question yesterday, I considered it unsuitable to name definite men or to try to determine their guilt here. Each country has its own "favourites" among the Nazi criminals, and if we fail to include these criminals in our list, it will be hard for us to explain why.

Stalin: But the proposal says: "such as ... and others". This does not limit the number, but makes for clarity.

Byrnes: This gives an advantage to those you name. [Laughter.]

Attlee: I don't believe a listing of names will enhance our document. For instance, I believe that Hitler is alive, but he is not on our list.

Stalin: But he is not in our hands.

Attlee: But you give the names of the chief criminals as examples.

Stalin: I agree to include Hitler [General laughter], even if he is not in our hands. I am making a concession. [General laughter.]

Attlee: I think the world is aware who the chief criminals are.

Stalin: But, you see, our silence on this matter is interpreted as an intention on our part to save the chief war criminals, that we are taking it out on the small criminals and allowing the big ones to escape.

Byrnes: Today, I had a telephone conversation with Justice Jackson, the Chairman of our Supreme Court. He is our representative on the War Criminals Commission which is meeting in London. He expressed the hope that today or possibly tomorrow there would be agreement on an International Tribunal. Justice Jackson is going to call me tomorrow morning to inform me on the question of the Tribunal. The report on the establishment of the International Tribunal will be good news for the peoples who are expecting an early trial of the war criminals.

Stalin: That is another question.

Byrnes: But we can include in our statement that an agreement has been reached in London. That will make our statement highly effective.

Stalin: Without naming some persons, especially the odious ones, among the German war criminals, our statement will not be politically effective. I consulted Russian jurists, and they think it would be better to name some persons as a guideline.

Truman: I want to make a proposal. We are expecting news from our representative in London tomorrow morning. Why not put off this question until tomorrow?

Stalin: Good.

Truman: I am very much interested in the question of inland waterways. It would be good to discuss this question and reach some decisions in principle. We discussed the question on July 23, and it was referred to a commission which, as far as I am aware, has not met even once. I very much want some sort of definite decision worked out concerning the use of these means of communication, because freedom of movement along these routes is of great importance. I believe that a common policy on the use of these inland waterways can play an important part. It is quite possible that we may not be able to reach agreement on the details of this question, but I think that this question is so important that it should be discussed.

Attlee: I agree on the whole with the American proposals on the question.

Stalin: This question arose in connection with that of the Black Sea Straits which was before us. The question of the Black Sea Straits was inserted in the agenda by the British and was then postponed. The question of inland waterways was raised here additionally. This is a serious question, and it requires study. The question was brought up unexpectedly for us, and we do not have the relevant material to hand. This question is a new one, it needs men who know about it. Perhaps something could be done before the end of the Conference, but there is little hope for that.

Truman: I move that this question should be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, and before then all the necessary material can be collected and the question studied.

[Stalin and Attlee agree.]

Truman: May I inform the representatives of the Polish Government who are here of our decisions on Poland's western frontier?

Stalin: All right.

Truman: Who can be entrusted with this communication?

Stalin: This could be done by the Ministers or a written communication could be sent. Or the President could be asked to do this, since he heads our Conference.

Truman: Good. I want to inform you that the commission on drafting the communiqué is working well. At what time do we meet tomorrow? At 4.00?

Stalin: I think that we shall have to meet twice: let us fix the first sitting for 3.00, and the second for 8.00 p.m.

That will be the concluding sitting.

[Truman and Attlee agree.]

Source: <https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/Stalin/potsdam.htm>

Twelfth Sitting. August 1, 1945

Truman: Mr. Byrnes will report today on the sitting of the Foreign Ministers.

Byrnes: The commission dealing with the question of reparations from Germany has reported that it has failed to reach agreement on all the questions of the draft agreement on reparations. The representatives of the United States and Great Britain believed that, in exchange for the agreed percentages of capital equipment made available to the Soviet Union under Point 4 of the draft agreement, the representatives of the Soviet Union agreed to waive their claims to German assets abroad, the gold seized from the Germans, and the shares of German enterprises in the Western zones of occupation. Accordingly, the representatives of the United States and Britain believed that Germany's assets abroad should be included in Point 3 as a source of reparations for other countries besides the Soviet Union. They declared that unless this is done, the agreed percentages of industrial equipment in Point 4 are unacceptable to the representatives of the United States and Britain.

The Soviet representative held that no agreed decision had been adopted concerning the Soviet Union's waiver of claims to Germany's assets abroad, gold and shares. That is why the Soviet representative did not agree to the inclusion of German assets abroad in Point 3, and recommended that the question should be referred for solution to the Heads of Government.

The representatives of the United States and Britain declared that the draft agreement on reparations would be acceptable to them, provided the Soviet representative agreed to the above-mentioned proposals concerning Germany's assets abroad, gold and shares. The Soviet representative declared that he was unable to agree with this approach on the part of the representatives of the United States and Britain.

The question is whether or not it can be considered that the Big Three yesterday reached agreement on the question of reparations, when the Soviet representative declared that he would not insist on the Soviet Union being given 30 per cent of German gold, shares and assets abroad.

Stalin: How are we to understand your proposals that the Soviet Union makes no claim to industrial shares? Does that relate only to the Western zone?

Truman: I think that when the Foreign Ministers spoke of the Western zone, they had in mind the zones of the United States, Great Britain and France.

Stalin: Can we not agree on the following: the Soviet delegation waives its claim to gold; as for shares of German enterprises in the Western zone, we also waive our claim to them, and will regard the whole of Western Germany as falling within your sphere, and Eastern Germany, within ours.

Truman: We shall have to discuss this proposal.

Stalin: As to the German investments, I should put the question this way: as to the German investments in Eastern Europe, they remain with us, and the rest, with you.

Truman: Does this apply only to German investments in Europe or in other countries as well?

Stalin: Let me put it more specifically: the German investments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, go to us, and all the rest, to you.

Bevin: The German investments in other countries go to us?

Stalin: In all the other countries, in South America, in Canada, etc., all this is yours.

Bevin: Consequently, all German assets in other countries lying west of the zones of occupation in Germany will belong to the United States, Great Britain and the other countries? Does this also apply to Greece?

Stalin: Yes.

Byrnes: How does this apply to the question of the shares of German enterprises?

Stalin: In our zone they will be ours, and in your zone, yours. There are the Western and the Eastern zones.

Byrnes: We took your proposal of yesterday to mean that you will have no claims to shares in the western zone.

Stalin: We shall not.

Byrnes: Do you also withdraw your second proposal, on investments abroad?

Stalin: There the matter is somewhat different.

Bevin: Yesterday, when we were dealing with the question of reparations, I understood that the Soviet delegation waived its claims to Germany's investments abroad.

Stalin: I believed that the investments in the Eastern zone were ours. We had in mind the Western zone, when we spoke of waiving claims to investments. We waive claims to investments in Western Europe and in all other countries. It is known that there were many more German investments in Western Europe and in America than in the East. We had hoped to receive 30 per cent of these investments, but subsequently waived this. But you too must waive your claims to Eastern Europe.

Bevin: I must say that when I agreed to the Generalissimo's proposal I took the proposal to mean that the Soviet delegation waived claims to any German investments abroad at all.

Stalin: But not in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

Byrnes: That is understandable. I should like to specify the matter of the shares of industrial or transport enterprises in Germany. Say, the head office of such an enterprise is in Berlin, but the enterprise itself and its property is in the Western zone or in the United States, will you make any claim in respect of such enterprises?

Stalin: If the enterprise is in the West, we shall make no claim to it. The head office may be in Berlin, that is immaterial, the point is where the enterprise itself is located.

Byrnes: If an enterprise is not in Eastern Europe but in Western Europe or in other parts of the world, that enterprise remains ours?

Stalin: In the United States, in Norway, in Switzerland, in Sweden, in Argentina [General laughter], etc. – all that is yours.

Bevin: I should like to ask the Generalissimo whether he is prepared to waive all claims to German assets abroad outside the zone of Russian occupation troops?

Stalin: Yes, I am.

Byrnes: What about the gold?

Stalin: We have already withdrawn our claims to the gold.

Byrnes: There are German assets in other countries. How is the Soviet proposal to be understood in this context?

Stalin: We keep only what is in the Eastern zone.

Byrnes: I believe it to be very important for us to understand each other. Mr. Bevin's question is whether the Russian claims are confined to the assets in the zone occupied by the Russian army? I should like you to accept Mr. Bevin's standpoint.

Stalin: We agree.

Byrnes: A few minutes ago you spoke of the assets in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Now I want to clarify everything so that there should be no misunderstandings in the future. Does your proposal mean that you make no claim to the assets outside your zone of occupation? You have claims only to the assets in the Soviet zone?

Stalin: Yes. Czechoslovakia is not included, Yugoslavia is not included. Eastern Austria will be included.

Bevin: It is clear that the assets belonging to Great Britain and the United States in that zone will not be affected.

Stalin: Of course, not. We're not fighting Great Britain or the United States. [General laughter.]

Bevin: But during the war these assets may have been seized by the Germans.

Stalin: That will have to be examined in every case.

Truman: I think that we agreed yesterday to meet the claims of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. But what happens if they do not lay claim to German assets on their territory?

Stalin: We shall make no claim to Germany's assets in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Western Austria.

Perhaps we shall expound our proposal in the protocol?

Byrnes: I think it would be better to do that in order to avoid any misunderstandings.

Stalin: Good.

Byrnes: Perhaps we should publish it?

Stalin: It's all the same, as you wish.

Byrnes: I want to call your attention to the sentence in Clause 3 of the report of the Reparations Commission which says that the reparations claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations are to be met from the Western zone and from German assets abroad. In view of the agreement we have just reached, I do not believe that there will be any differences on this wording.

Stalin: I propose that we say "and from the appropriate German assets abroad". This wording can be specified in the protocol.

Byrnes: Let us have the drafting commission put this proposal into shape.

Stalin: I have no objections.

Attlee: I have two questions which I should like to raise here: the first, that the French Government should be invited by the Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States to be a member of the Reparations Commission as of today.

Stalin: Let us also invite Poland, she has suffered heavily.

Attlee: I understood that we agreed to invite France.

Stalin: And why can't Poland be invited?

Truman: You agreed yesterday that the Soviet Union would undertake to meet Poland's reparations claims, while we, for our part, undertake to meet the reparations claims of France and other countries. I think the inclusion of France in this commission would cause some confusion.

Stalin: Does Mr. Attlee insist?

Attlee: I should like to.

Stalin: Good, I do not object.

Attlee: My second question is the following: I submitted a memorandum concerning the fact that the British and American commanders have to supply 40,000 tons of foodstuffs a month and 2,400 tons of coal a day to the British and American sectors in Berlin for 30 days, beginning from July 15. The Control Council should be immediately instructed to draw up a programme for the supply of food, coal and other types of fuel to the Greater Berlin area over the next six months. These quantities will be delivered to the Greater Berlin area by the Soviet Government in the form of advance deliveries under Point 4(a) of the reparations agreement. These are practical measures which will provide for current requirements.

Stalin: The question has not been prepared, we are not acquainted with this question, and we know nothing of the opinion of the Control Council on it. Consequently, we find it very hard to settle this question now. I think we should find out beforehand the opinion of the Control Council on how it intends to satisfy the needs of the population, and what its plans are concerning supply.

Attlee: I understood that deliveries of capital equipment from the Ruhr basin are to start now, and I think that the supply of the necessary food and fuel for the Greater Berlin area should also start now. Of course, the quantity can be fixed by the Control Council.

Stalin: Of course, there must be an agreement, but a quantity has to be specified, and that is something we cannot do now, without a report from the Control Council on its plans in this respect. I must say that the Control Council will solve this question better than we could settle it here; it takes a practical approach to solving this question.

Attlee: That is just what I am asking for. I am asking that the Control Council should draw up a programme, but in principle we should agree on that here.

Stalin: I have no information on how things stand. I can decide nothing without authentic materials. I can't take figures out of thin air. The figures must be justified.

Attlee: I'm not asking about figures, in my memorandum I ask that the Control Council should draw up this programme.

Stalin: 40,000 tons of food a month, 2,400 tons of coal a day – where do these figures come from, how are they justified?

Attlee: These figures have been agreed upon, and these quantities are already being supplied.

Stalin: I did not know that.

Bevin: The question is that there is a provisional agreement on monthly deliveries for Berlin.

Stalin: Who has agreed to this?

Bevin: A provisional agreement on deliveries was concluded in the Control Council, under which the British and American authorities undertook to supply these quantities for Berlin during a month, and this is now being done. We propose that the Control Council should draw up the necessary programme in principle, and that the Soviet authorities should start supplying the said quantities when the month expires. When the period runs out, the question arises: who is to go on supplying the food and fuel?

Stalin: We must hear the Control Council and its considerations. Then we can decide something.

Attlee: I understood you to say that you want the deliveries of capital equipment from the Ruhr basin to be started right away. We ask for the same thing in respect of your deliveries of food and fuel.

Stalin: I understand that, but I should like to know what the Control Council thinks, so that we can discuss it and adopt a decision. I think the question should be postponed.

Bevin: We want to work with each other.

Stalin: And what if we are not ready for the question, what are we to do?

Bevin: In that case it will have to be postponed.

Stalin: That is just what we are asking.

Bevin: We merely wanted to reach a mutual agreement to help each other.

Stalin: We are not prepared for this question, I have had no occasion to consult with the Control Council and find out what it thinks.

Truman: It looks as if we have exhausted all our differences on the reparations question?

Attlee: I understood the Generalissimo to say that we shall not be demanding reparations from Austria. Perhaps we should enter this in the protocol?

Stalin: It could be entered in the protocol.

Byrnes: The next question is that of economic principles in respect of Germany. The representatives of the United States and Britain propose the inclusion of a clause on German assets abroad in the document on economic principles. It will be Point 18, reading as follows: "Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany."

Stalin: Is that an amendment or a new proposal?

Byrnes: It is a recommendation to the commission on economic questions. It proposes the inclusion of this point in the document on the economic principles in respect of Germany.

Stalin: Will not an amendment to this point be necessary after adoption of the decision on reparations? We learned of this point after we had agreed on the question.

Byrnes: The Soviet representatives in the commission for economic questions declared that they have little interest in the matter and reserved their position until the question is studied. The question concerned relates to control.

Stalin: I do not object.

Truman: Thank you.

Byrnes: The commission has not had time to reach agreement on Point 19 of the draft on economic principles relating to the question of payment for imports to Germany. Besides, the Soviet representative declared that he is not yet prepared to continue discussing the question of oil deliveries to Western Europe.

Stalin: We do not object to the British formulation of Point 19.

Byrnes: I understand that the British representatives have agreed with the American representatives that if Point 19 is adopted there should be added the words proposed by the American representatives to the effect that the condition stipulated in the point will not be applicable to equipment or foodstuffs specified in Points 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the agreement on German reparations. We believe that the addendum flows from the agreement on reparations we reached yesterday.

Stalin: Good.

Attlee: I agree.

Byrnes: Thus, we have finished with all the differences over the draft on economic principles.

The next question is that of war criminals.

Bevin: Please excuse me, but I think we should inform the French of these economic principles.

Stalin: If you wish.

Byrnes: The next question is that of war criminals. The only question remaining open here is whether the names of some of the major German war criminals should be mentioned. The representatives of the United States and Britain, at today's meeting of the Foreign Ministers, deemed it right not to mention these names, but to leave that to the prosecutor. They also agreed that the British text should be adopted. The Soviet representatives declared that they agree with the British draft, provided some names are added.

Stalin: I think we need names. This must be done for public opinion. The people must know this. Are we to take action against any German industrialists? I think we are. We name Krupp. If Krupp will not do, let's name others.

Truman: I don't like any of them. [Laughter.] I think that if we mention some names and leave out others, people may think that we have no intention of putting those others on trial.

Stalin: But these names are given here as examples. It is surprising, for instance, why Hess is still in Britain all provided for and is not being put on trial. These names must be given; this will be important for public opinion, for the peoples.

Bevin: Don't worry about Hess.

Stalin: It's not a question of what I think, but of public opinion, and the opinion of the peoples of all the countries which had been occupied by the Germans.

Bevin: If you have any doubts about Hess I can promise that he will be put on trial.

Stalin: I am not asking for any undertakings on the part of Mr. Bevin, his statement is enough to leave me in no doubt that this will be done. But it is not a question of me. But of the peoples, of public opinion.

Truman: You are aware that we have appointed Justice Jackson as our representative on the London Commission. He is an outstanding judge and a very experienced Jurist. He has a good knowledge of legal procedure. Jackson is opposed to any names of war criminals being mentioned, and says that this

will hamper their work. He assures us that the trial will be ready within 30 days, and that there should be no doubt concerning our view of these men.

Stalin: Perhaps we could name fewer persons, say, three?

Bevin: Our jurists take the same view as the Americans.

Stalin: And ours take the opposite view. But perhaps we shall agree that the first list of the German war criminals to be brought to trial should be published not later than in one month?

[Truman and Attlee agree with Stalin's proposal]

Byrnes: The next question is one concerning the use of Allied property as reparations from satellites or as, war booty. I handed in this proposal yesterday. At today's sitting, the Soviet delegation asked to be given the possibility to make a more detailed study of the proposal.

[The Soviet delegation said that in view of the fact that there had actually been no break between the two sittings that day, it had not had time to study the wording of the proposal. It said that the proposal appeared to be correct and acceptable in substance, but its formulation had to be studied.]

Byrnes: I am prepared to postpone it until tonight.

Attlee: I propose that the agenda of tonight's sitting should contain as few items as possible.

Byrnes: The next question is that concerning the supply of oil to Western Europe. The question is now being examined in the economic commission.

The next question is that of the anti-Soviet activity of White Russian émigrés and other persons and organisations hostile to the U.S.S.R. in the American and British zones of occupation in Germany and Austria. The Anglo-American representatives have declared that they would examine the situation and the facts set out in the Soviet document, and would inform the Soviet Union at once of the results of their investigation, after which they would be prepared to discuss measures for stopping this activity.

The Soviet delegation has called attention to the memorandum which it handed to the British and American delegations concerning the repatriation of Soviet citizens. The British representatives declared that they would clarify the situation of which the Soviet document speaks and would deal with the matter immediately upon their return to London.

The Soviet representatives handed in a new document on this question and stressed the great importance they attach to it. The American and British representatives promised to deal with the matter as soon as possible.

The Foreign Ministers discussed the report of the commission drafting the protocol of the Conference. The commission failed to reach agreement on four questions but the Foreign Ministers managed to reach agreement on these questions. They also agreed that only the key decisions of the Conference would be included in the protocol. They indicated to the protocol commission that the new decisions of the Conference should also be included in the protocol.

The next question is that of reviewing the procedure of the Allied Control Commissions in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. The U.S draft on the question was adopted with the exception of the second sentence. It was decided that the sentence would be replaced by the third, fourth and fifth points of the letter from the Soviet representative handed to the representatives of the United States and Great Britain in the Allied Control Commission for Hungary. This question was referred to the drafting commission, which, after discussion, recommends to us the following text:

"The Three Governments took note that the Soviet representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased.

"The Three Governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and re-

sponsibilities of the Three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis, in respect of all three countries, the Soviet Government's proposals for Hungary."

Can we adopt the proposal of the drafting commission in this form?

Stalin: I have no objections.

Truman: Today, I received the President of Poland and four members of the Provisional Polish Government. I informed them of the decisions on Poland and handed them a copy of these decisions. They will refrain from making any statements on these decisions pending their publication in the press. They asked me on behalf of the Polish Government to convey their gratitude to all three Governments represented at the Conference.

Bevin: I should like to mention that the difficulties concerning the London-Warsaw air line, of which I spoke yesterday, have been removed. We have reached agreement with Poland on this question.

Byrnes: At the meeting of the Foreign Ministers I proposed that the words "and radio representatives" should be added in the documents on Poland and on admission to the United Nations Organisation, where they deal with the facilities which are to be extended to members of the Allied press.

Stalin: I don't think we should do that.

Attlee: I do not consider it expedient either.

Truman: We in America have a different radio situation than in other countries, such as Britain. The British radio is under Government control, but in America the radio is in the same position as the newspapers. We should like the radio representatives to have the same rights as newspaper correspondents.

Stalin: It's not worth while.

Truman: The representatives of the American radio will act in the same way as newspaper correspondents, but they will file their reports for the American radio.

Stalin: I should not advise doing that. Besides agreement must be reached with Poland.

Bevin: But you will not object, will you, against an agreement with the Governments concerned?

Stalin: No, why should I?

Truman: That is acceptable to us.

Stalin: You are welcome. But let us decide not to write about that here.

Truman: Good, I agree.

Byrnes: The next question is that of the German Navy and merchant fleet.

Truman: I understand that the report of the commission on this question is adopted and we confirm the prepared decision.

Stalin: That's right.

Byrnes: It was also agreed that the text of the decision was to be published later.

Bevin: Mr. President, I have drawn up the text of the point concerning the share of Poland and the other countries, which I think we could accept. It says: "The United Kingdom and the United States will provide out of their shares of the surrendered German merchant ships appropriate amounts for other Allied states whose merchant marines have suffered heavy losses in the common cause against Germany, except that the Soviet Union shall provide out of its share for Poland."

Stalin: I have no objections.

Truman: I agree.

Attlee: Before we adjourn, I should like to ask whether the Heads of Government think it appropriate to send Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden a telegram expressing thanks for their participation in the first half of the Conference and for their participation in other conferences?

Stalin: That would be appropriate.

Truman: I agree.

[After the interval]

Byrnes: Did you have time to study our document concerning the use of Allied property as payment for reparations by satellites or as war booty?

Stalin: I see no difficulties in settling this question as regards the substance, but I must have consultation on its formulation.

Attlee: I think the document requires some study, as not all its propositions appear to be acceptable.

Byrnes: In what respect is the draft unacceptable?

Attlee: Where the property belonging to the Allied countries has been withdrawn from the satellite countries as war booty, it is natural that the satellite countries must compensate the Allied countries to whom the property belonged. But where the property is seized by a third party, there arises the question: must it pay the Allied countries for this property or must we make the satellite countries pay for the property. In addition, I think that Point 3 dealing with currency also requires discussion. It seems to me that all this still needs to be studied.

Truman: Good.

Perhaps we could now acquaint ourselves with the communiqué?

Stalin: The commission has not yet finished drafting it.

Attlee: I propose that the commission on the drafting of the protocol and the commission on the drafting of the communiqué should deal with this question immediately, and that we should adjourn and meet again as soon as the commissions have completed their work. We could agree by telephone on the time of the meeting. The Heads of Government would deal with the question of the communiqué, and the Foreign Ministers with that of the protocol.

Stalin: It would be well to fix the time for the opening of the sitting, say 8.30 or 9.00 o'clock. The time is set to give the commissions a spur, then they will try hard.

Truman: A three-hour break suits me.

Byrnes: There was also the President's proposal on inland waterways. The protocol commission and the communiqué commission have not yet reached agreement on the decision adopted in connection with the President's proposal.

Truman: This question has been referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, but I am interested in having the communiqué say this. I should ask that mention of this be made in the communiqué.

Stalin: We have not discussed it.

Truman: I spoke thrice on the question, and the commission examined it for several days.

Stalin: It was not in the list of questions, we were not prepared for the question, and had no materials; our experts on this question are in Moscow. Why such haste; why should there be such a hurry?

Truman: This question has not been finally settled but referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

Stalin: No mention of the Black Sea Straits will be made in the communiqué either, although the question was on the agenda. The question of waterways arose as a free supplement to the question of the Straits. And I don't see why such preference should be given to the question of inland waterways over that of Straits.

Truman: The question of the Black Sea Straits will be mentioned both in the communiqué and the protocol.

Stalin: I think there is no need to put it into the communiqué, but only into the protocol.

I propose that no mention be made in the communiqué either of the Straits or the inland waterways, but that both these questions be included in the protocol only.

Truman: Good, there are no objections.

Bevin: I propose that we ask France to subscribe to our decision concerning war criminals. France is a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

Stalin: Good.

Truman: I do not object.

I still fail to understand why a decision adopted by us here and included in the protocol should not also be included in the communiqué.

Stalin: There is no need of it. As it is, the communiqué is much too long.

Truman: I should like to ask one question: are there any secret agreements at this Conference?

Stalin: No, not secret ones.

Byrnes: I should like to stress that we decided to refer the question of inland waterways to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Thus, we have an agreement on this question. Have we the right to make public the decision on this question? And if it is not included in the communiqué, but only in the protocol, can we officially put this question before the Council of Foreign Ministers?

Stalin: We should take the materials of the Crimea Conference or the Tehran Conference. At the Tehran Conference a number of questions were included in the protocol, but there was another series of decisions which were of interest to all and which determined our policy in respect of key issues. These decisions were included in the communiqué.

Take the work of the Crimea Conference. It too had two series of decisions on record. The first series – the greater one – went into the protocol, and no one insisted on it being transferred into the communiqué. The other series – the much smaller one – went into the communiqué. These were decisions determining our policy. I propose that we keep to this good rule, otherwise we shall have a whole volume instead of a communiqué.

Some of the decisions have no serious significance, some of the questions, like the one of the inland waterways, were not even discussed, and they will go into the protocol, so that no one reproach us with concealing these questions. It is a different matter with the questions of Germany, of Italy, of reparations, etc., which are of great significance, and they go into the communiqué. I think we should not break with this good tradition, and that there is no point in including all these questions in the communiqué. A communiqué is a communiqué, and a protocol is a protocol.

Truman: I do not object to this procedure, if it is adopted for all our decisions. But if I have to make a statement in the Senate to the effect that the question has been referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers, shall I have the right to do so?

Stalin: No one can encroach on your rights.

[Truman closes the sitting.]

Thirteenth (Final) Sitting. August 1, 1945

Truman opens the sitting.

Byrnes: The commission for economic questions has prepared a report on reparations. Proposals acceptable to all delegations have been worked out. Paragraph 1 says that the Soviet reparations claims are to be met from the zone of Germany occupied by the Soviet Union and the appropriate German investments abroad.

I call your attention to Paragraphs 8 and 9 of this document. I am very reluctant to propose an amendment right now, but I think this will be in the general interest. Paragraph 8 says: "The Soviet Government renounces all claims to shares of German enterprises", etc. I propose the addition of "in respect of reparations" after the words "all claims". The purpose of this amendment is to avoid creating the impression that the Soviet Union has some other claims to German enterprises apart from reparations. The same amendment should be made in Paragraph 9, which deals with the claims of the United States and the United Kingdom.

Stalin: That is right.

Byrnes: That is my only amendment. Can the reparations document be considered as approved?

Bevin: And how are we to consider, for instance, the case of plants belonging to British subjects which were taken over by the Germans for military purposes before 1939? In that case, owing to this amendment, the British will be deprived of their own property.

Byrnes: In the case cited by Mr. Bevin the amendment does not affect the situation.

Bevin: I do not object.

Byrnes: We can now discuss the question of the use of allied property to pay reparations or as war trophies, if the Soviet delegation has had time to study the proposal.

Stalin: We have not had time to consider the wording of the draft. I propose that we record the following decision:

"The Conference decided to accept the American proposal in principle. The wording of the proposal to be agreed through diplomatic channels."

We have not had time to give thought to the wording, but we agree with the proposal in substance.

Truman: I agree with the proposal of the Soviet delegation.

Attlee: So do I.

Byrnes: I have been informed that the commission charged with drawing up the protocol has reached agreement. I do not believe there is any need to read out the protocol in full, but only those points on which there were differences. Of course, we should add to it the Soviet delegation's proposal concerning war trophies which we have just adopted. I have no other amendments.

Stalin: I have an amendment. On the question of Poland's western frontier, the second paragraph says that the boundary line must run from the Baltic Sea through Swinemünde, as if the line passes through the town itself. I propose, therefore, that we say that the boundary line runs from the Baltic Sea immediately west or a little west of Swinemünde. That is what the map shows.

[Truman and Attlee agree with the wording "immediately west of Swinemünde".]

Stalin: The second amendment is about the boundary line of the Königsberg Region. The second paragraph says that the boundary line is subject to expert examination. It is proposed to say: "The exact line on the ground should be established by experts of the U.S.S.R. and Poland."

Bevin: We cannot leave this only to the Soviet Union and Poland.

Stalin: But this concerns the boundary line between Poland and Russia.

Bevin: But this must be recognised by the United Nations. We agreed that at the Peace Conference we would support the Soviet desire concerning this frontier, and now you say that it is to be determined by the Soviet Union and Poland and that we have nothing to do with it.

Stalin: This is a misunderstanding. The general boundary line is determined by the Peace Conference, but there is another concept – the line of demarcation on the ground. The general boundary line is given, but the line of demarcation on the ground may deviate from the imaginary line by half a kilometre or less to one side of it or the other. Say, the boundary line runs through a village. Why should the frontier line cut it in half? Only Poland and Russia are interested in laying down the actual line of demarcation on the ground. If you think that this is not entirely guaranteed, whom would you like to include in the commission? Someone from Britain or the United States? Anyone you wish, we do not mind.

Attlee: I think the question is as follows. We agreed to accept the proposal concerning the frontier in principle. As for the final demarcation of the territory, the precise determination of the frontier, that is the business of the Peace Conference. If we now hand this business over to the experts of Poland and Russia we shall be disrupting the technical work of the Peace Conference.

Stalin: What's Mr. Bevin's opinion?

Bevin: We want to have a commission of experts appointed by the Peace Conference.

Stalin: I fail to see the point.

Byrnes: I believe the following wording could be proposed: if there is agreement on the frontier between Poland and the Soviet Union at the Peace Conference, that will be the end of the matter, and no experts will be required. But if there are differences between Poland and Russia during the Peace Conference a commission of experts will have to be appointed, with the composition determined by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or the Peace Conference itself. But that is only in the event of differences between Poland and the Soviet Union.

Stalin: Let the old wording stand. But it says nothing of which experts are to be on the commission.

[Truman and Attlee agree to retain the old wording. The Soviet delegation then tabled an amendment to the section on the conclusion of peace treaties and on admission to the United Nations Organisation. The Soviet delegation pointed out that there was a contradiction between the first and the third paragraph of the document. The first paragraph said that the Three Governments considered it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland should be terminated after the conclusion of peace treaties, whereas the third paragraph provided for the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with these countries. The Soviet delegation proposed the deletion from the first paragraph of the words "after the conclusion of peace treaties".]

Attlee: In my opinion, that is wrong, because when we drafted the third paragraph we had in mind the establishment of diplomatic relations "to the extent possible". If the words "after the conclusion of peace treaties" are excluded from the first paragraph, it will mean that we shall be going farther than we intended to. These words should be left in.

Stalin: But the first paragraph says that diplomatic relations can be re-established only after the conclusion of peace treaties, and the third paragraph says something different. This leads to a contradiction.

Attlee: That is just why the British want to include these words. The first paragraph provides for mandatory action, namely, the establishment of diplomatic relations after the conclusion of peace treaties, whereas the third paragraph proposes that an effort should be made to do this, insofar as possible, before the conclusion of peace treaties.

Stalin: We cannot agree with that, because the effort which is assumed in the third paragraph to establish diplomatic relations is explicitly denied in the first paragraph. That changes the meaning of the whole decision. How can we agree to that?

Attlee: I do not think there is any contradiction there: in the first instance it is a question of establishing normal relations, that is, full diplomatic relations, and in the second, of an effort to come as close as possible to establishing such relations.

Stalin: I'm afraid I cannot agree with this interpretation. Let us take a concrete example – Finland. There is no reason at all to object any more to restoring diplomatic relations with Finland, but in the first paragraph the words “after the conclusion of peace treaties” explicitly prohibit the establishment of diplomatic relations. That is quite wrong.

Attlee: We are still in a state of war with Finland.

Stalin: The state of war with Italy is not yet over either, but America already has diplomatic relations with Italy, and so do we.

Attlee: I think we are now returning to something we already discussed a few days ago. We fully explained our standpoint, and we met the Soviet Union as far as we could under our constitution. We believe that we have made big concessions, beyond which we cannot go.

Stalin: Nothing will come of this. Finland has much more right than Italy to the establishment of diplomatic relations. Finland has a freely elected government. It has long since ended the war against the Allies and declared war on Germany. Italy has no freely elected government, and her participation in the war against Germany since her surrender has been minimal. On what grounds should we delay establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland? Where is the logic in that?

Bevin: I want to reach agreement and therefore make the following proposal. I propose the following wording for the first paragraph: “The Three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of peace treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.”

Stalin: Good. The Soviet delegation has no more amendments.

Bevin: Hurrah! [General laughter.]

Byrnes: The next question is that of the communiqué. We have received from the British delegation a new wording of the introductory part. We have no objections to it.

Stalin: Is there any great difference? What is the difference?

Byrnes: On the second page there are changes of a purely drafting nature, the meaning is unchanged.

Stalin: Perhaps we could do this: after the translation into Russian, we shall examine this alteration, and shall now go on to the next section.

[Truman and Attlee agree.]

Byrnes: Section II – on the institution of the Council of Foreign Ministers. There are no differences here.

[Section II is adopted.]

Byrnes: Section III – on Germany. The words “loudly applauded” in the first paragraph have evoked objections.

Stalin: Let us say: “openly approved”.

Bevin: Blindly obeyed, that is obeyed in a stupid manner.

Stalin: I propose that we put it this way: “whom, in the hour of their success, they openly approved and blindly obeyed”.

[The proposal is accepted.]

Byrnes: Are there any other amendments?

Stalin: No.

Bevin: Paragraph 12 of the economic principles repeats what is already said in Paragraph 9 (IV) of the political principles.

Stalin: I propose that we delete this expression from the economic principles and leave it in the political principles. [All agree.] We have no other amendments.

Byrnes: Section IV – on reparations from Germany. There are no amendments.

Section V – on Germany’s Navy and Merchant Marine.

Stalin: There is an agreed decision; we have no amendments.

Byrnes: Section VI – on Königsberg and the Adjacent Area.

Stalin: I agree.

Byrnes: Section VII – War Criminals.

Stalin: I think the first introductory paragraph should be excluded and only the second paragraph retained, beginning with the words: “The Three Governments have taken note, etc.”

Bevin: We have already done that. *Stalin:* Good.

Byrnes: Section VIII – on Austria.

[The Soviet delegation proposes the exclusion from the section on Austria of the last sentence – concerning reparations, leaving it only in the protocol.]

Truman: We accept the proposal of the Soviet delegation – to exclude the last sentence from the communiqué.

Byrnes: Section IX – on Poland.

Stalin: There are no amendments.

Bevin: I wish to propose a small amendment of the wording. In the second paragraph to say “they defined their attitude in the following statement” instead of the words: “their position was defined in the following statement”.

Stalin: All right.

Bevin: On the second page, also concerning Poland, I should substitute the words “Concerning Poland’s western boundary they established the following standpoint” for the introductory words “the agreement was reached on the western boundary of Poland”.

Truman: I have already informed the representatives of the Polish Government that we agreed on the earlier wording.

Stalin: In that case it is better to leave the old wording.

Bevin: I find Generalissimo Stalin’s expression, “immediately west of Swinemünde” very apt.

Stalin: Yes, it will be better to put it that way. Let’s go on to the tenth section.

Bevin: Here I wish to make a small amendment, mainly of a psychological nature. I would phrase the introductory part of Section X as follows: “The Conference agreed upon the following statement of common policy for establishing, as soon as possible, the conditions of lasting peace after victory in Europe.” This reads better.

Stalin: The wording is essentially the same, there is nothing new in it.

Truman: Both are acceptable.

Bevin: It reads better in English. Maybe it reads worse in American? [Laughter.]

Truman: Both are acceptable.

Stalin: The earlier wording contains the same idea which Mr. Bevin has expressed, but it is set out more briefly. Of course, we could accept either.

Bevin: Suppose you prefer our wording this time. [Laughter.]

Stalin: If Mr. Bevin insists, I suppose we could accept his wording.

Truman: I agree. Section XII – regarding the revision of Allied Control Commission procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

Stalin: That has been agreed.

Truman: Section XIII – transferring of German populations.

Stalin: Here the formulation is already better – “orderly transfers”.

Truman: The question of military negotiations.

Stalin: It is of general interest. I do not object to its inclusion in the communiqué.

Bevin: The British delegation has one question on Section XII – on revising the procedure in the Allied Control Commissions for Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The last three lines say: “and accepting as a basis, in respect of all three countries, the Soviet Government’s proposals for the Allied Control Commission in Hungary”. But we do not say what these proposals are. That is why we could say: “and accepting as a basis the agreed proposals”.

Stalin: All right. Which signatures are to stand under the communiqué?

Truman: All will sign.

Stalin: Good.

Truman: Let us return to the introductory part of the communiqué.

Stalin: We have no objections.

Bevin: We should like to publish the communiqué in the press on Friday morning.

Stalin: And when can it be broadcast on the radio?

Bevin: At 9.30 p.m. GMT on Thursday.

Stalin: Good.

Byrnes: Concerning the Ruhr area. The Russian text of the protocol says that the Conference examined the Soviet proposals concerning the Ruhr industrial area. It was decided to refer this question for discussion by the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. The English text of the protocol makes no mention of the Ruhr area. I understand that no such decision was taken, but the President says that it was adopted on his proposal. I propose, therefore, that the wording should be made more precise. It says nothing here of the content of the Soviet delegation’s proposal which is being referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

Stalin: I think this question should be deleted.

Truman: Good.

Stalin: [After studying the text of a message of greetings to Churchill and Eden.] I have no objection to the proposed text of the greetings.

Attlee: I propose that the telegram in English should be signed by the President and the Generalissimo.

Stalin: Could the President, as the Chairman of the Conference, sign first?

Attlee: All the three signatures will be there.

[The telegram of greetings is signed by the three Heads of Government.]

Byrnes: I think that we should appoint representatives to verify the text of the protocol.

[Representatives are appointed to a commission to edit the protocol.]

Truman: I declare the Berlin Conference closed. Until our next meeting, which, I hope, will be soon.

Stalin: Let’s hope so.

Attlee: Mr. President, before we separate I should like to express our gratitude to the Generalissimo for the excellent measures taken both for our accommodation here and to provide the conditions for work, and to you, Mr. President, for so ably presiding over this Conference.

I should like to express the hope that this Conference will be an important milestone on the road which our three nations are taking together towards a stable peace, and that the friendship between the three of us who have met here will be strong and enduring.

Stalin: That is also our hope.

Truman: On behalf of the American delegation I want to thank the Generalissimo for everything he has done for us, and I wish to join Mr. Attlee in what he has said here.

Stalin: The Russian delegation joins Mr. Attlee in the gratitude he expressed to the President for his able and apt chairmanship.

Truman: I thank you for your kind co-operation in settling all the important questions.

Stalin: I should personally like to thank Mr. Byrnes, who has helped our work very much and has promoted the achievement of our decisions.

Byrnes: I am deeply touched by the Generalissimo's kind words, and I hope that together with my colleagues I have been of use in the work of the Conference.

Stalin: The Conference, I believe, can be considered a success.

Truman: I want to thank the other Foreign Ministers and all those who have helped us so much in our work.

Attlee: I join in the expression of these feelings in respect of our Foreign Ministers.

Truman: I declare the Berlin Conference closed.

[The Conference ended at 00.30 hours on August 2, 1945.]

Source: <https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/Stalin/potsdam.htm>

Communiqué on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin

On July 17, 1945, the President of the United States of America, Harry S. Truman, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Generalissimo J.V. Stalin, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston S. Churchill, together with Mr. Clement R. Attlee, met in the Tripartite Conference of Berlin. They were accompanied by the Foreign Secretaries of the Three Governments, Mr. James F. Byrnes, Mr. V. M. Molotov, and Mr. Anthony Eden, the Chiefs of Staff, and other advisers.

There were nine meetings between July 17 and July 25. The Conference was then interrupted for two days while the results of the British general election were being declared.

On July 28, Mr. Attlee returned to the Conference as Prime Minister, accompanied by the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ernest Bevin. Four more sittings then took place. During the course of the Conference there were regular meetings of the Heads of the Three Governments accompanied by the Foreign Secretaries, and also of the Foreign Secretaries alone. Committees appointed by the Foreign Secretaries for preliminary consideration of questions before the Conference also met daily.

The meetings of the Conference were held at the Cecilienhof near Potsdam. The Conference ended on August 2, 1945.

Important decisions and agreements were reached. Views were exchanged on a number of other questions and consideration of these matters will be continued by the Council of Foreign Ministers established by the Conference.

President Truman, Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Attlee leave Conference, which has strengthened the ties between the Three Governments and extended the scope of their collaboration and understanding, with renewed confidence that their Governments and peoples, together with the other United Nations, will ensure the creation of a just and enduring peace.

II

Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers

A. The Conference reached an agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers representing the five principal Powers to continue the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements and to take up other matters which from time to time may be referred to the Council by agreement of the Governments participating in the Council.

The text of the agreement for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers is as follows:

(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States.

(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London, which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorised to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister, and by a small staff of technical advisers.

(ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st, 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time.

(3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorised to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. That Council shall be utilised for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany

to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

(iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments.

(4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question.

(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the States chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem.

B. In accordance with the decision of the Conference the Three Governments have each addressed an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council.

C. The establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text will be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodic consultation among the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom.

D. The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of Germany's unconditional surrender, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the co-ordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Allied Control Council at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly, it was agreed to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved.

III

Germany

The Allied armies are in occupation of the whole of Germany and the German people have begun to atone for the terrible crimes committed under the leadership of those whom, in the hour of their success, they openly approved and blindly obeyed.

Agreement has been reached at this Conference on the political and economic principles of a co-ordinated Allied policy toward defeated Germany during the period of Allied control.

The purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimea declaration on Germany. German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbours or the peace of the world.

It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people. It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis. If their own efforts are steadily directed to this

end, it will be possible for them in due course to take their place among the free and peaceful peoples of the world.

The text of the agreement is as follows:

The Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period

A. Political Principles

1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council.

2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are:

(I) The complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:

(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the S.S., S.A., S.D. and Gestapo, with all their organisations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organisations and all other military and quasi-military organisations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganisation of German militarism and Nazism;

(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialised facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.

(II) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(III) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organisations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.

(IV) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful co-operation in international life by Germany.

4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discrimination on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgement. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organisations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

8. The judicial system will be reorganised in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.

9. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralisation of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:

(I) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation;

(II) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;

(III) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;

(IV) for the time being no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

B. Economic Principles

11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Reparations Commission and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed.

12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralised for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.

13. In organising the German economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to:

- (a) mining and industrial production and allocations;
- (b) agriculture, forestry and fishing;
- (c) wages, prices and rationing;
- (d) import and export programmes for Germany as a whole;
- (e) currency and banking, central taxation and customs;
- (f) reparation and removal of industrial war potential;
- (g) transportation and communications.

In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions.

15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary:

(a) to carry out programmes of industrial disarmament and demilitarisation, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports;

(b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries (European countries means all European countries excluding the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics);

(c) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports;

(d) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein;

(e) to control all German public or private scientific bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories, etc., connected with economic activities.

16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited.

17. Measures shall be promptly taken:

(a) to effect essential repair of transport;

(b) to enlarge coal production;

(c) to maximise agricultural output; and

(d) to effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities.

18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.

19. Payment of reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports.

The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) of the Reparations Agreement.

IV

Reparations from Germany

In accordance with the Crimea decision that Germany be compelled to compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she has caused to the United Nations and for which the German people cannot escape responsibility, the following agreement on reparations was reached:

1. Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R. and from appropriate German external assets.

2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western zones and from appropriate German external assets.

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U.S.S.R. from its own zone of occupation, the U.S.S.R. shall receive additionally from the Western zones:

(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries, as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously.

5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in Paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4(a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U.S.S.R. in agreed instalments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparations shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Reparations Commission with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the zone Commander in the zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect of such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of Paragraph 6.

8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western zones of occupation in Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in Paragraph 9 below.

9. The Governments of the U.K. and the U.S.A. renounce their claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.

10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany.

V

Disposal of the German Navy and Merchant Marine

The Conference agreed in principle upon arrangements for the use and disposal of the surrendered German fleet and merchant ships. It was decided that the Three Governments would appoint experts to work out together detailed plans to give effect to the agreed principles. A further joint statement will be published simultaneously by the Three Governments in due course.

VI

City of Königsberg and the Adjacent Area

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the east-

ern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.

The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Königsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.

The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.

VII

War Criminals

The Three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October 1943 have no particular geographical localisation. The Three governments reaffirm their intention to bring those criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of those major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before September 1.

VIII

Austria

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria.

The Three Governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the city of Vienna.

IX

Poland

The Conference considered questions relating to the Polish Provisional Government and the western boundary of Poland.

On the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity they defined their attitude in the following statement:

A. We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognised by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognised Government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be.

They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens.

The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.

B. The following agreement was reached on the western frontier of Poland:

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirmed their opinion that the final determination of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemünde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this Conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

X

Conclusion of Peace Treaties and Admission to the United Nations Organisation

The Conference agreed upon the following statement of common policy for establishing, as soon as possible, the conditions of lasting peace after victory in Europe:

The Three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.

For their part the Three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the re-establishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognised and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the Three Governments to fulfil their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations.

The Three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognised democratic Governments in these States will also enable the Three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The Three Governments

agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.

The Three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

As regards the admission of other states into the United Nations Organisation, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:

“1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgement of the organisation, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;

“2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”

The Three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfil the qualifications set out above.

The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.

XI

Territorial Trusteeships

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government concerning trusteeship territories as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in the Charter of the United Nations Organisation.

After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian colonial territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question of Italian colonial territories would be considered by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

XII

Revised Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary

The Three Governments took note that the Soviet representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased.

The Three Governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the Three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis the agreed proposals.

XIII

Orderly Transfers of German Populations

The Conference reached the following agreement on the removal of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary:

The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognise that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner. Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Allied Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out, having regard to the present situation in Germany.

The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above, and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending the examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council.

XIV Military Talks

During the Conference there were meetings between the Chiefs of Staff of the Three Governments on military matters of common interest.

XV

[Here a list of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom delegates to the Conference is given.]

J. V. Stalin
Harry S. Truman
C. R. Attlee

Source: <https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/Stalin/potsdam.htm>

Protocol of Proceedings of the Berlin Conference. August 2, 1945

The Berlin Conference of the Three Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and U.K., which took place from July 17 to August 2, 1945, came to the following conclusions:

I

Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers

A. The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements:

“(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States.

“(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London, which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorised to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister, and by a small staff of technical advisers.

“(ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st, 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time.

“(3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorised to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilised for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

“(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

“(iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred, to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments.

“(4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question.

“(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the States chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem.”

B. It was agreed that the Three Governments should each address an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council. The text of the approved invitation was as follows:

Council of Foreign Ministers

Draft for Identical Invitation To Be Sent Separately by Each of the Three Governments to the Governments of China and France

“The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. consider it necessary to begin without delay the essential preparatory work upon the peace settlements in Europe. To this end they are agreed that there should be established a Council of the Foreign Ministers of the Five Great Powers to prepare treaties of peace with the European enemy States, for submission to the United

Nations. The Council would also be empowered to propose settlements of outstanding territorial questions in Europe and to consider such other matters as Member Governments might agree to refer to it.

“The text adopted by the Three Governments is as follows:

“In agreement with the Governments of ... the Government of ... extends a cordial invitation to the Government of China (France) to adopt the text quoted above and to join in setting up the Council.

“The Government of ... attaches much importance to the participation of the Chinese Government (French Government) in the proposed arrangements and it hopes to receive an early and favourable reply to this invitation.”

C. It was understood that the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text would be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodical consultation between the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom.

D. The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of surrender for Germany, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Allied Control Commission at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly the Conference agreed to recommend to the Member Governments of the European Advisory Commission that the Commission might now be dissolved.

[The subsequent text is omitted, as it is repeated in the Communiqué on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin. – Editor’s Note.]

IV

Disposal of the German Navy and Merchant Marine

A

The following principles for the distribution of the German Navy were agreed:

(1) The total strength of the German surface navy, excluding ships sunk and those taken over from Allied Nations, but including ships under construction or repair, shall be divided equally among the U.S.S.R., U.K., and U.S.

(2) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair may be completed within three to six months, according to the type of ship. Whether such ships under construction or repair shall be completed or repaired shall be determined by the technical commission appointed by the Three Powers and referred to below, subject to the principle that their completion or repair must be achieved within the time limits above provided, without any increase of skilled employment in the German shipyards and without permitting the reopening of any German ship building or connected industries. Completion date means the date when a ship is able to go out on its first trip, or, under peacetime standards, would refer to the customary date of delivery by shipyard to the Government.

(3) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the U.S.S.R., U.K. and the U.S. for experimental and technical purposes.

(4) All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy appertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) hereof shall be handed over to the respective Powers receiving such ships.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite naval commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German warships and to handle other

detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German fleet. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than 15th August, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each Delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect German warships wherever they may be located.

(6) The Three Governments agreed that transfers, including those of ships under construction and repair, shall be completed as soon as possible, but not later than 15th February, 1946. The Commission will submit fortnightly reports, including proposals for the progressive allocation of the vessels when agreed by the Commission.

B

The following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine were agreed.

(1) The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located, shall be divided equally among the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the U.S. The actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the end of the war against Japan. The United Kingdom and the United States will provide out of their shares of the surrendered German merchant ships appropriate amounts for other Allied States whose merchant marines have suffered heavy losses in the common cause against Germany, except that the Soviet Union shall provide out of its share for Poland.

(2) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships during the Japanese War period shall fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority.

(3) While actual transfer of the ships shall be delayed until after the end of the war with Japan, a Tripartite Shipping Commission shall inventory and value all available ships and recommend a specific distribution in accordance with Paragraph (1).

(4) German inland and coastal ships determined to be necessary to the maintenance of the basic German peace economy by the Allied Control Council of Germany shall not be included in the shipping pool thus divided among the Three Powers.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite merchant marine commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German merchant ships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German merchant ships. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than September 1st, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect the German merchant ships wherever they may be located.

[The subsequent text is omitted, as it is repeated in the Communiqué on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin. – Editor's Note.]

XIV

Iran

It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September 1945.

XV

The International Zone of Tangier

A proposal by the Soviet Government was examined and the following decisions were reached.

Having examined the question of the Zone of Tangier, the Three Governments have agreed that this Zone, which includes the City of Tangier and the area adjacent to it, in view of its special strategic importance shall remain international.

The question of Tangier will be discussed in the near future at a meeting in Paris of representatives of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France.

XVI

The Black Sea Straits

The Three Governments recognised that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised, as failing to meet present-day conditions.

It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the Three Governments and the Turkish Government.

XVII

International Inland Waterways

The Conference considered a proposal of the U.S. Delegation on this subject and agreed to refer it for consideration to the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

XVIII

European Inland Transport Conference

The British and U.S. Delegations to the Conference informed the Soviet Delegation of the desire of the British and U.S. Governments to reconvene the European Inland Transport Conference and stated that they would welcome assurance that the Soviet Government would participate in the work of the reconvened Conference. The Soviet Government agreed that it would participate in this Conference.

XIX

Directives to Military Commanders on Allied Control Council for Germany

The Three Governments agreed that each would send a directive to its representative on the Control Council concerning questions coming within the scope of his competence.

XX

Use of Allied Property for Satellite Reparations or "War Trophies"

The Conference decided to accept in principle the proposal of the American Delegation. [...] The wording of this proposal is to be agreed upon through the diplomatic channel.

[The subsequent text is omitted, as it is repeated in the Communiqué on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin – Editor's Note.]

J. V. Stalin
Harry S. Truman
C. R. Attlee

Circular telegram from the People's Commissariat of the USSR on the outcome of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference between the Heads of Government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain. August 4, 1945

** Sent to all Ambassadors and envoys of the USSR, and also to the Soviet representatives in Bucharest, Sofia, and Budapest, to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR D.Z. Manuil'sky in Kiev, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Belorussian SSR K.V. Kiselev in Minsk and to the Consulate General of the USSR in Pretoria.*

For your bearings and to familiarize yourself, I send you the following additional information on the Berlin Conference.

The decisions reached on the main issues of the Conference's communiqué were published on 2 August. However, in addition to the communiqué, the heads of the three governments signed a Conference protocol, which is not to be published. What follows below are the details of the decisions that are referred to in the protocol in question, but which are not conveyed or partially conveyed in the communiqué.

1. The German Navy.

It was decided that all of the German surface fleet would be divided equally between the USSR, USA and Great Britain. A large part of Germany's submarine fleet would be sunk, while 30 of the best submarines would be left intact, to be equally divided between the USSR, USA and Britain for experimental purposes. All German merchant fleet will be equally divided between the USSR, Britain and the USA. The actual transfer of the merchant ships will be carried out after the war against Japan, before the end of which the Anglo-Americans will use the said ships in the war. The US and England have struck off a number of commercial vessels from their own stocks to give to other nations who suffered losses in the war, while the Soviet Union is committing to sharing a portion of its ships with Poland.

2. At the suggestion of the Anglo-Americans, it was decided that reparations would not be imposed on Austria, and that the question of reparations from Italy would be settled by the Council of Foreign Ministers as part of the question of Italy's peace treaty.

3. Black Sea straits.

It has been decided: a) The Montreux Convention should be revised in order to meet the requirements of modern times; b) This issue will be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three governments and the Turkish Government.

The Soviet Government's [position] was not accepted. Instead of the Montreux International Convention, it called for the Soviet Union to be provided with control over Turkey's Black Sea straits, as well as for the Soviet Union to be provided the opportunity to have its military bases in the Straits.

4. Iran.

It has been decided: a) to immediately withdraw Allied forces from Tehran; b) to decide the question of the further withdrawal of troops from Iran at the Council of Foreign Ministers Affairs in September 1945.

5. A decision was made to establish two commissions, one Anglo-Soviet and one US-Soviet, in order to examine the question of seizing oil extraction equipment that was captured by the Germans in Romania, which, in the opinion of the British and American governments, was the property of the Anglo-American firms.

6. The international zone of Tangier.

In accordance with our proposal, it was decided: a) The zone of Tangier, in view of its strategic importance, shall remain international¹; b) the question of Tangiers to be discussed at the meeting in Paris between government representatives of the US, UK and France.

7. The Soviet government accepted the proposal of the British and US governments to take part in the London Conference on the intra-European transportation², which will resume its work.

8. Our proposal on the trust territories not only touched on the Italian colonies, but also on the mandates of the League of Nations. As you know from the published communiqué, the decision of the Conference was only on the question of the Italian colonies.

9. Our proposal on the issue of war criminals – to specify at the conference the names of some of the major war criminals – i.e. Goering³, Hess⁴, Ribbentrop⁵, etc.) – was not adopted.

10. In principal, the following US proposal was adopted: with collection of reparations and spoils of war from the satellite countries, the property of the Allied countries is not to be affected. The wording of this corresponding decision was entrusted to be coordinated through standard diplomacy.

11. The Americans have made a proposal to establish international control over such European inland waterways, as the Danube River Rhine, and the Kola channel. At our suggestion, this mattered was passed over to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

In addition, the Conference exchanged views on a number of issues that are not reflected in the communiqué or the Conference's protocol. So, the British and Americans persistently put forward the proposition of have the upcoming parliamentary elections in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Greece placed under the control of the Allied commission. We rejected this proposal as being incompatible with the principles of democracy.

The British and the Americans pointed out that in Yugoslavia the Tito-Šubašić agreement will not be enforced, which they offered to point out on behalf of the Conference. Rejecting such a statement, we proposed to discuss this issue by summoning Tito and Šubašić, but no agreement was reached.

Likewise, we made a proposal on the Greek government, pointing out its anti-democratic and aggressive character and demanding its reorganization in a democratic spirit on the basis of the agreement with the Greeks made in Varkiza in February⁶. At the request of the British, we did not insist on making a decision on the matter.

On our initiative, the sides exchanged opinions on the situation in Syria and Lebanon, but no decisions were taken.

¹ Port Tangier, which controls the southern part of the Gibraltar Strait, had been turned into an international demilitarised zone (on the territory of the French part of the Moroccan Protectorate) in accordance with the Paris convention of 18 December 1923 (initially signed by France, Spain and Great Britain, then later by a number of other European states). The status of the international zone was abolished following the inclusion of Tangier in the independent state of Morocco in 1956.

² The conference took place between 24 August and 27 September 1945. Contrary to its initially expressed acceptance, the Soviet side (in the person of the Ambassador, Gusev), citing the absence of instructions, did not take part in the conference. The British representatives, as did the American Ambassador Winant in his report to Washington, regarded this step by the USSR as 'blackmail on account of Rumania' (the reluctance of Great Britain and the USA to establish diplomatic relations with Bucharest and readiness to admit the Romanian delegation to the conference as observers only). Poland also abstained from participation in the conference. See: FRUS. 1945. Vol. 2. P. 1409.

³ Goering, Hermann Wilhelm (1893 – 1946) – Nazi German statesman and politician, de facto second most-powerful person in Nazi Germany and Hitler's successor, held numerous posts, including Vice-Chancellor (1941 – 1945), President of Reichstag (1932 – 1945), Minister-President of Prussia (1933 – 1945), Minister of Aviation (1933 – 1945).

⁴ Hess, Rudolf Walter Richard (1894 – 1987) – Nazi German statesman and politician, deputy head of the Nazi Party (1933 – 1941). In 1941 undertook a flight to Great Britain where he was taken prisoner and sentenced to life imprisonment.

⁵ Ribbentrop, Joachim von (1893 – 1946) – Nazi German statesman and politician, Minister for Foreign Affairs (1938 – 1945).

⁶ The Agreement was concluded on 12 February 1945 in Varkiza, near Athens between the Greek Government and representatives from ELAS. It provided for a ceasefire, a general election and a referendum to decide the political future of the country and the question of the monarchy.

We have made a proposal to have the UK, USA, USSR and France establish international control over the Ruhr industrial area, but having received assurances from the Anglo-Americans that the Ruhr would remain part of Germany and would be under the control of the Inter-Allied Control Council, we did not persist to have specific solutions about this question.

In addition, we gave several memorandums to the British and the Americans: a) on discovering in Norway four hundred thousand German troops that were not fully disarmed; b) on the anti-Soviet agitation by Russian fascists from the ranks of former Nazi agents, who are now among the Soviet prisoners of war and interned in Germany and Austria in the Anglo-Americans zones; c) on the British camp in Italy for Soviet prisoners of war, where instead of one hundred and fifty people, as reported by the British, there turned out to be upon inspection ten thousand Ukrainians, out of which the British formed a division that was headed by officers who served under Hitler; d) on the restrictions imposed on Soviet representatives when visiting Soviet prisoners of war and internees in Anglo-American camps; e) on the allies' removal of equipment from Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, which Anglo-Americans were temporarily doing, as well as about thirteen thousand wagons stolen by the allies in this region.

The allies promised us that they would verify all these issues and report back the results.

In conclusion, we can say that the Conference ended with satisfactory results for the Soviet Union.

Confirm receipt.

Molotov

Source: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943cairotehran/d2>

**Personal message from Winston Churchill to Joseph Stalin
on the acceptance by the Polish government-in-exile of the
eastern border along the Curzon Line. April 22, 1945**

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Russian translation.

English original.

The following is a public statement by M. Mikolajczyk which has appeared in his newspaper. There is no doubt about the answer which he gave in his last sentence to the question you put to me, namely that he accepts the Curzon Line including the Lwow cession to the Soviets. I hope that this will be satisfactory to you.



PERSONAL MESSAGE

FROM Mr CHURCHILL TO MARSHAL STALIN.

The following is a public statement by M. Mikolajczyk which has appeared in his newspaper. There is no doubt about the answer which he gave in his last sentence to the question you put to me, namely that he accepts the Curzon Line including the Lwow cession to the Soviets. I hope that this will be satisfactory to you.

"On demand of Russia the three Great Powers have declared themselves in favour of establishing Poland's eastern frontier on the Curzon Line with the possibility of small rectifications. My own point of view was that at least Lwow and the oil district should be left to Poland. Considering, however, firstly that in this respect there is an absolute demand on the Soviet side and secondly that the existence side by side of our two nations is dependent on the fulfilment of this condition, we Poles are obliged to ask ourselves whether in the name of the so-called integrity of our republic we are to reject it and thereby jeopardise the whole existence of our country's interests. The answer to this question must be 'No'."

22nd April, 1945.

**Telegram from the Chairman Council of the People's Commissars,
I.V. Stalin, to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs
of the USSR, V.M. Molotov, dated September 26, 1945**

Top Secret

NOT IN ORDER

SPECIAL

I am passing on Comrade Stalin's telegram:

"I consider it the pinnacle of arrogance for the British and the Americans, who consider themselves our allies, to not have wanted to listen to us – as is proper – on the issue of the Control Council in Japan. One of the Allies – the Soviet Union – declares itself dissatisfied with the situation in Japan, while the people who call themselves our allies refuse to discuss our statements. This suggests that they lack a basic sense of respect for their ally. Should Byrnes and Bevin not be given a hint, that under such circumstances, we will be forced to withdraw our men from Japan, since we cannot take any responsibility for the United States' and Great Britain's policy in Japan.

We have information that the Americans have laid their hands on Japan's gold reserves – which by one estimate are worth two billion dollars – and took the British on as their partner. We need to hint to them, making it clear that we know there is a reason that the Americans and the British oppose the Allied Council's organizations in Japan and do not want us anywhere near affairs concerning Japan, despite the fact that the British themselves had recently offered to organize Control Council in Japan.

When do you think the ministerial meeting should finish?"

Please confirm receipt.

VYSHINSKY

Source: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943cairotehran/d2>

**Telegram from Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V.M. Molotov
to the Chairman Council of the People's Commissars,
I.V. Stalin. September 28, 1945**

Copy
Top secret
NOT IN ORDER

TO STALIN.

...

I agree that now is the crucial moment. I agree that it is better to let the first Council of Ministers end in failure than to make significant concessions to Byrnes. I think that now you can either break the veils of well-being, the visibility which the Americans would like to have or obtain from the Americans (and, hence, from others) significant concessions in USSR's favour.

I think we can offer the following:

The Americans should agree with us about the imminent establishment of diplomatic relations with Romania and Bulgaria, as well as to promise a specific short period of time to create the Allied Control Council in Japan. Otherwise, we abandon the agreement with them on the subject of Italy and other significant decisions of the Council. We have the means to put pressure on the Americans, if they want to show the success of the first session of the Council of Ministers, which Byrnes apparently wants to. At the meeting with Byrnes and Bevin on 27 September 27, I assailed Byrnes for the fact that he is demanding to immediately set up short deadlines for the preparation of the peace treaties, but does not agree to a discussion on the establishment of the Control Council in Japan. I declared that the United States wants to play the role of the dictator, to dictate its proposals, but does not want to meet halfway on the issue of a Control Council in Japan, which all the Allies want: the Soviet Union, Britain, and China. I said that nothing will come of this, and that in such a case, I too cannot give an immediate response on the procedure for reviewing the peace treaties with Italy and other countries, on which Byrnes wants to create an impression of success regarding the work of Council of Ministers.

Under these circumstances, Bevin only moaned and repeated platitudes, without making any suggestions.

It will probably not be possible to immediately gain concessions from the Americans on the Balkan countries and Japan. But without significant concessions from the Americans on at least one of these questions (the Balkans or Japan), it is impermissible, in my opinion, to enter into an agreement with them regarding the main present-day issues. If the Americans (and the British) do agree to give way on at least one of these questions, then it is necessary to negotiate with them. Only then will the success of the Council's work be in our favour.

I await your reply.
28.IX.45 MOLOTOV

Part 1.

The Yalta Conference

- 1.1. Formation of the Anti-Hitler coalition
- 1.2. The Tehran Conference
- 1.3. The Yalta Conference
- 1.4. THE BERLIN (POTSDAM) CONFERENCE**
- 1.5. The End of the Second World War. The Surrender of Japan

**SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM PREMIER J.V. STALIN
TO THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL**

Your message of September 27 received.

I share your conviction that stable harmony between the three leading Powers is an earnest of future peace and is in tune with the hopes cherished by all peace-loving nations. The consistency of our Governments in this policy in the post-war; period, like that achieved during this great war, will, I believe, be the decisive thing.

Certainly I should like very much to meet you and the President. I think it very important to our common cause. I must, however, make a reservation as far as I am concerned: my doctors advise against undertaking long journeys. I shall have to bow to this for some time to come.

I wholeheartedly welcome your desire to come to Moscow in October. Military and other problems of great importance need to be discussed. Should anything keep you from coming, we should, naturally, be glad to see Mr Eden.

Your communication on the plans for the President's visit to Europe is very interesting. I, too, feel sure that he will win the election.

As regards Japan, our attitude remains the same as it was in Tehran.

I and Molotov send you our best wishes.

September 30, 1944

**PRIVATE, PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE FROM
Mr CHURCHILL TO MARSHAL STALIN**

Your people are anxious about the route I have been advised to take. It is not good for me to go much above 8,000 feet, though I can if necessary do so for an hour or so. We think it less of a risk to fly across the Aegean Sea and Black Sea. I have satisfied myself on the whole that this is best and involves no inappropriate risk.

So long as we can get down safely to refuel if necessary at Simferopol or at any other operational landing ground on the coast which you may prefer, I shall be quite content with the facilities available. I have everything I want in my plane. The only vital thing is that we may send an aircraft on ahead to establish with you a joint signal station regulating our homing and landing. Please have the necessary orders given.

I am looking forward to returning to Moscow under the much happier conditions created since August 1942.

October 4th, 1944

**SECRET AND PERSONAL FROM PREMIER J.V. STALIN
TO THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL**

Your message of October 4 received.
Landing arranged at the Sarabuz air field near Simferopol.
Direct your signal aircraft thither.

October 5, 1944

Source: Correspondence Between The Chairman Of The Council Of Ministers Of The USSR And The Presidents Of The USA And The Prime Ministers Of Great Britain During The Great Patriotic War Of 1941-1945. Volume 1. Correspondence with Winston S. Churchill and Clement R. Attlee (July 1941-November 1945). Progress Publishers.


1957

Personal and secret message from Joseph Stalin to Winston Churchill with a proposal to hold a meeting in Yalta. January 10, 1945

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

I agree that the word 'Argonaut', as you proposed in your message of 5 January, shall serve as a code name for all messages regarding the meeting of the three powers.

In accordance with the proposal made by the president, I hereby ask you to confirm that the meeting shall take place in Yalta on February 2.



**Note by the Soviet ambassador to the United States,
A.A. Gromyko¹, to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign
Affairs of the USSR, A.Y. Vyshinsky. January 26, 1945**

TOP SECRET.

TO THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Comrade A.Y. VYSHINSKY

Yesterday I forwarded to you and Vyacheslav Mihailovich a list of issues which may be raised by the Americans and the British at the forthcoming meeting². I also enclose remarks on some of these issues.

I. On Poland.

This issue will undoubtedly be raised at the meeting. The USA and Britain will apparently look for ways of reconciling Poland's provisional government³ with the emigrant Polish government in London. I know that the US government hopes to make Mikołajczyk⁴ a member of the government. According to official American circles (apparently British ones as well), Mikołajczyk may be a suitable link between the emigrant Polish government in London and the provisional government in Poland.

The aforementioned will be considered by the US and Britain when deciding on the acknowledgement of Poland's provisional government. It is quite possible that Roosevelt will not solve the issue of acknowledgement of the provisional Polish government by the United States, due to unprepared American public opinion and possible disapproval by the Congress [...].

Such a result may only be temporary and I believe that the US government will have to acknowledge the provisional Polish government, perhaps not right after the meeting, but a bit later. Certainly a lot will depend on whether the British government will firmly and consistently stick to their point of view on this issue, which it has already expressed earlier. It is unlikely that Roosevelt shall directly raise the issue of the Soviet Union giving Lvov to the Poles.

Perhaps Roosevelt will try to mention this issue in a diplomatic way.

However, regarding the territorial Polish issue, Roosevelt will be forced to agree, and I don't expect serious difficulties for the three parties coming to an agreement on this issue.

[...]

¹ Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich (1909 – 1989) – Soviet statesman and party figure, diplomat, Soviet Ambassador to the United States (1943 – 1946), Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for the USSR (1946 – 1949), Permanent Representative of the USSR on the United Nations Security Council (1946 – 1948), First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for the USSR (1949 – 1952, 1953 – 1957), Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain (1952 – 1953), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (1957 – 1985), First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1983 – 1985), Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (1985 – 1988).

² The Crimean (Yalta) Conference of the Soviet, US and British heads of state (4 – 11 February 1945).

³ The Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland was formed on the night of 31 December 1944/1 January 1945, as a result of the Krajowa Rada Narodowa passing the law on the reorganisation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation. On 2 January the Provisional Government proposed establishing diplomatic relations with the Allied states and on 5 January was formally recognised by the Soviet Union.

⁴ Mikołajczyk, Stanisław (1901 – 1966) – Polish statesman and politician, Deputy Prime Minister (1940 – 1943), Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile (1943 – 1944), Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Agriculture and Agricultural Reform of the Provisional Government of National Unity in Poland (1945 – 1947).

III. Yugoslavia.

I believe that by raising the issue of Yugoslavia, the US and Britain will aim for two things: 1) consolidation of Tito [regime] with the current Šubašić government, and 2) eliminate possibilities of a Soviet system establishing in Yugoslavia. The prospect of political events in Yugoslavia towards the establishment of a Soviet system there upsets official American circles. Such a prospect also disturbs the British official circles to no lesser degree¹. As for Britain, its attitude to Yugoslav affairs will apparently be determined to a great extent by our attitude to the Greek affairs. Though this is only my assumption.

I believe that regarding Yugoslavia we may expect success at the meeting in conducting a definite and determined policy of support for Tito, who has progressive public forces behind him. The condition of Yugoslav affairs are such as to enable us to easily achieve more active support from Roosevelt and Churchill for Tito.

IV. On the organisation of an Inter-Allied Advisory Body

As I already reported earlier, the USA and Britain are not satisfied by the work of the European Advisory Commission. According to them, they are unsatisfied because the Commission is slow in making decisions on the discussed issues and has limited rights and powers. I know from Stettinius² message that at the meeting the Americans will raise the issue of forming an Inter-Allied Advisory Body. Though Stettinius did not give details of his idea, I believe the Americans mean that such a body shall include the representatives of only the great countries. The purpose of an Advisory Body organisation is for the discussion of all the issues arising during the war in order to achieve coordination between the Allies on these issues. If such an Advisory Body is formed, the activities of the Soviet Union in Europe during the war would undoubtedly be limited to a certain extent, since the USA and Britain would first of all be striving towards discussing political and other issues arising in the Southeast Europe.

Certainly, the extent to which the existence of such an Advisory Body will limit our activities in a number of European countries, will be determined not only by the mere fact of its existence, but also by its rights and powers. If it happens that its functions do not differ greatly from those of the European Advisory Commission, there would be no big difference. However, if larger rights and powers are given to such an Advisory Body, the situation would be different and such a body could limit to a certain extent Soviet Union's activities in Europe.

[...]

Advocates of the idea of forming the United Nations Council intend for such a Council to exist until the creation of the International Security Organisation. Therefore, if the meeting manages to achieve an agreement on still-unresolved issues related to the creation of the International Security Organization and if the creation of the Organization is a task for near future, the ideas of cre-

¹ Such fears were very real in London. However, as evidenced by a Cabinet discussion in January 1945, both Churchill and Eden were hoping that movement towards the Tito-Šubašić agreement would avoid what would be for the British, the worst-case scenario. Eden, admitting that 'the crude reality of the situation is that Tito is in possession of Yugoslavia', called on the Yugoslav king to accede to the Tito-Šubašić agreement, seeing in the latter 'the King's best chance of preserving the monarchy and his own position' (W.P. (45) 13, Memo by Eden, 05/01/1945 // TNA, CAB 66/60). Churchill, disowning the public pronouncements of Peter II Karadorđević in opposition to the Tito-Šubašić agreement, indicated the extreme importance of backing the agreement in force and 'in particular the provisions contained in it for free elections, etc. Moreover, we must be at pains to avoid any impression in the minds of the Russians or of Marshal Tito that we had been privy to King Peter's action in issuing this statement' (W.M. (45) 4th Conclusions, Conf. Annex, Minute 2, 11/01/1945 // TNA, CAB 65/51).

² Stettinius, Edward Reilly Jr. (1900 – 1949) – U.S. statesman and politician, Undersecretary of State (1943 – 1944), Secretary of State (1944 – 1945), Ambassador to UN (1945 – 1946).

ating a United Nations Provisional Council would seemingly fall by the wayside for the Americans as well.

In my opinion, it is necessary to resolutely object to the suggestion of creating a United Nations Provisional Council. Such a Council, bestowed with broad-ranging powers, would be an assembly making decisions not in our favour. In such a Council, the Soviet Union would be countered on decisions regarding a number of major political issues not by 2-3 countries, but by dozens of countries.

[...]

From the point of view of the Soviet Union's interests an even more suitable way out would be a decision to conduct regular periodic meetings of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the allied countries. Such a decision would limit the Soviet Union's activities in Europe to a lesser degree. Such meetings would not be arranged frequently, anyway, they are unlikely to happen more often than twice a year. In this case the allies would be less importunate on decisions regarding current political issues. Therefore, I believe that the idea of organizing periodic meetings is a worthy one.

[...]

[Signature] (A. Gromyko)

Source: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943cairotehran/d2>

People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyacheslav Molotov meets US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the airport in Saky. February 1945

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Photo by Samary Gurary.



Source: <http://alliance.rusarchives.ru/ru/narodnyy-komissar-inostrannykh-del-sssr-vm-molotov-vstrechaet-prezidenta-ssha-f-ruzvelta-i-premer>

**British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
on the veranda of Livadia Palace. February 1945**

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Photo by Samary Gurary.



Source: <http://alliance.rusarchives.ru/ru/premer-ministr-velikobritanii-u-cherchill-na-verande-livadiyskogo-dvor-ca-fevral-1945-g>

**URGENT, MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE
FROM Mr CHURCHILL TO MARSHAL STALIN. February 1, 1945**

As the President will not arrive at Malta until February 2nd, we cannot reach Yalta earlier than February 3rd. I will however telegraph again as soon as it is possible to give a more definite time. We are of course dependent on the weather.

We shall travel in separate aircraft but in company.

Looking forward greatly to meeting you.

**PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET FROM PREMIER J.V. STALIN
TO THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL. February 1, 1945**

Your message received.

I and my colleagues have arrived at the meeting place.

**SECRET AND MOST URGENT MESSAGE FROM Mr CHURCHILL
TO MARSHAL STALIN. February 3, 1945**

Expected time of arrival at Saki 12.00 hours Moscow Time,
February 3rd. Will have lunched in aircraft before landing.
Will proceed by car to Yalta.

*Source: Correspondence Between The Chairman Of The Council Of Ministers Of The USSR And The Presidents
Of The USA And The Prime Ministers Of Great Britain During The Great Patriotic War Of 1941-1945. Volume 1.
Correspondence with Winston S. Churchill and Clement R. Attlee (July 1941-November 1945). Progress Publishers.*

1957

First Sitting at Livadia Palace. February 4, 1945

Stalin asked Roosevelt to open the sitting.

Roosevelt said that neither law nor history envisaged that he should open conferences. It was pure chance that he had opened the Conference at Tehran. He, Roosevelt, considered it a great honour to open the present Conference. He would like to start by expressing his gratitude for the hospitality accorded him.

The leaders of the three Powers, said Roosevelt, already understood each other well and their mutual understanding was growing. They all wanted an early end of the war and stable peace. That was why the participants in the Conference were able to start their unofficial talks. He, Roosevelt, believed the talks should be frank. Experience showed that frankness in talks made for an early achievement of good decisions. The participants in the Conference would have the maps of Europe, Asia and Africa before them. The day's sitting, however, was to be devoted to the situation on the Eastern front, where the troops of the Red Army had been advancing with such success. He, Roosevelt, asked someone to report on the situation at the Soviet-German front.

Stalin replied that he could offer a report by Army General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

Antonov: "1. On January 12-15, the Soviet forces went over to the offensive on a 700-kilometre front between the Niemen River and the Carpathians.

"General Chernyakhovsky's troops were advancing on Königsberg.

"Marshal Rokossovsky's troops were advancing along the northern bank of the Vistula, cutting off East Prussia from Germany's central areas.

"Marshal Zhukov's troops were advancing south of the Vistula towards Poznan.

"Marshal Konev's troops were advancing on Czestochowa and Breslau.

"General Petrov's troops were advancing on Nowy Targ in the area of the Carpathians.

"The main blow was struck by the forces under Rokossovsky, Zhukov and Konev on a 300-kilometre front between Ostroleka and Krakow.

"2. Because of the unfavourable weather conditions, the operation had been planned for the end of January, when an improvement in the weather had been expected.

"Since the operation had been regarded and prepared as one with decisive aims, the intention had been to conduct it in more favourable conditions.

"However, in view of the alarming situation that had developed on the Western front, in connection with the German offensive in the Ardennes, the High Command of the Soviet forces ordered the offensive to be started not later than mid-January, without waiting for the weather to improve.

«3. When the Soviet forces reached the Narew and the Vistula, the enemy grouping was most solid in the central sector of the front, because a strike from that sector would take our troops to Germany's vital centres along the shortest route.

«In order to create the most advantageous conditions for the offensive, the Soviet High Command decided to thin out this central grouping of the enemy.

«With that end in view, it conducted a supporting operation against East Prussia and continued the offensive in Hungary in the direction of Budapest.

«Both these directions were highly sensitive for the Germans, and they quickly reacted to our offensive by moving some forces from the central sector of the front to the flanks; thus, of the 24 tank divisions on our front, which constituted the Germans' main striking force, 11 tank divisions were moved to the Budapest direction, and 6 tank divisions, to East Prussia (3 tank divisions were in Kurland), thus leaving only 4 tank divisions in the central sector of the front.

«The objective set by the High Command has been attained.

«4. The balance of forces in the direction of the main attack:

«On the front between Ostroleka and Krakow, that is, the direction of our main attack, the enemy had up to 80 divisions; we created a grouping with a view to obtaining the following superiority over the enemy:

«Infantry – more than double (up to 180 divisions).

«Artillery, tanks and aviation – overwhelming.

«In the break-through sectors, the artillery density created was 220-230 pieces (from 76 mm and greater) per kilometre of front.

«5. The offensive was started in highly unfavourable weather conditions (low clouds and fog), which absolutely ruled out air force operations and limited artillery observation to a hundred meters.

«Thanks to the good preliminary reconnaissance and powerful artillery offensive, the enemy's fire system was suppressed and his fortifications destroyed. This enabled our troops to advance 10-15 kilometres on the first day of the offensive, that is, to break through the whole tactical depth of the enemy's defences.

«6. Results of the offensive:

«(a) By February 1, that is, in 18 days of the offensive, the Soviet forces had advanced up to 500 kilometres in the direction of the main attack, averaging 25-30 kilometres a day.

«(b) The Soviet forces have reached the Oder in the sector from Küstrin (north of Frankfort) and to the south and occupied the Silesian industrial area.

«(c) The main routes linking the enemy's East Prussian grouping with the central areas of Germany have been cut.

«Thus, in addition to the Kurland grouping (26 divisions), the enemy's grouping in East Prussia has been isolated (up to 27 divisions); a number of isolated groupings of Germans (in the area of Lodz, Thorn, Poznan, Schneidemühl etc. a total of up to 15 divisions) have been encircled and are being destroyed.

«(d) Permanent-type defence positions of the Germans in East Prussia – in the Königsberg and Letzen directions – have been broken through.

«(e) Forty-five German divisions have been routed, with the enemy suffering the following losses:

about 100,000 prisoners

about 300,000 dead

a total of up to 400,000 men

«7. The enemy's probable operations:

«(a) The Germans will defend Berlin, for which purpose they will try to hold back the advance of the Soviet forces on the Oder line, organising defence there with the help of retreating troops and reserves transferred from Germany, Western Europe and Italy.

«The enemy will try to use his Kurland grouping for the defence of Pomerania, transporting it by sea beyond the Vistula.

«(b) The Germans will cover the Vienna direction as solidly as possible, reinforcing it up with troops operating in Italy.

«8. Movement of enemy troops:

“(a) The following have already made their appearance on our front:

9 divisions from the central areas of Germany

6 divisions from the West European front

1 division from Italy

16 divisions

“(b) On the way:

4 tank divisions

1 motorised division

5 divisions

«(c) Up to 30-35 divisions more will probably be moved (from the West European front, Norway and Italy, and reserves in Germany).

«Thus, an additional 35-40 divisions may appear on our front.

«9. Our wishes:

«(a) Speed up the offensive by the Allied forces on the Western front, for which the situation now is very favourable, namely:

«(1) Defeat of the Germans on the Eastern front;

«(2) Defeat of the German grouping which had attacked in the Ardennes;

«(3) Weakening of the German forces in the West in view of the transfer of their reserves to the East.

«It is desirable that an offensive should be started in the first half of February.

«(b) Prevent the enemy from transferring his forces to the East from the Western front, Norway and Italy by air strikes against his communications; in particular, paralyse the Berlin and Leipzig junctions.

«(c) Prevent the enemy from withdrawing his forces from Italy.»

[The written text of Antonov's report was handed to Roosevelt and Churchill.]

Stalin asked whether there were any questions.

Roosevelt said he would like to know what the Soviet Government intended to do with the German locomotives, rolling stock and railways. He asked whether the Soviet Government intended to widen the gauge of the German railways.

Antonov replied that since the locomotives and the rolling stock abandoned by the Germans were of little use, the gauge of the German railways would have to be altered in several key directions.

Roosevelt stated that, in his opinion, it would be well for the Allied staffs to jointly discuss this question as the Allied forces were rapidly approaching each other.

Antonov said the Soviet command was altering the gauge on a minimum number of directions needed to ensure the supply of the Soviet forces.

Stalin said the bulk of the railways remained unaltered. The Soviet command had been changing the gauge of the railways none too eagerly.

Churchill declared that he had several questions to ask. He believed there were a number of questions which it would be expedient for the three staffs to discuss. For example, the question of time. It should be determined how much time the Germans would need to transfer eight divisions from Italy to the Soviet front. What should be done to prevent such a transfer? Should not a part of the Allied forces be transferred through the Ljubljana corridor to join up with the Red Army? It would also be necessary to determine the time that would take, and whether it might not be too late to do it.

He, Churchill, had indicated only one of the questions which could be discussed by the staffs. He proposed that General Marshall should make a report on the operations at the Western front whose conduct would be of assistance to the Soviet armies.

Roosevelt agreed with the Prime Minister. He said the Allies had been fighting at a great distance from each other. Germany had shrunk, and that was why closer contact between the staffs of the three countries was of special importance.

Stalin said that was right.

General Marshall declared that the consequences of the German offensive in the Ardennes had been eliminated. In the previous few weeks, General Eisenhower had regrouped his divisions. At

the same time, General Eisenhower had continued to exercise pressure on the enemy in the area of the German counter-offensive. As a result of the operations he had conducted, General Eisenhower had discovered that the Germans had rather big forces in the Ardennes. That was why General Eisenhower had begun to concentrate his forces in the north.

In the southern sector of the front, i.e., to the north of Switzerland, the objective of the planned operation was to throw back the Germans into the area of Mühlhausen and Colmar. The objective of the operations being conducted to the north of Strasbourg was to liquidate the bridgehead on the left bank of the Rhine. At the time, the 25th Army group and the U.S. 9th Army, which were under the command of Montgomery, were preparing for an offensive in the northern sector. The U.S. 9th Army would attack in the north-eastern direction.

The Allied command hoped to start the first of these operations on February 8. The second operation was to start in a week or possibly somewhat earlier. The Allies expected the Germans to retreat to Düsseldorf, after which the Allied troops would move on to Berlin. As many forces were to be moved into this offensive as allowed by the supply facilities. Paratroops would be used. The crossing of the Rhine in the north was expected to be possible in early March. In the north, there were three suitable places for forcing the Rhine.

For a certain time, the operations on the Western front had developed slowly because of the lack of tonnage. Then, following the opening of Antwerp, things were livening up, and the Allies were able to bring in from 70,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo a day, and 12,000 tons of liquid fuel. The Germans were trying to hamper the Allied supply and continued to bombard Antwerp with flying bombs. Information received that day showed that 60 flying bombs and 6 rockets had fallen in the Antwerp area in the previous 24 hours.

Stalin said bombs and rockets rarely hit the target.

Marshall remarked that there was always the possibility of bombs hitting vessels in the port.

He stated that the Allied air force had always been active when the weather permitted. Great destruction had been inflicted by fighters and light and heavy bombers. Information received that day indicated that troop trains on their way to the Soviet-German front had been attacked from the air. Great destruction had been done on the railways north of Strasbourg. Heavy bombers had attacked mainly plants producing fuel to deprive Germany of the possibility of supplying her tanks with fuel. Fuel production in Germany had fallen by 60 per cent. The air force had also been raiding communication lines. Tank works had been heavily raided.

As for the situation in Italy and to the south of Switzerland, he, Marshall, had the following to report. To the south of Switzerland, Germany had one or two divisions, and in Italy, 27 divisions. In Italy, the Allies had a force equal to that of the Germans. In addition, the Allies had an air force in Italy which was destroying the Germans' rolling stock, railways and bridges.

The Germans, Marshall declared, would probably soon resume their submarine offensive because they had produced an improved submarine. The Germans had at the time about 30 submarines at their disposal. Despite the small number of submarines, they could present a serious threat to Allied shipping because the devices developed by the Allies were unable to detect submarines of the improved type. That was why the operations of heavy bombers were directed against the shipyards where submarines were being built. The bomber operations had not detracted from the air force strikes against Germany's industry, in particular, plants making fuel.

Churchill said he would like to hear Field-Marshal Brooke and Admiral Cunningham. The speed of the Soviet advance was at the time highly important, because Danzig was one of the places where many submarines were concentrated.

Stalin asked where else submarines were concentrated.

Churchill replied that it was at Kiel and Hamburg.

Brooke stated that, in his opinion, the Allied plans and operations on the Western front had been given a full exposition.

Churchill said that before the participants in the Conference passed on to other, non-military, questions, he would like to mention one matter relating to the forcing of rivers. The Allies had a special centre for the study of forced river crossings. The officer in command of that centre was then in Yalta. Churchill said they would be grateful if the officer could contact the Soviet military for the purpose of obtaining information on the forcing of rivers. The Russians were known to have great experience, especially in the forcing of ice-bound rivers.

Stalin said he had a number of questions to ask. He would like to know the length of the front on which the breakthrough was to be made.

Marshall replied that the breakthrough was to be made on a front between 50 and 60 miles long.

Stalin asked whether the Germans had any fortifications on the front where the breakthrough was being planned.

Marshall replied that the Germans had built heavy-type fortifications in that sector of the front.

Stalin asked whether the Allies would have the reserves to exploit the success.

Marshall replied in the affirmative.

Stalin said he had asked the question because the Soviet command was aware of the great importance of reserves. That had become especially clear during the winter campaign. He would like to ask how many tank divisions the Allies had concentrated in the sector of the planned breakthrough. During the winter breakthrough, the Soviet command had concentrated about 9,000 tanks in the central sector of the front.

Marshall replied that he did not know that, but there would be one tank division for three infantry divisions, i.e., about 10-12 tank divisions for 35 divisions.

Stalin asked how many tanks there were in an Allied division.

Marshall replied: 300 tanks.

Churchill noted that on the entire West European theatre the Allies had 10,000 tanks.

Stalin said that was a great deal. On the front of the main attack the Soviet command had concentrated between 8,000 and 9,000 planes. He asked how many planes the Allies had.

Portal replied that the Allies had nearly as many planes, including 4,000 bombers, each of which was capable of carrying a bomb-load of from 3 to 5 tons.

Stalin asked what superiority the Allies had in infantry. On the front of the main attack the Soviet command had a superiority in infantry of 100 divisions to the Germans' 80.

Churchill declared that the Allies had never had any great superiority in infantry, but the Allies had at times had very great superiority in the air.

Stalin said the Soviet command had great superiority in artillery. He asked whether the Allies were interested to learn how Soviet artillery operated. Stalin said that the Soviet people, being the Allies' comrades-in-arms, could exchange experience with them. A year before, the Soviet command had established a special breakthrough artillery force. It had produced good results. An artillery division had from 300 to 400 guns. For example, on a front of 35-40 kilometres Marshal Konev had had six artillery breakthrough divisions supplemented with corps artillery. As a result, there had been almost 230 guns per kilometre of the breakthrough. After an artillery barrage, many Germans had been killed, others had been stunned and could not come to for a long time. That had opened the gates for the Red Army. From then on the advance had not been difficult.

He, Stalin, was sorry to have taken up time in relating the above. Stalin said he had expressed the wishes in respect of how the Allied armies could help the Soviet forces. He would like to know what wishes the Allies had in respect of the Soviet forces.

Churchill stated that he would like to take the opportunity to express his profound admiration for the might the Red Army had demonstrated in its offensive.

Stalin said that was not a wish.

Churchill declared that the Allies were aware of the difficulty of their task and did not minimise it. But the Allies were confident they would cope with their task. All the Allied commanders were confident of that. Although the attack was to be made against the Germans' strongest point, the Allies were sure that it would be a success and would be of benefit to the operations of the Soviet forces. As for any wishes, the Allies wanted the offensive of the Soviet armies to continue just as successfully.

Roosevelt declared that he was in agreement with Churchill.

Stalin said the Red Army's offensive, for which Churchill had expressed his gratitude, was in fulfilment of a comradely duty. According to the decisions adopted at the Tehran Conference, the Soviet Government had been under no obligation to launch a winter offensive.

The President had asked him whether he, Stalin, could receive a representative of General Eisenhower. He, Stalin, had naturally given his consent. Churchill had sent him a message, asking him whether he, Stalin, was planning to start an offensive in January. He, Stalin, had realised that neither Churchill nor Roosevelt were asking him outright for an offensive; he had appreciated this tact on the part of the Allies, but he had seen that such an offensive had been necessary for the Allies. The Soviet command had started its offensive even before the planned date. The Soviet Government had considered that to be its duty, the duty of an ally, although it was under no formal obligation on this score. He, Stalin, would like the leaders of the Allied Powers to take into account that Soviet leaders did not merely fulfil their obligations but were also prepared to fulfil their moral duty as far as possible.

As for the wishes, he asked about them because Tedder had expressed the wish that the Soviet forces should not stop their offensive until the end of March. He, Stalin, understood this to be possibly the wish not only of Tedder, but also of other Allied military leaders. Stalin said that the Soviet forces would continue their offensive, if the weather permitted and the roads were passable.

Roosevelt stated that he was in complete agreement with the opinion of Marshal Stalin. At the conference in Tehran it had been impossible to draw up a common plan of operations. He, Roosevelt, took it that each Ally was morally bound to advance with the utmost possible speed. At the time of the Tehran Conference there had been a great distance between the Allied forces moving from the East and the West. But the time had come when it was necessary to co-ordinate more thoroughly the operations of the Allied forces.

Churchill declared that he welcomed the words of Marshal Stalin. He, Churchill, believed he could say the following on behalf of the President and himself. The reason why the Allies had not concluded at Tehran any agreement with the Soviet Union on future operations, was their confidence in the Soviet people and its military.

Roosevelt replied that the Tehran Conference had been held before his re-election. It had been still unknown whether or not the American people would be on his side... that was why it had been hard to draw up any common military plan....

Churchill said the question raised by Tedder in his talk with Marshal Stalin could subsequently be discussed by the Allied staffs. Churchill said that the three leaders could, of course, be criticised for failing to co-ordinate the Allied offensives. If the weather hampered the operations of the Soviet forces, perhaps the Allies would then attack on their front. But that question must be decided by the staffs.

Stalin said there was lack of co-ordination. The Soviet forces had stopped their offensive in the autumn. Just then the Allies started their offensive. At the time, it was the other way round. In future, that should be avoided. Stalin asked whether it was expedient for the Allied military to discuss plans for summer operations.

Churchill said that might possibly have to be done. The Allied military could deal with the military questions while the leaders dealt with the political ones.

Stalin replied that that was right.

Cunningham said that he would like to supplement General Marshall's report. The threat of a fresh outbreak of submarine warfare on the part of the Germans was potential rather than actual. The Germans had achieved great success in improving their submarines. But that was not so important. What was important was that the Germans were already building new-type submarines. The submarines would be fitted out with the latest technical devices, and would have a great speed under water. The naval forces would, therefore, find it very hard to fight them. The German submarines were being built at Bremen, Hamburg and Danzig. If he, Cunningham, could express one wish, it was that, as a representative of the naval department, he would like to ask the Soviet forces to take Danzig as soon as possible, because 30 per cent of submarine construction was concentrated there.

Roosevelt asked whether Danzig was within the range of Soviet artillery.

Stalin replied that Danzig was not yet within the range of Soviet artillery. The Soviet command hoped soon to approach Danzig to within the range of artillery fire.

Churchill said the military could meet the next morning.

Stalin said he was in agreement with that. He proposed that the meeting be set for 12 o'clock.

Churchill declared that at the meeting the military should discuss not only the situation on the Eastern and Western fronts, but also on the Italian front, and also the question how best to use the available forces. He, Churchill, also proposed that a meeting be fixed for the next day to discuss political questions, namely, the future of Germany, if she had any.

Stalin replied that Germany would have a future.

Source: <https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/Stalin/yalta.htm#First>

Second Sitting at Livadia Palace. February 5, 1945

Roosevelt stated that the sitting would be devoted to political affairs. Questions pertaining to Germany ought to be selected. The questions of a world character – such as those of Dakar and Indochina – could be postponed. One of the questions that had already come up before the Allied Governments was that of occupation zones. It was a matter not of permanent but of temporary occupation. The question was becoming more and more urgent.

Stalin said that he would like the sitting to discuss the following questions. First, the proposals to dismember Germany¹. There had been an exchange of opinion on the point at Tehran, and then between him, Stalin, and Churchill, in Moscow in October 1944. No decisions had been adopted either in Tehran or Moscow. Some opinion should be arrived at on the question at the Conference.

There was also another question relating to Germany: should Germany be allowed any central government, or should the Allies confine themselves to the establishment of an administration in Germany or, if it was decided, after all, to dismember Germany, should several governments be established there, depending on the number of parts into which Germany would be split up? These points had to be cleared up.

The third question related to unconditional surrender. They all stood on the basis of the unconditional surrender of Germany. But he, Stalin, would like to know whether or not the Allies would leave the Hitler Government in power if it surrendered unconditionally. The one excluded the other. But if that was so, as much should be said. The Allies had the experience of the surrender of Italy, but there they had had the concrete demands which constituted the content of the unconditional surrender. Were not the three Allies going to determine the concrete content of the unconditional surrender of Germany? That question too should be cleared up.

Finally, there was the question of reparations, Germany's compensation for losses, and the question of the amount of the indemnity.

He, Stalin, raised all those questions in addition to the questions put forward by the President.

Roosevelt declared that, as he saw it, the questions raised by Marshal Stalin referred to a permanent state of affairs. However, they flowed from the question of occupation zones in Germany. The zones might prove to be the first step in the dismemberment of Germany.

Stalin declared that if the Allies intended to dismember Germany they should say so. There had been two exchanges of opinion between the Allies on the dismemberment of Germany after her military defeat. The first time at Tehran, when the President had proposed that Germany should be divided into five parts. At Tehran the Prime Minister too had stood for a dismemberment of Germany, although he had hesitated. But that had been only an exchange of opinion.

The second time the question of Germany's dismemberment had been discussed between him, Stalin, and the Prime Minister in Moscow the previous October. Under discussion had been the British plan for the division of Germany into two states: Prussia with her provinces and Bavaria, with the Ruhr and Westphalia being placed under international control. But no decision had been taken in Moscow, nor had it been possible to take one, because the President had not been present in Moscow.

Churchill declared that he agreed in principle to the dismemberment of Germany, but the method of demarcating the frontiers of the separate parts of Germany was too complicated for the question to be settled there in a matter of five or six days. It would take a very thorough study of the historical, ethnic and economic factors, and weeks of discussions of the question in a subcommittee or committee which would be set up for a detailed elaboration of the proposals and submission of rec-

¹ Proposals on the dismemberment of Germany were first submitted at meetings of the heads of the Three Powers by the United States and Britain at the Tehran Conference. – Ed.

ommendations in respect of the mode of action. The talks the heads of the three Governments had had on the question at Tehran, and the subsequent unofficial talks he, Churchill, had had with Marshal Stalin in Moscow, had been a most general approach to the question, without any precise plan.

He, Churchill, would be unable to give an immediate answer to the question as to how to divide Germany. He could merely hint at what he thought would be the most expedient way of doing it. But he, Churchill, would have to reserve the right to modify his opinion when he received the recommendations of commissions studying the matter. He, Churchill, had in mind the strength of Prussia, the tap-root of all evil. It was quite understandable that if Prussia were separated from Germany, her capability for starting a new war would be greatly restricted. He personally believed that the establishment of another big German state in the south, with a capital at Vienna, would provide a dividing line between Prussia and the rest of Germany. The population of Germany would be equally divided between those two states.

There were other questions which had to be examined. First of all, they agreed that Germany should lose a part of the territory most of which had already been captured by the Russian forces, and which should be given to the Poles. There were also questions relating to the Rhine valley, the frontier between France and Germany, and the question of possession of the industrial areas of the Ruhr and the Saar, which had a war potential (in the sense of a possible manufacture of weapons there). Were the areas to be handed over to countries, such as France, or were they to be left under a German administration, or was control over them to be set up by a world organisation in the form of a condominium over a long but specified period? All that required examination. He, Churchill, had to say he was unable to express any definite ideas on the question on behalf of his Government. The British Government must co-ordinate its plans with those of the Allies.

Finally, there was the question of whether Prussia was to be subjected to an internal fragmentation after she was isolated from the rest of Germany. Talks on the matter had been held at Tehran. It appeared that one question could be decided very swiftly, namely, the establishment of an apparatus to examine all the questions. Such an apparatus would have to submit reports to the Governments before the Governments took any final decisions.

He, Churchill, would like to say that the Allies were rather well prepared to accept an immediate surrender of Germany. All the details of such a surrender had been worked out and were known to the three Governments. There remained the question of reaching official agreement on the zones of occupation and on the control machinery in Germany. Assuming that Germany would surrender within a month, or six weeks, or six months, the Allies would only have to occupy Germany by zones.

Stalin said that was not clear. Some group, like Badoglio in Italy, might say it had overthrown the Government. Would the Allies be prepared to deal with such a government?

Eden said the group would be presented with the terms of surrender which had been agreed upon by the European Advisory Commission.

Churchill stated that he would like to project the possible course of events. Germany was no longer able to wage the war. He proposed to assume that Hitler or Himmler made a proposal of surrender. It was clear that the Allies would tell them that they would not negotiate with them because they were war criminals. If they were the only men in Germany, the Allies would continue the war. It was more probable that Hitler would try to hide or would be killed as a result of a coup in Germany, and another government would be set up there which would propose surrender. In that case, the Allies must immediately consult with each other on whether or not they could talk with those men in Germany. If they decided that they could, those men should be told the terms of surrender. Should the Allies decide that that group of men was unfit to negotiate with, they would continue the war and occupy the whole country. If those new men made their appearance and signed an unconditional surrender on the terms dictated to them, there would be no need to tell them of their future. Unconditional surrender would

give the Allies the opportunity to present additional demands to the Germans on the dismemberment of Germany.

Stalin declared that the demand for dismemberment was not an additional, but a highly essential one.

Churchill said it was, of course, an important demand. But he, Churchill, did not believe it must be presented to the Germans at the first stage. The Allies should come to a precise agreement on this point.

Stalin said that that was why he had raised the question.

Churchill said that although the Allies could study the question of dismemberment, he did not think it would be possible to reach a precise agreement on it just then. The matter required study. In his, Churchill's, opinion, that kind of question was more suitable for examination at a peace conference.

Roosevelt declared that it seemed to him Marshal Stalin had not received an answer to his question of whether or not they were going to dismember Germany. He, Roosevelt, believed that the question should be decided in principle, and the details could be left for the future.

Stalin remarked that that was right.

Roosevelt continued that the Prime Minister had said that at the time it was impossible to determine the frontiers of the separate parts of Germany and that the whole question required study. That was right. But the most important thing was still to decide at the Conference the main question whether or not the Allies agreed to dismember Germany. Roosevelt believed it would be well to present the Germans with the terms of surrender and, in addition, to tell them that Germany was to be dismembered. At Tehran, Roosevelt had spoken in favour of a decentralised administration in Germany. During his stay in Germany 40 years before, decentralised administration had still been a fact: Bavaria or Hessen had had a Bavarian or Hessen Government. They had been real Governments. The word "Reich" had not yet existed. But over the previous 20 years, the decentralised administration had been gradually abolished. The whole of the administration had been concentrated at Berlin. It was utopian to talk of plans for a decentralised Germany. That was why, under the conditions, Roosevelt saw no other way out except dismemberment. How many parts were there to be? Six, seven or less? He would not venture to say anything

definite on the score. The question had to be studied. But there, in the Crimea, agreement should be reached on whether the Allies were going to tell the Germans that Germany was to be dismembered.

Churchill stated that, in his opinion, there was no need to inform the Germans of the future policy to be conducted in respect of their country. The Germans should be told they would have to await further Allied demands after they surrendered. These further demands would be made on the Germans by mutual agreement between the Allies. As for dismemberment, he, Churchill, believed that such a decision could not be adopted in a matter of a few days. The Allies were dealing with an 80-million people and it would certainly take more than 30 minutes to settle the question of their future. A commission might take a month to work out the question in detail.

Roosevelt said that the Premier introduced the time factor into the question. If the question of dismemberment were to be publicly debated, there would be hundreds of plans. That was why he, Roosevelt, proposed that within the next 24 hours the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs should draw up a plan of procedure to study the dismemberment of Germany and then a detailed plan for the dismemberment of Germany could be drawn up within 30 days.

Churchill declared that the British Government was prepared to accept the principle of Germany's dismemberment and to set up a commission to study the procedure of dismemberment.

Stalin said he had raised the question to clarify what the Allies wanted. Events would develop towards Germany's disaster. Germany was losing the war, and her defeat would be hastened as a result

of an early Allied offensive. In addition to a military catastrophe, Germany might suffer an internal catastrophe, because she would have neither coal nor grain. Germany had already lost the Dabrowa coal basin, and the Ruhr would soon be under Allied gun fire. With events developing as rapidly as that, he, Stalin, would not like the Allies to be caught unawares. He had raised the question so that the Allies should be prepared for the events. He fully understood Churchill's considerations that it was hard to draw up a plan for the dismemberment of Germany at the time. That was correct. Nor did he propose that a concrete plan should be drawn up immediately. But the matter should be settled in principle and recorded in the terms of the unconditional surrender.

Churchill declared that an unconditional surrender precluded any armistice agreement. Unconditional surrender was the terms on which military operations were to be terminated. Those who signed the terms of an unconditional surrender submitted to the will of the victors.

Stalin said that terms of surrender were nonetheless signed.

Churchill replied in the affirmative and called attention to Article 12 of the terms of Germany's unconditional surrender worked out by the European Advisory Commission.

Roosevelt noted that the article said nothing at all about Germany's dismemberment.

Stalin said that that was right.

Churchill asked whether the terms of the armistice were to be published.

Stalin replied that the terms would not be made public for the time being, they existed for the Allies and would be presented to the German Government when the time came. The Allies would decide when they were to be made public. The Allies were doing the same thing with Italy, whose terms of surrender would be made public when they deemed it necessary.

Roosevelt asked whether the Germans would be given a government or an administration by the Allies. If Germany was dismembered, each of her parts would have an administration subordinate to the corresponding Allied command.

Churchill said that he did not know that. He, Churchill, found it hard to go beyond the statement made that the British Government was prepared to accept the principle of Germany's dismemberment and the establishment of a commission to work out a plan of dismemberment.

Roosevelt asked whether Churchill was prepared to supplement Article 12 with words about the dismemberment of Germany.

Churchill replied that he was prepared to have the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs examine Article 12 for the purpose of determining the possibility of including the words "dismemberment of Germany" or some other formulation in the Article.

[A decision was taken to instruct the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to examine the question.]

Churchill said the question of a government in Germany could be discussed.

Stalin stated that he preferred to discuss the question of reparations.

Roosevelt agreed and said there were two sides to the reparations question. First, the small countries, like Denmark, Norway and Holland, would also want to receive reparations from Germany. Secondly, the question arose of making use of German manpower. He, Roosevelt, wanted to ask what quantity of German manpower the Soviet Union would like to have. As for the United States of America, it needed neither German machinery nor German manpower.

Stalin replied that the Soviet Government had a plan for material reparations. As for the use of German manpower, the Soviet Government was not yet prepared to discuss that question.

Churchill asked whether he could have some information about the Soviet reparations plan.

Stalin said he would let Maisky speak on the question.

Maisky stated that the material reparations plan was based on several key principles.

The first principle was that the reparations were to be received from Germany not in money, as had been the case after the previous world war, but in kind.

The second principle was that Germany was to make its payments in kind in two forms, namely, (a) lump withdrawals from Germany's national wealth, both on the territory of Germany proper and outside, at the end of the war (factories, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, investments in foreign enterprises, etc.), and (b) annual goods deliveries after the end of the war.

The third principle was in short that by way of reparations payments Germany was to be economically disarmed, as otherwise security in Europe could not be ensured. Concretely this meant the removal of 80 per cent of the equipment from Germany's heavy industry (steel, engineering, metalworking, electrical engineering, chemistry, etc.). Aircraft factories and plants producing synthetic fuel were to be removed 100 per cent. All specialised military enterprises (arms factories, munitions plants, etc.) which had existed before the war or had been built during the war, were equally to be removed 100 per cent. The Soviet Government believed that the 20 per cent of Germany's pre-war heavy industry which was to remain, would be quite sufficient to cover the country's actual economic requirements.

The fourth principle was that the reparations period was set at 10 years, with removals from national wealth to be made within two years after the end of the war.

The fifth principle was that for the purpose of precise fulfilment by Germany of her reparations obligations, and also in the interests of security in Europe, strict Anglo-Soviet-American control must be established over the German economy. The forms of control were to be worked out later. But in any case, provision was to be made that the industrial, transport and other enterprises remaining in Germany which constituted the greatest danger from the standpoint of a possible revival of Germany's war potential were to be internationalised, with the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain participating in their administration. Control over the German economy was to be maintained after the expiry of the period of the reparations payments, i.e., after the first 10 years following the end of the war.

The sixth principle was that in view of the unprecedented immensity of the damage caused by the German aggression, it would be impossible to make it good fully even with the strictest exaction of reparations from Germany. The Soviet Government had tried to make a rough estimate of the scale of the damage – the figures obtained were quite astronomical. That was why the Soviet Government had arrived at the conclusion that if the Allies were to be realistic, only that type of damage should be subject to indemnification which could be characterised as direct material loss (destruction of or damage to houses, plants, railways, research institutions; confiscation of cattle, grain, private property of citizens, etc.). But since Soviet preliminary estimates, under the head of direct material losses alone, had yielded a total amount of damage in excess of the amount of possible reparations by way of direct removal and annual post-war deliveries, it would apparently be necessary to establish a certain priority in the receipt of compensation by countries which had the right to it. That priority was to be based on two indicators: (a) the size of the country's contribution to the victory over the enemy, and (b) the amount of direct material losses suffered by that country. Countries having the highest indicators under both heads were to receive reparations first, and the rest, later.

The seventh principle was that the U.S.S.R. considered it fair to receive at least \$10,000 million in compensation for its direct material losses, through removals and annual deliveries. That was, of course, only a very insignificant portion of the total amount of direct material losses suffered by the Soviet Union, but in the circumstances the Soviet Government was ready to be satisfied with that figure.

Finally, the eighth principle was that a special Reparations Commission, consisting of representatives of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and Great Britain should be set up, with headquarters in Moscow, to work out a detailed Allied reparations plan on the basis of the principles set forth above.

Such, in brief outline, was the material reparations plan which the Soviet Government placed before the Conference for discussion and approval.

Churchill said he well remembered the end of the previous war. Although he, Churchill, had not directly participated in framing the peace terms, he had access to all the conferences. The repara-

tions had proved to be highly disappointing. Only £1,000 million had been with great effort got out of Germany. But even that amount would not have been obtained but for U.S. and British investments in Germany. Britain had taken from Germany a few old ocean liners, and with the money Germany got from Britain, she built herself a new fleet. He, Churchill, hoped that Britain would not face similar difficulties again.

Churchill had no doubt at all that Russia's sacrifices were greater than those of any other country. He had always believed that the removal of plants from Germany would be a correct step. But he was also quite sure it would be impossible to receive from a defeated and destroyed Germany the quantity of values which would compensate for the losses sustained by Russia alone. He doubted that £250 million a year could be extracted from Germany. At the end of the previous war, the British had also dreamed of astronomical figures – but what had been the result?

Great Britain had suffered very heavily in the current war. A great part of her houses had been destroyed or damaged. Britain had sold all her investments abroad. Britain had to export goods to import foodstuffs; she had to buy abroad half of the food she needed. Fighting for the common cause, Britain had run into heavy debt, apart from Lend-Lease. Britain's total debt was £3,000 million. No other country among the victors would find herself in such a difficult economic and financial position at the end of the war as Great Britain. If he, Churchill, saw the possibility of maintaining the British economy through the exaction of reparations from Germany, he would resolutely take that way. But he was doubtful of success.

Other countries had also suffered great destruction. Holland was flooded. Norway had suffered heavily. True, their population was not big.

Moreover, what was going to happen to Germany? Churchill saw the spectre of a starving Germany with her 80 million population. Who was going to feed her? Who was going to pay for that? Wouldn't the Allies eventually have to cover a part of the reparations from their own pocket?

Stalin remarked that all those questions would certainly come up sooner or later.

Churchill said if one wanted to ride a horse one had to feed it with oats and hay.

Stalin replied that the horse should not charge at one.

Churchill admitted his metaphor was not very happy, and said that if one put a car in place of the horse one would still have to fill it up with petrol to use it.

Stalin replied that there was no analogy there. The Germans were men and not machines.

Churchill agreed with that too. Returning to the reparations, Churchill spoke in favour of setting up a Reparations Commission which would deliberate in secret.

Roosevelt declared that he, too, well remembered the previous war, and recalled that the United States had lost a great deal of money. It had loaned Germany more than \$10,000 million, but it would not repeat its old mistakes. The United States had no intention of using German manpower. The United States did not want any German machine tools. At the end of the previous war, there had been many German assets and German property in the United States. All that had been returned to the Germans.

He, Roosevelt, believed that things would be different after the current war. A special law might have to be issued under which all German property in the United States would remain in American hands. Roosevelt agreed with Churchill that some thought should be given to Germany's future. But despite the generosity of the United States, which was helping other countries, the United States was unable to guarantee the future of Germany. The United States did not want German living standards to be higher than those in the U.S.S.R. The United States wanted to help the Soviet Union to obtain everything necessary from Germany. The Americans wanted to help the British to increase their exports and find new market outlets to replace Germany.

Roosevelt believed that the time was ripe to set up a Reparations Commission to study the needs of the U.S.S.R. and the other European countries. He agreed to have the Commission work in Moscow.

Roosevelt very much hoped that everything destroyed in the Soviet Union could be made good. But he was also sure that it would be impossible to cover everything by reparations. Germany should be left with enough industry to keep the Germans from dying of starvation.

Churchill declared that he had no objections to the Reparations Commission being in Moscow.

Maisky said that he would like to reply briefly to Churchill and Roosevelt. In his remarks he intended to deal with three main points.

First, the question on which Churchill had dwelt specifically – the failure of reparations after the previous war. Indeed, that experience had proved to be extremely unsatisfactory. But why? The reason had not been that the total amount of reparations levied on Germany had been excessive. Actually, the amount had been very modest: \$30,000 million spread over a period of 58 years. Was that a great deal? According to the state of her national wealth and national income, Germany could have very easily paid such a sum. The trouble had been, however, that the Allies had wanted Germany to pay reparations chiefly in money, and not in kind. Germany had had to find ways of obtaining the necessary amount of foreign exchange. That, for various reasons, had turned out to be a very difficult task. There would have been no complications at all if the Allies had been prepared to receive reparations in kind. But the Allies had not wanted that. As a result, there had arisen an insoluble transfer problem, i.e., the conversion of German marks into pounds, dollars and francs, and that problem had killed the reparations after the previous war.

There was another factor which had greatly contributed to the failure of reparations after 1914-1918; it had been the policy of the United States, Britain and France. They had invested large amounts of capital in Germany, thereby encouraging the Germans not to fulfil their reparations obligations. Eventually, Germany has repaid, in the form of reparations, only about one-fourth of the amount the British, Americans and French had loaned Germany in the first years after the 1914-1918 war.

That was the root cause of the failure of the previous reparations. To avoid the difficulties of transfer, it was proposed that all reparations should be paid in kind. It was also hoped that the United States and Britain would not again finance Germany after the end of the war. [Roosevelt and Churchill indicated by gestures and exclamations that they intended to do nothing of the sort.] In the circumstances, there was no reason to draw pessimistic conclusions for the new reparations from the unfortunate experience of the old.

Secondly, Churchill had indicated that the reparations figure claimed by the U.S.S.R. would be excessive for Germany. That was hardly fair. In effect, what did the figure of \$10,000 million represent? It constituted only 10 per cent of the Federal budget of the United States for 1944/45. [Stettinius: "Absolutely correct".] It was also equal to one and a quarter of the U.S. Federal peacetime budget (for example, in the period between 1936 and 1938). As to Britain, the same figure of \$10,000 million was equal to no more than Great Britain's war spending over a period of six months, or two and a half times her national peacetime budget (1936-1938).

In that case, was it right to say that the Soviet Union's claims were excessive? It was not. Rather, they were much too modest. But that modesty sprang from the Soviet Government's desire to have no illusions and keep both feet on the ground.

Thirdly, Roosevelt and Churchill had stressed the need to prevent a famine in Germany. The Soviet Government had no intention at all of stripping and starving Germany. On the contrary, in working out its reparations plan, the Soviet Government had always had in mind the creation of conditions in which the German people in the post-war years could exist on the basis of the average European living standard, and the Soviet reparations plan ensured such a possibility. Germany had every chance of building her post-war economy on the basis of an expanding agriculture and light industries. There were all the conditions for it. The Soviet reparations plan provided no special restrictions in respect of the two branches of the German economy just named.

Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that post-war Germany would be entirely free from arms expenditure, because she would be completely disarmed. This would yield a great saving: after all, pre-war Germany had spent, in various forms, up to \$6,000 million a year on armaments. [Churchill exclaims: "Yes, that is a very important consideration!"] That was why the Soviet Government was convinced that even if the Soviet reparations plan was implemented in full the German people would be ensured a decent life.

Both Churchill and Roosevelt could see from the above that the Soviet reparations plan was thoroughly conceived and based on quite sober and realistic calculations.

Churchill stated that in his opinion all these questions should be examined in commission.

Stalin asked where.

Churchill said a secret commission should be set up, and nothing of its deliberations should be made public.

Stalin replied that nothing would be published about the work of the commission. But the question was where Churchill wanted to set up such a commission. Was it at the Conference?

Churchill replied that there was no need for that at the time. The Conference should merely adopt a decision on the establishment of a Reparations Commission, which would subsequently examine the claims and the assets at Germany's disposal, and also establish the priority in their allocation. It would be desirable to fix the priority with an eye not only to a nation's contribution to the cause of victory, but also the suffering it had gone through. The U.S.S.R. headed the list, whatever the criterion. Any contradictions that might arise in the Commission should be settled by the Governments. As for the Russian reparations plan, it would take time to examine it. It could not be accepted at once.

Roosevelt said that the Reparations Commission should consist of representatives of the three Powers.

Churchill supported Roosevelt's proposal.

Stalin stated that the setting up of a Reparations Commission in Moscow, something all those present had accepted, was a very good thing. But that was not enough. Even the best of commissions could not do much unless it had the proper guidelines for its work. The guidelines should be laid down there, at the Conference.

He, Stalin, believed that the main principle underlying the allocation of reparations should be the following: the states which had borne the main burden of the war and organised the victory over the enemy should be the first to receive reparations. Those states were the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain. Compensation must be received not only by the Russians, but also by the Americans and the British, and to the greatest possible extent. If the United States, as Roosevelt said, was not interested in obtaining machinery or manpower from Germany, other more suitable forms of reparations could be found, for example, raw materials, etc. At any rate, it should be firmly established that those who had made the greatest contribution to the enemy's defeat had a prior right to reparations. Stalin asked whether Roosevelt and Churchill agreed with that.

Roosevelt declared that he agreed.

Churchill did not object either.

Stalin then said that in estimating the assets available in Germany for the payment of reparations, it was not the obtaining situation that should be taken as a starting point but the resources Germany would have after the end of the war, when all her population returned home, and the factories started operating. Germany would then have more assets than she had at the time, and the states of which he had spoken could expect to have very considerable compensation for their damage. The three Ministers of Foreign Affairs would do well to discuss all that and then report to the Conference.

Churchill agreed that the Conference should indicate the main points of the directives for the Commission.

Stalin replied that he considered that to be correct.

Churchill said half in jest that if he seemed to be recalcitrant in discussing the question of reparations it was only because at home he had a Parliament and a Cabinet. If they refused to accept what Churchill had accepted at the Crimea Conference they might drive him out.

Stalin replied, in the same vein, that that was not so easy: victors were not driven out.

Churchill remarked that the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs could discuss the question of reparations the next day and later report to the Conference. He, Churchill, liked the principle: to each according to his needs, and from Germany according to her abilities. That principle should be made the basis of the reparations plan.

Stalin replied that he preferred another principle: to each according to his deserts.

Source: <https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/Stalin/yalta.htm#First>

Third Sitting at Livadia Palace. February 6, 1945

[...] Roosevelt declared that a discussion of the question of an international security organisation could be started that day. Roosevelt believed it was their task to ensure peace for at least 50 years. In view of the fact that neither he, Roosevelt, nor Marshal Stalin, nor Churchill, had been present at Dumbarton Oaks, it would be a good idea for Stettinius to report on the question.

Stettinius said that an agreement had been reached at Dumbarton Oaks to leave certain questions for further examination and future solution. Of those questions the principal one was that of the voting procedure to be applied in the Security Council. At Dumbarton Oaks, the three delegations had had a thorough discussion of that question. Since then it had been subjected to continued and intensive study on the part of each of the three Governments.

On December 5, 1944, the President had sent Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill a proposal to have the question decided by setting forth Section C of Chapter VI of the proposals, adopted at Dumbarton Oaks in the following manner:

«C. Voting.

«1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

«2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

«3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members: provided that in decisions under Section A of Chapter VIII and under the second phrase of the first paragraph of Section C, Chapter VIII, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.”

The text which he, Stettinius, had just read out contained minor drafting amendments made in accordance with the Soviet and British remarks on the initial text proposed by the President.

The American proposal was in complete accord with the special responsibility of the Great Powers for the maintenance of universal peace. In effect, the American proposal demanded unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all key issues relating to the maintenance of peace, including economic and military enforcement measures.

At the same time, the American proposal recognised the desirability of a direct declaration on the part of the permanent members that the pacific settlement of any dispute that might arise was a matter of general concern, a matter on which the sovereign states which were not permanent members had the right to set forth their views without any limitations whatsoever. Unless such freedom of discussion was ensured in the Council, the establishment of a world organisation, which they all wanted, might be seriously hampered or even made altogether impossible. Without the right of free and full discussion of such matters in the Council, an international security organisation, even if established, would differ greatly from what had been originally intended.

The document which the American delegation had presented to the two other delegations set forth the text of the provisions which he, Stettinius, had read out and a special list of decisions of the Council which, according to the American proposal, would demand unqualified unanimity, and a separate list of matters (in the sphere of disputes and their pacific settlement) on which a party to the dispute must abstain from voting.

From the standpoint of the Government of the United States, there were two important elements in the question of voting procedure.

The first was that for the maintenance of universal peace, which he, Stettinius, had mentioned, unanimity of the permanent members was needed.

The second was that for the people of the United States it was of exceptional importance that fair treatment for all the members of the Organisation be provided for.

The task was to reconcile those two main elements. The proposals made by the President to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5, 1944, provided a reasonable and just solution and combined the two elements satisfactorily.

Roosevelt declared that in his opinion it would be well to have Stettinius list the types of decisions which were to be adopted in the Security Council on the unanimity principle.

Stettinius said that, according to the formula proposed by the President, the following decisions would require an affirmative vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the votes of all the permanent members:

(I) Recommendations to the General Assembly on:

Admission of new members;

Suspension of a member;

Expulsion of a member;

Election of the Secretary-General.

(II) Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.

(III) Elimination of a threat to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:

1. Is the peace endangered as a result of non-settlement of a dispute between the parties by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council?

2. Is there a threat to the peace or breach of the peace from any other action on the part of one or another country?

3. What are the measures to be taken by the Council for the maintenance or restoration of the peace and how are these measures to be implemented?

4. Should not the implementation of enforcement measures be entrusted to a regional body?

(IV) Approval of special agreement or agreements on the provision of armed forces and facilities.

(V) Formulation of plans for a general system of arms regulation and presentation of such plans to the member states.

(VI) Decision on the question whether the nature and activity of a regional body or regional measures for the maintenance of peace and security are compatible with the aims and purposes of the world organisation.

An affirmative vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the votes of all the permanent members, provided, however, that a member of the Council abstained from voting on any decision relating to a dispute to which he was a party, should be required for the following decisions relating to the pacific settlement of a dispute:

(I) Is the dispute or situation brought to the notice of the Council of such a nature that its continuance may endanger the peace?

(II) Should the Council call upon the sides to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice?

(III) Should the Council give recommendations to the sides in respect of the methods and procedures of settlement?

(IV) Should the legal aspects of the matter before the Council be referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion?

(V) In the event there is a regional body for the pacific settlement of local disputes, should the body be requested to deal with the disputes?

Roosevelt believed the question could be discussed and settled. Big and small nations had one and the same purpose, namely, the preservation of peace, and procedural issues should not hamper the attainment of that aim.

Stalin asked what was new in the proposals set forth by Stettinius as compared with what the President had communicated in his message of December 5.

Roosevelt replied that those proposals were similar, with only minor drafting amendments.

Stalin asked what drafting amendments had been made.

Stettinius set forth these drafting amendments.

Molotov declared that the Soviet delegation also attached great importance to the questions raised and would like to study Stettinius's proposal. That was why he proposed that the discussion of the question be postponed until the next day's sitting.

Churchill remarked that he agreed with that. There should be no undue haste in the study of such an important matter. Its discussion could be postponed until the next day. He had not been quite satisfied with the initial proposals worked out at Dumbarton Oaks, because he had not been quite sure that those proposals had taken full account of the real position of the three Great Powers. After studying the President's new proposals, Churchill's doubts had disappeared, at any rate, as far as the British Commonwealth of Nations and the British Empire were concerned. That also applied to the independent dominions of the British Crown.

Churchill recognised that the question of whether the peace would be built on sound foundations depended on the friendship and co-operation of the three Great Powers; however, the Allies would be putting themselves in a false position and would be unfair to their intentions, if they did not provide for the possibility of the small states freely expressing their claims. Otherwise it would appear that the three chief Powers claimed to rule the world. As it was what they actually wanted was to serve the world and safeguard it from the horrors that had hit most of the nations in the current war. That was why the three Great Powers should show a readiness to submit to the interest of the common cause.

He, Churchill, was naturally thinking primarily of the effect the new situation would have on the future of the British Commonwealth of Nations. He would like to give a concrete example, an example which was a difficult one for Britain – Hong Kong. If the President's proposal was adopted, and China requested the return of Hong Kong, Great Britain would have the right to express her point of view and defend it; however, Great Britain would not be able to take part in voting on the five questions set out at the end of the American document. For her part, China would have the right fully to express her view on the question of Hong Kong, and the Security Council would have to decide on the issue, without the British Government taking part in the voting.

Stalin asked whether Egypt was to be a member of the Assembly.

Churchill replied that Egypt would be a member of the Assembly but not of the Council.

Stalin declared that he would like to take another example, that of the Suez Canal, which was situated on the territory of Egypt.

Churchill asked that his example be examined first. Assuming that the British Government could not agree to the examination of one of the questions dealt with in Paragraph 3, because it considered that the question infringed the sovereignty of the British Empire. In that case, the British Government would be assured of success, because, in accordance with Paragraph 3, every permanent member would have the right to veto the actions of the Security Council. On the other hand, it would be unfair for China not to have the possibility of expressing her view on the substance of the case.

The same applied to Egypt. In the event Egypt raised a question against the British pertaining to the Suez Canal, he, Churchill, would allow the discussion of the question without any apprehension, because British interests were ensured by Paragraph 3, which provided for the right of veto. He

also believed that if Argentina made a claim against the United States, the United States would submit to the established procedure of examination, but the United States would have the right to object and veto any decision by the Security Council. It could apply the Monroe Doctrine.

Roosevelt said that in the Tehran Declaration the three Powers had announced their readiness to accept responsibility for the establishment of a peace that would receive the approval of the peoples of the world.

Churchill stated that for the reasons which he had set forth the British Government did not object to the adoption of the U.S. proposals. Churchill believed it would be undesirable to create the impression that the three Powers wanted to dominate the world, without letting the other countries express their opinion.

Stalin declared that he would first of all ask that the Soviet delegation be handed the document which Stettinius had read out, because it was hard to study the proposals it contained by ear. To him, Stalin, it seemed that the said document was a commentary on the President's proposals.

Referring to the interpretation of the American proposals made at the sitting, Stalin said it seemed to him the Dumbarton Oaks decisions had aimed to ensure various countries not only the right to voice their opinion. That right was not worth much. No one denied it. The matter was much more serious. If any nation raised a question of great importance to it, it would do so not only to have the opportunity to set out its view, but to obtain a decision on it. None of those present would dispute the right of nations to speak in the Assembly. But that was not the heart of the matter. Churchill apparently believed that if China raised the question of Hong Kong, her only desire would be to speak out. That was not so. China would demand a decision. In much the same way, if Egypt raised the question of a return of the Suez Canal she would not be content with voicing her opinion on the matter. Egypt would demand a solution of the question. That was why the question was not just of ensuring the possibility of voicing one's opinions, but of much more important things.

Churchill expressed the apprehension that there might be an impression that the three Great Powers wanted to dominate the world. But who was contemplating such domination? Was it the United States? No, it was not thinking of that. [The President laughed and made an eloquent gesture.] Was it Britain? No, once again. [Churchill laughed and made an eloquent gesture.] Thus, two Great Powers were beyond suspicion. That left the third – the U.S.S.R. So it was the U.S.S.R. that was striving for world domination? [General laughter.] Or could it be China that was striving for world domination? [General laughter.] It was clear that the talk of striving for world domination was pointless. His friend Churchill could not name a single Power that wanted to dominate the world.

Churchill interposed that he himself did not, of course, believe in the striving for world domination on the part of any of the three Allies. But the position of those Allies was so powerful that others might think so, unless the appropriate preventive measures were taken.

Stalin, continuing his speech, declared that so far two Great Powers had adopted the charter of an international security organisation, which, in the opinion of Churchill, would protect them from being charged with a desire to rule the world. The third Power had not yet given its consent to the charter. However, he would study the proposals formulated by Stettinius, and would possibly see the point more clearly. He believed, however, that the Allies were faced with much more serious problems than the right of nations to express their opinion or the question of the three chief Powers striving for world domination.

Churchill said there was no reason to fear anything undesirable even in the event of the American proposals being adopted. Indeed, so long as they were all alive there was nothing to fear. They would not allow any dangerous divergences between them. They would not permit another aggression against anyone of their countries. But 10 years or possibly less might pass, and they would be gone. There would be a new generation which had not gone through what they had, and which would pos-

sibly view many questions in a different light. What would happen then? They seemed to be setting themselves the task of ensuring peace for at least another 50 years. Or was that the impression he, Stalin, had got because of his naïveté?

The unity of the three Powers was the most important requisite for the preservation of a lasting peace. If such unity was preserved, there was no need to fear the German danger. Thought should, therefore, be given to how best to ensure a united front between the three Powers, to which France and China should be added. That was why the question of the future charter of an international security organisation acquired such importance. It was necessary to create as many obstacles as possible to any divergence between the three chief Powers in future. A charter should be framed that would make it as difficult as possible for conflicts to arise between them. That was the main task.

On the more concrete question of the voting in the Security Council, Stalin asked the conference to excuse him for not having had the time to study the Dumbarton Oaks documents in every detail. He had been very busy with some other matters and hoped to have the indulgence of the British and American delegations.

Roosevelt and Churchill indicated by gestures and exclamations that they were well aware of what Stalin had been doing.

Stalin, continuing, said that, as far as he understood, all conflicts which might be brought up for examination by the Security Council fell into two categories. The first included disputes whose settlement demanded the application of economic, political, military or other kinds of sanctions. The second category included disputes which might be settled by peaceful means, without the application of sanctions. Stalin asked whether his understanding was correct.

Roosevelt and Churchill replied that it was correct.

Stalin then declared that, as far as he had understood it, there was to be freedom of discussion in the examination of conflicts of the first category, but the unanimity of the permanent members of the Council was required in the adoption of a decision. In that case, all the permanent members of the Council should take part in the voting, i.e., the Power which was a party to a dispute would not be asked to leave. As for conflicts of the second category which were to be settled by peaceful means, another procedure was proposed in that case: the Power which was a party to a dispute (including permanent members of the Council) should not take part in the voting. Stalin asked whether his understanding of the provision was correct.

Roosevelt and Churchill again confirmed that Stalin had a fully correct understanding of the provision.

Stalin, concluding, said the Soviet Union was being accused of putting too much emphasis on the question of the voting in the Security Council. The Soviet Union was being reproached for making too much ado on the point. Indeed, the Soviet Union did pay great attention to the voting procedure, because the Soviet Union was most of all interested in the decisions to be adopted by the Security Council. After all, the decisions would be adopted by a vote. Discussions could go on for a hundred years, without deciding anything. But it was the decisions that mattered for the Soviet Union. And not only for it.

He, Stalin, asked those present to return for a moment to the examples given at the sitting. If China demanded the return of Hong Kong or Egypt the return of the Suez Canal, the question would be up for a vote in the Assembly and in the Security Council. Stalin could assure his friend Churchill that China and Egypt would not be alone in that. They would have their friends in an international organisation. That had a direct bearing on the question of voting.

Churchill stated that if the said countries demanded the satisfaction of their claims, Great Britain would say "no". The authority of an international organisation could not be used against the three great Powers.

Stalin asked whether that was in fact the case.

Eden replied that countries might talk and argue but no decision could be adopted without the consent of the three chief Powers.

Stalin asked once again whether that was actually the case.

Churchill and Roosevelt replied in the affirmative.

Stettinius declared that no economic sanctions could be applied by the Security Council without the unanimity of the permanent members.

Molotov asked whether the same applied to recommendations.

Churchill replied that that applied only to those recommendations which were mentioned in the five points formulated at the end of the American document. The international security organisation did not exclude diplomatic relations between the great and the small countries. Diplomatic procedures would continue to exist. It would be wrong to exaggerate the power or to abuse it or to raise questions that could divide the three chief Powers.

Stalin said there was another danger. His colleagues surely remembered that during the Russo-Finnish war the British and the French had roused the League of Nations against the Russians, isolated the Soviet Union and expelled it from the League of Nations, by mobilising everyone against the U.S.S.R. A repetition of such things in future must be precluded.

Eden declared that that could not happen if the American proposals were adopted.

Churchill confirmed that in the said case that kind of danger would be ruled out.

Molotov said that was the first time the Soviet side heard of that.

Roosevelt declared that there could be no recurrence of a case similar to the one mentioned by Marshal Stalin, because the expulsion of a member required the consent of all the permanent members.

Stalin pointed out that even if the adoption of the American proposals made it impossible to expel a member, there still remained the possibility of mobilising public opinion against any one member.

Churchill said he could allow a case when a broad campaign was started against a member, but then diplomacy would be operating at the same time. Churchill did not think that the President would want to come out against Britain or support any action against her. He was confident that Roosevelt would want to stop such attacks. Churchill was also confident that Marshal Stalin would not want to come out against Britain, without having a talk with Britain beforehand. He, Churchill, was confident that a way to settle disputes could always be found. At any rate, he could vouch for himself.

Stalin declared that he, too, could vouch for himself; [half in jest] perhaps Maisky over there would start attacking Britain?

Roosevelt noted that the unity of the Great Powers was one of their aims. He, Roosevelt, believed that the American proposals promoted the attainment of that aim. If any contradictions should unfortunately arise between the Great Powers, they would be known to all the world, despite any voting procedure. At any rate, it was impossible to eliminate the discussion of contradictions in the Assembly. The American Government believed that by allowing freedom of discussion in the Council, the Great Powers would demonstrate to the world the confidence they had in each other.

Stalin replied that that was correct and proposed that the discussion of the question be continued the next day.

Churchill asked whether they could pass on to the Polish question.

Stalin and Roosevelt agreed with Churchill's proposal.

Roosevelt stated that the United States was far away from Poland, and he, Roosevelt, would ask the other two participants in the Conference to set forth their considerations. There were five or six

million persons of Polish origin in the United States. His, Roosevelt's, position, like that of the majority of the Poles resident in the United States, coincided with the position he had set forth in Tehran. He, Roosevelt, stood for the Curzon line. That, in essence, was accepted by most Poles, but the Poles, like the Chinese, were always worried about "losing face".

Stalin asked which Poles were meant, the real ones or the émigrés? The real Poles lived in Poland.

Roosevelt replied that all Poles wanted to get something to "save face". His position as President would be eased if the Soviet Government allowed the Poles the possibility of "saving face". It would be well to examine the question of concessions to the Poles on the southern sector of the Curzon line. He, Roosevelt, did not insist on his proposal, but wanted the Soviet Government to take it into consideration.

The establishment of a permanent government in Poland was the most essential part of the Polish question. Roosevelt believed that public opinion in the United States was opposed to America's recognition of the Lublin Government, because the people of the United States had the impression that the Lublin Government represented only a small part of the Polish people. As far as he was aware, the American people would like to see in Poland a government of national unity, including representatives of all Polish parties: the Workers' or Communist Party, the Peasant Party, the Socialist Party, the National Democratic Party and the others. He, Roosevelt, was not personally acquainted with any member of the Lublin Government or any member of the Polish Government in London. He personally knew only Mikolajczyk. During his visit to Washington, Mikolajczyk gave Roosevelt the impression of being a decent man.

He, Roosevelt, believed it was important to set up a government in Poland that would represent the mass of the people in the country and enjoy their support. It might be only a provisional government. There were many methods of forming such a government and it did not matter which one was chosen. He, Roosevelt, had a proposal to establish a Presidential Council, consisting of a small number of outstanding Poles. That Presidential Council would be entrusted with the task of forming a provisional government of Poland. That was the only proposal he had brought with him from the United States three thousand miles away. Roosevelt added, he hoped, of course, that Poland would have the most friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Stalin said Poland would have friendly relations not only with the Soviet Union but with all the Allies.

Roosevelt said he would like to hear the opinion of Marshal Stalin and Churchill concerning his proposal. Solution of the Polish question would be of great help to the Allied cause.

Churchill said he was authorised to express the British Government's positive attitude to the President's proposal. He had always spoken publicly in Parliament and elsewhere about the British Government's intention to recognise the Curzon line as it was interpreted by the Soviet Government, i.e., with Lvov remaining in the Soviet Union. He, Churchill, and Eden had been much criticised for that, both in Parliament and in the Conservative Party, but he had always believed that after the tragedy Russia had gone through in defending herself against the German aggression, and after the efforts Russia had exerted in the liberation of Poland, the Russian claims to Lvov and the Curzon line were not based on might but on right. Churchill still continued to hold that view.

But Churchill was much more interested in the question of Polish sovereignty and the freedom and independence of Poland than the specification of her frontiers. He wanted the Poles to have a homeland, where they could live as they thought best. He had heard Marshal Stalin announce the same aim several times with the greatest firmness. Since he, Churchill, had always had trust in Marshal Stalin's statements on the sovereignty and independence of Poland, he did not think the question of frontiers was very important.

Great Britain had no material interest in Poland. She had entered the war to defend Poland from the German aggression¹. Great Britain was concerned with Poland because it was a matter of honour for her. Great Britain could never be satisfied with a solution which did not ensure Poland a position in which she could be master of her own house. But he, Churchill, made one reservation: the freedom of Poland should not mean allowing any hostile intentions or intrigues against the Soviet Union on her part. Churchill said Great Britain would not ask to have Poland free if she had any hostile intentions in respect of the Soviet Union.

Churchill hoped that the participants in the Conference would not leave without taking practical measures on the Polish question. There were now two Polish Governments in respect of which the Allies had differing opinions. He, Churchill, had not had any direct contact with the members of the Polish Government in London. Despite the fact that the British Government recognised the Polish Government in London, it did not deem it necessary to meet with members of that Government. But Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski were intelligent and honest men, and the British Government had friendly relations with them.

He, Churchill, asked whether it was possible there to set up a Polish Government like that the President had spoken about, until the time the Polish people could freely elect a government which would be recognised by the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States and the other United Nations recognising the Polish Government in London. Churchill believed the establishment of the body of which the President had spoken would pave the way for the elaboration by the Polish people of their constitution and the election of their administration. If that could be done, a great step would be made towards peace and welfare in Central Europe. Churchill supported the President's proposal. But, of course, Churchill added, the Red Army's communication lines had to be ensured in all circumstances.

Stalin said that as Churchill had just stated, for the British Government the question of Poland was one of honour. Stalin understood that. For his part, however, he had to say that for the Russians the question of Poland was not only one of honour but of security as well. It was a question of honour because in the past the Russians had greatly sinned against Poland. The Soviet Government was trying to atone for those sins. It was a question of security because the most important strategic problems of the Soviet state were connected with Poland.

The point was not only that Poland was a neighbouring country. That, of course, was important, but the essence of the problem lay much deeper. Throughout history, Poland had always been a corridor for an enemy attacking Russia. Suffice it to recall only the previous 30 years: in that period, the Germans twice went across Poland to attack Russia. Why had the enemies crossed Poland so easily until then? Chiefly because Poland has been weak. The Polish corridor could not be closed mechanically only by Russian forces on the outside. It could be reliably locked only from the inside, by Poland's own forces. For that Poland must be strong. That was why the Soviet Union had a stake in creating a powerful, free and independent Poland. The question of Poland was a question of life and death for the Soviet state.

Hence the sharp turn from the policy of tsarism the Soviet Union had made in respect of Poland. The tsarist Government was known to have tried to assimilate Poland. The Soviet Government had ab-

¹ Here Churchill obviously erred against the truth. When Hitler Germany attacked Poland on September 1, 1939, Britain, formally declaring war on Germany, did nothing to implement her guarantees given Poland earlier. Churchill himself wrote in his memoirs: «Astonishment was world-wide, when Hitler's crashing onslaught upon Poland and the declarations of war upon Germany by Britain and France were followed only by a prolonged and oppressive pause.... We contented ourselves with dropping pamphlets to rouse the Germans to a higher morality. This strange phase of the war on land and in the air astounded everyone. France and Britain remained impassive while Poland was in a few weeks destroyed or subjugated by the whole might of the German war machine. Hitler had no reason to complain of this.» (W. Churchill, *The Second World War. The Gathering Storm*, Boston, 1948, pp. 422-423.) – Ed.

solutely changed that inhuman policy and had taken the road of friendship with Poland and of safeguarding her independence. That was where the reasons lay for the Russian desire to have a strong, independent and free Poland.

Then about some of the specific questions which had been dealt with during the discussion and on which there were differences.

First of all, about the Curzon Line. He, Stalin, felt bound to remark that the Curzon Line had not been invented by the Russians. It had been produced by Curzon, Clemenceau, and the Americans who had taken part in the Paris Conference of 1919. The Russians had not been present at that conference. The Curzon Line had been adopted on the basis of ethnic data, contrary to the will of the Russians. Lenin had not accepted that Line. He had not wanted to give Poland Belostok and Belostok Region, which in accordance with the Curzon Line had had to be handed over to Poland.

The Soviet Government had already deviated from Lenin's position. Stalin asked whether the Allies wanted the Soviet leaders to be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau. In that case they would disgrace them. What would the Ukrainians say if they accepted the Allies' proposals? They might say that Stalin and Molotov had turned out to be less reliable defenders of the Russians and the Ukrainians than Curzon and Clemenceau. In what light would Stalin appear then on his return to Moscow? No, it was better to let the war against the Germans go on a little longer, but the Soviet Union had to be in a position to compensate Poland in the west at Germany's expense.

During Mikolajczyk's visit to Moscow he had asked Stalin which frontier for Poland in the west the Soviet Government would recognise. Mikolajczyk had been very pleased to hear that the Soviet Union recognised the line along the Neisse River as Poland's western frontier. By way of explanation it should be said that there were two Neisse rivers: one of them ran nearer east, by Breslau, and the other farther west. Stalin believed that Poland's western frontier should run along the Western Neisse, and he asked Roosevelt and Churchill to support him in that.

Another question on which Stalin would like to say a few words was that of the establishment of a Polish Government. Churchill proposed the establishment of a Polish Government there, at the Conference. Stalin hoped that was a slip of the tongue on Churchill's part: how could a Polish Government be set up without the participation of the Poles? Many people called him, Stalin, a dictator, and did not believe he was a democrat, but he had enough democratic feeling to refrain from setting up a Polish Government without the Poles. A Polish Government could be set up only with the participation and consent of the Poles.

A suitable moment for that had been Churchill's visit to Moscow the previous autumn, when he had brought Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Romer along with him. At that time representatives of the Lublin Government had also been invited to Moscow. A meeting had been arranged between the London and the Lublin Poles. There had even been indications of some points of agreement. Churchill should recall that. Afterwards Mikolajczyk had gone to London with the aim of returning to Moscow soon to take the last steps in organising a Polish Government. Instead, however, Mikolajczyk had been dropped from the Polish Government in London for insisting on an agreement with the Lublin Government. The Polish Government in London headed by Arcyszewski and led by Razkewicz, was opposed to any agreement with the Lublin Government. What was more it took a hostile attitude to such an agreement. The London Poles called the Lublin Government an assemblage of criminals and bandits. Naturally, the former Lublin Government and later the Warsaw Government paid them in kind, and called the London Poles traitors and turncoats. How were they to be united in the circumstances? He, Stalin, did not know.

The leading members of the Warsaw Government – Bierut, Osobka-Morawski and Rola-Zymierski – did not even want to hear of any unity with the Polish Government in London. Stalin had asked the Warsaw Poles what concessions they could make. He had got the following answer: the Warsaw

Poles could stand in their midst such persons from among the London Poles as Grabski and Zeligowski, but they would not hear of Mikolajczyk being Prime Minister. Stalin was prepared to make every effort to unite the Poles, but only if it had any chance of success. What was to be done? Perhaps the Warsaw Poles should be invited to the Conference? Or perhaps they should be invited to Moscow to talk things over?

In conclusion, Stalin would like to deal with yet another question – a very important one – on which he would be speaking as a military man. What would he, as a military man, want of the Government of a country liberated by the Red Army? He wanted only one thing: that the Government ensured law and order in the Red Army's rear, and that it prevented civil war breaking out behind its front lines. After all, the military did not care much about the kind of government; what was important was that they should not be shot at from behind. There was the Warsaw Government in Poland. In Poland, there were also agents of the London Government who were connected with underground circles styling themselves «forces of internal resistance». As a military man Stalin compared the activity of the two groups and inevitably arrived at the following conclusion: the Warsaw Government was doing a fair job of ensuring law and order in the Red Army's rear, whereas there was nothing but harm from the «forces of internal resistance». Those «forces» had already managed to kill 212 Red Army men. They were attacking Red Army depots to seize arms. They violated orders on the registration of radio transmitters on the territory liberated by the Red Army. The «forces of internal resistance» were violating all the laws of war. They complained that the Red Army was arresting them. Stalin stated flatly that if those «forces» continued their attacks on Soviet soldiers, they would be shot.

In the final analysis, from the purely military standpoint, the Warsaw Government turned out to be useful and the London Government and its agents in Poland – harmful. Of course, military men would always support a government which ensured law and order in their rear without which the Red Army could not continue its successes. Law and order in the rear was one of the conditions of Soviet successes. That was understood not only by the military but by the non-military as well. That was how matters stood.

Roosevelt proposed that the discussion of the Polish question be postponed until the next day.

Churchill said that the Soviet Government and the British Government had different sources of information. The British Government did not believe that the Lublin Government represented even a third of the Polish people. That was the opinion of the British Government. Of course, there might be a mistake in that. Clearly, one could not believe every story told by people returning from Poland. The British Government wanted an agreement because it was afraid that clashes between the Polish underground army and the Lublin Government might lead to bloodshed and numerous arrests. The British Government recognised that attacks on the Red Army in the rear were inadmissible. But the British Government did not believe the Lublin Government had any ground to consider itself as resting on a broad basis, insofar, at least, as could be judged from the information at the British Government's disposal, which, of course, might not be quite faultless.

Roosevelt pointed out that the Polish question had been giving the world a headache over a period of five centuries.

Churchill stated that an effort should be made to stop the Polish question from giving mankind a headache.

Stalin replied that that must certainly be done.

Fourth Sitting at Livadia Palace. February 7, 1945

Roosevelt said that Marshal Stalin's statement on the Polish question had been heard the day before. He, Roosevelt, was most interested in the question of a Polish Government. He was not so much concerned with this or that Polish frontier. He was not interested in the legitimacy or permanency of a Polish Government, for it was known that Poland had not had any Government at all over a period of several years. He believed, however, that the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom could help the Poles to set up a Provisional Government until they had the opportunity of staging a free election in the country. There was need to do something new in this sphere; something that would look like a breath of fresh air in this dismal question [...]

Stalin said that about an hour and a half before he had received a message from Roosevelt setting forth the following propositions: summon two men from the Lublin Government in Poland and two representatives of the social forces of the other camp (out of a list of five named in the President's letter) and in the presence of these four Poles settle the question of a new Polish Government. In the event of the success of such a step, the new Government should stage free elections in Poland.

Besides, Roosevelt's message expressed the wish to include representatives of certain other circles in the Polish Government. The message named Mikolajczyk and Grabski. He would like to know where the persons who were named in Roosevelt's message were to be found and who, according to his information, were in Poland. If these men were found it could be ascertained how soon they would arrive. If Wincenty Witos or Sapieha were to come, their arrival would facilitate matters. But he had no knowledge of their addresses and feared the participants in the Conference would be unable to await the arrival of the Poles in the Crimea. The Soviet delegation had worked out a project meeting Roosevelt's proposals. The project had not yet been printed. That is why he proposed that in the meanwhile they should deal with some other matter, say, the question of Dumbarton Oaks.

Roosevelt and Churchill agreed.

[The Soviet delegation then expressed its satisfaction with Stettinius's report and Churchill's explanations on the question of setting up an international security organisation. The Soviet delegation expressed the view that the unity of the three Powers in ensuring post-war security could be attained and that the proposals worked out at Dumbarton Oaks, and the additional proposals made by Roosevelt, could serve as a basis for future co-operation between big and small Powers in matters of international security.]

Considering these proposals acceptable, the Soviet delegation then returned to a question which had been raised at Dumbarton Oaks but had not been resolved there, namely, the question of the participation of Soviet Republics as foundation members of the international security organisation. The Soviet delegation raised the question not in the form in which it had been raised at Dumbarton Oaks, but proposed that three, or at least two, of the Soviet Republics should be among the sponsors of the international organisation (the reference was to the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania). The Soviet delegation believed that these three Soviet Republics or two, at any rate, ought to be recognised as foundation members.]

Roosevelt declared that he was happy to hear of the Soviet Government's acceptance of his proposals. Consequently, great progress had been reached.

The next question to be solved pertained to which of the countries from among the participants in the war against Germany were to be invited to attend the conference instituting the international organisation. Everyone in the United States wanted the conference to be held as soon as possible. Its convocation at the end of March was said to be desirable. It was physically possible for the representatives of the United Nations to meet within a month. He, Roosevelt, personally believed that the soon-

er the decision to convoke the conference was adopted, the sooner there could be a start in the examination of the questions raised by the Soviet side, which were of great interest. After the establishment of the organisation the question of its initial members could be tackled.

There was now one important practical point: was an invitation to attend the conference to be issued, alongside the countries fighting against Germany, also to the «associated countries», such as Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Chile, Egypt, Iceland, which had broken off relations with Germany but had not declared war on her?

The question of the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania was a highly interesting one. The participants might take different views of it, for their countries had different state structures and traditions. The British Empire, for instance, consisted of dominions: Canada, Australia, etc. The U.S.S.R. had many Republics. The United States, on the contrary, was a homogeneous country, without any colonies. It had one language. The constitution of the United States provided for only one minister of foreign affairs. That was why the question raised by the Soviet side required study. It was closely bound up with this other question: were the big Powers to have more than one vote in the international organisation? If one country were to be given more than one vote that would be a violation of the rule that each member of the organisation was to have one vote only.

Roosevelt proposed that the Foreign Ministers should be entrusted with the study of the question of the organisation's initial members and also of the time and place of the conference.

Churchill declared that he wanted to express his deep gratitude to the Soviet Government for the great stride it had taken to meet the common views worked out at Dumbarton Oaks. Churchill was sure that the agreement of the three Great Powers on this crucial question would make all thinking men happy.

The question of the number of members of the Assembly had been raised by the Russian Ally in a new form. Everyone would feel that in that respect a great stride had been made towards agreement. Churchill agreed that the United States and the British Empire were in different positions. There were self-governing dominions in the British Empire which had, for a quarter of a century, played a notable part in the international security organisation, which had collapsed on the eve of the current war. All the dominions had worked for the cause of peace and democratic progress. All the dominions had, without hesitation, entered the war against Germany, although they had been aware of Britain's weakness. Britain had had no means of forcing the dominions to follow her or right to urge them to do so, but all the dominions had entered the war of their own accord.

He, Churchill, had heard the Soviet Government's proposal with a feeling of profound sympathy. His heart was touched and turned to great Russia, which was bleeding but smiting the tyrant on her path. Churchill felt that such a great nation as Russia, with her 180-million population, might have reasons to look askance at the British Commonwealth of Nations if she had only one vote, despite the fact that the population of Russia greatly exceeded the white population of the British Empire.

Churchill would be very happy to have the President give the Soviet delegation an answer that could not be considered negative. Churchill himself was unable to exceed his powers. He would like to have time to exchange opinion on the Soviet proposal with the Foreign Minister and the war cabinet in London. Churchill, therefore, begged to be excused for being unable to give an answer to the Soviet delegation's proposal on behalf of the British Government right away.

Roosevelt repeated his proposal to have the Foreign Ministers discuss the question of the Soviet Republics and also of the time and place of the conference, and the countries to be invited to attend. The decision at Dumbarton Oaks had been to convoke the conference as soon as possible. An early convocation of the conference was also important for Roosevelt from the standpoint of domestic politics.

Churchill declared that he would be glad to have the three Foreign Ministers examine the three points proposed by the President. As for the conference, Churchill doubted that it could be called in

March. In March, fighting on all the fronts would be at its height. More forces than ever before would be taking part in the battles. The domestic problems in the various countries were highly complicated. Britain, in particular, suffered from a shortage of housing and had to maintain supplies for the fronts. Besides, Britain had a Parliament which was very active and demanded a great deal of time and attention of the ministers, notably the Foreign Minister. A quarter of February was over. Churchill, therefore, asked himself this question: would the state of Europe and the world allow the convocation of a conference in March? And if the conference were called in March would the delegations of the various countries really be headed by their leaders? Wasn't it better to postpone the convocation of the Assembly for some time?

Roosevelt explained that it was not a matter of convoking the Assembly but of a conference to institute the international security organisation. The first Assembly would probably be called within three to six months.

Churchill declared that some of the countries to be represented at the conference would still be under the German yoke at the time of its convocation. There was no saying to what extent their delegations would really be representative of their peoples. Other countries at the time would be starving and suffering from the aftermath of war. In that connection, Churchill named Holland and France. Alongside those unfortunate countries at the conference there would be nations which had in no way suffered from the war and had not taken part in it. Churchill believed that in the circumstances the conference could easily become chaotic. Some peoples would be suffering the tortures of agony, while others would be calmly discussing the problems of the future. For all those reasons, Churchill anticipated difficulties in the convocation of the conference at any rate insofar as Great Britain was concerned.

Roosevelt said that it had been decided at Dumbarton Oak to set up the international organisation as soon as possible. Roosevelt, like the Prime Minister had domestic political difficulties. However, he would find it easier to secure a two-thirds majority in the Senate if the Plan for establishing the international security organisation went through during the war.

Churchill declared that Great Britain's constitution had an effect on her attitude. A Parliamentary election was likely to be held in Britain soon, and if the Government remained in power it would have to lead the new Parliament. That had to be taken into account. Of course, Great Britain would do everything she could to satisfy Roosevelt's desire. However, Churchill still considered it necessary to make a frank statement about the practical difficulties which, he anticipated, would arise in the realisation of the President's intention. Personally, Churchill would regret deferring the settlement of the question of the organisation's initial members until the convocation of the United Nations conference.

Roosevelt said that he wanted to reiterate his earlier proposal, namely, that the Foreign Ministers should look into the question of the membership, time and place of the conference and then report to the heads of the three Governments on their results.

Stalin expressed agreement with that.

Churchill did not object to the three Foreign Ministers' discussing the question referred to, but emphasised that the question was not at all a technical one. Churchill was not sure that such an examination would be a success but in view of the President's request was prepared to accept his proposal.

Stalin declared that the three Foreign Ministers would meet and then report to the Heads of Government on the results of their work [...].

The Soviet delegation then tabled the following proposals on the Polish question:

«1. To accept that Poland's border in the East should run along the Curzon Line with deviations at some points of 5 to 6 kilometres in favour of Poland.

«2. To accept that Poland's western border should run from the town of Stettin (for the Poles) southward along the Oder River, and then on along the Neisse River (Western).

«3. To recognise as desirable to enlarge the Provisional Polish Government through the inclusion of some democratic leaders from among the émigré Polish circles.

«4. To consider desirable that the Allied Governments should recognise the enlarged Provisional Polish Government.

«5. To recognise as desirable that the Provisional Polish Government, enlarged in the manner specified in Paragraph 3, should, within the shortest possible period, call on the population of Poland to take part in a general election to set up permanent organs of state administration in Poland.

«6. To authorise V. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Mr. Kerr to discuss the question of enlarging the Provisional Polish Government together with representatives of the Provisional Polish Government and to submit their proposals for the consideration of the three Governments.»

Roosevelt declared that the Soviet proposals constituted a certain progress. He wanted to have the opportunity of studying them with Stettinius. All he could say at the moment was that he did not like the expression “émigré Polish circles” used in the Soviet proposals. As Roosevelt had said the day before he was not acquainted with any of the exiles, with the exception of Mikolajczyk. Furthermore, he believed that it was not at all necessary to invite specifically persons from abroad to take part in the Polish Government. Suitable men could be found inside Poland herself.

Stalin noted that was, of course, true.

Churchill said he shared Roosevelt’s doubts on the word “émigrés”. The fact was that the word had first been used during the French Revolution to designate persons expelled from France by the French people. The Poles who were abroad had not been expelled by the Polish people but by Hitler. Churchill proposed that the word “émigrés” should be substituted by the words “Poles abroad”.

Stalin agreed to Churchill’s proposal.

Churchill, continuing, said that the second paragraph of the proposals spoke of the Neisse River. On the question of the displacement of Poland’s border to the west, the British Government wanted to make this reservation: Poland must have the right to take a territory which she wanted and which she was able to administer. It would hardly be the proper thing to have the Polish goose so stuffed with German viands that it died of indigestion. In addition, there were circles in Britain who were apprehensive of the idea of expelling a great number of Germans. Churchill himself was not at all afraid of such a prospect. The results of the resettlement of Greeks and Turks after the previous world war had been quite satisfactory.

Stalin said there was almost no German population in the parts of Germany occupied by the Red Army.

Churchill remarked that that naturally made things easier. Moreover, 6 or 7 million Germans had already been killed, and at least 1 or 1.5 million more would probably be killed before the end of the war.

Stalin replied that Churchill’s figures were on the whole correct.

Churchill declared that he was not at all proposing to stop destroying the Germans.

Churchill proposed that the words «and from Poland herself» should be inserted in Paragraph 3 of the Soviet draft.

Stalin replied that that was acceptable.

Churchill said that the Soviet proposals should be studied and then discussed at the following sitting. He considered the proposals a step forward.

Fifth Sitting at Livadia Palace. February 8, 1945

Roosevelt declared that he believed the Foreign Ministers had done a good job of what they had been entrusted to do, and invited Eden to report on their results.

Eden said that the Foreign Ministers had examined the question of the date of the conference, the membership of the international organisation, the granting of the rights of foundation members to two or three Soviet Republics, and also the question of the countries to be invited to attend the inaugural conference. It had been decided to recommend the calling of the conference in the United States on April 25, 1945. A tentative decision had been adopted to invite to the conference members of the United Nations, that is, the countries signing the declaration of the United Nations by a specified day of February 1945. The conference was to draw up a list of the initial members of the international organisation. The delegates of Great Britain and the United States would support the U.S.S.R. in having two Soviet Republics among the initial members of the organisation. The examination of all the details of the invitation had been entrusted to a special sub-committee.

Stalin declared that he had a list of states which had declared war on Germany. Did that mean that all of them were to be included among the members of the Assembly? Ten of these countries had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

Roosevelt replied that there were several countries which were eager to establish relations with the Soviet Union but had not yet done so. There were others which were not establishing relations with the U.S.S.R., because of the strong influence there of the Catholic Church. But it should be borne in mind that states which had not established relations with the Soviet Union had attended the conferences at Bretton Woods and Atlantic City with it.

Stalin said that it would be hard to build security with states which had no relations with the Soviet Union.

Roosevelt declared that the best way of making these countries establish relations with the U.S.S.R. was to invite them to attend the conference.

Roosevelt then referred to a question which, he said, had a history of its own. Three years previously, Sumner Welles, the then acting Secretary of State, had advised some South American Republics not to declare war on Germany, but merely to break off relations with her. The Republics had followed the American advice. They had subsequently helped the United States a great deal (for instance, by supplying raw materials). They had a good reputation. A month earlier, Roosevelt had sent a letter to six presidents of South American Republics saying that if they wanted to be invited to the conference they had to declare war on Germany. Ecuador had already done so, but had not yet had time to sign the U.N. Declaration. Paraguay was to declare war on Germany in 10 days, and Peru and Venezuela were to follow suit shortly. It would be embarrassing for the American Government to fail to invite these countries to the conference after they had taken the American Government's advice, although, to be quite honest, the advice had been a mistake.

Stalin asked how things stood with Argentina.

Roosevelt replied that Argentina was not on the list submitted by the U.S. delegation.

Stalin said that Argentina had, after all, also broken off relations with Germany.

Roosevelt declared that Argentina was not recognised as one of the United Nations.

Stalin replied that he wanted to call attention to the fact that if invitations to attend the conference were issued not only to countries which had declared war but also to those which had "associated themselves", the countries which had actually fought against Germany would resent sitting next to those who had wavered and cheated during the war.

Churchill said he believed the countries of that category should declare war on Germany before they got an invitation to attend the conference. He agreed that some of these countries had played a rather sad part, biding their time to see who would win. However, it should not be forgotten that if another group of Powers were to declare war on her the impression on Germany would be unnerving. The other enemy countries would find the whole world fighting against them, and that could have a strong impact on them.

Roosevelt declared that he wanted to add Iceland to the list of those to be invited.

Churchill remarked that His Majesty's Government felt a special responsibility in respect of Egypt, because Egypt had twice expressed the desire to declare war on Germany and Italy. However, the British Government had advised Egypt not to do that, as Egypt's continued neutrality had helped to prevent aerial bombardments of Cairo. Moreover, the British found Egypt's neutrality advantageous from various other angles. When the enemy had been within 30 miles of Alexandria, the Egyptian Army had helped the Allies by guarding the bridges and communication lines. Egypt had been of greater use as a neutral than if she had declared war on Germany and Italy. Of course, if Egypt wanted to declare war at that time the British Government would not object. Iceland had also played a useful role in the period before the United States had entered the war. Iceland had allowed American troops into the country, thereby violating her neutrality. Iceland had ensured Allied communication lines. Churchill thought both those countries had grounds to participate in the conference if they were to declare war. The Allies ought to give them that opportunity. Churchill wanted to know whether there was the intention to admit to the conference all Powers declaring war by March 1.

Stalin gave a positive reply to Churchill's question.

Churchill said that Eire would not be among the invited either because she had a German and Japanese missions. Upon the other hand, he, Churchill, had to speak in favour of inviting Turkey, although the proposal might not meet with universal approval. Turkey had concluded an alliance with Britain before the outbreak of war, at a very dangerous time. When the war started, the Turks believed that their army was not adequately armed for a modern type of war. Nevertheless, Turkey's position was friendly and useful in many respects. The Turks had even offered aid to the British, although the British did not take up their offer. Churchill was asking himself: ought not the Turks to be given a chance to repent on their deathbed?

Stalin replied that Turkey ought to be invited if she declared war on Germany before the end of February.

Roosevelt and Churchill voiced their agreement with that. Roosevelt said that Denmark had been occupied by the Germans in 24 hours, the King had been taken prisoner, and Parliament had been dissolved. Denmark was at the moment under German control. Only one man claiming to represent Denmark had not recognised the new Danish Government. He was the Danish Envoy in Washington. He had been unable to declare war on Germany but he had repudiated the acts of the German-sponsored government. What was to be done with Denmark? There was no doubt that had the Danes been free, they would have sided with the Allies.

Churchill asked whether the Danes had recognised the independence of Iceland.

Stalin replied in the negative.

Churchill did not believe there would be any difficulties between Iceland and Denmark. He agreed with Marshal Stalin and the President that all those who declared war by the end of February should be allowed to attend the conference. Denmark would take part in the security organisation when she got the opportunity to speak on her own behalf.

Roosevelt proposed the approval of the report of the Foreign Ministers in toto, with an amendment in the sense that United Nations declaring war on the common enemy by March 1 were to be in-

vited to the conference. Roosevelt said that Turkey could be added to the list provided she declared war on the common enemy before the first of March.

Stalin asked about the opinion of the Conference concerning the signing by Byelorussia and the Ukraine of the U.N. Declaration by March 1.

Roosevelt declared that the Conference had already adopted the point of the Foreign Ministers' decision which said that at the U.N. Conference the three Powers would recommend inclusion of the Soviet Republics among the sponsors.

Churchill remarked that it appeared to him to be not entirely logical to invite to the conference all the small countries which had done next to nothing for victory and had declared war only at that last moment, while postponing the invitation of the two Soviet Republics. The sacrifices made by Byelorussia and the Ukraine were well known. He, Churchill, believed that if those two Republics signed the U.N. Declaration they should be invited.

Stalin said that it could happen that when the conference met and heard the recommendation to invite the Soviet Republics someone might get up and say that they had not signed the U.N. Declaration. That is why it would be better for the Soviet Republics to sign the Declaration then. Otherwise how were they to be recommended? He did not want to inconvenience the President but would still ask him to explain what the matter was.

Roosevelt replied that that was a technical matter but an important one none the less. It was a question of agreeing to give the Soviet Union three votes.

Stalin asked if the invitation of the Ukraine and Byelorussia would not be hampered by the fact that they had not signed the U.N. Declaration by March 1.

Roosevelt answered in the negative.

Stalin declared that in that case he withdrew his proposal. He would only like to insert the names of the Republics – the Ukraine and Byelorussia – in the text of the decisions of the Foreign Ministers.

Roosevelt and Churchill indicated their consent.

The Dumbarton Oaks question was considered settled, and Roosevelt went on to the Polish question.

Churchill said that with their permission he wanted to say beforehand that he had studied the results of yesterday's conference of the Foreign Ministers and approved of them.

Roosevelt declared that on the question of Polish borders the U.S. delegation had no objections to the first paragraph of the Soviet proposals. The U.S. delegation also agreed that Poland should be given compensation at Germany's expense, namely, East Prussia south of Königsberg and Upper Silesia up to the Oder. However, Roosevelt thought that there was little justification for displacing the Polish border to the Western Neisse.

As for the question of a Polish Government, Roosevelt would like to propose that the Soviet Foreign Minister and the Ambassadors of the United States and Britain to the U.S.S.R. should be authorised to negotiate in Moscow with Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, Sapieha, Witos, Mikolajczyk and Grabski on the formation of a new Government on the following basis: a Presidential Council should first be set up to consist of three persons, possibly Bierut, Grabski and Sapieha. The Presidential Council would be representative of the power of the President in Poland. That Presidential Council would deal with the formation of a Government consisting of men in the Warsaw Government, democratic elements in Poland and abroad. The Provisional Government thus formed would undertake to stage an election to the Constituent Assembly, which would then elect a permanent Government of Poland. When the Provisional Polish Government of national unity was set up the three Governments would recognise it.

Stalin asked whether in that case the London Government was to be disbanded.

Churchill and Roosevelt replied in the affirmative.

Churchill said that when the Provisional Polish Government of national unity was set up, the British Government would withdraw recognition from the Polish Government in London and would accredit its ambassador to the new Government.

Stalin asked whether in that case the national property of Poland which was then at the disposal of the Polish Government in London would remain in Arcyszewski's hands or would be handed over to the new Polish Government.

Roosevelt replied that Poland's property abroad would automatically pass to the new Polish Government.

Churchill remarked that he was not aware of the legal aspect of the matter, but he thought the President was right.

Churchill then declared that the British delegation had drawn up an alternative document on the Polish question which had been handed to the Russian friends. But since the discussion had been started on the President's proposal, Churchill was prepared to continue it in that plane.

Churchill said that he had some amendments to Roosevelt's proposals. He believed that the Conference had reached its crucial point. He was referring to the question whose solution was being awaited by the whole world. If they diverged, continuing to recognise different Polish governments, everyone would take that as a sign of basic contradictions between Great Britain and the United States, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. That would have rather deplorable consequences throughout the world, and would lay the stamp of bankruptcy on the Conference. At the same time, it had to be stated that they took differing views of the basic facts or, at any rate, of some of the basic facts. According to the information at the disposal of the British Government, the Lublin, and then the Warsaw, Government was not the kind that could be recognised by the bulk of the Polish people. If they were to renounce the Polish Government in London and back the Lublin Government there was every indication that that would arouse the protest of the world, and of all Poles abroad, without exception.

They had a Polish Army consisting of Poles outside Poland. It had fought gallantly. Churchill did not believe that that Polish Army would be reconciled with the Lublin Government. That Polish Army would regard the British Government's recognition of the Lublin Government and refusal of continued recognition of the Polish Government in London as a betrayal.

The Soviet Government was very well aware that he, Churchill, was not in agreement with the views of the Polish Government in London and considered its actions unwise. However, formal recognition of the new Polish Government set up a year earlier would generate a great deal of criticism of the British Government's actions. People would assert that the British Government had earlier given in to the Soviet Union on the question of Poland's eastern border and had again capitulated to it on the question of the character of the Polish Government. As a result, the British Government would be subjected to accusations in Parliament. The debate that would be started in that connection would be highly regrettable and would have a negative effect on Allied unity.

In Churchill's opinion, the Soviet proposals did not go far enough. Before His Majesty's Government could abandon its position, namely, recognition of the Polish Government in London, and recognise the new Polish Government, it had to be convinced that the new Polish Government was sufficiently representative of the Polish people. Of course, the British Government's difficulties would all disappear once a free election was held in Poland on the basis of universal suffrage. The British Government would welcome any Polish Government that emerged as a result of the election, and would turn its back on the London Government. However, the British Government was highly apprehensive of developments in the interim, before an election was possible.

Roosevelt declared that as a visitor from another hemisphere he stated the existence of a common view shared by the conferees: a general election ought to be held in Poland as soon as possible.

What Roosevelt was concerned about, however, was how Poland would be run in the interim, before the staging of a free election.

Stalin said that Churchill complained about the absence of information on Poland and the impossibility of receiving any from there.

Churchill replied that he had some information.

Stalin stated that although Churchill did have some information it did not coincide with that of the Soviet Government.

Churchill replied in the affirmative.

Stalin declared that, in his view, Great Britain and the United States could have informants in Poland. Referring to the leaders of the Warsaw Government, he said that the popularity of Bierut, Osobka-Morawski and Rola-Zymierski among the Polish people was truly tremendous. What was the basis of their popularity? It was above all that they had not left their country during the occupation. They had remained in German-occupied Warsaw, they had worked in the underground and had emerged from the underground. This commanded respect among the Polish people, who naturally sympathised with men who had not abandoned them in their hour of need. The Polish people did not like Arcyszewski's men, because they did not see them in their midst in the arduous years of the occupation. The people's mentality had to be taken into account.

The second important fact making for the popularity of the Warsaw Government leaders sprang from the Red Army's victories. The Soviet forces were advancing and liberating Poland. This was creating a great revolution in the Polish people's mind. The Poles were known not to like the Russians, because the Russians had thrice taken part in the division of Poland. However, the Red Army's offensive and its liberation of the Polish people from Hitler occupation had reversed the Polish mood entirely. Their hostility for the Russians had disappeared and had been replaced by a feeling of quite another order: the Poles were happy to see the Russians drive the Germans before them and liberate the Polish population, and this kindled a warm feeling among them for the Russians.

The Poles believed they were celebrating a grand national festival in their history. And the Poles were surprised to see the men from the Polish Government in London refuse to take part in this celebration. The Poles were asking themselves why they saw the members of the Provisional Polish Government at the festivities, but not any of the London Poles? That naturally tended to detract from the prestige of the Polish Government in London.

Those were the two factors which lay at the source of the great popularity enjoyed by the members of the Provisional Polish Government. Could they ignore these facts? Of course, they could not, if they wanted to reckon with the people's will. Such were the considerations he had wanted to express in connection with the question of the prestige of the men from the Warsaw Government.

Concerning Churchill's apprehensions that the conferees could leave without reaching any agreement on the Polish question. What was to be done in that case? They had different information and different conclusions. Perhaps they should summon Poles from the different camps and hear them? Would that increase their information? Churchill was dissatisfied with the fact that the Provisional Polish Government had not been elected. Of course, it was better to have an elected government, but that had been prevented until then by the war. He believed the time was not far off when the election could be held in Poland.

But then, the de Gaulle Government in France had not been elected either, and consisted of diverse elements. Nevertheless, they were willingly dealing with de Gaulle and had concluded agreements with him. Why couldn't the same thing be done with the Provisional Polish Government after it is enlarged? Why was more to be demanded of Poland than of France? He was sure that if the Polish question were approached without bias, it could be solved successfully. The situation was not as tragic as Churchill had depicted it. A way out could be found if they concentrated on the main thing and did not

attach too much importance to secondary things. It was easier to reconstruct the existing Provisional Polish Government than to set up an entirely new one. As for the question of the Presidential Council, the matter should be discussed with the Poles themselves.

Roosevelt asked when it would be possible to stage free elections in Poland.

Stalin replied that the elections could be held within a month, unless there was some disaster at the front, unless the Germans beat the Allies, but he hoped that the Germans would not beat the Allies.

Churchill declared that a free election would, of course, set minds at rest in Britain. The British Government would support the new Government and all the other questions would disappear. Of course, they could not ask for anything that would hamper the operations of the Soviet forces. Those operations had priority. But if it proved possible to stage the election within two months, a new situation would be created, and no one could question that.

Roosevelt recommended that the question under discussion should be referred to the Foreign Ministers.

Churchill agreed to that and added that he wanted to raise one small question. It would be highly useful to have an agreement on regular meetings between the three Foreign Ministers for consultations every three or four months, on a rota basis in each of the capitals.

Stalin said that that would be right.

Roosevelt declared that that was a good proposal. However, Stettinius was also busy with South American affairs. That was why Roosevelt believed that the Foreign Ministers' meetings could be held as the need arose, without fixing specified dates.

Churchill proposed that the first meeting should be held in London.

Stalin signified agreement [...].

Source: <https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/Stalin/yalta.htm#First>

Sixth Sitting at Livadia Palace. February 9, 1945

Roosevelt proposed that Stettinius should report on the conference of the three Foreign Ministers.

Stettinius declared that on behalf of the Foreign Ministers he wished to make the following brief report on the results of their work. The Foreign Ministers had had a detailed discussion of the Polish question on the basis of the memorandum of the American delegation. The memorandum, in conformity with the proposal of the Soviet delegation, left out the question of the Presidential Council. As for the formula on the creation of a Polish Government, it had been decided to continue discussion of the question and to report that the three Foreign Ministers had not yet reached an agreement. The Ministers' conference had also discussed the question of reparations.

Churchill said that perhaps the Polish question should be discussed first.

Roosevelt agreed.

[Setting forth its view of the memorandum of the U.S. delegation on the question of the Polish Government, the Soviet delegation declared that, being desirous without any further delay to work out a common stand, it was adopting the American proposal as a basis, but was putting forward some amendments to it. The Soviet delegation proposed the following wording for the first clause of the American formula for the creation of a Polish Government: «The present Provisional Polish Government should be reorganised on the basis of a broader democratism through the inclusion of democratic leaders in Poland and abroad. This Government is to be called the National Provisional Government.»

At the end of the paragraph, the Soviet delegation proposed the addition of the following words: «non-fascist and anti-fascist parties», with the whole reading thus: “All nonfascist and anti-fascist democratic parties must have the right to participate in these elections and nominate candidates.”

The Soviet delegation also considered it necessary to add the following sentence: «When the Polish Government of National Unity is formed in the specified manner, the Three Governments will recognise it.” Finally, the Soviet delegation proposed the exclusion of the last clause of the American proposal – concerning the duty of the ambassadors of the Three Powers in Warsaw to observe and report on the fulfilment of the obligation on the staging of free elections on the ground that the ambassadors of the Three Powers accredited to the Polish Government had full possibility of observing developments in Poland, that being their immediate duty. The Soviet delegation indicated that with these amendments it considered the American proposal acceptable.]

Churchill declared that he was glad that a great step had been made towards agreement on the Polish question. But he wished to make a few general remarks before its discussion was continued. Churchill was of the opinion that it should not be decided in haste. The possibility of agreement was already in the air, but there was a danger of everything being spoiled by undue haste. It was better to give a little more thought to the proposal of the Soviet delegation. It was true that there remained only 48 hours for their meetings. However, Churchill did not wish to ruin the whole thing because of the Conference wanting some 24 hours. If those 24 hours were needed to reach agreement, they had to be found. One thing should not be forgotten: if the participants in the Conference left without reaching agreement on the Polish question, the whole Conference would be regarded as a failure.

Roosevelt proposed that Stettinius should complete his report, after which they would adjourn for half an hour to study the proposals of the Soviet delegation.

Churchill stressed once again that the participants in the Conference had a very valuable prize almost in their grasp. They must not let the prize be broken because of undue haste. They must have a little time for thought. However, Churchill did not object to Roosevelt's proposal.

Stalin also accepted Roosevelt's proposal.

Stettinius, continuing his report, said that he would go on to the question of reparations. The American delegation had submitted its project of the principles of levying reparations on Germany. The delegations were unanimous on Points 1 and 2 of the American draft¹. On Point 3 they had reached a compromise, namely: the Moscow Reparations Commission would take as a basis for its work the total amount of reparations of \$20,000 million, by way of lump withdrawals and annual goods deliveries, of which 50 per cent were earmarked for the Soviet Union.

On this point, Eden had made a reservation to the effect that he had not yet received instructions from London. The Soviet delegation declared that the reparations would be calculated on the basis of 1938 prices, with increases between 10 and 15 per cent, depending on the nature of the object.

Stettinius then dealt with the forthcoming conference of the United Nations. The American delegation, he said, proposed that before the conference the future permanent members of the Council should have consultations with each other through diplomatic channels concerning the trusteeship over colonial and dependent peoples.

Churchill [in great agitation] resolutely protested against any discussion of the question. Great Britain had been carrying on a hard struggle for so long to preserve the integrity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the British Empire. He was sure that the struggle would end in complete success, and while the British flag flew over the territories of the British Crown, he would not allow any piece of British soil to be put up for auction before 40 states. The British Empire would never be placed in the dock of an international court on the question of "trusteeship" over under-age nations.

Stettinius reassured Churchill that it was not a question of the British Empire. The American delegation wanted the world organisation to establish trusteeship, in case of necessity, over territories which would be taken away from the enemy.

Churchill declared that he had no objections if the question was of enemy territories. It might be the appropriate thing to establish trusteeship over these territories.

Stettinius added that the conference of the Three Ministers recognised it as desirable to have a discussion of the trusteeship question at the United Nations Conference.

Churchill insisted on a qualification in the text of the decision that the discussion of the trusteeship question in no sense related to the territory of the British Empire. Turning to Stalin, Churchill asked what his feelings would have been if an international organisation had offered to place the Crimea under international control as an international holiday resort.

Stalin replied that he would willingly make the Crimea available for Three-Power conferences.

Stettinius declared that the sub-commission set up to work out the question of invitation to the United Nations Conference continued its work and would report that day on the results to the Foreign Ministers.

[It was then decided, on the proposal of Stettinius, that the persons appointed by the British and the Soviet sides, should prepare a report on the Yugoslav question.]

Churchill remarked that there were no considerable differences on the Yugoslav question.

Stettinius declared that it had been decided to put the Tito-Subasić agreement into effect before the conclusion of the Crimea Conference, in spite of King Peter's whims.

¹ Points 1 and 2 of the American draft read as follows:

"1. Reparations are to be received in the first place by countries which had borne the main burden of the war, had suffered the greatest losses and had organised the victory over the enemy.

"2. Leaving aside the question of the use of German manpower in the form of reparations, a question to be examined later, reparations in kind must be levied on Germany in the following two forms:

"a) Lump withdrawals at the end of the war from Germany's national wealth, both on the territory of Germany proper and outside (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), with these withdrawals being aimed chiefly to effect the military and economic disarmament of Germany.

"These withdrawals should be completed within two years after the war.

"b) Annual goods deliveries over a period of 10 years after the end of the war." (Retranslated from the Russian. – Ed.)

Churchill declared that the British delegation had two highly valuable amendments to the Tito-Subasić agreement. They had been handed to the Russian friends. If the participants in the Conference decided the amendments to be appropriate, they could be recommended to Subasić and Tito for acceptance.

Stalin remarked that the Soviet side could also make its own amendments. The British delegation would then propose something else. The question was being dragged out, while the situation in Yugoslavia remained unstable.

Churchill declared that Tito was a dictator in his country. They could ask him to accept the amendments.

Stalin replied that Tito was not a dictator at all. The situation in Yugoslavia remained indefinite.

Eden declared that there was no question of changing the Tito-Subasić agreement. The question was only of the two assurances which Subasić would ask of Tito in any case.

Stalin said that the amendments tabled by the British boiled down to having the deputies of the Skupština who had not compromised themselves by collaboration with the Germans included in the Anti-Fascist Veće. The second amendment consisted in the proposal that the legislative acts adopted by the Anti-Fascist Veće should be subsequently confirmed by the Constituent Assembly. The Soviet delegation was essentially in agreement with those amendments. They were correct. But he considered that they should in no way delay the formation of a new Government.

Eden declared that the British Government wanted an immediate implementation of the Tito-Subasić agreement. Later, Tito could be asked to accept the amendments in question.

Stalin agreed.

Churchill also expressed agreement.

Eden said that Subasić was to have left London for Yugoslavia on February 7.

Churchill remarked that information on whether he had left or not would be available the next day. At any rate Subasić would leave as soon as the weather permitted.

Stalin declared that before they left the Crimea, the Three Powers should recommend that the Tito-Subasić agreement be put into effect immediately and a single Yugoslav Government formed on the basis of the agreement, regardless of any of the fantastic ideas Peter might have in his head.

Churchill proposed the insertion of a corresponding clause in the communiqué. In that connection, Churchill asked whether there was agreement that the said amendments should be subsequently recommended to Tito.

Stalin replied that he never made empty statements. He always kept his word.

[After the break.]

Roosevelt declared that he had made a closer study of the proposals of the Soviet delegation on the Polish question and had exchanged opinions with the British side. He felt the whole thing now turned on a certain difference in the wording. The participants in the Conference were close to agreement. Great progress had indeed been achieved in this question. But the phrase, "The present Provisional Polish Government should be reorganised on the basis of a broader democratism", would embarrass the position of those Governments which recognised the Polish Government in London. Roosevelt wanted to have the expression "the present Provisional Polish Government" substituted by the words "the Polish Government now functioning in Poland".

Furthermore, said Roosevelt, the Soviet delegation had proposed the deletion of the final phrase concerning the duty of the ambassadors of our three states to observe the free elections in Poland. It was better not to do that. In that connection, Roosevelt wanted to recall that there were six million Poles in the United States. In respect of them, some sort of gesture should be made to reassure them that the elections in Poland would be fair and free. Roosevelt believed that, considering that the participants in the Conference were so close to agreement, it would be advisable for the Foreign Ministers to work a little that night and report the next day on the results of their work to the Conference.

Churchill agreed with the President that great progress had been made that day towards a joint statement by the Allied Powers on the Polish question. Churchill had no objections to have the matter finally elaborated by the three Foreign Ministers. But at the moment he wanted to dwell on two small points which flowed from what Marshal Stalin had said the previous day. Marshal Stalin had told how Poland had been liberated and how the enemy had been expelled from the country by the Red Army. That was a new fact of very great significance. That is why Churchill believed it would be advisable to emphasise the fact before the whole world and to open the declaration on Poland with something like the following words: "The Red Army has liberated Poland. This makes it necessary to set up a fully representative Polish Government, which can now be established on a broader basis than was possible before the liberation of Western Poland."

The second point Churchill wanted to call attention to was the concluding phrase of the American draft. The British Government was at a disadvantage in negotiations on Polish affairs because it had little knowledge of what was going on in Poland herself. At the same time, the British Government had to take important decisions relating to Poland. Churchill was aware that the relations between the various groups of Poles were highly aggravated. Osobka-Morawski, for instance, had not long before used rather threatening language in respect of the London Government: the Lublin Government intended to institute judicial proceedings against all soldiers of the Polish Army and members of the Polish underground, as traitors. This had caused the British Government serious apprehension.

Of course, it was necessary above all to remove all the obstacles in the way of the Red Army's operations. Nevertheless, Churchill wanted to request Marshal Stalin to take account of the British Government's difficult position. The British Government really had no knowledge of what was going on inside Poland, because the only way it could obtain information was to drop parachutists in Poland from time to time or talk with people, members of the underground movement, who arrived from Poland. That was a highly unsatisfactory situation.

How was it to be altered without at the same time creating difficulties for the Red Army's operations? Churchill reiterated that he placed the interests of the operations of the Soviet forces above all else. Still: couldn't the British be given the corresponding opportunities, which, Churchill believed, would also be readily used by the Americans, to see for themselves how the existing dissensions were being settled in Poland? That was why the British delegation thought the final phrase in the American draft was so important.

When elections were held in Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito, as he had understood it, would not object to the presence of Soviet, American and British observers, so that these observers could assure the whole world that the elections were conducted the right way. As for Greece, the British would welcome the presence of Soviet, American and British observers, when the elections took place there. The same applied to Italy. When Northern Italy was liberated, a sharp change would take place in Italy's internal situation, and elections to a constituent assembly or a parliament would have to be held. The British Government believed that a Soviet, American and British observers must have the possibility of attending the elections in Italy so as to assure the Great Powers of their normal conduct.

The considerations expressed by Churchill had real grounds. In Egypt, for instance, victory always went to the Government staging the election. Nahas Pasha had quarrelled with the King and wanted to stage an election. The King said that so long as Nahas Pasha remained a member of the Government, there would be no election. And naturally when Nahas Pasha was expelled from the Government, the King's men won the election and took his place.

Stalin remarked that no real election could be held in Egypt. Bribery there was still widespread. Stalin asked what the literacy percentage in Egypt was. (None of the British delegation was able to answer the question.) In Poland, literacy was as high as 70-75 per cent. Those were people who read the papers and could voice their opinion. There could be no comparison between Egypt and Poland.

Churchill replied that he had no intention of making a comparison between Poland and Egypt. He merely wanted to say that the elections must be free and just. He was interested, for instance, in whether Mikolajczyk would be allowed to take part in the election.

Stalin replied that the question had to be discussed with the Poles.

Churchill asked whether the ambassadors should discuss the question during their negotiations with the Poles in Moscow.

Stalin replied that this had to be done in accordance with the decision which they were going to adopt.

Churchill replied that he had no desire to continue discussing the matter, but he wished to have the possibility of informing Parliament that the elections would be free, and that justice in their conduct had been guaranteed.

Stalin said that Mikolajczyk was a representative of the peasant party. It was not a fascist party. It would, of course, be allowed to take part in the election. Some of the candidates from the peasant party would enter the Government. But he thought the solution of the question should be left until its discussion with the Poles. They would arrive and could be heard. There were men with different views among the Poles.

Churchill declared that the only thing he wanted was, upon his return to Britain, to get the question of Poland's eastern border through Parliament. Churchill believed that to be possible if the Poles could decide between themselves the question of a Government. He, Churchill, did not have too high an opinion of the Poles.

Stalin remarked that there were very good men among the Poles. The Poles were brave fighters. The Polish people had produced some outstanding scientists and artists.

Churchill said that the only thing he wanted was for all the sides to have equal opportunities.

Stalin remarked that all non-fascist and anti-fascist sides would have equal opportunities.

Churchill said that he did not consider it quite right to have the watershed run between fascist and non-fascist. He preferred the term "democrats".

Stalin said that he had before him the draft Declaration on Liberated Europe proposed by the American delegation. The draft contained the following sentence: "The establishment of order in Europe and the reconstruction of national economic life should be achieved in a way that would allow the liberated peoples to obliterate the last traces of fascism and Nazism, and to create democratic institutions of their own choice." (Retranslated from the Russian. – Ed.) Those were good words! There the distinction between fascism and anti-fascism was clearly drawn. Those words showed that there could be no unity between democracy and fascism.

Churchill confirmed that no such unity could or would exist.

Roosevelt said that, in his view, Poland would provide an example of the practical implementation of the principles of the Declaration on Liberated Europe. The sentence read out by Marshal Stalin was of great significance, because it gave them the opportunity to obliterate all traces of fascism. The following paragraph of the Declaration said that the peoples could establish provisional government authorities representing all democratic sections of the population, and subsequently to set up permanent ones through free and just elections. Roosevelt would like the Polish elections to be, like Caesar's wife, above suspicion.

Stalin remarked that Caesar's wife only had that kind of reputation. Actually, she wasn't all that lily-white.

Roosevelt said that the elections in Poland had to be absolutely "pure", so pure that no one could cast any doubt on them, and that the Poles themselves – very hot-headed people – could accept the elections without any reservations. Roosevelt summed up by saying that the Foreign Ministers were well aware of the views of their Heads of Government concerning the Polish elections. They should deal with the question that night and report on the results of their work the following day.

Stalin said that he agreed with Roosevelt's amendment: the substitution of the words "the present Provisional Government" by the words "the Provisional Government now functioning in Poland".

Roosevelt went on to the next question, the Declaration on Liberated Europe.

Churchill said that Eden wanted to make a remark on the draft Declaration. Churchill himself agreed with the Declaration; he considered it necessary to note in the record that Great Britain followed the principles of the Atlantic Charter in the sense which Churchill had given it in Parliament upon his return from Newfoundland. Churchill would present the text of his Parliamentary statement at the next sitting [...].

Roosevelt proposed that the sitting be closed.

Churchill said that he wanted to discuss the question of war criminals. What he meant was war criminals whose crimes were not connected with definite geographical places.

Roosevelt declared that the question of war criminals was a complicated one. It was impossible to examine it during the current Conference. Wouldn't it be better to refer the question to the three Foreign Ministers? Let them submit a report within three or four weeks.

Churchill said that he had drawn up a draft declaration on war criminals for the Moscow Conference of 1943. At the time, Churchill had made a proposal, which had been adopted, on the handing over of criminals to the countries where they had committed their crimes. The said declaration also made mention of the chief criminals whose crimes were not connected with any specific geographical place. What was to be done with these chief criminals? Churchill thought the first thing to do was to draw up a list of such persons, with the right of adding to it in the future. That would isolate them from their peoples. Churchill believed that the best thing would be to shoot the chief criminals as soon as they were caught.

Stalin asked: What was to be done with criminals who, like Hess, had been caught already? Would he be included in the list which Churchill proposed to draw up? Could prisoners of war be included in the list of criminals? The old view had been that prisoners of war could not be tried.

Churchill replied that, of course, prisoners of war who had violated the laws could be put on trial. Otherwise war criminals would start surrendering in order to avoid punishment. However, Churchill had understood Marshal Stalin to mean that before the chief criminals were shot they should be tried.

Stalin replied in the affirmative.

Churchill asked what the court procedure was to be: juridical or political?

Roosevelt declared that the procedure should not be too juridical. At all events, correspondents and photographers should not be admitted to the trial.

Churchill said that, in his view, the trial of the chief criminals should be a political and not a juridical act. Churchill would like the Three Powers to be clear on this question. However, nothing should be published on the subject to prevent the chief criminals from revenging themselves on Allied prisoners of war.

Roosevelt proposed that the question of the war criminals should be referred for study to the Foreign Ministers of the Three Powers.

[That was accepted.]

Stalin asked whether the offensive on the Western front had started.

Churchill replied that a 100,000-strong British Army had started an offensive in the Nijmegen area at 10 o'clock the previous morning. The troops had advanced 3,000 yards on a five-mile front. They had reached the Siegfried Line. The defences were not particularly strong, with the exception of two villages. Several hundred prisoners had been taken. The second wave of the offensive was due to start the following day. The U.S. Ninth Army was extending the front of its offensive. The offensive would be continuous and would steadily grow.

Seventh Sitting at Livadia Palace. February 10, 1945

Eden read out the text of the Statement on Poland agreed at the conferences of the Foreign Ministers on the night of February 9 and the morning of February 10.

Roosevelt declared that he agreed with the text of the Statement on Poland read out by Eden.

Churchill said that an agreement had been reached on Poland's eastern border, and there was agreement that the Poles should be given East Prussia and the territory up to the Oder. However, Churchill had some doubts about whether the Poles should have their border run along the Neisse River (Western). Churchill added that he had received a cable from the War Cabinet which set out the apprehensions concerning the difficulties involved in resettling large numbers of people into Germany.

Roosevelt remarked that it would be desirable to have the opinion of the new Polish Government on the western border.

Stalin said that the Statement should say something definite about the border.

Churchill believed it was important to issue a statement on the agreement reached on the question of the eastern border (Curzon Line). But then if nothing were said there and then about the western border, people would at once ask where Poland's border in the west was to run. Churchill believed that the opinion of the Poles themselves on the question of the western border should be taken into account and that this question should be settled at the peace conference.

Roosevelt thought that it would be better to say nothing about Poland's borders, because the question still had to be discussed in the Senate, and he, Roosevelt, was not authorised to take any decisions on it.

Churchill declared that something still had to be said about the western border. He thought a suitable formula could be found, since the Three Governments were agreed that Poland was to receive an accession of territory to the west and the north, and that the opinion of the Polish Government was to be taken into account in deciding the question.

Stalin also considered it necessary to have the decision refer to Poland's borders.

Roosevelt agreed with that in principle and proposed that the three Foreign Ministers should be asked to examine the question and add another paragraph on borders to the text of the Statement on Poland.

[The Conference adopted the proposal and went on to the Declaration on Liberated Europe.

The Soviet delegation proposed the following addendum to the third paragraph from the end:

"They will immediately consult with each other on the necessary measures in exercising the joint responsibility established in the present Declaration."

The proposal of the Soviet delegation was adopted.]

Eden declared that there was another addendum concerning the French. The text of the addendum was as follows:

«In issuing the present Declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may join them in the proposed procedure.»

Roosevelt declared that after some thought he had arrived at the conclusion that de Gaulle could join in the Declaration, if the French took part in the Allied control mechanism in Germany. He, Roosevelt, had previously been against France taking part in the Control Council in Germany, but he now favoured French participation in it.

Stalin declared that he had no objection to the French participating in the Control Council, and that he favoured their joining in the Declaration.

Churchill said that that should be said in the communiqué. Stalin and Roosevelt agreed with Churchill's proposal.

[The Conference went on to the question of Yugoslavia.]

Eden proposed the dispatch of a cable to Tito and Subasić.

Stalin proposed that the text of the cable should speak of the immediate entry into force of the Tito-Subasić agreement, the inclusion of the members of the Skupština into the body of the Veće, and the approval by the new parliament of the laws adopted by the Veće. He proposed that Point 3 of the cable – saying that the Government was merely a provisional one until the free expression of the people's will – be dropped and the whole text of the cabled message incorporated in the communiqué.

Roosevelt and Churchill agreed with Stalin's proposal.

[The Conference then adopted a decision to entrust the working out of the text of the cable to the three Foreign Ministers.]

Eden reported that everything had been agreed on the question of the international security organisation.

[The Conference went on to the question of reparations.]

Churchill said that the amount of reparations should not be specified.

Roosevelt agreed that perhaps nothing should be said at that time about amounts of money. It would be better to authorise the Reparations Commission to make a study of the question and then to determine the amount of reparations.

Stalin declared that it would be wrong to create the impression that they intended to levy reparations in the form of money. It was not a question of money but of goods worth \$20,000 million. There were already three agreements – with Hungary, Finland and Rumania – which stated the amount of reparations levied in kind, and until then they had not had any misunderstandings on that score. Or was it the wish of the Conference that the Russians should not receive any reparations at all?

Churchill said: Not at all, on the contrary. He wanted to propose that the Commission should study the question of reparations and draw up a report on the levy of reparations.

Stalin raised the question: Was there agreement that goods should be taken from Germany to cover the losses? They had not yet taken any decision on the question of reparations, and even the principles of levying reparations had not been adopted. He proposed the adoption of the following decision: "The Three Powers are in agreement that Germany must compensate in goods (or in kind) the most substantial damage inflicted by her on the Allied nations in the course of the war. The Reparations Commission is to discuss the question of the amounts of compensation for the losses, taking the Soviet-American formula as a basis, and is to report on the results to the Governments." Stalin further pointed out that the American side had agreed to accept the figure of \$20,000 million as a basis for discussion, naturally assuming that the compensation of losses was to be in kind. The Soviet side was not proposing the publication of the decision just then. That could be done when all the Three Powers would deem such a step necessary.

Roosevelt declared that he agreed with Stalin's proposals.

Churchill reiterated that the Conference would not bind itself by any figures until the Reparations Commission had made a study of the question and had arrived at definite conclusions.

Stalin replied that they were not obliging the Conference to adopt any figures, but were merely asking the Commission to take the said figure as material for discussion.

Churchill announced that he had received a cable from the War Cabinet and wanted to read out an extract from it. Churchill then declared that the British considered it absolutely impossible to name any amount of reparations just then. Churchill pointed out that the British attached special importance to the capacity of the Germans to pay for their imports. Otherwise, they would find themselves in the position, said Churchill, when they would have to pay Germany, while others received the reparations.

Stalin asked Churchill to name his figure of reparations. The Soviet side did not consider its figure invariable and merely offered it for discussion. He proposed the adoption of a decision on reparations in the following form:

1) The Heads of the Three Governments agreed that Germany must compensate in kind the damage inflicted by her on the Allied nations in the course of the war.

2) To authorise the Moscow Reparations Commission to discuss the question of the amounts of losses subject to compensation and report its conclusions to the Governments.

Roosevelt and Churchill declared that they agreed with Stalin's proposal.

Stalin asked ironically: You will not go back on this tomorrow? [...]

[The Conference went on to the question of Poland's borders.]

Eden read out the British draft of the addendum to the Statement on Poland concerning her borders.

Roosevelt said that on the question of Poland's borders he had an amendment to the text: instead of the words "the Three Governments" insert "the Heads of the Three Governments". Roosevelt explained that if it said "the Three Governments", he, as President, would have to take the question to Congress, something that it was desirable to avoid. In the second phrase, the words "the Three Governments" should be deleted and the word "recognised" written instead. In the last phrase, the words "they agree" should be substituted by "they consider". Roosevelt accepted the text of the addendum to the Statement on Poland with the said amendments.

[The text of the addendum on Poland's borders was adopted with Roosevelt's amendments.]

Source: <https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/Stalin/yalta.htm#First>

**Memorandum from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Joseph Stalin
expressing his support for the admission of the Ukrainian SSR
and the Belorussian SSR into the Assembly
of the International Organisation. February 10, 1945**

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

Russian translation.

English original. Handsigned by Franklin D. Roosevelt.

We have agreed, and I shall certainly carry out that agreement, to support at the forthcoming United Nations Conference the admission of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics as members of the Assembly of the World Organization. I am somewhat concerned lest it be pointed out that the United States will have only one vote in the Assembly. It may be necessary for me, therefore, if I am to ensure whole-hearted acceptance by the Congress and people of the United States of our participation in the World Organization, to ask for additional votes in the Assembly in order to give parity to the United States.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1945.

My dear Marshal Stalin:

I have been thinking, as I must, of possible political difficulties which I might encounter in the United States in connection with the number of votes which the Big Powers will enjoy in the Assembly of the World Organization. We have agreed, and I shall certainly carry out that agreement, to support at the forthcoming United Nations Conference the admission of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics as members of the Assembly of the World Organization. I am somewhat concerned lest it be pointed out that the United States will have only one vote in the Assembly. It may be necessary for me, therefore, if I am to insure whole hearted acceptance by the Congress and people of the United States of our participation in the World Organization, to ask for additional votes in the Assembly in order to give parity to the United States.

I would

Marshal I. V. Stalin,
Koreis, The Crimea.

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- 2 -

I would like to know, before I face this problem, that you would perceive no objection and would support a proposal along this line if it is necessary for me to make it at the forthcoming conference. I would greatly appreciate your letting me have your views in reply to this letter.

Most sincerely yours,

Franklin Roosevelt

Eighth Sitting at Livadia Palace. February 11, 1945

Roosevelt opened the sitting and proposed to start a discussion of the draft Communiqué.

Stalin proposed that the American draft Communiqué should be taken as a basis for discussion.

Churchill agreed with that.

[The Conference adopted the American draft as a basis and went on to discuss Section I of the Communiqué: The Defeat of Germany.]

Churchill proposed the deletion in the second phrase of the word “jointly”.

[Churchill’s proposal was adopted.]

Stalin remarked that the first section of the Communiqué was well drafted, and proposed that they go on to a discussion of the second section.

[Stalin’s proposal was adopted.]

Eden proposed that the following words should be added concerning the French zone: “The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four Governments concerned through their representatives on the K.A.C.”

[Eden’s addendum was adopted. The Conference went on to a discussion of Section III on Reparation by Germany.]

Churchill asked that he be shown the draft of the special protocol on reparations from Germany proposed that morning by the Soviet delegation.

After studying the text of the protocol, Churchill remarked that in English «reparation» sounded better and was more impressive than «reparations».

Churchill agreed to leave, in Section III of the Communiqué, the general reference to Germany’s reparation of the damage inflicted by her on the Allied countries.

Roosevelt agreed with the text of Section III and Churchill’s remarks on it.

Eden did not object to the text of the Soviet protocol on reparations, but proposed that the final discussion of it should be postponed until the entire text of the Communiqué was reviewed.

[The Conference went on to discuss Section IV on the United Nations Conference.]

The Soviet delegation proposed the addition of a new paragraph following the first two with this wording: “It was also decided to recommend to the Conference that it should invite the Ukraine and Byelorussia as original members of the international security organisation.”]

Roosevelt declared that the publication of that decision at that time would create political difficulties for him at home, and proposed that they confine themselves to the agreement reached at the Conference to the effect that the Americans would support the proposal to invite the two Soviet Republics as original members of the organisation.

Churchill also believed that great difficulties and disputes could arise in the event of publication of the decision on the Soviet Republics. The British dominions could lodge protests against one state having more than one vote. Churchill needed to contact the dominions and prepare them on the question of the Ukraine and Byelorussia participating as original members in the international security organisation. That is why he proposed that the agreement on the Ukraine and Byelorussia should be written into the decisions of the Conference.

Stalin said that in that case the Soviet delegation could withdraw its proposal, and proposed that they should go on.

Roosevelt declared that Stalin’s agreement to withdraw the Soviet proposal would help Roosevelt to avoid a war with the Irish in the United States.

[The Conference went on to discuss Section V on the Declaration on Liberated Europe.]

Churchill declared that he had no remarks or amendments.

Roosevelt and Stalin declared that they did not have any amendments either.

[The text of Section V was adopted. The Conference went on to discuss Section VI on Poland. The Declaration on Poland was adopted without amendments.]

Churchill remarked, with reference to that section, that he anticipated great criticism of the British Government, especially by the London Poles, and accusations that it had surrendered its positions to the U.S.S.R.

Roosevelt declared that he has ten times as many Poles in the United States as Churchill had in Britain, but he would nevertheless back the Declaration on Poland in every way.

[The Conference went on to discuss Section VII on Yugoslavia. The text of Section VII was adopted. The Conference went on to discuss Section VIII on the Meetings of the Foreign Secretaries.]

Stalin proposed the adoption of the British text.

[All agreed. The Conference went on to discuss the section of the British draft which dealt with prisoners of war.]

Stalin proposed that the section on prisoners of war should not be included in the Communiqué, but that its text should be adopted as a special decision.

Churchill asked whether they could publish the agreement on prisoners of war which was to be signed that day after the morning sitting.

Stalin replied that the agreement could be published. [The Conference went on to discuss Section IX on Unity for Peace as for War. The text of the Anglo-American draft of the section was adopted by all without any objections or remarks. The Conference went on to discuss the last section of the American draft Communiqué: Summary.]

Stalin tabled the proposal: was it not better to exclude the Summary, because it was weaker than the content of the Communiqué itself?

Roosevelt and Churchill agreed with that.

[Discussion of the Communiqué was ended.]

Roosevelt said that the Communiqué should be signed by the Heads of Government and he, Roosevelt, proposed that Stalin's signature should be affixed first.

Stalin objected by saying that there was a sharp-tongued press in the United States, which could give the impression that Stalin had had the President and the Prime Minister on a lead. That was why he proposed that the Communiqué should be signed in alphabetical order, that is, with Roosevelt's first, Stalin's second, and Churchill's third.

Churchill declared that according to the English alphabet his signature would be first.

Stalin replied that he was prepared to accept Churchill's proposal.

[The Heads of Government agreed to sign the Communiqué after luncheon, when the Foreign Ministers had made the amendments in accordance with the results of the discussion of the text of the Communiqué at that day's sitting.] Returning to the question of the protocol on reparations from Germany, Roosevelt said that the draft protocol proposed by the Soviet delegation was acceptable to him.

Churchill declared that he wanted to read the text of the draft protocol once again, as, he thought, it would require some stylistic editing, without however any changes in the content of the protocol. Having read it, Churchill declared that, apart from some stylistic changes, he agreed with the draft protocol.

Churchill proposed that they discuss the time of publication of the Communiqué.

Early proposed that the Communiqué should be published at 8.00 a.m. Washington time on February 13.

[As a result of the discussion of the question, the Heads of Government agreed to broadcast the text of the Communiqué simultaneously in Moscow, London and Washington, at 23.30 Moscow time on Monday, February 12.]

Communiqué. On the Crimea Conference of the Heads of Government of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain

For the past eight days, Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, and Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have met with the Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff, and other advisers in the Crimea.

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America, and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of the Crimea Conference:

I

The Defeat of Germany

We have considered and determined the military plans of the Three Allied Powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three Allied Nations have met in daily meetings throughout the Conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer co-ordination of the military effort of the Three Allies than ever before. The fullest information has been interchanged. The timing, scope, and co-ordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our Armies and Air Forces into the heart of Germany from the east, west, north, and south have been fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among the three staffs attained at this Conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.

II

The Occupation and Control of Germany

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the Three Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan through a Central Control Commission, consisting of the supreme commanders of the Three Powers, with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the Three Powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four Governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organisations, and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the

world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations.

III

Reparation by Germany

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognised it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible.

A commission for the compensation of damage will be established. The commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The commission will work in Moscow.

IV

United Nations Conference

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our Allies of a general international organisation to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic, and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present Conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a Conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on April 25, 1945, to prepare the Charter of such an organisation, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the Conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

V

Declaration on Liberated Europe

We have drawn up and subscribed to a Declaration on Liberated Europe. This Declaration provides for concerting policies of the Three Powers and for joint action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles. The text of the Declaration is as follows:

«The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their Three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

«The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter – the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live – the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

«To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the Three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgement conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsible to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

«The Three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

«When, in the opinion of the Three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

«By this Declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom, and general well-being of all mankind.

«In issuing this Declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.»

VI

Poland

We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settle our differences about Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of the question. We reaffirm our common desire to see established a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland. As a result of our discussions we have agreed on the conditions in which a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three major Powers.

The agreement reached is as follows:

«A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

«Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorised as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible, on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

«When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom, and the Government of the United States of America, will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

«The Three Heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line with digressions from it in some regions of 5 to 8 kilometres in favour of Poland. They

recognised that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.»

VII

Yugoslavia

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasić that the Agreement between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new Government should be formed on the basis of that Agreement.

We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare that:

1) the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (Avnoj) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupština) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary parliament; and,

2) legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.

There was also a: general review of other Balkan questions.

VIII

Meetings of Foreign Secretaries

Throughout the Conference, besides the daily meetings of the Heads of Government and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, and their advisers have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the Conference agree that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every 3 or 4 months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations Conference on World Organisation.

IX

Unity for Peace as for War

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with the continuing and growing co-operation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realised – a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, «afford assurance, that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want».

Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organisation will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

February 11, 1945

Winston S. Churchill

Franklin D. Roosevelt

J. V. Stalin

Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea Conference

The Crimea Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which took place from February 4th to 11th came to the following conclusions.

World Organisation

It was decided:

(1) that a United Nations Conference on the proposed World Organisation should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America;

(2) the nations to be invited to this Conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on the 8th February, 1945 and

(b) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945. (For this purpose by the term «Associated Nations» was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the Conference on World Organisation is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White Russia;

(3) that the United States Government on behalf of the Three Powers should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to the decisions taken at the present Conference concerning the proposed World Organisation;

(4) that the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows:

Invitation

«The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of ... to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 25th April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security.

«The above-named Governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

«C Voting

«1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

«2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

«3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Section C, Chapter VIII, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

«Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

«In the event that the Government of ... desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.»

Territorial Trusteeship

It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations Conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

Zone of Occupation for the French and Control Council for Germany

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

Reparations

The following protocol has been approved.

Protocol on the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimea Conference on the German Reparations in Kind

The Heads of the three Governments have agreed as follows:

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses cause by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war.

Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

a) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organised resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, share of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany:

b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

c) Use of German labour.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives – one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4 With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

«The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50 per cent of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.»

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

Major War Criminals

The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference.

Agreement between the Allied States Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians of These States

Negotiations have taken place at the Crimea Conference between the British, American and Soviet delegations on the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement concerning measures for the protection, maintenance and repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America liberated by the Allied forces now invading Germany. The texts of the Agreements signed on February 11 between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain and between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America are identical. The Agreement between the Soviet Union and Great Britain was signed by V. M. Molotov and Mr. Eden. The Agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States of America was signed by Lieut.-Gen. Gryzlov and General Deane.

Under these Agreements, each ally was to provide food, clothing, medical attention, and other needs for the nationals of the others until transport is available for their repatriation. Soviet officers were to assist British and American authorities in their task of caring for Soviet citizens liberated by the British and American forces during such time as they were on the continent of Europe or in the United Kingdom, awaiting transport to take them home.

British and American officers were to assist the Soviet Government in its task of caring for British subjects and American citizens.

With the achievement of agreement, the Three Governments were pledged to give every assistance consistent with operational requirements to help to insure that all these prisoners of war and civilians were speedily repatriated.

Agreement between the Three Great Powers on Questions of the Far East

The leaders of the Three Great Powers – the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain – have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:
 - a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,
 - b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalised, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored,
 - c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet Chinese Company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the Three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

February 11, 1945


J. V. Stalin

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Winston S. Churchill

Source: <https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/Stalin/yalta.htm#First>

**Text of W. Churchill's speech at the airport before
departure from the Crimea. February 14, 1945**



21.05

-2-

I am so glad that we are all here together today and that the Royal Air Force detachments who have lived here with you have had a chance of knowing what true Russian hospitality is. These are the seeds of a harvest which in the future will be gathered in by other generations who will rejoice in what their fathers are doing now.

I thank you all and on leaving the soil of Russia, the redeemed Crimea cleansed from the foul x/ of the Huns, by Russian valor, on leaving the Soviet territories I express to you all and to your leaders and particularly to your great leader the Supreme Chief Marshal Stalin the gratitude and admiration of the British race spread as they are all over the world on the oceans and in every quarter of the globe for the Russians and their army and their valiant people. We pray that they may never be subjected to the cruel ordeals from which they have emerged with so much glory.

 x/ Слово неразборчиво. Слышится слово - taint .

MESSAGE FROM Mr CHURCHILL TO MARSHAL STALIN.**February 17, 1945**

On behalf of His Majesty's Government I send you grateful thanks for all the hospitality and friendship extended to the British delegation to the Crimea Conference. We were deeply impressed by the feats of organisation and of improvisation which enabled the Conference to meet in such agreeable and imposing surroundings, and we all take back with us most happy recollections. To this I must add a personal expression of my own thanks and gratitude. No previous meeting has shown so clearly the results which can be achieved when the three heads of Government meet together with the firm intention to face difficulties and solve them. You yourself said that cooperation would be less easy when the unifying bond of the fight against a common enemy had been removed. I am resolved, as I am sure the President and you are resolved, that the friendship and cooperation so firmly established shall not fade when victory has been won. I pray that you may long be spared to preside over the destinies of your country which has shown its full greatness under your leadership, and I send you my best wishes and heartfelt thanks.

**PERSONAL FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN TO THE PRIME
MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL. February 20, 1945**

I have received your message of February, 18. I am very glad that you were satisfied with the facilities provided in the Crimea.

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM PREMIER J.V. STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT. April 7, 1945

With reference to your message of April 1st I think I must make the following comments on the Polish question.

The Polish question has indeed reached an impasse.

What is the reason?

The reason is that the U.S. and British Ambassadors in Moscow— members of the Moscow Commission—have departed from the instructions of the Crimea Conference, introducing new elements not provided for by the Crimea Conference.

Namely:

(a) At the Crimea Conference the three of us regarded the Polish Provisional Government as the government now functioning in Poland and subject to reconstruction, as the government that should be the core of a new Government of National Unity. The U.S. and British Ambassadors in Moscow, however, have departed from that thesis; they ignore the Polish Provisional Government, pay no heed to it and at best place individuals in Poland and London on a par with the Provisional Government. Furthermore, they hold that reconstruction of the Provisional Government should be understood in terms of its abolition and the establishment of an entirely new government. Things have gone so far that Mr Harriman declared in the Moscow Commission that it might be that not a single member of the Provisional Government would be included in the Polish Government of National Unity.

Obviously this thesis of the U.S. and British Ambassadors cannot but be strongly resented by the Polish Provisional Government. As regards the Soviet Union, it certainly cannot accept a thesis that is tantamount to direct violation of the Crimea Conference decisions.

(b) At the Crimea Conference the three of us held that five people should be invited for consultation from Poland and three from London, not more. But the U.S. and British Ambassadors have abandoned that position and insist that each member of the Moscow Commission be entitled to invite an unlimited number from Poland and from London.

Clearly the Soviet Government could not agree to that, because, according to the Crimea decision, invitations should be sent not by individual members of the Commission, but by the Commission as a whole, as a body. The demand for no limit to the number invited for consultation runs counter to what was envisaged at the Crimea Conference.

(c) The Soviet Government proceeds from the assumption that by virtue of the Crimea decisions, those invited for consultation should be in the first instance Polish leaders who recognize the decisions of the Crimea Conference, including the one on the Curzon Line,⁷² and, secondly, who actually want friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government insists on this because the blood of Soviet soldiers, so freely shed in liberating Poland, and the fact that in the past 30 years the territory of Poland has twice been used by an enemy for invading Russia, oblige the Soviet Government to ensure friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Poland.

The U.S. and British Ambassadors in Moscow, however, ignore this and want to invite Polish leaders for consultation regardless of their attitude to the Crimea decisions and to the Soviet Union.

Such, to my mind, are the factors hindering a settlement of the Polish problem through mutual agreement. In order to break the deadlock and reach an agreed decision, the following steps should, I think, be taken:

(1) Affirm that reconstruction of the Polish Provisional Government implies, not its abolition, but its reconstruction by enlarging it, it being understood that the Provisional Government shall form the core of the future Polish Government of National Unity.

(2) Return to the provisions of the Crimea Conference and restrict the number of Polish leaders to be invited to eight persons, of whom five should be from Poland and three from London.

(3) Affirm that the representatives of the Polish Provisional Government shall be consulted in all circumstances, that they be consulted in the first place, since the Provisional Government is much stronger in Poland compared with the individuals to be invited from London and Poland whose influence among the population in no way compares with the tremendous prestige of the Provisional Government.

I draw your attention to this because, to my mind, any other decision on the point might be regarded in Poland as an affront to the people and as an attempt to impose a government without regard to Polish public opinion.

(4) Only those leaders should be summoned for consultation from Poland and from London who recognise the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland and who in practice want friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

(5) Reconstruction of the Provisional Government to be effected by replacing a number of Ministers of the Provisional Government by nominees among the Polish leaders who are not members of the Provisional Government.

As to the ratio of old and new Ministers in the Government of National Unity, it might be established more or less on the same lines as was done in the case of the Yugoslav Government.

I think if these comments are taken into consideration the Polish question can be settled in a short time.


Source: Correspondence Between The Chairman Of The Council Of Ministers Of The USSR And The Presidents Of The USA And The Prime Ministers Of Great Britain During The Great Patriotic War Of 1941-1945. Volume 1. Correspondence with Winston S. Churchill and Clement R. Attlee (July 1941-November 1945). Progress Publishers.

1957

Message from Joseph Stalin to President Harry S. Truman expressing condolences on the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt. April 13, 1945

Russian State Archive of Social and Political History

In the name of the Soviet government and myself personally, I would like to extend heartfelt condolences to the government of the United States of America on the death of President Roosevelt. The American people and the United Nations have lost a great international politician and an advocate of the postwar organisation of peace and security.



Part 1.

The Yalta Conference

- 1.1. Formation of the Anti-Hitler coalition
- 1.2. The Tehran Conference
- 1.3. The Yalta Conference
- 1.4. The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference
- 1.5. THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN**



INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER. September 2, 1945

We, acting by command of and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions set forth in the declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, China, and Great Britain on 26 July 1945 at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which four powers are hereafter referred to as the Allied Powers.

We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under the Japanese control wherever situated.

We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilities forthwith, to preserve and save from damage all ships, aircraft, and military and civil property and to comply with all requirements which may be imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Headquarters to issue at once orders to the Commanders of all Japanese forces and all forces under Japanese control wherever situated to surrender unconditionally themselves and all forces under their control.

We hereby command all civil, military and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, and orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority and we direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority.

We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever actions may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representative of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to places as directed.

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.

Signed at TOKYO BAY, JAPAN at 0904 I on the SECOND day of SEPTEMBER, 1945.

MAMORU SHIGMITSU

By Command and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Government

YOSHIJIRO UMEZU

By Command and in behalf of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters

Accepted at TOKYO BAY, JAPAN at 0903 I on the SECOND day of SEPTEMBER, 1945, for the United States, Republic of China, United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and in the interests of the other United Nations at war with Japan.

DOUGLAS MAC ARTHUR,
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

C.W. NIMITZ,
United States Representative

HSU YUNG-CH'ANG,
Republic of China Representative

BRUCE FRASER,
United Kingdom Representative

KUZMA DEREVYANKO,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Representative

THOMAS BLAMEY<
Commonwealth of Australia Representative

L. MOORE COSGRAVE,
Dominion of Canada Representative

JACQUES LE CLERC,
Provisional Government of the French Republic Representative

C.E.L. HELFRICH,
Kingdom of the Netherlands Representative

LEONARD M. ISITT,
Dominion of New Zealand Representative

Source: <http://www.sakhalin.ru/Region/WORLDWAR2/japsurrender.htm>

Signing of the Act of surrender



Source: Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, photo Fund

Japan's surrender



Source: Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, photo Fund.

Document sheet with signatures of country representatives

Signed at TOKYO BAY, JAPAN at 09 44.
on the SECOND day of SEPTEMBER, 1945.

重光葵
By Command and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan
and the Japanese Government.

梅津美治郎
By Command and in behalf of the Japanese
Imperial General Headquarters.

Accepted at TOKYO BAY, JAPAN at 09 08
on the SECOND day of SEPTEMBER, 1945,
for the United States, Republic of China, United Kingdom and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and in the interests of the other
United Nations at war with Japan.

Douglas MacArthur
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

W. A. Stoen
United States Representative

徐永昌
Republic of China Representative

Bruce Fraser
United Kingdom Representative

Joseph Antonovitch
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Representative

Ch. Blomey
Commonwealth of Australia Representative

Ernest Brown
Dominion of Canada Representative

Leclerc
Provisional Government of the French
Republic Representative

W. K. Murphy
Kingdom of the Netherlands Representative

Leonard H. Smith
Dominion of New Zealand Representative

Declaration on the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority over Germany by the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the Provisional Government of the French Republic. June 5, 1945

Declaration on the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority over Germany by the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the Provisional Government of the French Republic = Declaration on the defeat of Germany and the supposition of supreme authority with respect to Germany by the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic. – Berlin, June 5, 1945. – 4 years.. – (Memory of the Great Victory). -

At the end of the text of the signature: G.K. Zhukov, D. Eisenhower, Montgomery, Delatre de Tassigny.

The typewritten text on one side of the sheet with handwritten dirty.

I. “The countries of the anti-Hitler coalition in the fight against fascism”, exhibition (St. Petersburg, 2010). II. Presidential Library. B.N. Yeltsin (St. Petersburg). 1. Russia and the countries of the world (collection). 2. Power (collection). 3. Memory of the Great Victory (collection). 4. Russia-USA: from the history of relationships (collection). 5. World War II – Projects of the post-war organization of Germany – 1939 – 1945. 6. International treaties – 1945 – Documents and materials.

SECRET

Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme authority with respect to Germany by the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic.

The German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air have been completely defeated and have surrendered unconditionally and Germany, which bears responsibility for the war, is no longer capable of resisting the will of the victorious Powers. The unconditional surrender of Germany has thereby been effected, and Germany has become subject to such requirements as may now or hereafter be imposed upon her.

There is no central Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and compliance with the requirements of the victorious Powers.

It is in these circumstances necessary, without prejudice to any subsequent decisions that may be taken respecting Germany, to make provision for the cessation of any further hostilities on the part of the German armed forces, for the maintenance of order in Germany and for the administration of the country, and to announce the immediate requirements with which Germany must comply.

The Representatives of the Supreme Commands of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the French Republic, hereinafter called the "Allied Representatives," acting by authority of their respective Governments and in the interests of the United Nations, accordingly make the following Declaration:-

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers does not effect the annexation of Germany.

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, and the Provisional Government of

the/

Employees of the USSR Embassy in Japan. August 15–20, 1945



Source: Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation

Discussion of the terms of surrender. 1945



Source: Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, fotofond, K. 46, d.

**PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN TO
THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL. April 7, 1945**

I have received your message of April 1 on the Polish problem. In a relevant message to the President, a copy of which I am also sending to you, I have replied to the salient points about the work of the Moscow Commission on Poland.¹⁰⁵ Concerning the other points in your message, I must say this:

The British and U.S. Ambassadors—members of the Moscow Commission—refuse to consider the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government and insist on inviting Polish leaders for consultation regardless of their attitude to the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland or to the Soviet Union. They insist, for example, on Mikolajczyk being invited to Moscow for consultation, and they do so in the form of an ultimatum, ignoring the fact that Mikolajczyk has openly attacked the Crimea Conference decisions on Poland. However, if you deem it necessary, I shall try to induce the Provisional Polish Government to withdraw its objections to inviting Mikolajczyk provided he publicly endorses the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question and declares in favour of establishing friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

2. You wonder why the Polish military theatre should be veiled in secrecy. Actually there is no secrecy at all. You forget the circumstance that the Poles regard the despatch of British or other foreign observers to Poland as an affront to their national dignity, especially when it is borne in mind that the Polish Provisional Government feels the British Government has adopted an unfriendly attitude towards it. As to the Soviet Government, it has to take note of the Polish Provisional Government's negative view on sending foreign observers to Poland. Furthermore, you know that, given a different attitude towards it, the Polish Provisional Government would not object to representatives of other countries entering Poland and, as was the case, for example, with representatives of the Czechoslovak Government, the Yugoslav Government and others, would not put any difficulties in their way.

3. I had a pleasant talk with Mrs Churchill who made a deep impression upon me. She gave me a present from you. Please accept my heartfelt thanks for it.

Act of military surrender (Kapitulationserklaerung). Berlin, May 8, 1945

At the end of the signature text: On behalf of the German High Command: Friedeburg, Keitel, Stumpf. In the presence of: under the authority of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov. Under the authority of the Supreme Commander of the expeditionary forces of the Allies, Chief Marshal of Aviation, Tedder. At the signing also attended as witnesses: the commander of US Strategic Air Force General Spaats. Commander-in-Chief of the French army, General Delatre de Tassigny

ACT OF MILITARY SURRENDER

1. We the undersigned, acting by authority of the German High Command, hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and simultaneously to the Supreme High Command of the Red Army all forces on land, at sea, and in the air who are at this date under German control.

2. The German High Command will at once issue orders to all German military, naval and air authorities and to all forces under German control to cease active operations at 2301 hours Central European time on 8th May 1945, to remain in the positions occupied at that time and to disarm completely, handing over their weapons and equipment to the local allied commanders or officers designated by Representatives of the Allied Supreme Commands. No ship, vessel, or aircraft is to be scuttled, or any damage done to their hull, machinery or equipment, and also to machines of all kinds, armament, apparatus, and all the technical means of prosecution of war in general.

3. The German High Command will at once issue to the appropriate commanders, and ensure the carrying out of any further orders issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and by the Supreme High Command of the Red Army.

4. This act of military surrender is without prejudice to, and will be superseded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to GERMANY and the German armed forces as a whole.

5. In the event of the German High Command or any of the forces under their control failing to act in accordance with this Act of Surrender, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and the Supreme High Command of the Red Army will take such punitive or other action as they deem appropriate.

6. This Act is drawn up in the English,
Russian and German languages. The English and
Russian are the only authentic texts.

Signed at *Berlin* on the *8.* day of May, 1945

W. Keitel
On behalf of the German High Command

Stalin

IN THE PRESENCE OF:

A. Eisenhower
On behalf of the
Supreme Commander
Allied Expeditionary Force

On behalf of the
Supreme High Command of the
Red Army *V. V. Maslennikov*

At the signing also were present as witnesses:

Y. d. Lathu-Traviçny
General Commanding in Chief
First French Army

Carl Spaatz
General, Commanding
United States Strategic Air Forces

**FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MARSHAL STALIN MESSAGE
TO THE RED ARMY AND TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE FROM
THE BRITISH NATION. Received on May 9, 1945**

I send you heartfelt greetings on the splendid victory you have won in driving the invader from your soil and laying the Nazi tyrant low. It is my firm belief that on friendship and understanding between the British and Russian peoples depends the future of mankind. Here in our island home we are thinking today very often about you and we send you from the bottom of our hearts our wishes for your happiness and well-being and that after all the sacrifices and sufferings of the dark valley through which we have marched together we may also in loyal comradeship and sympathy walk in the sunshine of victorious peace. I have asked my wife to speak these few words of friendship and admiration to you all.

**FROM J. V. STALIN TO THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL
MESSAGE TO THE ARMED FORCES. May 10, 1945**

AND PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN
FROM THE PEOPLES OF THE SOVIET UNION

I salute you, the gallant British Armed Forces and people of Britain, and cordially congratulate you on the great victory over our common enemy, German imperialism. This historic victory has crowned the joint struggle waged by the Soviet, British and United States armies for the liberation of Europe.

I express confidence in continued successful and happy development in the post-war period of the friendly relations that have taken shape between our countries during the war.

I have instructed our Ambassador in London to convey to all of you my congratulations on the victory and my best wishes.

Source: Correspondence Between The Chairman Of The Council Of Ministers Of The USSR And The Presidents Of The USA And The Prime Ministers Of Great Britain During The Great Patriotic War Of 1941-1945. Volume 1. Correspondence with Winston S. Churchill and Clement R. Attlee (July 1941-November 1945). Progress Publishers. 1957

Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal. London, August 8, 1945

... The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:

(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;

(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;

(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war,* or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.

Article 7.

The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.

Article 8.

The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determine that justice so requires.

Article 9.

At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal organization.

After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give such notice as it thinks fit that the Prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal to make such declaration and any member of the organization will be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tribunal upon the question of the criminal character of the organization. The Tribunal shall have power to allow or reject the application. If the application is allowed, the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard.

Article 10.

In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for membership there-

in before national, military, or occupation courts. In any such case the criminal nature of the group or organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned.

Article 11.

Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be charged before a national, military, or occupation court, referred to in Article 10 of this Charter, with a crime other than of membership in a criminal group or organization and such court may, after convicting him, impose upon him punishment independent of and ' additional to the punishment imposed by the. Tribunal for participation in the criminal activities of such group or organization.

Article 12.

The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a person charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this Charter in his absence, if he has not been found or if the Tribunal, for any reason, finds it necessary, in the interests of justice, to conduct the hearing in his absence

Source: https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/NT_major-war-criminals.html (volume 1)

HIS EXCELLENCY, GENERALISSIMO STALIN.**Received on December 19, 1945**

Moscow

Dear Generalissimo,

It is natural that approaching our common problems from different starting points we should at the outset encounter some difficulties. But it is becoming increasingly evident that these difficulties are assuming exaggerated proportions in the minds of our respective peoples and are delaying in many ways the progress, which we both desire to expedite, towards peace and reconstruction.

I repeat my assurance to you that it is my earnest wish, and I am sure it is the wish of the people of the United States, that the people of the Soviet Union and the people of the United States should work together to restore and maintain peace. I am sure that the common interest of our two countries in keeping the peace far outweighs any possible differences between us.

Secretary Byrnes and I have sought to go as far as we have felt able to meet your views with reference to the Allied Council for Japan and to the Far Eastern Commission, and I sincerely hope that your Government will accept the proposals which we have made. If these proposals are accepted I assure you that in carrying them out it is my intention to insist on the fullest possible collaboration with the Soviet Union in the implementation of the Potsdam Declaration and the Surrender Terms for Japan.

•Secretary Byrnes and I have also gone far in an effort to meet your views on the future procedure for handling the peace treaties, and the difference between us now on this matter is not great. In view of our willingness to accept your suggestions as to the handling of the preparatory work by the Deputies, I hope very much that your Government can accept our proposals regarding the formal peace conference which will, I am sure, help greatly in securing the general acceptance of the work of our Deputies by other countries.

Prompt agreement between us on the procedure for making the European peace settlements and on the machinery to govern Allied relations with Japan will stop the undermining of confidence in the ability of the Great Powers to work together and will give renewed hope to a world longing for peace.

This hope will also be greatly strengthened if your Government will join in the proposals to have a commission created under the United Nations Organization to inquire into and make recommendations for the control of atomic energy in the interest of world peace.

If we can agree on these general points of procedure without further delay, we should be able to start discussions on other matters as to which it is important in our common interest for us to concert our policies.

I hope very much you will see and talk frankly with Secretary Byrnes. He is thoroughly familiar with my purposes and I feel certain that if you had a full and frank talk with him it would be most helpful

Sincerely yours,
Harry TRUMAN

J.V. STALIN TO H. TRUMAN

MOST SECRET

My dear Mr President,

I was glad to receive your message, transmitted to me by Mr Byrnes, in which you dwell on the highly important subjects that we are now discussing. I agree with you that the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States should strive to work together in restoring and maintaining peace, and that we should proceed from the fact that the common interests of our two countries far outweigh certain differences between us.

The conference of the Ministers now in session in Moscow has already yielded good results. The steps taken by you and Mr Byrnes with regard to both Japan and the peace treaties have helped in a big way. We may take it that agreement on these important points has been reached^{^*} and that the conference has done work that will play a prominent part in establishing proper mutual understanding between our countries in this period of transition from war to peace.

The subject of atomic energy is still under discussion. I hope that on this matter, too, we shall establish unity of views and that by joint effort a decision will be reached that will be satisfactory to both countries and to the other nations. 3 02

I take it that you have been informed of my first talk with Mr Byrnes. We shall meet for further talks. But even now I feel I can say that on the whole I am optimistic as to the results of the exchange of views now taking place between us on urgent international problems, and this, I hope, will provide further opportunities for coordinating the policies of our countries on other issues.

I take this opportunity to answer the letter which I recently received from you concerning the arrival of the artist Chandor in Moscow. I have been away from Moscow for a long time and regret to say that in the immediate future I should find it hard, in view of my numerous duties, to give any time to Mr Chandor. I am, of course, ready to send him my portrait if you think that would be suitable in this instance.

J. STALIN

December 23, 1945

Source: Correspondence Between The Chairman Of The Council Of Ministers Of The USSR And The Presidents Of The USA And The Prime Ministers Of Great Britain During The Great Patriotic War Of 1941-1945. Volume 1. Correspondence with Winston S. Churchill and Clement R. Attlee (July 1941-November 1945). Progress Publishers.

1957

**From a circular telegram by the People's Commissariat
for Foreign Affairs of the USSR on the outcome of the Moscow
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the USSR,
the United States and the United Kingdom. January 2, 1946**

[...]

The Soviet delegation managed to defend the resolution of the Berlin Conference on the procedure for drafting peace treaties and to eliminate the difficulties in this matter that arose at the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers [...]

As a result of discussions with Harriman and at the meeting of the three ministers the US Government has made concessions and agreed to grant control functions to the Soviet Union and to change the functions of the Far-Eastern Commission¹ [...] In the adopted resolutions [relating to Bulgaria and Romania – Ed.] the idea put forward is in fact not about reorganising the governments, but about enlarging them with two representatives from opposition groups which will be obliged to cooperate loyally with the governments [...] The resolutions relating to Bulgaria and Romania strengthen the position of democratic governments friendly to the Soviet Union and, at the same time, thanks to small concessions, make it possible for Britain and the USA to recognise the Romanian and Bulgarian governments quickly² [...] We consider the outcome of the meeting of the three foreign ministers to be positive. At this meeting we have managed to reach decisions on a range of important European and Far-Eastern issues and to maintain the process of three-power cooperation that emerged during the war.

Source: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943cairotehran/d2>

¹ It was created in December 1945 in accordance with resolutions of the meeting in Moscow of Foreign Ministers from the USSR, USA and Great Britain; its aim was to work out agreed decisions facilitating the fulfillment by Japan of the terms of its surrender. It existed until April 1952.

² The Romanian Government was recognised by the USA and Great Britain on 4 February 1946; the Bulgarian Government was recognised by Britain on 11 February 1947 and by the USA on 1 October 1947.

Truman Doctrine. PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN'S ADDRESS BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS. MARCH 12, 1947

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress of the United States:

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.

One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey.

The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.

I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek Government.

Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious and peace loving country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife.

When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five per cent of the children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings.

As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible.

Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances the people of Greece cannot make progress in solving their problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate need of financial and economic assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel and seeds. These are indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods necessary to restore internal order and security, so essential for economic and political recovery.

The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American administrators, economists and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public administration.

The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A Commission appointed by the United Nations security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece and alleged border violations along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other.

Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the government throughout Greek territory. Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy.

The United States must supply that assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but these are inadequate.

There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn.

No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government.

The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece.

We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.

It is important to note that the Greek Government has asked for our aid in utilizing effectively the financial and other assistance we may give to Greece, and in improving its public administration. It is of the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to Greece; in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making Greece self-supporting, and will help to build an economy in which a healthy democracy can flourish.

No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected. The Government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it represents eighty-five per cent of the members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the views of the Greek people.

The Greek Government has been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek Government has done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the left. We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now.

Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention.

The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid.

Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support.

Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity.

That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.

The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey.

As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.

I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.

To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations, The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national

integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.

It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East.

We must take immediate and resolute action.

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the \$350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruc-

tion, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.

Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized.

If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government must work together.

This is a serious course upon which we embark.

I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious. The United States contributed \$341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace.

The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than 1 tenth of 1 per cent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world -- and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.

I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

Part 2.

The Yalta World: Historical Experience

2.1. FORMATION OF UN AND UNESCO

2.2. The Post-War World Order

2.3. The Stages of the Yalta World

UN Charter, June 26, 1945

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and

to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

CHAPTER II: MEMBERSHIP

Article 3

The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.

Article 4

Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 5

A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

Article 6

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

CHAPTER III: ORGANS

Article 7

There are established as principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice and a Secretariat.

Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 8

The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.

CHAPTER IV: THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

COMPOSITION

Article 9

The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.
Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11

The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

Article 12

While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

Article 13

The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:

promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;

promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

The further responsibilities, functions and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

Article 14

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

Article 15

The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.

The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United Nations.

Article 16

The General Assembly shall perform such functions with respect to the international trusteeship system as are assigned to it under Chapters XII and XIII, including the approval of the trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic.

Article 17

The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.

The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.

The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.

VOTING**Article 18**

Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.

Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.

Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Article 19

A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.

PROCEDURE**Article 20**

The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

Article 21

The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President for each session.

Article 22

The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

CHAPTER V: THE SECURITY COUNCIL**COMPOSITION****Article 23**

The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

FUNCTIONS and POWERS**Article 24**

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

VOTING**Article 27**

Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.

Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

PROCEDURE

Article 28

The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.

The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.

The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 30

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

Article 31

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

Article 32

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be neces-

sary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

Article 48

The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

CHAPTER VIII: REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS**Article 52**

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER IX: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CO-OPERATION

Article 55

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

- a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
- b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
- c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 56

All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 57

The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.

Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter referred to as specialized agencies.

Article 58

The Organization shall make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies.

Article 59

The Organization shall, where appropriate, initiate negotiations among the states concerned for the creation of any new specialized agencies required for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 60

Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X.

CHAPTER X: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

COMPOSITION

Article 61

The Economic and Social Council shall consist of fifty-four Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly.

Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-election.

At the first election after the increase in the membership of the Economic and Social Council from twenty-seven to fifty-four members, in addition to the members elected in place of the nine members whose term of office expires at the end of that year, twenty-seven additional members shall be elected. Of these twenty-seven additional members, the term of office of nine members so elected shall ex-

pire at the end of one year, and of nine other members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the General Assembly.

Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 62

The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.

It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence.

It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its competence.

Article 63

The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly.

It may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations.

Article 64

The Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain regular reports from the specialized agencies. It may make arrangements with the Members of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to its own recommendations and to recommendations on matters falling within its competence made by the General Assembly.

It may communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly.

Article 65

The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.

Article 66

The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its competence in connection with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General Assembly.

It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of Members of the United Nations and at the request of specialized agencies.

It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

VOTING

Article 67

Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote.

Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

PROCEDURE**Article 68**

The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions.

Article 69

The Economic and Social Council shall invite any Member of the United Nations to participate, without vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that Member.

Article 70

The Economic and Social Council may make arrangements for representatives of the specialized agencies to participate, without vote, in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it, and for its representatives to participate in the deliberations of the specialized agencies.

Article 71

The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.

Article 72

The Economic and Social Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

The Economic and Social Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

CHAPTER XI: DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES**Article 73**

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;

c. to further international peace and security;

d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and

e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

Article 74

Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general

principle of good-neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.

CHAPTER XII: INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

Article 75

The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

Article 76

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

- a. to further international peace and security;
- b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
- c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and
- d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

Article 77

1 The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

- a. territories now held under mandate;
- b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and
- c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2 It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Article 78

The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

Article 79

The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.

Article 80

Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.

Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.

Article 81

The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

Article 82

There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.

Article 83

All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment shall be exercised by the Security Council.

The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.

The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

Article 84

It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defence and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

Article 85

The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

CHAPTER XIII: THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

COMPOSITION

Article 86

1 The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:

- a. those Members administering trust territories;
- b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories; and
- c. as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.

2 Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent it therein.

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 87

The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

- a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;
- b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;
- c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and
- d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

Article 88

The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.

VOTING

Article 89

Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall have one vote.

Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

PROCEDURE

Article 90

The Trusteeship Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

The Trusteeship Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

Article 91

The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic and Social Council and of the specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively concerned.

CHAPTER XIV: THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Article 92

The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.

Article 93

All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 94

Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.

If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.

Article 95

Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future.

Article 96

a. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

b. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.

CHAPTER XV: THE SECRETARIAT**Article 97**

The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Article 98

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 100

In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101

The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.

Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.

The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

CHAPTER XVI: MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Article 102

Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.

No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.

Article 103

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

Article 104

The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.

Article 105

The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.

Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connexion with the Organization.

The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose.

CHAPTER XVII: TRANSITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Article 106

Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, 30 October 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Article 107

Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.

CHAPTER XVIII: AMENDMENTS

Article 108

Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

Article 109

A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.

Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.

CHAPTER XIX: RATIFICATION AND SIGNATURE**Article 110**

The present Charter shall be ratified by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

The ratifications shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, which shall notify all the signatory states of each deposit as well as the Secretary-General of the Organization when he has been appointed.

The present Charter shall come into force upon the deposit of ratifications by the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, and by a majority of the other signatory states. A protocol of the ratifications deposited shall thereupon be drawn up by the Government of the United States of America which shall communicate copies thereof to all the signatory states.

The states signatory to the present Charter which ratify it after it has come into force will become original Members of the United Nations on the date of the deposit of their respective ratifications.

Article 111

The present Charter, of which the Chinese, French, Russian, English, and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatory states.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the representatives of the Governments of the United Nations have signed the present Charter. DONE at the city of San Francisco the twenty-sixth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. December 10, 1948

Preamble

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1.

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2.

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3.

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4.

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5.

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6.

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7.

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8.

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10.

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11.

(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13.

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14.

(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15.

(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16.

(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17.

(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18.

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19.

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20.

- (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
- (2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21.

- (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
- (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
- (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22.

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23.

- (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
- (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
- (3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
- (4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24.

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25.

- (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
- (2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26.

- (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
- (2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
- (3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27.

(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28.

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29.

(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30.

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

Source: <https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>

Protocol Noting of the Reception of the Delegation from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Moscow,
28th of June 1949

Absolutely Secret

The reception was held on 27 June and continued from 11 PM to 12 AM.

The following were present at the reception: comrades Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Liu Shao Chi, – Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Gao Gan – member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee and also the Secretary of the Bureau of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Government of Manchuria, Van Tsyasyan – member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Karsky (Shi Chzhe) – interpreter and I. V. Kovalyev.

After mutual greetings and handshakes with the delegation, Comrade Stalin enquired about the health of comrade Mao Tse Tung.

Comrade Liu Shao Chi thanked Comrade Stalin for his attention to Comrade Mao Tse-tung and handed him a letter from Comrade Mao Tse-tung expressing gratitude to comrade Stalin for the extraordinary support, which was provided to China by the Soviet Union and requested comrade Stalin to receive the delegation.

Later comrade Stalin turned to the discussion of the questions put forward by the delegation.

1. Credit. Comrade Stalin said that the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) has decided to provide the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China a credit worth \$300 million. He noted that such an agreement between the two parties is being done for the first time in history.

A credit of \$300 million carrying 1% interest per annum will be provided to China in terms of equipment, machines and different sorts of materials and commodities amounting to \$60 million per year for a period of 5 years.

Repayment of the credit by China would be over a period of 10 years after the full realisation of the credit. Comrade Stalin also said that Comrade Mao Tse Tung in a telegram to him had expressed the opinion that 1% interest per annum is too small for a sum of that magnitude and that it should be increased.

Comrade Stalin explained to the delegation that to the countries of Western democracies (the countries of Eastern Europe – Editor) the Soviet Union has provided credit at 2% per annum, but from China it is asking for 1%, as, unlike the countries of western democracies where there is no war and the economies have strengthened, in China the war is continuing as also the devastation and thus China needs greater support on the basis of greater concessions.

Later comrade Stalin jokingly added that after all if you still insist on a higher interest then it is your cause and we can accept even that.

Regarding the signing of the agreement for providing the credit Comrade Stalin said that there are two options: first – the agreement can be signed by the representatives of the Central Committees of the All-Union Communist Party (b) and the Communist Party of China, and second by the representatives of the Soviet government and the government of Manchuria which already exists so that later when the all-Chinese Democratic Coalition government is established the agreement can then be redefined as one between the governments of the Soviet Union and China.

2. Regarding the specialists. Comrade Stalin said that we can provide specialists. We are ready in the near future to send the first group of specialists you had asked for. But we have to agree about the conditions of their stay. We think that the payment is possible through provisions if you do to your own specialists and must be at the same level as for the best of your specialists, neither less nor more. In this regard in case that the salaries of our specialists are higher then we can if needed augment these at the expense of the Soviet state.

We request you, Comrade Stalin said, that you must inform us about any inappropriate behaviour by any individual specialist if such behaviour occurs, as no family is without a black sheep and among the good ones there may be a bad one too.

Bad behaviour would put to shame the reputation of the Soviet State and therefore we would take preventive measures of educating and if needed punishment.

We will not allow the Soviet specialists to look down upon the Chinese specialists and the Chinese people and ensure that they relate to them with sensitivity.

Responding to what was said by Comrade Stalin, Comrade Liu Shao Chi said that there are foreign specialists in China who are not related in any way with the imperialists and that their salaries are much higher than that of the Chinese specialists. To which comrade Stalin said that the Soviet state has its own thinking and regulations different from that prevalent in capitalist countries and we would like to adhere to these.

3. Sending Of Specialists To Shanghai. Comrade Stalin said that we have chosen 15 specialists and we can on demand send them at any time. Please discuss about it and let us know. In general you should keep in mind that in large cities and specially in Shanghai there are large number of your own specialists and qualified workers who are capable of not less but more than what the Soviet specialists can do and, therefore, you need to employ the former actively.

4. Comrade Stalin said that we are ready to offer you help in the removal of mines in the waters off Shanghai as we have large numbers of specialists and trawlers.

We could, for example, send a number of minesweepers to the government of Manchuria and train Chinese sailors subsequently in Dalen, Vladivostok or Port Arthur for the mine-clearing. He added, laughing, that the Manchurian government can then 'sell' them to the Central Government.

5. Regarding Sinkiang. Comrade Stalin said that the occupation of Sinkiang should not be further postponed as the postponement may allow the English to intervene in the affairs of Sinkiang. They may instigate the Muslims including the Indian Muslims for continuing the Civil War against the communists which is undesirable as there are large reserves of petroleum and cotton in Sinkiang which are greatly needed by China.

The Chinese population in Sinkiang is not more than 5% and after the occupation of Sinkiang it is necessary to increase the percentage of the Chinese population to 30%. Resettling Chinese will serve the purpose of comprehensive development of such a large and rich region and strengthening the defences of the Chinese border.

In general for strengthening the security of China it is necessary to resettle Chinese population in the border areas.

You, said Comrade Stalin, greatly overestimate the strengths of M. A. Bufan (the commander of the Kuomintang military forces in the north-west of China – Editor) . He has cavalry which can be routed by the help of artillery. If you want we can give you 40 fighter planes which would help you in crushing this cavalry very quickly.

6. Navy. Comrade Stalin said that China does not have a flotilla of its own but added it appears that you have some ships which have been captured from the Kuomintang?

China must have the navy of its own and we are ready to help you in creating the navy. As of now, for example, we can lift sunken military and commercial ships and help in repairing them.

And concerning your request for strengthening the defence of Tsindao we can send a group of ships on a visit to the port of Tsindao after the establishment of the All-Chinese government.

7. Comrade Liu Shao Chi thanked Comrade Stalin for the enormous help being given in all the spheres of life in China on extremely concessional conditions such as never before in history.

He immediately pointed out that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has formulated instructions which will be sent to all the party organisations for creating conducive conditions for the Soviet specialists.

8. Comrade Stalin said that we will work out a set of similar instructions for the Soviet specialists so that they do not offend Chinese specialists.

9. Replying to the request of the Chinese comrades to set up an air link between Moscow and Peking Comrade Stalin said that we are ready to start organising this air route.

We are ready to help you in building an assembly and repair aviation workshop. We can give you the latest fighter planes (the word 'latest' was underlined by Stalin – Ed.) – Czechoslovakian or Russian as you desire so that you can use them to train your own aviation cadres.

10. Comrade Stalin agreed to the request made by the delegation to a hearing in the Political Bureau of their report about the war-political and economic situation in China, and to exchange opinions on a range of crucial questions, when it would be ready, in 3 or 4 days.

11. Comrade Stalin said that we are ready to give you comprehensive help in studying the state apparatus or the industry or anything else which you would want to know, but for this purpose we must first have you legalised by naming you as the trade delegation from Manchuria.

12. If this satisfies you then we can publish a statement in the press that the trade delegation headed by Comrade Gao Gan has come to Moscow on a visit which will allow you to see all that you wish to including the places of entertainment.

The Chinese comrades requested to be allowed to give a reply after consultations with Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

Note. The notings were made by I. V. Kovalyev (1901-1993), head of the group of Soviet experts on economic issues, representative of the CC of the AUCP(b) under the CC of CPC. Stalin later went through the document. The numbering and the underlining of parts of the text are his own.

APRF. F. 45, Op. 1. D. 329, L. 1-7.

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I. Stalin, Sochinenia, Tom 18, 1917-1953, Informatsionno-izdatelskii tsentr 'SOYUZ', Tver, 2006, pp. 527-530.

Translated from the Russian by Tahir Asghar.

<https://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv17n2/protocol.htm>

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. November 16, 1945

Adopted in London on 16 November 1945 and amended by the General Conference at its 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 15th, 17th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 31st and 40th sessions.

The Governments of the States Parties to this Constitution on behalf of their peoples declare:

That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed;

That ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war;

That the great and terrible war which has now ended was a war made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men, and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and prejudice, of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races;

That the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern;

That a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.

For these reasons, the States Parties to this Constitution, believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives;

In consequence whereof they do hereby create the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for the purpose of advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind for which the United Nations Organization was established and which its Charter proclaims.

Article I

Purposes and functions.

1. The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.

2. To realize this purpose the Organization will:

(a) Collaborate in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples, through all means of mass communication and to that end recommend such international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image;

(b) Give fresh impulse to popular education and to the spread of culture:

By collaborating with Members, at their request, in the development of educational activities;

By instituting collaboration among the nations to advance the ideal of equality of educational opportunity without regard to race, sex or any distinctions, economic or social;

By suggesting educational methods best suited to prepare the children of the world for the responsibilities of freedom;

(c) Maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge:

By assuring the conservation and protection of the world's inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science, and recommending to the nations concerned the necessary international conventions;

By encouraging cooperation among the nations in all branches of intellectual activity, including the international exchange of persons active in the fields of education, science and culture and the exchange of publications, objects of artistic and scientific interest and other materials of information;

By initiating methods of international cooperation calculated to give the people of all countries access to the printed and published materials produced by any of them.

3. With a view to preserving the independence, integrity and fruitful diversity of the cultures and educational systems of the States Members of the Organization, the Organization is prohibited from intervening in matters which are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction.

Article II

Membership.

1. Membership of the United Nations Organization shall carry with it the right to membership of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

2. Subject to the conditions of the Agreement between this Organization and the United Nations Organization, approved pursuant to Article X of this Constitution, states not members of the United Nations Organization may be admitted to membership of the Organization, upon recommendation of the Executive Board, by a two-thirds majority vote of the General Conference.

3. Territories or groups of territories which are not responsible for the conduct of their international relations may be admitted as Associate Members by the General Conference by a two-thirds majority of Members present and voting, upon application made on behalf of such territory or group of territories by the Member or other authority having responsibility for their international relations. The nature and extent of the rights and obligations of Associate Members shall be determined by the General Conference.

4. Members of the Organization which are suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership of the United Nations Organization shall, upon the request of the latter, be suspended from the rights and privileges of this Organization.

5. Members of the Organization which are expelled from the United Nations Organization shall automatically cease to be Members of this Organization.

6. Any Member State or Associate Member of the Organization may withdraw from the Organization by notice addressed to the Director-General. Such notice shall take effect on 31 December of the year following that during which the notice was given. No such withdrawal shall affect the financial obligations owed to the Organization on the date the withdrawal takes effect. Notice of withdrawal by an Associate Member shall be given on its behalf by the Member State or other authority having responsibility for its international relations.

7. Each Member State is entitled to appoint a Permanent Delegate to the Organization.

8. The Permanent Delegate of the Member State shall present his credentials to the Director-General of the Organization, and shall officially assume his duties from the day of presentation of his credentials.

Article III

Organs.

The Organization shall include a General Conference, an Executive Board and a Secretariat.

Article IV

The General Conference.

A. Composition

1. The General Conference shall consist of the representatives of the States Members of the Organization. The Government of each Member State shall appoint not more than five delegates, who shall be selected after consultation with the National Commission, if established, or with educational, scientific and cultural bodies.

B. Functions

2. The General Conference shall determine the policies and the main lines of work of the Organization. It shall take decisions on programmes submitted to it by the Executive Board.

3. The General Conference shall, when it deems desirable and in accordance with the regulations to be made by it, summon international conferences of states on education, the sciences and humanities or the dissemination of knowledge; non-governmental conferences on the same subjects may be summoned by the General Conference or by the Executive Board in accordance with such regulations.

4. The General Conference shall, in adopting proposals for submission to the Member States, distinguish between recommendations and international conventions submitted for their approval. In the former case a majority vote shall suffice; in the latter case a two-thirds majority shall be required. Each of the Member States shall submit recommendations or conventions to its competent authorities within a period of one year from the close of the session of the General Conference at which they were adopted.

5. Subject to the provisions of Article V, paragraph 6 (c), the General Conference shall advise the United Nations Organization on the educational, scientific and cultural aspects of matters of concern to the latter, in accordance with the terms and procedure agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the two Organizations.

6. The General Conference shall receive and consider the reports sent to the Organization by Member States on the action taken upon the recommendations and conventions referred to in paragraph 4 above or, if it so decides, analytical summaries of these reports.

7. The General Conference shall elect the members of the Executive Board and, on the recommendation of the Board, shall appoint the Director-General.

C. Voting

8. (a) Each Member State shall have one vote in the General Conference. Decisions shall be made by a simple majority except in cases in which a two-thirds majority is required by the provisions of this Constitution, or the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference. A majority shall be a majority of the Members present and voting.

(b) A Member State shall have no vote in the General Conference if the total amount of contributions due from it exceeds the total amount of contributions payable by it for the current year and the immediately preceding calendar year.

(c) The General Conference may nevertheless permit such a Member State to vote, if it is satisfied that failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member State.

D. Procedure

9. (a) The General Conference shall meet in ordinary session every two years. It may meet in extraordinary session if it decides to do so itself or if summoned by the Executive Board, or on the demand of at least one third of the Member States.

(b) At each session the location of its next ordinary session shall be designated by the General Conference. The location of an extraordinary session shall be decided by the General Conference if the session is summoned by it, or otherwise by the Executive Board.

10. The General Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall at each session elect a President and other officers.

11. The General Conference shall set up special and technical committees and such other subsidiary organs as may be necessary for its purposes.

12. The General Conference shall cause arrangements to be made for public access to meetings, subject to such regulations as it shall prescribe.

E. Observers

13. The General Conference, on the recommendation of the Executive Board and by a two-thirds majority may, subject to its rules of procedure, invite as observers at specified sessions of the Conference or of its commissions representatives of international organizations, such as those referred to in Article XI, paragraph 4.

14. When consultative arrangements have been approved by the Executive Board for such international non-governmental or semi-governmental organizations in the manner provided in Article XI, paragraph 4, those organizations shall be invited to send observers to sessions of the General Conference and its commissions.

Article V

Executive Board.

A. Composition

1. (a) The Executive Board shall be elected by the General Conference and it shall consist of fifty-eight Member States. The President of the General Conference shall sit *ex officio* in an advisory capacity on the Executive Board.

(b) A Member State shall not be eligible as a Member of the Executive Board if the total amount of contributions due from it exceeds the total amount of contributions payable by it for the current year and the immediately preceding calendar year. The General Conference may nevertheless permit such a Member State to be eligible as a Member of the Executive Board if it is satisfied that failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member State.

(c) Elected States Members of the Executive Board are hereinafter referred to as "Members" of the Executive Board.

2. (a) Each Member of the Executive Board shall appoint one representative. It may also appoint alternates.

(b) In selecting its representative on the Executive Board, the Member of the Executive Board shall endeavour to appoint a person qualified in one or more of the fields of competence of UNESCO and with the necessary experience and capacity to fulfil the administrative and executive duties of the Board. Bearing in mind the importance of continuity, each representative shall be appointed for the duration of the term of the Member of the Executive Board, unless exceptional circumstances warrant his replacement. The alternates appointed by each Member of the Executive Board shall act in the absence of its representative in all his functions.

3. In electing Members to the Executive Board, the General Conference shall have regard to the diversity of cultures and a balanced geographical distribution.

4. (a) Members of the Executive Board shall serve from the close of the session of the General Conference which elected them until the close of the second ordinary session of the General Conference following their election. The General Conference shall, at each of its ordinary sessions, elect the number of Members of the Executive Board required to fill vacancies occurring at the end of the session.

(b) Members of the Executive Board are eligible for re-election. Re-elected Members of the Executive Board shall endeavour to change their representatives on the Board.

5. In the event of the withdrawal from the Organization of a Member of the Executive Board, its term of office shall be terminated on the date when the withdrawal becomes effective.

B. Functions

6. (a) The Executive Board shall prepare the agenda for the General Conference. It shall examine the programme of work for the Organization and corresponding budget estimates submitted to it by the Director-General in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article VI and shall submit them with such recommendations as it considers desirable to the General Conference.

(b) The Executive Board, acting under the authority of the General Conference, shall be responsible for the execution of the programme adopted by the Conference. In accordance with the decisions of the General Conference and having regard to circumstances arising between two ordinary sessions, the Executive Board shall take all necessary measures to ensure the effective and rational execution of the programme by the Director-General.

(c) Between ordinary sessions of the General Conference, the Board may discharge the functions of adviser to the United Nations, set forth in Article IV, paragraph 5, whenever the problem upon which advice is sought has already been dealt with in principle by the Conference, or when the solution is implicit in decisions of the Conference.

7. The Executive Board shall recommend to the General Conference the admission of new Members to the Organization.

8. Subject to decisions of the General Conference, the Executive Board shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its officers from among its Members.

9. The Executive Board shall meet in regular session at least four times during a biennium and may meet in special session if convoked by the Chairman on his initiative or upon the request of six Members of the Executive Board.

10. The Chairman of the Executive Board shall present, on behalf of the Board, to the General Conference at each ordinary session, with or without comments, the reports on the activities of the Organization which the Director-General is required to prepare in accordance with the provisions of Article VI. 3 (b).

11. The Executive Board shall make all necessary arrangements to consult the representatives of international organizations or qualified persons concerned with questions within its competence.

12. Between sessions of the General Conference, the Executive Board may request advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice on legal questions arising within the field of the Organization's activities.

13. The Executive Board shall also exercise the powers delegated to it by the General Conference on behalf of the Conference as a whole.

C. Voting rights

14 (a) Each Member of the Executive Board shall have one vote.

(b) A Member State shall have no vote if the total amount of contributions due from it exceeds the total amount of contributions payable by it for the current year and the immediately preceding calendar year. The General Conference may nevertheless permit such a Member State to vote if it is satisfied that failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member State.

Article VI

Secretariat.

1. The Secretariat shall consist of a Director-General and such staff as may be required.

2. The Director-General shall be nominated by the Executive Board and appointed by the General Conference for a period of four years, under such conditions as the Conference may approve. The Director-General may be appointed for a further term of four years but shall not be eligible for reappointment for a subsequent term. The Director-General shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

3. (a) The Director-General, or a deputy designated by him, shall participate, without the right to vote, in all meetings of the General Conference, of the Executive Board, and of the Committees of the

Organization. He shall formulate proposals for appropriate action by the Conference and the Board, and shall prepare for submission to the Board a draft programme of work for the Organization with corresponding budget estimates.

(b) The Director-General shall prepare and communicate to Member States and to the Executive Board periodical reports on the activities of the Organization. The General Conference shall determine the periods to be covered by these reports.

4. The Director-General shall appoint the staff of the Secretariat in accordance with staff regulations to be approved by the General Conference. Subject to the paramount consideration of securing the highest standards of integrity, efficiency and technical competence, appointment to the staff shall be on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

5. The responsibilities of the Director-General and of the staff shall be exclusively international in character. In the discharge of their duties they shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might prejudice their positions as international officials. Each State Member of the Organization undertakes to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General and the staff, and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.

6. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the Organization from entering into special arrangements within the United Nations Organization for common services and staff and for the interchange of personnel.

Article VII

National cooperating bodies.

1. Each Member State shall make such arrangements as suit its particular conditions for the purpose of associating its principal bodies interested in educational, scientific and cultural matters with the work of the Organization, preferably by the formation of a National Commission broadly representative of the government and such bodies.

2. National Commissions or National Cooperating Bodies, where they exist, shall act in an advisory capacity to their respective delegations to the General Conference, to the representatives and alternates of their countries on the Executive Board and to their Governments in matters relating to the Organization and shall function as agencies of liaison in all matters of interest to it.

3. The Organization may, on the request of a Member State, delegate, either temporarily, a member of its Secretariat to serve on the National Commission of that state, in order to assist in the development of its work.

Article VIII

Reports by Member States.

Each Member State shall submit to the Organization, at such times and in such manner as shall be determined by the General Conference, reports on the laws, regulations and statistics relating to its educational, scientific and cultural institutions and activities, and on the action taken upon the recommendations and conventions referred to in Article IV, paragraph 4.

Article IX

Budget.

1. The budget shall be administered by the Organization.

2. The General Conference shall approve and give final effect to the budget and to the apportionment of financial responsibility among the States Members of the Organization subject to such arrangement with the United Nations as may be provided in the agreement to be entered into pursuant to Article X.

3. The Director-General may accept voluntary contributions, gifts, bequests and subventions directly from governments, public and private institutions, associations and private persons, subject to the conditions specified in the Financial Regulations.

Article X

Relations with the United Nations Organization.

This Organization shall be brought into relation with the United Nations Organization, as soon as practicable, as one of the specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 of the Charter of the United Nations. This relationship shall be effected through an agreement with the United Nations Organization under Article 63 of the Charter, which agreement shall be subject to the approval of the General Conference of this Organization. The agreement shall provide for effective cooperation between the two Organizations in the pursuit of their common purposes, and at the same time shall recognize the autonomy of this Organization, within the fields of its competence as defined in this Constitution. Such agreement may, among other matters, provide for the approval and financing of the budget of the Organization by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Article XI

Relations with other specialized international organizations and agencies.

1. This Organization may cooperate with other specialized intergovernmental organizations and agencies whose interests and activities are related to its purposes. To this end the Director-General, acting under the general authority of the Executive Board, may establish effective working relationships with such organizations and agencies and establish such joint committees as may be necessary to assure effective cooperation. Any formal arrangements entered into with such organizations or agencies shall be subject to the approval of the Executive Board.

2. Whenever the General Conference of this Organization and the competent authorities of any other specialized intergovernmental organizations or agencies whose purpose and functions lie within the competence of this Organization deem it desirable to effect a transfer of their resources and activities to this Organization, the Director-General, subject to the approval of the Conference, may enter into mutually acceptable arrangements for this purpose.

3. This Organization may make appropriate arrangements with other intergovernmental organizations for reciprocal representation at meetings.

4. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization may make suitable arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental international organizations concerned with matters within its competence, and may invite them to undertake specific tasks. Such cooperation may also include appropriate participation by representatives of such organizations on advisory committees set up by the General Conference.

Article XII

Legal status of the Organization.

The provisions of Articles 104 and 105 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization concerning the legal status of that Organization, its privileges and immunities, shall apply in the same way to this Organization.

Article XIII

Amendments.

1. Proposals for amendments to this Constitution shall become effective upon receiving the approval of the General Conference by a two-thirds majority; provided, however, that those amendments which involve fundamental alterations in the aims of the Organization or new obligations for the Member States shall require subsequent acceptance on the part of two thirds of the Member States before they come into force. The draft texts of proposed amendments shall be communicated by the Director-General to the Member States at least six months in advance of their consideration by the General Conference.

2. The General Conference shall have power to adopt by a two-thirds majority rules of procedure for carrying out the provisions of this Article.

Article XIV

Interpretation.

1. The English and French texts of this Constitution shall be regarded as equally authoritative.
2. Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation of this Constitution shall be referred for determination to the International Court of Justice or to an arbitral tribunal, as the General Conference may determine under its Rules of Procedure.

Article XV

Entry into force.

1. This Constitution shall be subject to acceptance. The instrument of acceptance shall be deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom.
2. This Constitution shall remain open for signature in the archives of the Government of the United Kingdom. Signature may take place either before or after the deposit of the instrument of acceptance. No acceptance shall be valid unless preceded or followed by signature. However, a state that has withdrawn from the Organization shall simply deposit a new instrument of acceptance in order to resume membership.
3. This Constitution shall come into force when it has been accepted by twenty of its signatories. Subsequent acceptances shall take effect immediately.
4. The Government of the United Kingdom will inform all Members of the United Nations and the Director-General of the receipt of all instruments of acceptance and of the date on which the Constitution comes into force in accordance with the preceding paragraph.

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, have signed this Constitution in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in London the sixteenth day of November, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five, in a single copy, in the English and French languages, of which certified copies will be communicated by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Governments of all the Members of the United Nations.

Source: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. October 5, 1963

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the “Original Parties”,

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man’s environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I.

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or

(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a Treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article II.

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties.

Article III.

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties – the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article IV

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

Article V.

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.

Source: http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/test_ban/text

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. December 19, 1966

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of mans entry into outer space,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development,

Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Believing that such co-operation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples,

Recalling resolution 1962 (XVIII), entitled "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space," which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 1963,

Recalling resolution 1884 (XVIII), calling upon States to refrain from placing in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or from installing such weapons on celestial bodies, which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 17 October 1963,

Taking account of United Nations General Assembly resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947, which condemned propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and considering that the aforementioned resolution is applicable to outer space,

Convinced that a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, will further the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed on the following:

Article I

The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.

There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such investigation.

Article II

Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

Article III

States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the

Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

Article IV

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.

Article V

States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party or on the high seas. When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle.

In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States Parties.

States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts.

Article VI

States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization.

Article VII

Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.

Article VIII

A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are carried shall be returned to that State Party, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to their return.

Article IX

In the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.

Article X

In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity with the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those States.

The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under which it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States concerned.

Article XI

In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, agree to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities. On receiving the said information, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it immediately and effectively.

Article XII

All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.

Article XIII

The provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties to the Treaty in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by a single State Party to the Treaty or jointly with other States, including cases where they are carried on within the framework of international intergovernmental organizations.

Any practical questions arising in connection with activities carried on by international inter-governmental organizations in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be resolved by the States Parties to the Treaty either with the appropriate inter-

national organization or with one or more States members of that international organization, which are Parties to this Treaty.

Article XIV

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depository Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by five Governments including the Governments designated as Depository Governments under this Treaty.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force and other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XV

Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it.

Article XVI

Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Depository Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of this notification.

Article XVII

This Treaty, of which the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depository Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depository Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

Signed at Washington, London, Moscow, January 27, 1967

Ratification advised by U. S. Senate April 25, 1967

Ratified by U. S. President May 24, 1967

U. S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow October 10, 1967

Proclaimed by U. S. President October 10, 1967

Entered into force October 10, 1967

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Having met at Rio de Janeiro from
3 to 14 June 1992,

Reaffirming the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at Stockholm on 16 June 1972, /1 and seeking to build upon it,

With the goal of establishing a new and equitable global partnership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among States, key sectors of societies and people,

Working towards international agreements which respect the interests of all and protect the integrity of the global environmental and developmental system,

Recognizing the integral and interdependent nature of the Earth, our home,
Proclaims that:

Principle 1

Human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.

Principle 2

States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.

Principle 3

The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.

Principle 4

In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.

Principle 5

All States and all people shall cooperate in the essential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable development, in order to decrease the disparities in standards of living and better meet the needs of the majority of the people of the world.

Principle 6

The special situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed and those most environmentally vulnerable, shall be given special priority. International actions in the field of environment and development should also address the interests and needs of all countries.

Principle 7

States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.

Principle 8

To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all people, States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies.

Principle 9

States should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for sustainable development by improving scientific understanding through exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge, and by enhancing the development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including new and innovative technologies.

Principle 10

Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.

Principle 11

States shall enact effective environmental legislation. Environmental standards, management objectives and priorities should reflect the environmental and developmental context to which they apply. Standards applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries.

Principle 12

States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental degradation. Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.

Principle 13

States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage. States shall also cooperate in an expeditious and more determined manner to develop further international law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction.

Principle 14

States should effectively cooperate to discourage or prevent the relocation and transfer to other States of any activities and substances that cause severe environmental degradation or are found to be harmful to human health.

Principle 15

In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.

Principle 16

National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in prin-

ciple, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and investment.

Principle 17

Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority.

Principle 18

States shall immediately notify other States of any natural disasters or other emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful effects on the environment of those States. Every effort shall be made by the international community to help States so afflicted.

Principle 19

States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to potentially affected States on activities that may have a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect and shall consult with those States at an early stage and in good faith.

Principle 20

Women have a vital role in environmental management and development. Their full participation is therefore essential to achieve sustainable development.

Principle 21

The creativity, ideals and courage of the youth of the world should be mobilized to forge a global partnership in order to achieve sustainable development and ensure a better future for all.

Principle 22

Indigenous people and their communities and other local communities have a vital role in environmental management and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognize and duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable development.

Principle 23

The environment and natural resources of people under oppression, domination and occupation shall be protected.

Principle 24

Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.

Principle 25

Peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible.

Principle 26

States shall resolve all their environmental disputes peacefully and by appropriate means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Principle 27

States and people shall cooperate in good faith and in a spirit of partnership in the fulfilment of the principles embodied in this Declaration and in the further development of international law in the field of sustainable development.

Note. 1 / Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E. 73. II. A. 14 and corrigendum), chap. I.

United Nations Millennium Declaration

General Assembly resolution 55/2 of
8 September 2000

The General Assembly

Adopts the following Declaration:

I. Values and principles

1. We, heads of State and Government, have gathered at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 6 to 8 September 2000, at the dawn of a new millennium, to reaffirm our faith in the Organization and its Charter as indispensable foundations of a more peaceful, prosperous and just world.

2. We recognize that, in addition to our separate responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world's people, especially the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to whom the future belongs.

3. We reaffirm our commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which have proved timeless and universal. Indeed, their relevance and capacity to inspire have increased, as nations and peoples have become increasingly interconnected and interdependent.

4. We are determined to establish a just and lasting peace all over the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. We rededicate ourselves to support all efforts to uphold the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their territorial integrity and political independence, resolution of disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the right to self-determination of peoples which remain under colonial domination and foreign occupation, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the equal rights of all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion and international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character.

5. We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world's people. For while globalization offers great opportunities, at present its benefits are very unevenly shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed. We recognize that developing countries and countries with economies in transition face special difficulties in responding to this central challenge. Thus, only through broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future, based upon our common humanity in all its diversity, can globalization be made fully inclusive and equitable. These efforts must include policies and measures, at the global level, which correspond to the needs of developing countries and economies in transition and are formulated and implemented with their effective participation.

6. We consider certain fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century. These include:

Freedom. Men and women have the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice. Democratic and participatory governance based on the will of the people best assures these rights.

Equality. No individual and no nation must be denied the opportunity to benefit from development. The equal rights and opportunities of women and men must be assured.

Solidarity. Global challenges must be managed in a way that distributes the costs and burdens fairly in accordance with basic principles of equity and social justice. Those who suffer or who benefit least deserve help from those who benefit most.

Tolerance. Human beings must respect one other, in all their diversity of belief, culture and language. Differences within and between societies should be neither feared nor repressed, but cherished as a precious asset of humanity. A culture of peace and dialogue among all civilizations should be actively promoted.

Respect for nature. Prudence must be shown in the management of all living species and natural resources, in accordance with the precepts of sustainable development. Only in this way can the immeasurable riches provided to us by nature be preserved and passed on to our descendants. The current unsustainable patterns of production and consumption must be changed in the interest of our future welfare and that of our descendants.

Shared responsibility. Responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally. As the most universal and most representative organization in the world, the United Nations must play the central role.

7. In order to translate these shared values into actions, we have identified key objectives to which we assign special significance.

II. Peace, security and disarmament

8. We will spare no effort to free our peoples from the scourge of war, whether within or between States, which has claimed more than 5 million lives in the past decade. We will also seek to eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction.

9. We resolve therefore:

To strengthen respect for the rule of law in international as in national affairs and, in particular, to ensure compliance by Member States with the decisions of the International Court of Justice, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, in cases to which they are parties.

To make the United Nations more effective in maintaining peace and security by giving it the resources and tools it needs for conflict prevention, peaceful resolution of disputes, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. In this context, we take note of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and request the General Assembly to consider its recommendations expeditiously.

To strengthen cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

To ensure the implementation, by States Parties, of treaties in areas such as arms control and disarmament and of international humanitarian law and human rights law, and call upon all States to consider signing and ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

To take concerted action against international terrorism, and to accede as soon as possible to all the relevant international conventions.

To redouble our efforts to implement our commitment to counter the world drug problem.

To intensify our efforts to fight transnational crime in all its dimensions, including trafficking as well as smuggling in human beings and money laundering.

To minimize the adverse effects of United Nations economic sanctions on innocent populations, to subject such sanctions regimes to regular reviews and to eliminate the adverse effects of sanctions on third parties.

To strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

To take concerted action to end illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, especially by making arms transfers more transparent and supporting regional disarmament measures, taking account

of all the recommendations of the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.

To call on all States to consider acceding to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, as well as the amended mines protocol to the Convention on conventional weapons.

10. We urge Member States to observe the Olympic Truce, individually and collectively, now and in the future, and to support the International Olympic Committee in its efforts to promote peace and human understanding through sport and the Olympic Ideal.

III. Development and poverty eradication

11. We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a billion of them are currently subjected. We are committed to making the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human race from want.

12. We resolve therefore to create an environment - at the national and global levels alike - which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty.

13. Success in meeting these objectives depends, *inter alia*, on good governance within each country. It also depends on good governance at the international level and on transparency in the financial, monetary and trading systems. We are committed to an open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading and financial system.

14. We are concerned about the obstacles developing countries face in mobilizing the resources needed to finance their sustained development. We will therefore make every effort to ensure the success of the High-level International and Intergovernmental Event on Financing for Development, to be held in 2001.

15. We also undertake to address the special needs of the least developed countries. In this context, we welcome the Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries to be held in May 2001 and will endeavour to ensure its success. We call on the industrialized countries:

To adopt, preferably by the time of that Conference, a policy of duty- and quota-free access for essentially all exports from the least developed countries;

To implement the enhanced programme of debt relief for the heavily indebted poor countries without further delay and to agree to cancel all official bilateral debts of those countries in return for their making demonstrable commitments to poverty reduction; and

To grant more generous development assistance, especially to countries that are genuinely making an effort to apply their resources to poverty reduction.

16. We are also determined to deal comprehensively and effectively with the debt problems of low- and middle-income developing countries, through various national and international measures designed to make their debt sustainable in the long term.

17. We also resolve to address the special needs of small island developing States, by implementing the Barbados Programme of Action and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly rapidly and in full. We urge the international community to ensure that, in the development of a vulnerability index, the special needs of small island developing States are taken into account.

18. We recognize the special needs and problems of the landlocked developing countries, and urge both bilateral and multilateral donors to increase financial and technical assistance to this group of countries to meet their special development needs and to help them overcome the impediments of geography by improving their transit transport systems.

19. We resolve further:

To halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world's people whose income is less than one dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger and, by the same date, to halve the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water.

To ensure that, by the same date, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling and that girls and boys will have equal access to all levels of education.

By the same date, to have reduced maternal mortality by three quarters, and under-five child mortality by two thirds, of their current rates.

To have, by then, halted, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS, the scourge of malaria and other major diseases that afflict humanity.

To provide special assistance to children orphaned by HIV/AIDS.

By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers as proposed in the "Cities Without Slums" initiative.

20. We also resolve:

To promote gender equality and the empowerment of women as effective ways to combat poverty, hunger and disease and to stimulate development that is truly sustainable.

To develop and implement strategies that give young people everywhere a real chance to find decent and productive work.

To encourage the pharmaceutical industry to make essential drugs more widely available and affordable by all who need them in developing countries.

To develop strong partnerships with the private sector and with civil society organizations in pursuit of development and poverty eradication.

To ensure that the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communication technologies, in conformity with recommendations contained in the ECOSOC 2000 Ministerial Declaration, are available to all.

IV. Protecting our common environment

21. We must spare no effort to free all of humanity, and above all our children and grandchildren, from the threat of living on a planet irredeemably spoilt by human activities, and whose resources would no longer be sufficient for their needs.

22. We reaffirm our support for the principles of sustainable development, including those set out in Agenda 21, agreed upon at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.

23. We resolve therefore to adopt in all our environmental actions a new ethic of conservation and stewardship and, as first steps, we resolve:

To make every effort to ensure the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, preferably by the tenth anniversary of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 2002, and to embark on the required reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases.

To intensify our collective efforts for the management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests.

To press for the full implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa.

To stop the unsustainable exploitation of water resources by developing water management strategies at the regional, national and local levels, which promote both equitable access and adequate supplies.

To intensify cooperation to reduce the number and effects of natural and man-made disasters.

To ensure free access to information on the human genome sequence.

V. Human rights, democracy and good governance

24. We will spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development.

25. We resolve therefore:

To respect fully and uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

To strive for the full protection and promotion in all our countries of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights for all.

To strengthen the capacity of all our countries to implement the principles and practices of democracy and respect for human rights, including minority rights.

To combat all forms of violence against women and to implement the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

To take measures to ensure respect for and protection of the human rights of migrants, migrant workers and their families, to eliminate the increasing acts of racism and xenophobia in many societies and to promote greater harmony and tolerance in all societies.

To work collectively for more inclusive political processes, allowing genuine participation by all citizens in all our countries.

To ensure the freedom of the media to perform their essential role and the right of the public to have access to information.

VI. Protecting the vulnerable

26. We will spare no effort to ensure that children and all civilian populations that suffer disproportionately the consequences of natural disasters, genocide, armed conflicts and other humanitarian emergencies are given every assistance and protection so that they can resume normal life as soon as possible.

We resolve therefore:

To expand and strengthen the protection of civilians in complex emergencies, in conformity with international humanitarian law.

To strengthen international cooperation, including burden sharing in, and the coordination of humanitarian assistance to, countries hosting refugees and to help all refugees and displaced persons to return voluntarily to their s, in safety and dignity and to be smoothly reintegrated into their societies.

To encourage the ratification and full implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols on the involvement of children in armed conflict and on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.

VII. Meeting the special needs of Africa

27. We will support the consolidation of democracy in Africa and assist Africans in their struggle for lasting peace, poverty eradication and sustainable development, thereby bringing Africa into the mainstream of the world economy.

28. We resolve therefore:

To give full support to the political and institutional structures of emerging democracies in Africa.

To encourage and sustain regional and subregional mechanisms for preventing conflict and promoting political stability, and to ensure a reliable flow of resources for peacekeeping operations on the continent.

To take special measures to address the challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable development in Africa, including debt cancellation, improved market access, enhanced Official Development Assistance and increased flows of Foreign Direct Investment, as well as transfers of technology.

To help Africa build up its capacity to tackle the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other infectious diseases.

VIII. Strengthening the United Nations

29. We will spare no effort to make the United Nations a more effective instrument for pursuing all of these priorities: the fight for development for all the peoples of the world, the fight against poverty, ignorance and disease; the fight against injustice; the fight against violence, terror and crime; and the fight against the degradation and destruction of our common .

30. We resolve therefore:

To reaffirm the central position of the General Assembly as the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations, and to enable it to play that role effectively.

To intensify our efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects.

To strengthen further the Economic and Social Council, building on its recent achievements, to help it fulfil the role ascribed to it in the Charter.

To strengthen the International Court of Justice, in order to ensure justice and the rule of law in international affairs.

To encourage regular consultations and coordination among the principal organs of the United Nations in pursuit of their functions.

To ensure that the Organization is provided on a timely and predictable basis with the resources it needs to carry out its mandates.

To urge the Secretariat to make the best use of those resources, in accordance with clear rules and procedures agreed by the General Assembly, in the interests of all Member States, by adopting the best management practices and technologies available and by concentrating on those tasks that reflect the agreed priorities of Member States.

To promote adherence to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.

To ensure greater policy coherence and better cooperation between the United Nations, its agencies, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Trade Organization, as well as other multilateral bodies, with a view to achieving a fully coordinated approach to the problems of peace and development.

To strengthen further cooperation between the United Nations and national parliaments through their world organization, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, in various fields, including peace and security, economic and social development, international law and human rights and democracy and gender issues.

To give greater opportunities to the private sector, non-governmental organizations and civil society, in general, to contribute to the realization of the Organization's goals and programmes.

31. We request the General Assembly to review on a regular basis the progress made in implementing the provisions of this Declaration, and ask the Secretary-General to issue periodic reports for consideration by the General Assembly and as a basis for further action.

32. We solemnly reaffirm, on this historic occasion, that the United Nations is the indispensable common house of the entire human family, through which we will seek to realize our universal aspirations for peace, cooperation and development. We therefore pledge our unstinting support for these common objectives and our determination to achieve them.

Part 2.

The Yalta World: Historical Experience

2.1. Formation Of Un And Unesco

2.2. THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER

2.3. The Stages of the Yalta World

Charter of the International military tribunal

The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:

(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;

(b) War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to Wave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;

(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.

Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.

Article 7

The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.

Article 8

The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.

Article 9

At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal organization.

After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give such notice as it thinks fit that the prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal to make such declaration and any member of the organization will be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tribunal upon the question of the criminal character of the organization. The Tribunal shall have power to allow or reject the application. If the application is allowed, the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard.

Article 10

In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for membership therein before national, military or occupation courts. In any such case the criminal nature of the group or organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned.

Article 11

Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be charged before a national, military or occupation court, referred to in Article 10 of this Charter, with a crime other than of membership in a criminal group or organization and such court may, after convicting him, impose upon him punishment inde-

pendent of and additional to the punishment imposed by the Tribunal for participation in the criminal activities of such group or organization

Article 12

The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a person charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this Charter in his absence, if he has not been found or if the Tribunal, for any reason, finds it necessary, in the interests of justice, to conduct the hearing in his absence

Source: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39614.html>

Part 2.

The Yalta World: Historical Experience

2.1. Formation Of Un And Unesco

2.2. The Post-War World Order

2.3. THE STAGES OF THE YALTA WORLD

Charter of Paris for a New Europe. November 19-21, 1990

Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) : Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy -European Community, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

A NEW ERA OF DEMOCRACY, PEACE AND UNITY

We, the Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, have assembled in Paris at a time of profound change and historic expectations. The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended.

We declare that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and co-operation. Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past. The courage of men and women, the strength of the will of the peoples and the power of the ideas of the Helsinki Final Act have opened a new era of democracy, peace and unity in Europe.

Ours is a time for fulfilling the hopes and expectations our peoples have cherished for decades : steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our countries.

The Ten Principles of the Final Act will guide us towards this ambitious future, just as they have lighted our way towards better relations for the past fifteen years. Full implementation of all CSCE commitments must form the basis for the initiatives we are now taking to enable our nations to live in accordance with their aspirations.

GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE

Proceeding from our firm commitment to the full implementation of all CSCE principles and provisions, we now resolve to give a new impetus to a balanced and comprehensive development of our co-operation in order to address the needs and aspirations of our peoples.

Human Dimension

We declare our respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms to be irrevocable. We will fully implement and build upon the provisions relating to the human dimension of the CSCE.

Proceeding from the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, we will cooperate to strengthen democratic institutions and to promote the application of the rule of law. To that end, we decide to convene a seminar of experts in Oslo from 4 to 15 November 1991.

Determined to foster the rich contribution of national minorities to the life of our societies, we undertake further to improve their situation. We reaffirm our deep conviction that friendly relations among our peoples, as well as peace, justice, stability and democracy, require that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities be protected and conditions for the promotion of that identity be created. We declare that questions related to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework. We further acknowledge that the rights of persons belonging to national minorities must be fully respected as part of universal human rights. Being aware of the urgent need for increased cooperation on, as well as better protection of, national minorities, we decide to convene a meeting of experts on national minorities to be held in Geneva from 1 to 19 July 1991.

We express our determination to combat all forms of racial and ethnic hatred, antisemitism, xenophobia and discrimination against anyone as well as persecution on religious and ideological grounds.

In accordance with our CSCE commitments, we stress that free movement and contacts among our citizens as well as the free flow of information and ideas are crucial for the maintenance and development of free societies and flourishing cultures. We welcome increased tourism and visits among our countries. The human dimension mechanism has proved its usefulness, and we are consequently determined to expand it to include new procedures involving, inter alia, the services of experts or a roster of eminent persons experienced in human rights issues which could be raised under the mechanism. We shall provide, in the context of the mechanism, for individuals to be involved in the protection of their rights. Therefore, we undertake to develop further our commitments in this respect, in particular at the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, without prejudice to obligations under existing international instruments to which our States may be parties.

We recognize the important contribution of the Council of Europe to the promotion of human rights and the principles of democracy and the rule of law as well as to the development of cultural co-operation. We welcome moves by several participating States to join the Council of Europe and adhere to its European Convention on Human Rights. We welcome as well the readiness of the Council of Europe to make its experience available to the CSCE.

Source: <https://www.osce.org/mc/39516>

**A speech by Winston Churchill at Westminster College.
March 5, 1946**

An attempt is being made by the Russians in Berlin to build up a quasi-Communist party in their zone of occupied Germany by showing special favors to groups of left-wing German leaders. At the end of the fighting last June, the American and British Armies withdrew westward, in accordance with an earlier agreement, to a depth at some points of 150 miles upon a front of nearly four hundred miles, in order to allow our Russian allies to occupy this vast expanse of territory which the Western Democracies had conquered. If no the Soviet Government tries, by separate action , to build up a pro-Communist Germany in their areas, this will cause new serious difficulties in the American and British zones, and will give the defeated Germans the power of putting themselves up to auction between the Soviets and the Western Democracies. Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts – and facts they are – this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace. ...».

Source: <https://subscribe.ru/archive/socio.edu.englishtexts/201103/29113606.html>

UN Security Council resolution No. 82, adopted June 25, 1950

The Security Council,

Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949 that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea,

Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 195 (III) of 12 December 1948 and 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949 about the consequences which might follow unless Member States refrained from acts derogatory to the results sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report⁹ menaces the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and might lead to open military conflict there,

Noting with grave concern the armed attack on the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,

Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace; and

I

Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities;

Calls upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel;

II

Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea:

(a) *To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay;*

(b) *To observe the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel;*

(c) *To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution;*

III

Calls upon all Member States to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

Adopted at the 473rd meeting by 9 votes to none, with 1 abstention (Yugoslavia).¹⁰

⁹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 15, 473rd meeting, p. 2, footnote 2 (document S/1496, incorporating S/1496/Corr.1).*

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. August 5, 1963

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the “Original Parties”,

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man’s environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or

(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a Treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article II

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties.

Article III

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties – the United

States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article IV

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

Article V

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

The States Parties to this Convention,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recognising the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere,

Desiring also to contribute to the realisation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,

Recognising that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end,

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimise this risk,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

- (1) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
- (2) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Article II

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents,

toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this Article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.

Article III

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organisations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention.

Article IV

Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

Article V

The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

Article VI

(1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

Article VII

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.

Article VIII

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

Article IX

Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognised objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.

Article X

(1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological infor-

mation for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organisations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for the prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.

(2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

Article XI

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

Article XII

Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realised. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

Article XIII

(1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardised its supreme interests.

Article XIV

(1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

(2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

(3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention.

(4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

(5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.

(6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XV

This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

Source: <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc/text>

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 2994 (XXVII). United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. December 15, 1972

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the responsibility of the international community to take action to preserve and enhance the environment and, in particular, the need for continuous international co-operation to this end,

Recalling its resolutions 2398 (XXIII) of 3 December 1968, 2581 (XXIV) of 15 December 1969, 2657 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2849 (XXVI) and 2850 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971,

Having considered the report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, /33 held at Stockholm from 5 to 16 June 1972, and the report of the Secretary-General thereon,

Expressing its satisfaction that the Conference and the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment succeeded in focusing the attention of Governments and public opinion on the need for prompt action in the field of the environment,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment;

2. Draws the attention of Governments and the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme/35 to the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment/36 and refers the Action Plan for the Human Environment/37 to the Governing Council for appropriate action;

3. Draws the attention of Governments to the recommendations for action at the national level referred to them by the Conference for their consideration and such action as they might deem appropriate;

4. Designates 5 June as World Environment Day and urges Governments and the organizations in the United Nations system to undertake on that day every year world-wide activities reaffirming their concern for the preservation and enhancement of the environment, with a view to deepening environmental awareness and to pursuing the determination expressed at the Conference;

5. Takes note with appreciation of resolution 4 (I) of 15 June 1972/38 adopted by the Conference on the convening of a second United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and refers this matter to the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme with the request that the Council study this matter, taking into account the status of implementation of the Action Plan and future developments in the field of the environment, and report its views and recommendations to the General Assembly so that the Assembly can take a decision on all aspects of the matter not later than at its twenty-ninth session.

2112th plenary meeting

15 December 1972

Notes:

33/ A/CONF. 48/14 and Corr. 1.

34/ A/8783 and Add. 1, Add. 1/Corr. 1 and Add. 2

35/ See resolution 2997 (XXVII), Sect. 1.

36/ A/CONF. 48/14 and Corr. 1, chap. I.

37/ Ibid., chap. II.

38/ Ibid., chap. IV.

Agreement between the USSR and the United States on cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. May 18, 1977

COOPERATION IN SPACE

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration of the Use of Outer Space for the Peaceful Purposes. May 24, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Considering the role which the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. play in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes;

Striving for a further expansion of cooperation between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes;

Noting the positive cooperation which the parties have already experienced in this area;

Desiring to make the results of scientific research gained from the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes available for the benefit of the peoples of the two countries and of all peoples of the world;

Taking into consideration the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, as well as the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space;

In accordance with the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and Other Fields, signed April 11, 1972, and in order to develop further the principles of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries:

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The parties will develop cooperation in the fields of space meteorology; study of the natural environment; exploration of near earth space, the moon and the planets; and space biology and medicine; and, in particular, will cooperate to take all appropriate measures to encourage and achieve the fulfillment of the Summary of Results of Discussion on Space Cooperation Between the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. dated January 21, 1971.

ARTICLE 2

The parties will carry out such cooperation by means of mutual exchanges of scientific information and delegations, through meetings of scientists and specialists of both countries, and also in such other ways as may be mutually agreed. Joint working groups may be created for the development and implementation of appropriate programs of cooperation.

ARTICLE 3

The Parties have agreed to carry out projects for developing compatible rendezvous and docking systems of United States and Soviet manned spacecraft and stations in order to enhance the safety of manned flights in space

and to provide the opportunity for conducting joint scientific experiments in the future. It is planned that the first experimental flight to test these systems be conducted during 1975, envisaging the docking of a United States Apollo-type spacecraft and a Soviet Soyuz-type spacecraft with visits of Astronauts in each other's spacecraft. The implementation of these projects will be carried out on the basis of principles and procedures which will be developed in accordance with the Summary of Results of the Meeting Between Representatives of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences on the Question of Developing Compatible Systems for Rendezvous and Docking of Manned Spacecraft and Space Stations of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. dated April 6, 1972.

ARTICLE 4

The Parties will encourage international efforts to resolve problems of international law in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes with the aim of strengthening the legal order in space and further developing international space law and will cooperate in this field.

ARTICLE 5

The Parties may by mutual agreement determine other areas of cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE 6

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for five years. It may be modified or extended by mutual agreement of the Parties.


DONE at Moscow this 24th day of May 1972 in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:




RICHARD NIXON
President of the United States

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:



A. N. KOSYGIN
Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR



Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate- Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). December 8, 1987

Signed at Washington December 8, 1987

Ratification advised by U. S. Senate May 27, 1988

Instruments of ratification exchanged June 1, 1988

Entered into force June 1, 1988

Proclaimed by U. S. President December 27, 1988

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty.

Article II

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. The term «ballistic missile» means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term «ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM) » means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

2. The term «cruise missile» means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term «ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) » means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

3. The term «GLBM launcher» means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM.

4. The term «GLCM launcher» means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM.

5. The term «intermediate-range missile» means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers.

6. The term «shorter-range missile» means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers.

7. The term «deployment area» means a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles may operate and within which one or more missile operating bases are located.

8. The term «missile operating base» means:

(a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located within a deployment area, at which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate, in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located; and

(b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located any place, at which shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located.

9. The term «missile support facility,» as regards intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, means a missile production facility or a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility or a launcher repair facility, a training facility, a missile storage facility or a launcher storage facility, a test range, or an elimination facility as those terms are defined in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. The term «transit» means movement, notified in accordance with paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of this Treaty, of an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile between missile support facilities, between such a facility and a deployment area or between deployment areas, or of a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile from a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility.

11. The term «deployed missile» means an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

12. The term «non-deployed missile» means an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

13. The term «deployed launcher» means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

14. The term «non-deployed launcher» means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

15. The term «basing country» means a country other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on whose territory intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles of the Parties, launchers of such missiles or support structures associated with such missiles and launchers were located at any time after November 1, 1987. Missiles or launchers in transit are not considered to be «located.»

Article III

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of intermediate-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of shorter-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IA, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively.

Article IV

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. To implement paragraph 1 of this Article, upon entry into force of this Treaty, both Parties shall begin and continue throughout the duration of each phase, the reduction of all types of their deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. These reductions shall be implemented in two phases so that:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 29 months after entry into force of this Treaty:

(i) the number of deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 171 warheads;

(ii) the number of deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 180 warheads;

(iii) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads;

(iv) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads; and

(v) the ratio of the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range GLBMs of existing types for each Party to the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles of existing types possessed by that Party shall not exceed the ratio of such intermediate-range GLBMs to such intermediate-range missiles for that Party as of November 1, 1987, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding; and

(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles of each Party, launchers of such missiles and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, shall be eliminated.

Article V

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. No later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. No later than 12 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

3. Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less than 1000 kilometers.

Article VI

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall:

(a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or

(b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

Article VII

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.

3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply.

4. The range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles.

5. The maximum number of warheads an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile carries shall be considered to be the number listed for missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads listed for a GLBM or GLCM of the type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. If a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs.

8. If a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM.

9. The number of missiles each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile shall be considered to be capable of carrying or containing at one time is the number listed for launchers of missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. Except in the case of elimination in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination, the following shall apply:

(a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a complete missile;

(b) for GLBMs which are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party

that it does not contain such a missile, or an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM, shall be counted as a complete missile; and

(c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM shall be counted as a complete missile.

11. A ballistic missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLBM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLBM launchers. A cruise missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers.

12. Each Party shall have the right to produce and use for booster systems, which might otherwise be considered to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, only existing types of booster stages for such booster systems. Launches of such booster systems shall not be considered to be flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles provided that:

(a) stages used in such booster systems are different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III of this Treaty;

(b) such booster systems are used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves;

(c) the aggregate number of launchers for such booster systems shall not exceed 35 for each Party at any one time; and

(d) the launchers for such booster systems are fixed, emplaced above ground and located only at research and development launch sites which are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Research and development launch sites shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of this Treaty.

Article VIII

1. All intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities or between missile support facilities and deployment areas.

3. Until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located at missile operating bases, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

4. Transit of a missile or launcher subject to the provisions of this Treaty shall be completed within 25 days.

5. All deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or in subsequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty. Neither Party shall increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. A missile support facility shall not be considered to be part of a deployment area even though it may be located within the geographic boundaries of a deployment area.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, including stages of such missiles, or launchers of such missiles at

missile production facilities, launcher production facilities or test ranges listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. Neither Party shall locate any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities.

8. A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or contained within a launcher of such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities.

9. Training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall be subject to the same locational restrictions as are set forth for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article.

Article IX

1. The Memorandum of Understanding contains categories of data relevant to obligations undertaken with regard to this Treaty and lists all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Updates of that data and notifications required by this Article shall be provided according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

2. The Parties shall update that data and provide the notifications required by this Treaty through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

3. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

4. No later than 30 days after the end of each six-month interval following the entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide updated data for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding by informing the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, in that data, which have occurred during the six-month interval since the preceding data exchange, and the net effect of those changes.

5. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall provide the following notifications to the other Party:

(a) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility;

(b) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and scheduled date of each change;

(c) notification, except with respect to launches of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and stages of such missiles, and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, including:

(i) the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated;

(ii) the elimination site;

(iii) for intermediate-range missiles, the location from which such missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers are moved to the elimination facility; and

(iv) except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty and the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(d) notification, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, including:

(i) the type of missiles to be eliminated;

(ii) the location of the launch, or, if elimination is by a series of launches, the location of such launches and the number of launches in the series;

(iii) the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty; and

(iv) the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(e) notification, no later than 48 hours after they occur, of changes in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers resulting from elimination as described in the Protocol on Elimination, including:

(i) the number and type of items of a missile system which were eliminated; and

(ii) the date and location of such elimination; and

(f) notification of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, including:

(i) the number of missiles or launchers;

(ii) the points, dates, and times of departure and arrival;

(iii) the mode of transport; and

(iv) the location and time at that location at least once every four days during the period of transit.

6. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall notify the other Party, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII of this Treaty.

Article X

1. Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Verification by on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination shall be carried out in accordance with Article XI of this Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection.

3. When a Party removes its intermediate-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers from deployment areas to elimination facilities for the purpose of their elimination, it shall do so in complete deployed organizational units. For the United States of America, these units shall be Pershing II batteries and BGM-109G flights. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, these units shall be SS-20 regiments composed of two or three battalions.

4. Elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be carried out at the facilities that are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or notified in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty, unless eliminated in accordance with Sections IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination. Support structures, associated with the missiles and launchers subject to this Treaty, that are subject to elimination shall be eliminated in situ.

5. Each Party shall have the right, during the first six months after entry into force of this Treaty, to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100 of its intermediate-range missiles.

6. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which have been tested prior to entry into force of this Treaty, but never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of this Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminated within six months after entry into force of this Treaty in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. Such missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is known to the United States of America as the SSC-X-4.

7. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon the notification provided for in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this Treaty.

8. Each Party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities. A Party shall notify the other Party pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty once the conditions set forth below are fulfilled:

(a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been removed;

(b) all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been eliminated; and

(c) all activity related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers has ceased there.

Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities shall be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination which was notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility listed in the Memorandum of Understanding that met the above conditions prior to entry into force of this Treaty, and is not included in the initial data exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated.

9. If a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the Memorandum of Understanding for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted.

Article XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this Article, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this Article both within the territory of the other Party and within the territories of basing countries.

3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the Memorandum of Understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment and

other data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to verify the elimination, notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities, which are thus no longer subject to inspections pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of this Article. Such an inspection shall be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility. If a Party conducts an inspection at a particular facility pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility, then no additional inspection of that facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be permitted.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last five years. Neither Party shall use more than half of its total number of these inspections per calendar year within the territory of any one basing country. Each Party shall have the right to conduct:

(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities, to ascertain, according to the categories of data specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at each missile operating base or missile support facility at the time of the inspection; and

(b) inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty other than former missile production facilities.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right, for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty, to inspect by means of continuous monitoring:

(a) the portals of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages, any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this Treaty, is accomplished; or

(b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced.

The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of this Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party conducts the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the other Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah; in accordance with subparagraph (a), for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

7. Each Party shall conduct inspections of the process of elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Inspectors conducting inspections provided for in this paragraph shall determine that

the processes specified for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and support equipment have been completed.

8. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination, and of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV and V of the Protocol on Elimination.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or

(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

3. To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each Party shall have the right until a Treaty between the Parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, to request the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in excess of 5500 kilometers, which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The Party making such a request shall inform the other Party of the deployment base at which cooperative measures shall be implemented. The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) no later than six hours after such a request, the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and

(b) the Party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such an observation.

Each Party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these cooperative measures at any one time.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and

(b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to:

(a) exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination;

(b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of this Treaty;

(c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of this Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and

(d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this Treaty.

Article XIV

The Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article XVII

1. This Treaty, including the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols, which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Ronald Reagan

President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Mikhail Gorbachev

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. May 23, 1992

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

CONSCIOUS that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all humanity, that it cannot be won and must never be fought,

CONVINCED that the measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security,

RECOGNIZING that the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security require the strengthening of strategic stability,

MINDFUL of their undertakings with regard to strategic offensive arms in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968; Article XI of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972; and the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE I.

Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding.

ARTICLE II.

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed:

(a) 1600, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers, including 154 for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers;

(b) 6000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, including:

(i) 4900, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(ii) 1100, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(iii) 1540, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

2. Each Party shall implement the reductions pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article in three phases, so that its strategic offensive arms do not exceed:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 36 months after entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:

(i) 2100, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers;

(ii) 9150, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;

(iii) 8050, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than 60 months after entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:

(i) 1900, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers;

(ii) 7950, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;

(iii) 6750, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(c) by the end of the third phase, that is, no later than 84 months after entry into force of this Treaty: the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article. 3. Each Party shall limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter such aggregate throw-weight does not exceed 3600 metric tons.

ARTICLE III.

1. For the purposes of counting toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in subparagraphs 1(a), 2(a) (i), and 2(b) (i) of Article II of this Treaty:

(a) Each deployed ICBM and its associated launchers shall be counted as one unit; each deployed SLBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit.

(b) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one unit.

2. For the purposes of counting deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers and deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers:

(a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs and each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be considered to contain one deployed ICBM or one deployed SLBM, respectively.

(b) If a deployed ICBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, such an ICBM removed from its launcher and located at that ICBM base shall continue to be considered to be contained in that launcher.

(c) If a deployed SLBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, such an SLBM removed from its launcher shall be considered to be contained in that launcher. Such an SLBM removed from its launcher shall be located only at a facility at which non-deployed SLBMs may be located pursuant to subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of this Treaty or be in movement to such a facility.

3. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBMs:

(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

(c) For ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM of that type.

(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM is installed in it until an ICBM has been launched from it or until an ICBM has been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister shall not be considered to contain an ICBM if it contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs of a different type.

4. For the purposes of counting warheads:

(a) The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of each existing type shall be the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.

(b) The number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. The number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front

section of an existing design with multiple reentry vehicles, or to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with one reentry vehicle, shall be no less than the nearest integer that is smaller than the result of dividing 40 percent of the accountable throw-weight of the ICBM or SLBM by the weight of the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested on an ICBM or SLBM of that type. In the case of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of a fundamentally new design, the question of the applicability of the 40-percent rule to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be subject to agreement within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Until agreement has been reached regarding the rule that will apply to such an ICBM or SLBM, the number of warheads that will be attributed to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. The number of new types of ICBMs or SLBMs with a front section of a fundamentally new design shall not exceed two for each Party as long as this Treaty remains in force.

(c) The number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM has been flight-tested shall be considered to be the sum of the number of reentry vehicles actually released during the flight test, plus the number of procedures for dispensing reentry vehicles performed during that same flight test when no reentry vehicle was released. A procedure for dispensing penetration aids shall not be considered to be a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, provided that the procedure for dispensing penetration aids differs from a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.

(d) Each reentry vehicle of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to be one warhead.

(e) For the United States of America, each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 150 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with ten warheads. Each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The United States of America shall specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 150 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 such heavy bombers is considered to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped.

(f) For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 180 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with eight warheads. Each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 180 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 180 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 180 such heavy bombers is considered to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped.

(g) Each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be attributed with one warhead. All heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be considered to be heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, with the exception of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, test heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers.

5. Each Party shall have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs only of existing types, up to an aggregate number of 1250 at any one time.

(a) Such aggregate number shall consist of the following:

(i) for the United States of America, the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to the type of ICBM designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, Minuteman III, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types;

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, four multiplied by the number of deployed SLBMs designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RSM-50, which is known to the United States of America as SS-N-18, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types.

(b) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to Minuteman III ICBMs shall be carried out subject to the following:

(i) Minuteman III ICBMs to which different numbers of warheads are attributed shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base.

(ii) Any such reductions shall be carried out no later than seven years after entry into force of this Treaty.

(iii) The reentry vehicle platform of each Minuteman III ICBM to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform.

(c) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of types other than Minuteman III shall be carried out subject to the following:

(i) Such reductions shall not exceed 500 warheads at any one time for each Party.

(ii) After a Party has reduced the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of two existing types, that Party shall not have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of any additional type.

(iii) The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM shall be reduced by no more than four below the number attributed as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

(iv) ICBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base.

(v) SLBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed on submarines based at submarine bases adjacent to the waters of the same ocean.

(vi) If the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type is reduced by more than two, the reentry vehicle platform of each ICBM or SLBM to which such a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform.

(d) A Party shall not have the right to attribute to ICBMs of a new type a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any ICBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph

(c) of this paragraph. A Party shall not have the right to attribute to SLBMs of a new type a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any SLBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

6. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty as follows:

(a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility;

(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier;

(d) for the purpose of counting a deployed ICBM and its associated launcher, a silo launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the exca-

vation begins, whichever occurs earlier, and a mobile launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when it arrives at a maintenance facility, except for the non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV of this Treaty, or when it leaves an ICBM loading facility;

(e) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility;

(f) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched;

(g) for the purpose of counting a deployed SLBM and its associated launcher, an SLBM launcher shall be considered to contain a deployed SLBM when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched;

(h) a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which components of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to heavy bomber or former heavy bomber airframes.

7. ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM or SLBM of the previous type.

Such converted launchers shall be considered to be launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of that different type as follows:

(a) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a missile of a different type is first installed in that launcher, or when the silo door is reinstalled, whichever occurs first;

(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, as agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission;

(c) an SLBM launcher, when all launchers on the submarine on which that launcher is installed have been converted to launch an SLBM of that different type and that submarine begins sea trials, that is, when that submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the conversion of launchers was performed.

8. Heavy bombers that have been converted into heavy bombers of a different category or into former heavy bombers shall be considered to be heavy bombers of that different category or former heavy bombers as follows:

(a) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, when it is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building where it was equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs;

(b) a heavy bomber of one category converted into a heavy bomber of another category provided for in paragraph 9 of Section VI of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, or into a former heavy bomber, when the inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol is completed or, if such an inspection is not conducted, when the 20-day period provided for in paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol expires. 9. For the purposes of this Treaty: (a) A ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the limitations provided for in this Treaty apply.

(b) If a ballistic missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all ballistic missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

(c) If a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

(d) If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has contained an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type. If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has been converted into a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of a different

type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of the type for which it has been converted.

(e) If a heavy bomber is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, all heavy bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, except those that are not so equipped and are distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. If long-range nuclear ALCMs have not been flight-tested from any heavy bomber of a particular type, no heavy bomber of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a training heavy bomber, and a former heavy bomber shall be distinguishable from one another.

(f) Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988, shall be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM. Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber after December 31, 1988, shall not be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM if it is a long-range non-nuclear ALCM and is distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. Long-range non-nuclear ALCMs not so distinguishable shall be considered to be long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(g) Mobile launchers of ICBMs of each new type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs. Such new launchers, with their associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed, and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed.

(h) Mobile launchers of ICBMs converted into launchers of ICBMs of another type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of ICBM. Such converted launchers, with their associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of ICBM with their associated missiles installed. Conversion of mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 10. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:

(a) Existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the types of missiles designated by the United States of America as Minuteman II, Minuteman III, Peacekeeper, Poseidon, Trident I, and Trident II, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Minuteman II, Minuteman III, MX, Poseidon, Trident I, and Trident II, respectively;

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-10, RS-12, RS-16, RS-20, RS-18, RS-22, RS-12M, RSM-25, RSM-40, RSM-50, RSM-52, and RSM-54, which are known to the United States of America as SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, SS-24, SS-25, SS-N-6, SS-N-8, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-N-23, respectively.

(b) Existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the type of missile designated by the United States of America as Peacekeeper, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as MX;

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-22 and RS-12M, which are known to the United States of America as SS-24 and SS-25, respectively.

(c) Former types of ICBMs and SLBMs are the types of missiles designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, Minuteman I and Polaris A-3. (d) Existing types of heavy bombers are:

(i) for the United States of America, the types of bombers designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-52, B-1, and B-2;

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of bombers designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95 and Tu-160, which are known to the United States of America as Bear and Blackjack, respectively. (e) Existing types of long-range nuclear ALCMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, AGM-86 and AGM-129;

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RKV-500A and RKV-500B, which are known to the United States of America as AS-15 A and AS-15 B, respectively. ARTICLE IV 1. For ICBMs and SLBMs:

(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 250. Within this limit, the number of non-deployed ICBMs for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 125.

(b) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs at a maintenance facility of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base. Non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs located at a maintenance facility shall be stored separately from non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at that maintenance facility.

(c) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs and sets of ICBM emplacement equipment at an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs to no more than:

(i) two ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and six sets of ICBM emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base; or

(ii) four ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and two sets of ICBM emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

(d) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges to no more than 35 during the seven-year period after entry into force of this Treaty. Thereafter, the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges shall not exceed 25.

2. For ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers:

(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 110. Within this limit, the number of non-deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 18.

(b) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility of each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two such ICBM launchers of each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

(c) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at training facilities for ICBMs to no more than 40. Each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs that contain training models of missiles shall not be located outside a training facility.

(d) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of test launchers to no more than 45 during the seven-year period after entry into force of this Treaty. Within this limit, the number of fixed test launchers shall not exceed 25, and the number of mobile test launchers shall not exceed 20. Thereafter, the aggregate number of test launchers shall not exceed 40. Within this limit, the number of fixed test launchers shall not exceed 20, and the number of mobile test launchers shall not exceed 20.

(e) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of silo training launchers and mobile training launchers to no more than 60. ICBMs shall not be launched from training launchers. Each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Mobile training launchers shall not be capable of launching ICBMs, and shall differ from mobile launchers of ICBMs and other road vehicles or railcars on the basis of differences that are observable by national technical means of verification.

3. For heavy bombers and former heavy bombers:

(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers to no more than 75.

(b) Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no more than 20.

4. For ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space:

(a) Each Party shall limit the number of space launch facilities to no more than five, unless otherwise agreed. Space launch facilities shall not overlap ICBM bases.

(b) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers located at space launch facilities to no more than 20, unless otherwise agreed. Within this limit, the aggregate number of silo launchers of ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs located at space launch facilities shall not exceed, unless otherwise agreed. (JCICA Agreement No. 45, Article 1, of July 17, 2001 raised the limit of silo launchers and mobile launchers of ICBMs located at space launch facilities to 12. Within this limit, the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs located at space launch facilities shall not exceed ten.)

(c) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at a space launch facility to no more than the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers located at that facility.

5. Each Party shall limit the number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at each deployment area or test range to no more than two for each type of ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that is attributed with one warhead and that is specified for that deployment area or test range, and shall limit the number of such transporter-loaders located outside deployment areas and test ranges to no more than six. The aggregate number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 30.

6. Each Party shall limit the number of ballistic missile submarines in dry dock within five kilometers of the boundary of each submarine base to no more than two.

7. For static displays and ground trainers:

(a) Each Party shall limit the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, the number of ICBMs and SLBMs placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, the number of launch canisters placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, and the number of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20. Such items placed on static display prior to signature of this Treaty shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, but shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty.

(b) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of heavy bombers converted after signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers and former heavy bombers converted after signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers to no more than five. Such items converted prior to signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, but shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty.

8. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs and repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs to no more than 50.

9. With respect to locational and related restrictions on strategic offensive arms:

(a) Each Party shall locate non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs only at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; production facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; test ranges; or space launch facilities. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases. Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs may also be in transit. Non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs may also be transferred within an

ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs. Non-deployed SLBMs that are located on missile tenders and storage cranes shall be considered to be located at the submarine base at which such missile tenders and storage cranes are specified as based.

(b) Each Party shall locate non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs only at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs, production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM loading facilities, training facilities for ICBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, test ranges, or space launch facilities. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may also be in transit.

(c) Each Party shall locate test launchers only at test ranges, except that rail-mobile test launchers may conduct movements for the purpose of testing outside a test range, provided that:

(i) each such movement is completed no later than 30 days after it begins;

(ii) each such movement begins and ends at the same test range and does not involve movement to any other facility;

(iii) movements of no more than six rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs are conducted in each calendar year; and

(iv) no more than one train containing no more than three rail-mobile test launchers is located outside test ranges at any one time.

(d) A deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a test range may, at the discretion of the testing Party, either continue to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, or be counted as a mobile test launcher pursuant to paragraph 2

(d) of this Article. If a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a test range continues to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, the period of time during which it continuously remains at a test range shall not exceed 45 days. The number of such deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time shall not exceed three, and the number of such deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time shall not exceed three.

(e) Each Party shall locate silo training launchers only at ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs and training facilities for ICBMs. The number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

(f) Test heavy bombers shall be based only at heavy bomber flight test centers and at production facilities for heavy bombers. Training heavy bombers shall be based only at training facilities for heavy bombers.

10. Each Party shall locate solid rocket motors for first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBM only at locations where production and storage, or testing of such motors occurs and at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such solid rocket motors may also be moved between these locations. Solid rocket motors with nozzles attached for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall only be located at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and at locations where testing of such solid rocket motors occurs. Locations where such solid rocket motors are permitted shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding.

11. With respect to locational restrictions on facilities:

(a) Each Party shall locate production facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, repair facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, storage facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, ICBM loading facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, and conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs of a particular type no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs of that type of

ICBM, any ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any deployment area for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested, any production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any repair facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any storage facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, and any training facility for ICBMs at which non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs are located. New facilities at which non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs of any type of ICBM may be located, and new storage facilities for ICBM emplacement equipment, shall be located no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, except that existing storage facilities for intermediate-range missiles, located less than 100 kilometers from an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs or from a test range, may be converted into storage facilities for ICBMs not specified for that ICBM base or that test range.

(b) Each Party shall locate production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM, and storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM and any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested.

(c) Each Party shall locate test ranges and space launch facilities no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, any ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and any deployment area.

(d) Each Party shall locate training facilities for ICBMs no less than 100 kilometers from any test range

(e) Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than 100 kilometers from any air base for heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments and any training facility for heavy bombers. Each Party shall locate storage areas for long-range nuclear ALCMs no less than 100 kilometers from any air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, any air base for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, and any training facility for heavy bombers.

12. Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit to no more than 30 days.

ARTICLE V.

1. Except as prohibited by the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

2. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy ICBMs of a new type, or increase the launch weight or throw-weight of heavy ICBMs of an existing type;

(b) produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy SLBMs;

(c) produce, test, or deploy mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;

(d) produce, test, or deploy additional silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, except for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that replace silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have been eliminated in accordance with Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, provided that the limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty are not exceeded;

(e) convert launchers that are not launchers of heavy ICBMs into launchers of heavy ICBMs;

(f) produce, test, or deploy launchers of heavy SLBMs;

(g) reduce the number of warheads attributed to a heavy ICBM of an existing type.

3. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBMs other than in silo launchers of ICBMs, on road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or on rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy ICBM launchers other than silo launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. 4. Each Party undertakes not to deploy on a mobile launcher of ICBMs an ICBM

of a type that was not specified as a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol, unless it is an ICBM to which no more than one warhead is attributed and the Parties have agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to permit deployment of such ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs. A new type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs may cease to be considered to be a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if no ICBM of that type has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher of ICBMs.

5. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBM launchers of a new type of ICBM and not to deploy SLBM launchers of a new type of SLBM if such launchers are capable of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types. ICBM launchers of existing types of ICBMs and SLBM launchers of existing types of SLBMs shall be incapable, without conversion, of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types.

6. Each Party undertakes not to convert SLBMs into ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or to load SLBMs on, or launch SLBMs from, mobile launchers of ICBMs.

7. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy transporter-loaders other than transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs attributed with one warhead.

8. Each Party undertakes not to locate deployed silo launchers of ICBMs outside ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs. 9. Each Party undertakes not to locate soft-site launchers except at test ranges and space launch facilities. All existing soft-site launchers not at test ranges or space launch facilities shall be eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol no later than 60 days after entry into force of this Treaty.

10. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired or former type from other than test launchers specified for such use or launchers at space launch facilities. Except for soft-site launchers, test launchers specified for such use shall not be used to flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a type, any one of which is deployed;

(b) produce ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a retired type.

11. Each Party undertakes not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs.

12. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more than ten reentry vehicles;

(b) flight-test an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it, or, for an ICBM or SLBM of a retired type, with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the largest number of warheads that was attributed to any ICBM or SLBM of that type;

(c) deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it;

(d) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing or new type.

13. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it.

14. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from space launch facilities ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with reentry vehicles.

15. Each Party undertakes not to use ICBMs or SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space for purposes inconsistent with existing international obligations undertaken by the Parties.

16. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload and not to conduct rapid reload.

17. Each Party undertakes not to install SLBM launchers on submarines that were not originally constructed as ballistic missile submarines.

18. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy: (a) ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers, or launchers of such missiles, for installation on waterborne vehicles, including free-floating launchers, other than submarines. This obligation shall not require changes in current ballistic missile storage, transport, loading, or unloading practices; (b) launchers of ballistic or cruise missiles for emplacement on or for tethering to the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or for emplacement in or for tethering to the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles that move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers. This obligation shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof of February 11, 1971; (c) systems, including missiles, for placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit or a fraction of an Earth orbit; (d) air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs); (e) long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more nuclear weapons.

19. Each Party undertakes not to: (a) flight-test with nuclear armaments an aircraft that is not an airplane, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more; equip such an aircraft for nuclear armaments; or deploy such an aircraft with nuclear armaments; (b) flight-test with nuclear armaments an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more, or an integrated platform area in excess of 310 square meters; equip such an airplane for nuclear armaments; or deploy such an airplane with nuclear armaments; (c) flight-test with long-range nuclear ALCMs an aircraft that is not an airplane, or an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber; equip such an aircraft or such an airplane for long-range nuclear ALCMs; or deploy such an aircraft or such an airplane with long-range nuclear ALCMs.

20. The United States of America undertakes not to equip existing or future heavy bombers for more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs.

21. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes not to equip existing or future heavy bombers for more than 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs.

22. Each Party undertakes not to locate long-range nuclear ALCMs at air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, or training facilities for heavy bombers.

23. Each Party undertakes not to base heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, or heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at air bases at which heavy bombers of either of the other two categories are based.

24. Each Party undertakes not to convert:

(a) heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if such heavy bombers were previously equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs;

(b) heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs;

(c) training heavy bombers into heavy bombers of another category;

(d) former heavy bombers into heavy bombers.

25. Each Party undertakes not to have underground facilities accessible to ballistic missile submarines.

26. Each Party undertakes not to locate railcars at the site of a rail garrison that has been eliminated in accordance with Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, unless such railcars have differences, observable by national technical means of verification, in length, width, or height from rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or launch-associated railcars.

27. Each Party undertakes not to engage in any activities associated with strategic offensive arms at eliminated facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of a new facility at the same location has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Strategic offensive arms and support equipment shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers at such facilities. Missile tenders may be located at eliminated facilities only for purposes not associated with strategic offensive arms.

28. Each Party undertakes not to base strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of this Treaty outside its national territory.

29. Each Party undertakes not to use naval vessels that were formerly declared as missile tenders to transport, store, or load SLBMs. Such naval vessels shall not be tied to a ballistic missile submarine for the purpose of supporting such a submarine if such a submarine is located within five kilometers of a submarine base.

30. Each Party undertakes not to remove from production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, solid rocket motors with attached nozzles for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, except for: (a) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages; (b) the removal of such motors as part of assembled ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters; and (c) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, for the purpose of technical characteristics exhibitions.

ARTICLE VI.

1. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in restricted areas. A restricted area shall not exceed five square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another restricted area. No more than ten deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be based or located in a restricted area. A restricted area shall not contain deployed ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of more than one type of ICBM.

2. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs within each restricted area so that these structures shall not be capable of containing more road-mobile launchers of ICBMs than the number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs specified for that restricted area.

3. Each restricted area shall be located within a deployment area. A deployment area shall not exceed 125,000 square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another deployment area. A deployment area shall contain no more than one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

4. Deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in rail garrisons. Each Party shall have no more than seven rail garrisons. No point on a portion of track located inside a rail garrison shall be more than 20 kilometers from any entrance/exit for that rail garrison. This distance shall be measured along the tracks. A rail garrison shall not overlap another rail garrison.

5. Each rail garrison shall have no more than two rail entrances/exits. Each such entrance/exit shall have no more than two separate sets of tracks passing through it (a total of four rails).

6. Each Party shall limit the number of parking sites in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each rail garrison shall have no more than five parking sites.

7. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each such structure shall contain no more than one train of standard configuration.

8. Each rail garrison shall contain no more than one maintenance facility.

9. Deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave restricted areas or rail-garrisons only for routine movements, relocations, or dispersals. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave deployment areas only for relocations or operational dispersals.

10. Relocations shall be completed within 25 days. No more than 15 percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside restricted areas at any one time for the purpose of relocation. No more than 20 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside rail garrisons at any one time for the purpose of relocation.

11. No more than 50 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be engaged in routine movements at any one time.

12. All trains with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles of a particular type shall be of one standard configuration. All such trains shall conform to that standard configuration except those taking part in routine movements, relocations, or dispersals, and except that portion of a train remaining within a rail garrison after the other portion of such a train has departed for the maintenance facility associated with that rail garrison, has been relocated to another facility, or has departed the rail garrison for routine movement. Except for dispersals, notification of variations from standard configuration shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

ARTICLE VII.

1. Conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and facilities shall be carried out pursuant to this Article and in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Conversion and elimination shall be verified by national technical means of verification and by inspection as provided for in Articles IX and XI of this Treaty; in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol; and in the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol.

2. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and support equipment shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated, or otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

3. ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated by rendering them inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose, using procedures at the discretion of the Party possessing the ICBMs or SLBMs. 4. The elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities, except as provided for in Sections VII and VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Fixed launchers of ICBMs and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to elimination shall be eliminated in situ. A launch canister remaining at a test range or ICBM base after the flight test of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be eliminated in the open in situ, or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

ARTICLE VIII.

1. A data base pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty is set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding, in which data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty are listed according to categories of data.

2. In order to ensure the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to this Treaty, each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in data, as provided for in subparagraph 3(a) of this Article, and shall also provide other notifications required by paragraph 3 of this Article, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this Article, the Notification Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol.

3. Each Party shall provide to the other Party, in accordance with the Notification Protocol, and, for subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, in accordance with Section III of the Inspection Protocol: (a) notifications concerning data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and other agreed categories of data; (b) notifications concerning movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty; (c) notifications concerning data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight in connection with the Protocol on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Throw-weight Protocol; (d) notifications concerning conversion or elimination of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty or elimination of facilities subject to this Treaty; (e) notifications concerning cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification; (f) notifications concerning flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and notifications concerning telemetric information; (g) notifications concerning strategic offensive arms of new types and new kinds; (h) notifications concerning changes in the content of information provided pursuant to this paragraph, including the rescheduling of activities; (i) notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities; and (j) notifications concerning operational dispersals.

4. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to provide and receive notifications in accordance with the Notification Protocol and the Inspection Protocol, unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty, and to acknowledge receipt of such notifications no later than one hour after receipt.

5. If a time is to be specified in a notification provided pursuant to this Article, that time shall be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. If only a date is to be specified in a notification, that date shall be specified as the 24-hour period that corresponds to the date in local time, expressed in Greenwich Mean Time.

6. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, each Party shall have the right to release to the public all data current as of September 1, 1990, that are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding, as well as the photographs that are appended thereto. Geographic coordinates and site diagrams that are received pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty of July 31, 1991, shall not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed. The Parties shall hold consultations on releasing to the public data and other information provided pursuant to this Article or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in this Treaty. The provisions of this Article shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other information to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in this Treaty.

ARTICLE IX.

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. In this connection, the obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases and deployment areas, or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.

4. To aid verification, each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have a unique identifier as provided for in the Inspection Protocol.

ARTICLE X.

1. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall make on-board technical measurements and shall broadcast all telemetric information obtained from such measurements. The Party conducting the flight test shall determine which technical parameters are to be measured during such flight test, as well as the methods of processing and transmitting telemetric information.

2. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to engage in any activity that denies full access to telemetric information, including: (a) the use of encryption; (b) the use of jamming; (c) broadcasting telemetric information from an ICBM or SLBM using narrow directional beaming; and (d) encapsulation of telemetric information, including the use of ejectable capsules or recoverable reentry vehicles.

3. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to broadcast from a reentry vehicle telemetric information that pertains to the functioning of the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM.

4. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, in accordance with Section I of the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol, tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is broadcast during the flight test.

5. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, in accordance with Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, data associated with the analysis of the telemetric information.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to encapsulate and encrypt on-board technical measurements during no more than a total of eleven flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs each year. Of these eleven flight tests each year, no more than four shall be flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of each type, any missile of which has been flight-tested with a self-contained dispensing mechanism. Such encapsulations shall be carried out in accordance with Section I and paragraph 1 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol, and such encryption shall be carried out in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol. Encapsulation and encryption that are carried out on the same flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall count as two flight tests against the quotas specified in this paragraph.

ARTICLE XI.

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections and continuous monitoring activities and shall conduct exhibitions pursuant to this Article and the Inspection Protocol. Inspections, continuous monitoring activities, and exhibitions shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol and the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections at facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections at facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the notifications and regular exchanges of updated data provided in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct new facility inspections to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified in the notifications of new facilities provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspectsite inspections to confirm that covert assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring.

6. Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that such ballistic missiles contain no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to them.

7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct post-exercise dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles to confirm that the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that are located at the inspected ICBM base and those that have not returned to it after completion of the dispersal does not exceed the number specified for that ICBM base.

8. Each Party shall conduct or shall have the right to conduct conversion or elimination inspections to confirm the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms.

9. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections to confirm that the elimination of facilities has been completed.

10. Each Party shall have the right to conduct formerly declared facility inspections to confirm that facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, are not being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.

11. Each Party shall conduct technical characteristics exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections of an ICBM and an SLBM of each type, and each variant thereof, and of a mobile launcher of ICBMs and each version of such launcher for each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that technical characteristics correspond to the data specified for these items.

12. Each Party shall conduct distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of: (a) heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and each variant of such heavy bombers correspond to the data specified for these items in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; to demonstrate the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of each type and each variant is actually equipped; and to demonstrate that this number does not exceed the number provided for in paragraph 20 or 21 of Article V of this Treaty, as applicable; (b) for each type of heavy bomber from any one of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers. If, for such a type of heavy bomber, there are no heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a test heavy bomber from which a long-range

nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested shall be exhibited. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that, for each exhibited type of heavy bomber, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, each variant of training heavy bombers, and a former heavy bomber are distinguishable from one another and from each variant of heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; and (c) long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and each variant of such long-range ALCMs correspond to the data specified for these items in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding. The further purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate differences, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 13, 14, or 15 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that make long-range non-nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs.

13. Each Party shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of all heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all training heavy bombers, and all former heavy bombers specified in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that such airplanes satisfy the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. After a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested from a heavy bomber of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM had previously been flight-tested, the Party conducting the flight test shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and the other Party shall have the right during such exhibitions to conduct inspections, of 30 percent of the heavy bombers of such type equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs at each air base specified for such heavy bombers. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party the presence of specified features that make each exhibited heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

14. Each Party shall have the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm the number of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs produced.

ARTICLE XII.

1. To enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification, each Party shall, if the other Party makes a request in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, carry out the following cooperative measures: (a) a display in the open of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within restricted areas specified by the requesting Party. The number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs based at the restricted areas specified in each such request shall not exceed ten percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of the requested Party, and such launchers shall be contained within one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. For each specified restricted area, the roofs of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be open for the duration of a display. The road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the restricted area shall be displayed either located next to or moved halfway out of such fixed structures; (b) a display in the open of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at parking sites specified by the requesting Party. Such launchers shall be displayed by removing the entire train from its fixed structure and locating the train within the rail garrison. The number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to display pursuant to each such request shall include all such launchers located at no more than eight parking sites, provided that no more than two parking sites may be requested within any one rail garrison in anyone request. Requests concerning specific parking sites shall include the designation for each parking site as provided for in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding; and (c) a display

in the open of all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers located within one air base specified by the requesting Party, except those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations. Such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall be displayed by removing the entire airplane from its fixed structure, if any, and locating the airplane within the air base. Those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at the air base specified by the requesting Party that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations shall be specified by the requesting Party in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section V of the Notification Protocol. Such a notification shall be provided no later than 12 hours after the request for display has been made.

2. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers subject to each request pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be displayed in open view without using concealment measures. Each Party shall have the right to make seven such requests each year, but shall not request a display at any particular ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, any particular parking site, or any particular air base more than two times each year. A Party shall have the right to request, in any single request, only a display of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a display of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or a display of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. A display shall begin no later than 12 hours after the request is made and shall continue until 18 hours have elapsed from the time that the request was made. If the requested Party cannot conduct a display due to circumstances brought about by force majeure, it shall provide notification to the requesting Party in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, and the display shall be cancelled. In such a case, the number of requests to which the requesting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

3. A request for cooperative measures shall not be made for a facility that has been designated for inspection until such an inspection has been completed and the inspectors have departed the facility. A facility for which cooperative measures have been requested shall not be designated for inspection until the cooperative measures have been completed or until notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol.

ARTICLE XIII

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct exercised dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles from restricted areas or rail garrisons. Such an exercise dispersal may involve either road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or both road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Exercise dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be conducted as provided for below: (a) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. (b) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. (c) Those ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in an exercise dispersal. (d) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles engaged in a routine movement from a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal. (e) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles engaged in a relocation from a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such a dispersal shall continue to be considered to be engaged in a relocation. Notification of the completion of the relocation shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of the completion of

the relocation was provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. (f) During an exercise dispersal, all deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that depart a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal, except for such launchers and missiles that relocate to a facility outside their associated ICBM base during such a dispersal. (g) An exercise dispersal shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins. (h) Exercise dispersals shall not be conducted: (i) more than two times in any period of two calendar years; (ii) during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections; (iii) from a new ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs until a new facility inspection has been conducted or until the period of time provided for such an inspection has expired; or (iv) from an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that has been designated for a data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection, until completion of such an inspection. (i) If a notification of an exercise dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, the other Party shall not have the right to designate for data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal, or to request cooperative measures for such an ICBM base, until the completion of such a dispersal. (j) When an exercise dispersal is completed, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles involved in such a dispersal shall be located at their restricted areas or rail garrisons, except for those otherwise accounted for in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

2. A major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, about which a notification has been provided pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises of September 23, 1989, shall be conducted as provided for below: (a) Such exercise shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. (b) Such exercise shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. (c) The air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in such exercise. (d) Such exercise shall begin no more than one time in any calendar year, and shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins. (e) Such exercise shall not be conducted during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections. (f) During such exercise by a Party, the other Party shall not have the right to conduct inspections of their bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers involved in the exercise. The right to conduct inspections of such air bases shall resume three days after notification of the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers has been provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. (g) Within the 30-day period following the receipt of the notification of the completion of such exercise, the receiving Party may make a request for cooperative measures to be carried out in accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Article XII of this Treaty at one of the air bases involved in the exercise. Such a request shall not be counted toward the quota provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XII of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XIV.

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct operational dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and heavy bombers. There shall be no limit on the number and duration of operational dispersals, and there shall be no limit on the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, or heavy bombers involved in such dispersals. When an operational dispersal begins, all strategic offensive arms of a Party shall be considered to be part of the dispersal. Operational dispersals shall be

conducted as provided for below: (a) An operational dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. (b) An operational dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol.

2. During an operational dispersal each Party shall have the right to: (a) suspend notifications that it would otherwise provide in accordance with the Notification Protocol except for notification of flight tests provided under the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988; provided that, if any conversion or elimination processes are not suspended pursuant to subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, the relevant notifications shall be provided in accordance with Section IV of the Notification Protocol; (b) suspend the right of the other Party to conduct inspections; (c) suspend the right of the other Party to request cooperative measures; and (d) suspend conversion and elimination processes for its strategic offensive arms. In such case, the number of converted and eliminated items shall correspond to the number that has actually been converted and eliminated as of the date and time of the beginning of the operational dispersal specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section X of the Notification Protocol.

3. Notifications suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume no later than three days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. The right to conduct inspections and to request cooperative measures suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume four days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. Inspections or cooperative measures being conducted at the time a Party provides notification that it suspends inspections or cooperative measures during an operational dispersal shall not count toward the appropriate annual quotas provided for by this Treaty.

4. When an operational dispersal is completed: (a) All deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be located within their deployment areas or shall be engaged in relocations. (b) All deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be located within their rail garrisons or shall be engaged in routine movements or relocations. (c) All heavy bombers shall be located within national territory and shall have resumed normal operations. If it is necessary for heavy bombers to be located outside national territory for purposes not inconsistent with this Treaty, the Parties will immediately engage in diplomatic consultations so that appropriate assurances can be provided.

5. Within the 30 day period after the completion of an operational dispersal, the Party not conducting the operational dispersal shall have the right to make no more than two requests for cooperative measures, subject to the provisions of Article XII of this Treaty, for ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs or airbases. Such requests shall not count toward the quota of requests provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XII of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XV

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to: (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; (b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and (c) resolve questions related to the application of relevant provisions of this Treaty to a new kind

of strategic offensive arm, after notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol.

ARTICLE XVI

To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties shall hold consultations in accordance with Article XV of this Treaty in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. The Parties agree that this provision does not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State.

ARTICLE XVII

1. This Treaty, including its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, all of which form integral parts thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 15 years unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. No later than one year before the expiration of the 15-year period, the Parties shall meet to consider whether this Treaty will be extended. If the Parties so decide, this Treaty will be extended for a period of five years unless it is superseded before the expiration of that period by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. This Treaty shall be extended for successive five-year periods, if the Parties so decide, in accordance with the procedures governing the initial extension, and it shall remain in force for each agreed five-year period of extension unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XVIII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XIX

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: George Bush President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: M. Gorbachev President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Source: <https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaties-between-united-states-america-and-union-soviet-socialist-republics-strategic-offensive-reductions-start-i-start-ii/>

Part 3.

On the Path to a Sustainable Multipolar World Order (Yalta World – 2)

3.1. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE YALTA WORLD

3.2. Dialogue Among Civilizations

3.3. Laying the Foundations of a Sustainable Multipolar World Order

3.4. The Scientific Platform for the Formation of Yalta World - 2

UN Security Council resolution 1244. June 10, 1999

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/RES/1244 (1999)
10 June 1999

RESOLUTION 1244 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting,
on 10 June 1999

The Security Council,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,

Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,

Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,

Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,

Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on

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2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,

Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;

2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;

3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;

4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;

5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;

7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;

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8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;

9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:

(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;

(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;

(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;

(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;

(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;

(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;

(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required;

(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations;

10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;

11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:

(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;

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(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;

(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;

(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;

(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;

(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;

(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;

(j) Protecting and promoting human rights;

(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;

12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid;

13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;

14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;

15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences;

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17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;

18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution;

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex 1

Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;

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- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.

Annex 2

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
 - Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence;
 - Marking/clearing minefields;
 - Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;
 - Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other

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countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.

10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below.¹ A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn;

Returning personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel;
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;
- Timetable for their return;
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;
- Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the international civil mission.

Notes

¹ Other required elements:

- A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours;
- Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands);

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- Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals;
- The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.

Military technical agreement between the international security forces (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. June 15, 1999

**UNITED
NATIONS**

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1999/682
15 June 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to attach a copy of a letter dated 10 June 1999 addressed to me by Javier Solana, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), transmitting a copy of the military-technical agreement concluded by NATO military authorities with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the procedures and modalities for the withdrawal from Kosovo of security forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (see annex).

I should appreciate it if this letter and its annex could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

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Annex

Letter dated 10 June 1999 from the Secretary-General of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the
Secretary-General

Please find attached for your information a copy of the military-technical agreement concluded by NATO military authorities with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the procedures and modalities for the withdrawal from Kosovo of security forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

EnclosureMilitary-technical agreement between the international security force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of SerbiaArticle IGeneral obligations

1. The Parties to this agreement reaffirm the document presented by President Ahtisaari to President Milosevic and approved by the Serb Parliament and the Federal Government on 3 June 1999, to include deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences. The Parties further note that the United Nations Security Council is prepared to adopt a resolution, which has been introduced, regarding these presences.
2. The State governmental authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia understand and agree that the international security force (KFOR) will deploy following the adoption of the Security Council resolution referred to in paragraph 1 and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission. They further agree to comply with all of the obligations of this agreement and to facilitate the deployment and operation of this force.
3. For purposes of the agreement, the following expressions shall have the meanings as described below:
 - (a) "The Parties" are those signatories to the agreement;
 - (b) "Authorities" means the appropriate responsible individual, agency or organization of the Parties;
 - (c) "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces" includes all of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia personnel and organizations with a military capability. This includes regular army and naval forces, armed civilian groups, associated paramilitary groups, air forces, national guards, border police, army reserves, military police, intelligence services, federal and Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs local, special, riot and anti-terrorist police, and any other groups or individuals so designated by the international security force (KFOR) commander;
 - (d) The air safety zone (ASZ) is defined as a 25-kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia territory. It includes the airspace above the 25-kilometre zone;
 - (e) The ground safety zone (GSZ) is defined as a 5-kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia territory. It includes the terrain within that 5-kilometre zone;

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(f) Entry-into-force day (EIF) is defined as the day this agreement is signed.

4. The purposes of these obligations are as follows:

(a) To establish a durable cessation of hostilities, under no circumstances shall any forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia enter into, re-enter, or remain within the territory of Kosovo or the ground safety zone and the air safety zone described in article I, paragraph 3, without the prior express consent of the international security force (KFOR) commander. Local police will be allowed to remain in the GSZ.

The above paragraph is without prejudice to the agreed return of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian personnel, which will be the subject of a subsequent separate agreement as provided for in paragraph 6 of the document mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article;

(b) To provide for the support and authorization of the international security force (KFOR) and in particular to authorize the international security force (KFOR) to take such actions as are required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with this agreement and protection of the international security force (KFOR), and to contribute to a secure environment for the international civil implementation presence and other international organizations, agencies and non-governmental organizations (details in appendix B).

Article II

Cessation of hostilities

1. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces shall immediately, upon entry into force of this agreement, refrain from committing any hostile or provocative acts of any type against any person in Kosovo and will order armed forces to cease all such activities. They shall not encourage, organize or support hostile or provocative demonstrations.

2. Phased withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces (ground). The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agrees to a phased withdrawal of all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces from Kosovo to locations in Serbia outside Kosovo. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces will mark and clear minefields, booby traps and obstacles. As they withdraw, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces will clear all lines of communication by removing all mines, demolitions, booby traps, obstacles and charges. They will also mark all sides of all minefields. The entry and deployment of the international security force (KFOR) into Kosovo will be synchronized. The phased withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces from Kosovo will be in accordance with the sequence outlined below:

(a) By EIF + 1 day, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces located in zone 3 will have vacated, via designated routes, that zone to demonstrate compliance (depicted on the map in appendix A to this agreement). Once it is verified that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces have complied with this

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subparagraph and with paragraph 1 of this article, NATO air strikes will be suspended. The suspension will continue provided that the obligations of this agreement are fully complied with and provided that the Security Council adopts a resolution concerning the deployment of the international security force (KFOR) so rapidly that a security gap can be avoided;

(b) By EIF + 6 days, all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces in Kosovo will have vacated zone 1 (depicted on the map in appendix A to this agreement). Establish liaison teams with the KFOR commander in Pristina;

(c) By EIF + 9 days, all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces in Kosovo will have vacated zone 2 (depicted on the map in appendix A to this agreement);

(d) By EIF + 11 days, all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces in Kosovo will have vacated zone 3 (depicted on the map in appendix A to this agreement);

(e) By EIF + 11 days, all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces in Kosovo will have completed their withdrawal from Kosovo (depicted on the map in appendix A to this agreement) to locations in Serbia outside Kosovo, and not within the 5-kilometre GSZ. At the end of the sequence (EIF+11), the senior Federal Republic of Yugoslavia force commanders responsible for the withdrawing forces shall confirm in writing to the international security force (KFOR) commander that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces have complied and completed the phased withdrawal. The international security force (KFOR) commander may approve specific requests for exceptions to the phased withdrawal. The bombing campaign will terminate on complete withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces as provided under article II. The international security force (KFOR) shall retain, as necessary, authority to enforce compliance with this agreement;

(f) The authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia will cooperate fully with the international security force (KFOR) in its verification of the withdrawal of forces from Kosovo and beyond the ASZ/GSZ;

(g) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia armed forces withdrawing in accordance with appendix A, i.e., in designated assembly areas or withdrawing on designated routes, will not be subject to air attack;

(h) The international security force (KFOR) will provide appropriate control of the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Kosovo with Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* until the arrival of the civilian mission of the United Nations.

3. Phased withdrawal of Yugoslav air and air defence forces:

(a) At EIF + 1 day, no Federal Republic of Yugoslavia aircraft, fixed wing or rotary, will fly in Kosovo airspace or over the ASZ without prior approval by the international security force (KFOR) commander. All air defence systems, radar, surface-to-air missiles and aircraft of the Parties will refrain from

* Turkey recognizes Macedonia by its constitutional name.

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acquisition, target-tracking or otherwise illuminating international security force (KFOR) air platforms operating in the Kosovo airspace or over the ASZ;

(b) By EIF + 3 days, all aircraft, radars, surface-to-air missiles (including man-portable air defence systems) and anti-aircraft artillery in Kosovo will withdraw to other locations in Serbia outside the 25-kilometre ASZ;

(c) The international security force (KFOR) commander will control and coordinate use of airspace over Kosovo and the ASZ commencing at EIF. Violation of any of the provisions above, including the international security force (KFOR) commander's rules and procedures governing the airspace over Kosovo, as well as unauthorized flight or activation of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia integrated air defence within the ASZ, are subject to military action by the international security force (KFOR), including the use of necessary force. The international security force (KFOR) commander may delegate control of normal civilian air activities to appropriate Federal Republic of Yugoslavia institutions to monitor operations, deconflict international security force (KFOR) air traffic movements and ensure smooth and safe operations of the air traffic system. It is envisioned that control of civil air traffic will be returned to civilian authorities as soon as practicable.

Article III

Notifications

1. This agreement and written orders requiring compliance will be immediately communicated to all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces.
2. By EIF + 2 days, the State governmental authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia shall furnish the following specific information regarding the status of all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces:
 - (a) Detailed records, positions and descriptions of all mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices, demolitions, obstacles, booby traps, wire entanglement, or physical or military hazards to the safe movement of any personnel in Kosovo laid by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces;
 - (b) Any further information of a military or security nature about Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces in the territory of Kosovo and the GSZ and ASZ requested by the international security force (KFOR) commander.

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Article IV

Establishment of a Joint Implementation Commission

A Joint Implementation Commission shall be established with the deployment of the international security force (KFOR) to Kosovo, as directed by the international security force (KFOR) commander.

Article V

Final authority to interpret

The international security force (KFOR) commander is the final authority regarding interpretation of this agreement and the security aspects of the peace settlement it supports. His determinations are binding on all Parties and persons.

Article VI

Entry into force

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

Appendices:

- A. Phased withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces from Kosovo.
- B. International security force (KFOR) operations.

For the international security
force (KFOR)

Lieutenant General Mike Jackson
Commander, KFOR

For the Governments of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Republic of Serbia

Colonel General Svetozar Marjanovic
General Staff of VJ

Lieutenant General Obrad Stevanovic
Ministry of Internal Affairs
of the Republic of Serbia

9 June 1999

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Appendix B

International security force (KFOR) operations

1. Consistent with the general obligations of the military-technical agreement the State governmental authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia understand and agree that the international security force (KFOR) will deploy and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo.
2. The international security force (KFOR) commander shall have the authority, without interference or permission, to do all that he judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect the international security force (KFOR) and the international civil implementation presence, and to carry out the responsibilities inherent in this military-technical agreement and the peace settlement which it supports.
3. Neither the international security force (KFOR) nor any of its personnel shall be liable for any damages to public or private property that they may cause in the course of duties related to the implementation of this agreement. The Parties will agree on a status-of-forces agreement as soon as possible.
4. The international security force (KFOR) shall have the right:
 - (a) To monitor and ensure compliance with this agreement and to respond promptly to any violations and restore compliance, using military force if required. This includes necessary actions to:
 - (i) Enforce withdrawals of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces;
 - (ii) Enforce compliance following the return of selected Federal Republic of Yugoslavia personnel to Kosovo;
 - (iii) Provide assistance to other international entities involved in the implementation or otherwise authorized by the Security Council;
 - (b) To establish liaison arrangements with local Kosovo authorities and with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbian civil and military authorities;
 - (c) To observe, monitor and inspect any and all facilities or activities in Kosovo that the international security force (KFOR) commander believes has or may have military or police capability, or may be associated with the employment of military or police capabilities, or are otherwise relevant to compliance with this agreement.
5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this agreement, the Parties understand and agree that the international security force (KFOR) commander has the right and is authorized to compel the removal, withdrawal or relocation of specific forces and weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities whenever the international security force (KFOR) commander determines a

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potential threat to either the international security force (KFOR) or its mission, or to another party. Forces failing to redeploy, withdraw, relocate or to cease threatening or potentially threatening activities following such a demand by the international security force (KFOR) shall be subject to military action by the international security force (KFOR), including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance.

Resolution 1973 (2011). Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on March 17, 2011

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011,

Deploring the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970 (2011),

Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties,

Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians,

Condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions,

Further condemning acts of violence and intimidation committed by the Libyan authorities against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel and urging these authorities to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law as outlined in resolution 1738 (2006),

Considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity,

Recalling paragraph 26 of resolution 1970 (2011) in which the Council expressed its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Expressing its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the safety of humanitarian personnel,

Recalling the condemnation by the League of Arab States, the African Union, and the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that have been and are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Taking note of the final communiqué of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference of 8 March 2011, and the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 10 March 2011 which established an ad hoc High Level Committee on Libya,

Taking note also of the decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March 2011 to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Taking note further of the Secretary-General's call on 16 March 2011 for an immediate cease-fire,

Recalling its decision to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and stressing that those responsible for or complicit in attacks targeting the civilian population, including aerial and naval attacks, must be held to account,

Reiterating its concern at the plight of refugees and foreign workers forced to flee the violence in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, welcoming the response of neighbouring States, in particular Tunisia and Egypt, to address the needs of those refugees and foreign workers, and calling on the international community to support those efforts,

Deploring the continuing use of mercenaries by the Libyan authorities,

Considering that the establishment of a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes an important element for the protection of civilians as well as the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Libya,

Expressing concern also for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Welcoming the appointment by the Secretary General of his Special Envoy to Libya, Mr. Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib and supporting his efforts to find a sustainable and peaceful solution to the crisis in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Determining that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians;

2. Stresses the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people and notes the decisions of the Secretary-General to send his Special Envoy to Libya and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to send its ad hoc High Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution;

3. Demands that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law and take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance;

Protection of civilians

4. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council;

5. Recognizes the important role of the League of Arab States in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region, and bearing in mind Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, requests the Member States of the League of Arab States to cooperate with other Member States in the implementation of paragraph 4;

No Fly Zone

6. Decides to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians;

7. Decides further that the ban imposed by paragraph 6 shall not apply to flights whose sole purpose is humanitarian, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related assistance, or evacuating foreign nationals from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, nor shall it apply to flights authorised by paragraphs 4 or 8, nor other flights which are deemed necessary by States acting under the authorisation conferred in paragraph 8 to be

for the benefit of the Libyan people, and that these flights shall be coordinated with any mechanism established under paragraph 8;

8. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights imposed by paragraph 6 above, as necessary, and requests the States concerned in cooperation with the League of Arab States to coordinate closely with the Secretary General on the measures they are taking to implement this ban, including by establishing an appropriate mechanism for implementing the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 above,

9. Calls upon all Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to provide assistance, including any necessary over-flight approvals, for the purposes of implementing paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above;

10. Requests the Member States concerned to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General on the measures they are taking to implement paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above, including practical measures for the monitoring and approval of authorised humanitarian or evacuation flights;

11. Decides that the Member States concerned shall inform the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States immediately of measures taken in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above, including to supply a concept of operations;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council immediately of any actions taken by the Member States concerned in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above and to report to the Council within 7 days and every month thereafter on the implementation of this resolution, including information on any violations of the flight ban imposed by paragraph 6 above;

Enforcement of the arms embargo

13. Decides that paragraph 11 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall be replaced by the following paragraph : “Calls upon all Member States, in particular States of the region, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, in order to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo established by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011), to inspect in their territory, including seaports and airports, and on the high seas, vessels and aircraft bound to or from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, calls upon all flag States of such vessels and aircraft to cooperate with such inspections and authorises Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections”;

14. Requests Member States which are taking action under paragraph 13 above on the high seas to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General and further requests the States concerned to inform the Secretary-General and the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) (“the Committee”) immediately of measures taken in the exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 13 above;

15. Requires any Member State whether acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 13 above, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, the results of such inspection, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and

disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

16. Deplores the continuing flows of mercenaries into the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and calls upon all Member States to comply strictly with their obligations under paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) to prevent the provision of armed mercenary personnel to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

Ban on flights

17. Decides that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft registered in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or owned or operated by Libyan nationals or companies to take off from, land in or overfly their territory unless the particular flight has been approved in advance by the Committee, or in the case of an emergency landing;

18. Decides that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, except in the case of an emergency landing;

Asset freeze

19. Decides that the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply to all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and directs the Committee to designate such Libyan authorities, individuals or entities within 30 days of the date of the adoption of this resolution and as appropriate thereafter;

20. Affirms its determination to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall, at a later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and for the benefit of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

21. Decides that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or subject to its jurisdiction, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, if the States have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to violence and use of force against civilians;

Designations

22. Decides that the individuals listed in Annex I shall be subject to the travel restrictions imposed in paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 1970 (2011), and decides further that the individuals and entities listed in Annex II shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011);

23. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply also to individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970 (2011), particularly paragraphs 9 and 10 thereof, or to have assisted others in doing so;

Panel of Experts

24. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts ("Panel of Experts"), under the direction of the Committee to carry out the following tasks:

(a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution;

(b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organisations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

(c) Make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures;

(d) Provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel's appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

25. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

26. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution;

27. Decides that all States, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Libyan authorities, or of any person or body in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 1970 (2011), this resolution and related resolutions;

28. Reaffirms its intention to keep the actions of the Libyan authorities under continuous review and underlines its readiness to review at any time the measures imposed by this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011), including by strengthening, suspending or lifting those measures, as appropriate, based on compliance by the Libyan authorities with this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011).

29. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Libya: UNSCR proposed designations

Number	Name	Justification	Identifiers
Annex I: Travel Ban			
1	QUREN SALIH QUREN AL QADHAFI	Libyan Ambassador to Chad. Has left Chad for Sabha. Involved directly in recruiting and coordinating mercenaries for the regime.	
2	Colonel AMID HUSAIN AL KUNI	Governor of Ghat (South Libya). Directly involved in recruiting mercenaries.	
Annex II: Asset Freeze			
	Dorda, Abu Zayd Umar	Position: Director, External Security Organisation	
	Jabir, Major General Abu Bakr Yunis	Position: Defence Minister	Title: Major General DOB: --/--/1952. POB: Jalo, Libya
	Matuq, Matuq Mohammed	Position: Secretary for Utilities	DOB: --/--/1956. POB: Khoms
	Qadhafi, Mohammed Muammar	Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime	DOB: --/--/1970. POB: Tripoli, Libya
	Qadhafi, Saadi	Commander Special Forces. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations	DOB: 25/05/1973. POB: Tripoli, Libya
	Qadhafi, Saif al-Arab	Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime	DOB: --/--/1982. POB: Tripoli, Libya
	Al-Senussi, Colonel Abdullah	Position: Director Military Intelligence	Title: Colonel DOB: --/--/1949. POB: Sudan
Entities			
	Central Bank of Libya	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	
	Libyan Investment Authority	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	a.k.a: Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO) Address: 1 Fateh Tower Office, No 99 22 nd Floor, Borgaida Street, Tripoli, Libya, 1103
	Libyan Foreign Bank	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family and a potential source of funding for his regime.	
	Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	Address: Jamahiriya Street, LAP Building, PO Box 91330, Tripoli, Libya
	Libyan National Oil Corporation	Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.	Address: Bashir Saadwi Street, Tripoli, Tarabulus, Libya

Resolution 2254 (2015). Adopted by the Security Council at its 7588th meeting, on December 18, 2015

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2042 (2012), 2043 (2012), 2118 (2013), 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2170 (2014), 2175 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2235 (2015), and 2249 (2015) and Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011 (S/PRST/2011/16), 21 March 2012 (S/PRST/2012/6), 5 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/10), 2 October 2013 (S/PRST/2013/15), 24 April 2015 (S/PRST/2015/10) and 17 August 2015 (S/PRST/2015/15),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing its gravest concern at the continued suffering of the Syrian people, the dire and deteriorating humanitarian situation, the ongoing conflict and its persistent and brutal violence, the negative impact of terrorism and violent extremist ideology in support of terrorism, the destabilizing effect of the crisis on the region and beyond, including the resulting increase in terrorists drawn to the fighting in Syria, the physical destruction in the country, and increasing sectarianism, and underscoring that the situation will continue to deteriorate in the absence of a political solution,

Recalling its demand that all parties take all appropriate steps to protect civilians, including members of ethnic, religious and confessional communities, and stresses that, in this regard, the primary responsibility to protect its population lies with the Syrian authorities,

Reiterating that the only sustainable solution to the current crisis in Syria is through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people, with a view to full implementation of the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 as endorsed by resolution 2118 (2013), including through the establishment of an inclusive transitional governing body with full executive powers, which shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent while ensuring continuity of governmental institutions,

Encouraging, in this regard, the diplomatic efforts of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) to help bring an end to the conflict in Syria,

Commending the commitment of the ISSG, as set forth in the Joint Statement on the outcome of the multilateral talks on Syria in Vienna of 30 October 2015 and the Statement of the ISSG of 14 November 2015 (hereinafter the “Vienna Statements”), to ensure a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition based on the Geneva Communiqué in its entirety, and emphasizing the urgency for all parties in Syria to work diligently and constructively towards this goal,

Urging all parties to the UN-facilitated political process to adhere to the principles identified by the ISSG, including commitments to Syria’s unity, independence, territorial integrity, and non-sectarian character, to ensuring continuity of governmental institutions, to protecting the rights of all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity or religious denomination, and to ensuring humanitarian access throughout the country,

Encouraging the meaningful participation of women in the UN-facilitated political process for Syria,

Bearing in mind the goal to bring together the broadest possible spectrum of the opposition, chosen by Syrians, who will decide their negotiation representatives and define their negotiation positions so as to enable the political process to begin, taking note of the meetings in Moscow and Cairo and other initiatives to this end, and noting in particular the usefulness of the meeting in Riyadh on 9-11 December 2015, whose outcomes contribute to the preparation of negotiations under UN auspices on a political settlement of the conflict, in accordance with the Geneva Communiqué and the

“Vienna Statements”, and looking forward to the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Syria finalizing efforts to this end,

1. Reconfirms its endorsement of the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012, endorses the “Vienna Statements” in pursuit of the full implementation of the Geneva Communiqué, as the basis for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition in order to end the conflict in Syria, and stresses that the Syrian people will decide the future of Syria;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, through his good offices and the efforts of his Special Envoy for Syria, to convene representatives of the Syrian government and the opposition to engage in formal negotiations on a political transition process on an urgent basis, with a target of early January 2016 for the initiation of talks, pursuant to the Geneva Communiqué, consistent with the 14 November 2015 ISSG Statement, with a view to a lasting political settlement of the crisis;

3. Acknowledges the role of the ISSG as the central platform to facilitate the United Nations’ efforts to achieve a lasting political settlement in Syria;

4. Expresses its support, in this regard, for a Syrian-led political process that is facilitated by the United Nations and, within a target of six months, establishes credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance and sets a schedule and process for drafting a new constitution, and further expresses its support for free and fair elections, pursuant to the new constitution, to be held within 18 months and administered under supervision of the United Nations, to the satisfaction of the governance and to the highest international standards of transparency and accountability, with all Syrians, including members of the diaspora, eligible to participate, as set forth in the 14 November 2015 ISSG Statement;

5. Acknowledges the close linkage between a ceasefire and a parallel political process, pursuant to the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, and that both initiatives should move ahead expeditiously, and in this regard expresses its support for a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, which the ISSG has committed to support and assist in implementing, to come into effect as soon as the representatives of the Syrian government and the opposition have begun initial steps towards a political transition under UN auspices, on the basis of the Geneva Communiqué, as set forth in the 14 November 2015 ISSG Statement, and to do so on an urgent basis;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to lead the effort, through the office of his Special Envoy and in consultation with relevant parties, to determine the modalities and requirements of a ceasefire as well as continue planning for the support of ceasefire implementation, and urges Member States, in particular members of the ISSG, to support and accelerate all efforts to achieve a ceasefire, including through pressing all relevant parties to agree and adhere to such a ceasefire;

7. Emphasizes the need for a ceasefire monitoring, verification and reporting mechanism, requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on options for such a mechanism that it can support, as soon as possible and no later than one month after the adoption of this resolution, and encourages Member States, including members of the Security Council, to provide assistance, including through expertise and in-kind contributions, to support such a mechanism;

8. Reiterates its call in resolution 2249 (2015) for Member States to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), Al-Nusra Front (ANF), and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al Qaeda or ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council, and as may further be agreed by the ISSG and determined by the Security Council, pursuant to the Statement of the ISSG of 14 November 2015, and to eradicate the safe haven they have established over significant parts of Syria, and notes that the aforementioned ceasefire will not apply to offensive or defensive actions against these individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, as set forth in the 14 November 2015 ISSG Statement;

9. Welcomes the effort that was conducted by the government of Jordan to help develop a common understanding within the ISSG of individuals and groups for possible determination as terrorists and will consider expeditiously the recommendation of the ISSG for the purpose of determining terrorist groups;

10. Emphasizes the need for all parties in Syria to take confidence building measures to contribute to the viability of a political process and a lasting ceasefire, and calls on all states to use their influence with the government of Syria and the Syrian opposition to advance the peace process, confidence building measures and steps towards a ceasefire;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council, as soon as possible and no later than one month after the adoption of this resolution, on options for further confidence building measures;

12. Calls on the parties to immediately allow humanitarian agencies rapid, safe and unhindered access throughout Syria by most direct routes, allow immediate, humanitarian assistance to reach all people in need, in particular in all besieged and hard-to-reach areas, release any arbitrarily detained persons, particularly women and children, calls on ISSG states to use their influence immediately to these ends, and demands the full implementation of resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014) and any other applicable resolutions;

13. Demands that all parties immediately cease any attacks against civilians and civilian objects as such, including attacks against medical facilities and personnel, and any indiscriminate use of weapons, including through shelling and aerial bombardment, welcomes the commitment by the ISSG to press the parties in this regard, and further demands that all parties immediately comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law as applicable;

14. Underscores the critical need to build conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their home areas and the rehabilitation of affected areas, in accordance with international law, including applicable provisions of the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and taking into account the interests of those countries hosting refugees, urges Member States to provide assistance in this regard, looks forward to the London Conference on Syria in February 2016, hosted by the United Kingdom, Germany, Kuwait, Norway and the United Nations, as an important contribution to this endeavour, and further expresses its support to the post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation of Syria;

15. Requests that the Secretary-General report back to the Security Council on the implementation of this resolution, including on progress of the UN-facilitated political process, within 60 days;

16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Source: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2254\(2015\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2254(2015))

Resolution 2268 (2016). Adopted by the Security Council at its 7634th meeting, on February 26, 2016

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2042 (2012), 2043 (2012), 2118 (2013), 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2170 (2014), 2175 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2235 (2015), 2249 (2015), 2253 (2015), 2254 (2015), and 2258 (2015) and Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011 (S/PRST/2011/16), 21 March 2012 (S/PRST/2012/6), 5 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/10), 2 October 2013 (S/PRST/2013/15), 24 April 2015 (S/PRST/2015/10) and 17 August 2015 (S/PRST/2015/15),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recognizing the efforts of the Secretary-General in implementing resolution 2254 (2015) and noting, through his good offices and by his Special Envoy for Syria, the launch of the formal negotiations on a political transition process, consistent with paragraph 2 of resolution 2254 (2015), on 29 January 2016,

Commending the commitment of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) to ensure a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition based on the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 in its entirety and to immediately facilitate the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015), and emphasizing the urgency for all parties in Syria to work diligently and constructively towards this goal,

Welcoming the ISSG statement of 11 February 2016, including the establishment of an ISSG humanitarian task force and an ISSG ceasefire task force,

1. Endorses in full the Joint Statement of the United States and the Russian Federation, as Co-Chairs of the ISSG, on Cessation of Hostilities in Syria of 22 February 2016 and the Terms for the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria (hereafter referred to as “the Annex”) attached to the Statement, and demands the cessation of hostilities to begin at 00:00 (Damascus time) on 27 February 2016;

2. Demands the full and immediate implementation of resolution 2254 (2015) to facilitate a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition, in accordance with the Geneva Communiqué as set forth in the ISSG Statements, in order to end the conflict in Syria, and stresses again that the Syrian people will decide the future of Syria;

3. Demands that all parties to whom the cessation of hostilities applies as set forth in the Annex (hereafter referred to as the “parties to the cessation of hostilities”) fulfil their commitments laid out in the Annex, and urges all Member States, especially ISSG members, to use their influence with the parties to the cessation of hostilities to ensure fulfillment of those commitments and to support efforts to create conditions for a durable and lasting ceasefire;

4. Recognizes the efforts of the Russian Federation and the United States to reach understanding on the Terms of the Cessation of Hostilities, and acknowledges and welcomes that the forces of the Syrian government and those supporting it, as communicated to the Russian Federation, and the Syrian armed opposition groups, as communicated to the Russian Federation or the United States, have accepted and committed to abide by the Terms of the Cessation of Hostilities, and as such are now parties to it;

5. Reiterates its call on the parties to immediately allow humanitarian agencies rapid, safe and unhindered access throughout Syria by most direct routes, allow immediate, humanitarian assistance to reach all people in need, in particular in all besieged and hard-to-reach areas, and immediately comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law as applicable;

6. Expresses support for the ISSG initiative, coordinated through the ISSG humanitarian working group, to accelerate the urgent delivery of humanitarian aid, with the view towards the full, sustained,

and unimpeded access throughout the country, including to Deir ez Zor, Foah, Kafraya, Az-Zabadani, Madaya/Bqin, Darayya, Madamiyet Elsham, Duma, East Harasta, Arbin, Zamalka, Kafr Batna, Ein Terma, Hammuria, Jisrein, Saqba, Zabadin, Yarmuk, eastern and western rural Aleppo, Azaz, Afrin, At Tall, Rastan, Talbiseh, Al Houle, Tier Malah/Al Gantho/Der Kabira, Al Waer, Yalda, Babila and Beit Saham;

7. Reaffirms its support for a Syrian-led political process facilitated by the United Nations, requests the Secretary-General, through his good offices and the efforts of his Special Envoy for Syria, to resume the formal negotiations between the representatives of the Syrian government and the opposition, under the auspices of the United Nations, as soon as possible, and urges the representatives of the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition to engage in good faith in these negotiations;

8. Welcomes the cessation of hostilities as a step towards a lasting ceasefire and reaffirms the close linkage between a ceasefire and a parallel political process, pursuant to the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, and that both initiatives should move ahead expeditiously as expressed in resolution 2254 (2015);

9. Calls on all states to use their influence with the government of Syria and the Syrian opposition to advance the peace process, confidence building measures, including the early release of any arbitrarily detained persons, particularly women and children, and implementation of the cessation of hostilities;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution, including by drawing on information provided by the ISSG ceasefire taskforce, and on resolution 2254 (2015), within 15 days of the adoption of this resolution and every 30 days thereafter;

11. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Source: [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2268\(2016\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2268(2016))

Part 3.

On the Path to a Sustainable Multipolar World Order (Yalta World – 2)

3.1. The Destruction Of The Yalta World

3.2. DIALOGUE AMONG CIVILIZATIONS

3.3. Laying the Foundations of a Sustainable Multipolar World Order

3.4. The Scientific Platform for the Formation of Yalta World - 2

United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations. November, 1998

UNITED
NATIONS

A



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERALA/RES/53/22
16 November 1998Fifty-third session
Agenda item 168

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[without reference to a Main Committee (A/53/L.23/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1)]

53/22. United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, which, *inter alia*, call for collective effort to strengthen friendly relations among nations, remove threats to peace and foster international cooperation in resolving international issues of an economic, social, cultural and humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,

Recognizing the diverse civilizational achievements of mankind, crystallizing cultural pluralism and creative human diversity,

Aware that positive and mutually beneficial interaction among civilizations has continued throughout human history despite impediments arising from intolerance, disputes and wars,

Emphasizing the importance of tolerance in international relations and the significant role of dialogue as a means to reach understanding, remove threats to peace and strengthen interaction and exchange among civilizations,

Noting the designation of 1995 as the United Nations Year for Tolerance, and recognizing that tolerance and respect for diversity facilitate universal promotion and protection of human rights and constitute sound foundations for civil society, social harmony and peace,

Reaffirming that civilizational achievements constitute the collective heritage of mankind, providing a source of inspiration and progress for humanity at large,

A/RES/53/22

Page 2

Welcoming the collective endeavour of the international community to enhance understanding through constructive dialogue among civilizations on the threshold of the third millennium,

1. *Expresses its firm determination* to facilitate and promote dialogue among civilizations;
2. *Decides* to proclaim the year 2001 as the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations;
3. *Invites* Governments, the United Nations system, including the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and other relevant international and non-governmental organizations, to plan and implement appropriate cultural, educational and social programmes to promote the concept of dialogue among civilizations, including through organizing conferences and seminars and disseminating information and scholarly material on the subject, and to inform the Secretary-General of their activities;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to present a provisional report on activities in this regard to the General Assembly at its fifty-fourth session, and a final report to the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth session.

*53rd plenary meeting
4 November 1998*

United Nations Millennium Declaration. September 15, 2000



General Assembly

Distr.: General
18 September 2000

Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 60 (b)

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly

[without reference to a Main Committee (A/55/L.2)]

55/2. United Nations Millennium Declaration

The General Assembly

Adopts the following Declaration:

United Nations Millennium Declaration

I. Values and principles

1. We, heads of State and Government, have gathered at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 6 to 8 September 2000, at the dawn of a new millennium, to reaffirm our faith in the Organization and its Charter as indispensable foundations of a more peaceful, prosperous and just world.
2. We recognize that, in addition to our separate responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world's people, especially the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to whom the future belongs.
3. We reaffirm our commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which have proved timeless and universal. Indeed, their relevance and capacity to inspire have increased, as nations and peoples have become increasingly interconnected and interdependent.
4. We are determined to establish a just and lasting peace all over the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. We rededicate ourselves to support all efforts to uphold the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their territorial integrity and political independence, resolution of disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the right to self-determination of peoples which remain under colonial domination and foreign occupation, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the equal rights of all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion and international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character.

A/RES/55/2

5. We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world's people. For while globalization offers great opportunities, at present its benefits are very unevenly shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed. We recognize that developing countries and countries with economies in transition face special difficulties in responding to this central challenge. Thus, only through broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future, based upon our common humanity in all its diversity, can globalization be made fully inclusive and equitable. These efforts must include policies and measures, at the global level, which correspond to the needs of developing countries and economies in transition and are formulated and implemented with their effective participation.
 6. We consider certain fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century. These include:
 - **Freedom.** Men and women have the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice. Democratic and participatory governance based on the will of the people best assures these rights.
 - **Equality.** No individual and no nation must be denied the opportunity to benefit from development. The equal rights and opportunities of women and men must be assured.
 - **Solidarity.** Global challenges must be managed in a way that distributes the costs and burdens fairly in accordance with basic principles of equity and social justice. Those who suffer or who benefit least deserve help from those who benefit most.
 - **Tolerance.** Human beings must respect one other, in all their diversity of belief, culture and language. Differences within and between societies should be neither feared nor repressed, but cherished as a precious asset of humanity. A culture of peace and dialogue among all civilizations should be actively promoted.
 - **Respect for nature.** Prudence must be shown in the management of all living species and natural resources, in accordance with the precepts of sustainable development. Only in this way can the immeasurable riches provided to us by nature be preserved and passed on to our descendants. The current unsustainable patterns of production and consumption must be changed in the interest of our future welfare and that of our descendants.
 - **Shared responsibility.** Responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally. As the most universal and most representative organization in the world, the United Nations must play the central role.
 7. In order to translate these shared values into actions, we have identified key objectives to which we assign special significance.
- II. Peace, security and disarmament**
8. We will spare no effort to free our peoples from the scourge of war, whether within or between States, which has claimed more than 5 million lives in the

past decade. We will also seek to eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction.

9. We resolve therefore:

- To strengthen respect for the rule of law in international as in national affairs and, in particular, to ensure compliance by Member States with the decisions of the International Court of Justice, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, in cases to which they are parties.
- To make the United Nations more effective in maintaining peace and security by giving it the resources and tools it needs for conflict prevention, peaceful resolution of disputes, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. In this context, we take note of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations¹ and request the General Assembly to consider its recommendations expeditiously.
- To strengthen cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter.
- To ensure the implementation, by States Parties, of treaties in areas such as arms control and disarmament and of international humanitarian law and human rights law, and call upon all States to consider signing and ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.²
- To take concerted action against international terrorism, and to accede as soon as possible to all the relevant international conventions.
- To redouble our efforts to implement our commitment to counter the world drug problem.
- To intensify our efforts to fight transnational crime in all its dimensions, including trafficking as well as smuggling in human beings and money laundering.
- To minimize the adverse effects of United Nations economic sanctions on innocent populations, to subject such sanctions regimes to regular reviews and to eliminate the adverse effects of sanctions on third parties.
- To strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.
- To take concerted action to end illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, especially by making arms transfers more transparent and supporting regional disarmament measures, taking account of all the recommendations of the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.
- To call on all States to consider acceding to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and

¹ A/55/305-S/2000/809; see *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifty-fifth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 2000*, document S/2000/809.

² A/CONF.183/9.

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on Their Destruction,³ as well as the amended mines protocol to the Convention on conventional weapons.⁴

10. We urge Member States to observe the Olympic Truce, individually and collectively, now and in the future, and to support the International Olympic Committee in its efforts to promote peace and human understanding through sport and the Olympic Ideal.

III. Development and poverty eradication

11. We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a billion of them are currently subjected. We are committed to making the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human race from want.
12. We resolve therefore to create an environment – at the national and global levels alike – which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty.
13. Success in meeting these objectives depends, *inter alia*, on good governance within each country. It also depends on good governance at the international level and on transparency in the financial, monetary and trading systems. We are committed to an open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading and financial system.
14. We are concerned about the obstacles developing countries face in mobilizing the resources needed to finance their sustained development. We will therefore make every effort to ensure the success of the High-level International and Intergovernmental Event on Financing for Development, to be held in 2001.
15. We also undertake to address the special needs of the least developed countries. In this context, we welcome the Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries to be held in May 2001 and will endeavour to ensure its success. We call on the industrialized countries:
 - To adopt, preferably by the time of that Conference, a policy of duty- and quota-free access for essentially all exports from the least developed countries;
 - To implement the enhanced programme of debt relief for the heavily indebted poor countries without further delay and to agree to cancel all official bilateral debts of those countries in return for their making demonstrable commitments to poverty reduction; and
 - To grant more generous development assistance, especially to countries that are genuinely making an effort to apply their resources to poverty reduction.
16. We are also determined to deal comprehensively and effectively with the debt problems of low- and middle-income developing countries, through various national and international measures designed to make their debt sustainable in the long term.

³ See CD/1478.

⁴ Amended protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices (CCW/CONF I/16 (Part I), annex B).

17. We also resolve to address the special needs of small island developing States, by implementing the Barbados Programme of Action⁵ and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly rapidly and in full. We urge the international community to ensure that, in the development of a vulnerability index, the special needs of small island developing States are taken into account.
18. We recognize the special needs and problems of the landlocked developing countries, and urge both bilateral and multilateral donors to increase financial and technical assistance to this group of countries to meet their special development needs and to help them overcome the impediments of geography by improving their transit transport systems.
19. We resolve further:
 - To halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world's people whose income is less than one dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger and, by the same date, to halve the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water.
 - To ensure that, by the same date, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling and that girls and boys will have equal access to all levels of education.
 - By the same date, to have reduced maternal mortality by three quarters, and under-five child mortality by two thirds, of their current rates.
 - To have, by then, halted, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS, the scourge of malaria and other major diseases that afflict humanity.
 - To provide special assistance to children orphaned by HIV/AIDS.
 - By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers as proposed in the "Cities Without Slums" initiative.
20. We also resolve:
 - To promote gender equality and the empowerment of women as effective ways to combat poverty, hunger and disease and to stimulate development that is truly sustainable.
 - To develop and implement strategies that give young people everywhere a real chance to find decent and productive work.
 - To encourage the pharmaceutical industry to make essential drugs more widely available and affordable by all who need them in developing countries.
 - To develop strong partnerships with the private sector and with civil society organizations in pursuit of development and poverty eradication.

⁵ Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States (*Report of the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, Bridgetown, Barbados, 23 April-6 May 1994* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.I.18 and corrigenda), chap. I, resolution I, annex II).

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- To ensure that the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communication technologies, in conformity with recommendations contained in the ECOSOC 2000 Ministerial Declaration,⁶ are available to all.

IV. Protecting our common environment

21. We must spare no effort to free all of humanity, and above all our children and grandchildren, from the threat of living on a planet irredeemably spoilt by human activities, and whose resources would no longer be sufficient for their needs.
22. We reaffirm our support for the principles of sustainable development, including those set out in Agenda 21,⁷ agreed upon at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.
23. We resolve therefore to adopt in all our environmental actions a new ethic of conservation and stewardship and, as first steps, we resolve:
 - To make every effort to ensure the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, preferably by the tenth anniversary of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 2002, and to embark on the required reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases.
 - To intensify our collective efforts for the management, conservation and sustainable development of all types of forests.
 - To press for the full implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity⁸ and the Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in Africa.⁹
 - To stop the unsustainable exploitation of water resources by developing water management strategies at the regional, national and local levels, which promote both equitable access and adequate supplies.
 - To intensify cooperation to reduce the number and effects of natural and man-made disasters.
 - To ensure free access to information on the human genome sequence.

V. Human rights, democracy and good governance

24. We will spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development.
25. We resolve therefore:

⁶ E/2000/L.9.

⁷ *Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.I.8 and corrigenda), vol. I: *Resolutions adopted by the Conference*, resolution 1, annex II.

⁸ See United Nations Environment Programme, *Convention on Biological Diversity* (Environmental Law and Institution Programme Activity Centre), June 1992.

⁹ A/49/84/Add.2, annex, appendix II.

- To respect fully and uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.¹⁰
- To strive for the full protection and promotion in all our countries of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights for all.
- To strengthen the capacity of all our countries to implement the principles and practices of democracy and respect for human rights, including minority rights.
- To combat all forms of violence against women and to implement the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.¹¹
- To take measures to ensure respect for and protection of the human rights of migrants, migrant workers and their families, to eliminate the increasing acts of racism and xenophobia in many societies and to promote greater harmony and tolerance in all societies.
- To work collectively for more inclusive political processes, allowing genuine participation by all citizens in all our countries.
- To ensure the freedom of the media to perform their essential role and the right of the public to have access to information.

VI. Protecting the vulnerable

26. We will spare no effort to ensure that children and all civilian populations that suffer disproportionately the consequences of natural disasters, genocide, armed conflicts and other humanitarian emergencies are given every assistance and protection so that they can resume normal life as soon as possible.

We resolve therefore:

- To expand and strengthen the protection of civilians in complex emergencies, in conformity with international humanitarian law.
- To strengthen international cooperation, including burden sharing in, and the coordination of humanitarian assistance to, countries hosting refugees and to help all refugees and displaced persons to return voluntarily to their homes, in safety and dignity and to be smoothly reintegrated into their societies.
- To encourage the ratification and full implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child¹² and its optional protocols on the involvement of children in armed conflict and on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.¹³

VII. Meeting the special needs of Africa

27. We will support the consolidation of democracy in Africa and assist Africans in their struggle for lasting peace, poverty eradication and sustainable development, thereby bringing Africa into the mainstream of the world economy.

¹⁰ Resolution 217 A (III).

¹¹ Resolution 34/180, annex.

¹² Resolution 44/25, annex.

¹³ Resolution 54/263, annexes I and II.

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28. We resolve therefore:

- To give full support to the political and institutional structures of emerging democracies in Africa.
- To encourage and sustain regional and subregional mechanisms for preventing conflict and promoting political stability, and to ensure a reliable flow of resources for peacekeeping operations on the continent.
- To take special measures to address the challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable development in Africa, including debt cancellation, improved market access, enhanced Official Development Assistance and increased flows of Foreign Direct Investment, as well as transfers of technology.
- To help Africa build up its capacity to tackle the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other infectious diseases.

VIII. Strengthening the United Nations

29. We will spare no effort to make the United Nations a more effective instrument for pursuing all of these priorities: the fight for development for all the peoples of the world, the fight against poverty, ignorance and disease; the fight against injustice; the fight against violence, terror and crime; and the fight against the degradation and destruction of our common home.

30. We resolve therefore:

- To reaffirm the central position of the General Assembly as the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations, and to enable it to play that role effectively.
- To intensify our efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects.
- To strengthen further the Economic and Social Council, building on its recent achievements, to help it fulfil the role ascribed to it in the Charter.
- To strengthen the International Court of Justice, in order to ensure justice and the rule of law in international affairs.
- To encourage regular consultations and coordination among the principal organs of the United Nations in pursuit of their functions.
- To ensure that the Organization is provided on a timely and predictable basis with the resources it needs to carry out its mandates.
- To urge the Secretariat to make the best use of those resources, in accordance with clear rules and procedures agreed by the General Assembly, in the interests of all Member States, by adopting the best management practices and technologies available and by concentrating on those tasks that reflect the agreed priorities of Member States.
- To promote adherence to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.¹⁴

¹⁴ Resolution 49/59, annex.

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- To ensure greater policy coherence and better cooperation between the United Nations, its agencies, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Trade Organization, as well as other multilateral bodies, with a view to achieving a fully coordinated approach to the problems of peace and development.
 - To strengthen further cooperation between the United Nations and national parliaments through their world organization, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, in various fields, including peace and security, economic and social development, international law and human rights and democracy and gender issues.
 - To give greater opportunities to the private sector, non-governmental organizations and civil society, in general, to contribute to the realization of the Organization's goals and programmes.
31. We request the General Assembly to review on a regular basis the progress made in implementing the provisions of this Declaration, and ask the Secretary-General to issue periodic reports for consideration by the General Assembly and as a basis for further action.
32. We solemnly reaffirm, on this historic occasion, that the United Nations is the indispensable common house of the entire human family, through which we will seek to realize our universal aspirations for peace, cooperation and development. We therefore pledge our unstinting support for these common objectives and our determination to achieve them.

*8th plenary meeting
8 September 2000*

Source: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions?y=2000>

Part 3.

On the Path to a Sustainable Multipolar World Order (Yalta World – 2)

3.1. The Destruction Of The Yalta World

3.2. Dialogue Among Civilizations

**3.3. LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS OF A SUSTAINABLE MULTIPOLAR
WORLD ORDER**

3.4. The Scientific Platform for the Formation of Yalta World – 2

56/6. Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations. November 9, 2001 года

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 53/22 of 4 November 1998, 54/113 of 10 December 1999 and 55/23 of 13 November 2000 entitled “United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations”,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, which are, *inter alia*, to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace, and to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

Underlining that all Members have undertaken to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Reaffirming their commitment to the fulfilment of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights/1 as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations and as a source of inspiration for the further promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms – political, social, economic, civil and cultural – including the right to development,

Underlining that all civilizations celebrate the unity and diversity of humankind and are enriched and have evolved through dialogue with other civilizations and that, despite obstacles of intolerance and aggression, there has been constructive interaction throughout history among various civilizations,

Emphasizing that a common humanity unites all civilizations and allows for the celebration of the variegated splendour of the highest attainments of this civilizational diversity, and reaffirming that the civilizational achievements constitute the collective heritage of humankind,

Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration of 8 September 2000,/2 which considers, *inter alia*, that tolerance is one of the fundamental values essential to international relations in the twenty-first century and should include the active promotion of a culture of peace and dialogue among civilizations, with human beings respecting one another, in all their diversity of belief, culture and language, neither fearing nor repressing differences within and between societies but cherishing them as a precious asset of humanity,

Noting that globalization brings greater interrelatedness among people and increased interaction among cultures and civilizations, and encouraged by the fact that the celebration of the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, has underscored that globalization is not only an economic, financial and technological process which could offer great benefit but that it also presents the challenge of preserving and celebrating the rich intellectual and cultural diversity of humankind and of civilization,

Bearing in mind the valuable contribution that dialogue among civilizations can make to an improved awareness and understanding of the common values shared by all humankind,

Recognizing that human rights and fundamental freedoms derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person and are thus universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated, and that the human person is the central subject of human rights and fundamental freedoms and, consequently, should be the principal beneficiary and should participate actively in the realization of these rights and freedoms,

Reaffirming that all peoples have the right of self-determination, by virtue of which they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development,

Emphasizing that promotion and protection of freedom of opinion and expression and a collective commitment to listen to and learn from each other and to respect cultural heritage and diversity are essential for dialogue, progress and human advancement,

Underlining the fact that tolerance and respect for diversity and universal promotion and protection of human rights are mutually supportive, and recognizing that tolerance and respect for diversity effectively promote and are supported by, inter alia, the empowerment of women,

Recalling its resolution 55/254 of 31 May 2001, which calls upon all States to exert their utmost efforts to ensure that religious sites are fully respected and protected,

Emphasizing the need to acknowledge and respect the richness of all civilizations and to seek common ground among civilizations in order to address comprehensively common challenges facing humanity,

Welcoming the endeavours of Governments, international organizations, civil society organizations and countless individuals to enhance understanding through constructive dialogue among civilizations,

Welcoming also the efforts of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations and of the Group of Eminent Persons established by the Secretary-General,

Expressing its firm determination to facilitate and promote dialogue among civilizations,
Proclaims the Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations:

A. Objectives, principles and participants

Article 1

Dialogue among civilizations is a process between and within civilizations, founded on inclusion, and a collective desire to learn, uncover and examine assumptions, unfold shared meaning and core values and integrate multiple perspectives through dialogue.

Article 2

Dialogue among civilizations constitutes a process to attain, inter alia, the following objectives:

Promotion of inclusion, equity, equality, justice and tolerance in human interactions;

Enhancement of mutual understanding and respect through interaction among civilizations;

Mutual enrichment and advancement of knowledge and appreciation of the richness and wisdom found in all civilizations;

Identification and promotion of common ground among civilizations in order to address common challenges threatening shared values, universal human rights and achievements of human society in various fields;

Promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and enrichment of common understanding of human rights;

Development of a better understanding of common ethical standards and universal human values;

Enhancement of respect for cultural diversity and cultural heritage.

Article 3

Pursuit of the above-mentioned objectives will be enhanced by collective commitment to the following principles:

Faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small;

Fulfilment in good faith of the obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

Respect for fundamental principles of justice and international law;

Recognition of diversified sources of knowledge and cultural diversity as fundamental features of human society and as indispensable and cherished assets for the advancement and material and spiritual welfare of humanity at large;

Recognition of the right of members of all civilizations to preserve and develop their cultural heritage within their own societies;

Commitment to inclusion, cooperation and the search for understanding as the mechanisms for the promotion of common values;

Enhancement of participation by all individuals, peoples and nations in local, national and international decision-making processes.

Article 4

Dialogue among civilizations provides important contributions to progress in the following areas:

Promotion of confidence-building at local, national, regional and international levels;

Enhancing mutual understanding and knowledge among different social groups, cultures and civilizations in various areas, including culture, religion, education, information, science and technology;

Addressing threats to peace and security;

Promotion and protection of human rights;

Elaboration of common ethical standards.

Article 5

Participation in dialogue among civilizations shall be global in scope and shall be open to all, including:

People from all civilizations;

Scholars, thinkers, intellectuals, writers, scientists, people of arts, culture and media and the youth, who play an instrumental role in initiation and sustainment of dialogue among civilizations;

Individuals from civil society and representatives of non-governmental organizations, as instrumental partners in promoting dialogue among civilizations.

Article 6

Governments shall promote, encourage and facilitate dialogue among civilizations.

Article 7

Regional and international organizations should take appropriate steps and initiatives to promote, facilitate and sustain dialogue among civilizations.

Article 8

The media has an indispensable and instrumental role in the promotion of dialogue among civilizations and in the fostering of greater understanding among various civilizations and cultures.

Article 9

The United Nations should continue to promote and strengthen the culture of dialogue among civilizations.

B. Programme of Action

1. States, the United Nations system and other international and regional organizations and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, are invited to consider the following as a means of promoting dialogue among civilizations in all domains, within existing resources and also drawing upon voluntary contributions:

Facilitating and encouraging interaction and exchange among all individuals, inter alia, intellectuals, thinkers and artists of various societies and civilizations;

Promoting of mutual visits and meetings of experts in various fields from different civilizations, cultures and backgrounds, which provide an opportunity for discovering commonalities among various civilizations and cultures;

Exchange of visits among representatives of the arts and culture and the organization of cultural festivals through which people will have a chance of getting acquainted with other cultures;

Sponsorship of conferences, symposiums and workshops to enhance mutual understanding, tolerance and dialogue among civilizations;

Planning sports competitions, Olympiads and scientific competitions, with a view to encouraging positive interaction among youth from different backgrounds and cultures;

Reinvigorating and encouraging translation and dissemination of basic manuscripts and books and studies representing different cultures and civilizations;

Promotion of historical and cultural tourism;

Incorporation of programmes to study various cultures and civilizations in educational curricula, including the teaching of languages, history and socio-political thoughts of various civilizations, as well as the exchange of knowledge, information and scholarship among academia;

Advancement of research and scholarship to achieve an objective understanding of the characteristics of each civilization and the differences, as well as ways and means to enhance constructive interaction and understanding among them;

Utilization of communication technologies, including audio, video, printed press, multimedia and the Internet, to disseminate the message of dialogue and understanding throughout the globe and depict and publicize historical instances of constructive interaction among different civilizations;

Provision of equitable opportunities for participation in the dissemination of information, with a view to achieving an objective understanding of all civilizations and enhancing constructive interaction and cooperative engagement among civilizations;

Implementation of programmes to enhance the spirit of dialogue, understanding and rejection of intolerance, violence and racism among people, particularly the youth;

Utilizing the existence of migrants in various societies in bridging the gap of understanding between cultures;

Consultation to articulate effective mechanisms to protect the rights of all people to maintain their cultural identity, while facilitating their integration into their social environment.

2. States should encourage and support initiatives taken by civil society and non-governmental organizations for the promotion of dialogue among civilizations.

3. States, international and regional organizations and civil society, including non-governmental organizations, are invited to develop appropriate ways and means at the local, national, regional and international levels to further promote dialogue and mutual understanding among civilizations, and to report their activities to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

4. Governments, funding institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector are invited to mobilize the necessary resources to promote dialogue among civilizations, including by contributing to the Trust Fund established by the Secretary-General in 1999 for that purpose.

5. The United Nations system, including, in particular, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, are invited to continue to encourage and facilitate dialogue among civilizations and formulate ways and means to promote dialogue among civilizations in the activities of the United Nations in various fields.

6. The Secretary-General is requested to report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session on the implementation of this Global Agenda and Programme of Action.

43rd plenary meeting
9 November 2001

/1 Resolution 217 A (III).
/2 See resolution 55/2.

Source: <http://www.un-documents.net/a56r6.htm>

UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. November 2, 2001

The General Conference,

Committed to the full implementation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other universally recognized legal instruments, such as the two International Covenants of 1966 relating respectively to civil and political rights and to economic, social and cultural rights,

Recalling that the Preamble to the Constitution of UNESCO affirms “that the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man

and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern”,

Further recalling Article I of the Constitution, which assigns to UNESCO among other purposes that of recommending “such international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image”,

Referring to the provisions relating to cultural diversity and the exercise of cultural rights in the international instruments enacted by UNESCO,(1)

Reaffirming that culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs, (2)

Noting that culture is at the heart of contemporary debates about identity, social cohesion, and the development of a knowledge-based economy,

Affirming that respect for the diversity of cultures, tolerance, dialogue and cooperation, in a climate of mutual trust and understanding are among the best guarantees of international peace and security,

Aspiring to greater solidarity on the basis of recognition of cultural diversity, of awareness of the unity of humankind, and of the development of intercultural exchanges,

Considering that the process of globalization, facilitated by the rapid development of new information and communication technologies, though representing a challenge for cultural diversity, creates the conditions for renewed dialogue among cultures and civilizations,

Aware of the specific mandate which has been entrusted to UNESCO, within the United Nations system, to ensure the preservation and promotion of the fruitful diversity of cultures,

Proclaims the following principles and adopts the present Declaration:

IDENTITY, DIVERSITY AND PLURALISM

Article 1 – Cultural diversity: the common heritage of humanity

Culture takes diverse forms across time and space. This diversity is embodied in the uniqueness and plurality of the identities of the groups and societies making up humankind. As a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature. In this sense, it is the common heritage of humanity and should be recognized and affirmed for the benefit of present and future generations.

Article 2 – From cultural diversity to cultural pluralism

In our increasingly diverse societies, it is essential to ensure harmonious interaction among people and groups with plural, varied and dynamic cultural identities as well as their willingness to live together. Policies for the inclusion and participation of all citizens are guarantees of social cohesion,

the vitality of civil society and peace. Thus defined, cultural pluralism gives policy expression to the reality of cultural diversity. Indissociable from a democratic framework, cultural pluralism is conducive to cultural exchange and to the flourishing of creative capacities that sustain public life.

Article 3 – Cultural diversity as a factor in development

Cultural diversity widens the range of options open to everyone; it is one of the roots of development, understood not simply in terms of economic growth, but also as a means to achieve a more satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual existence.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Article 4 – Human rights as guarantees of cultural diversity

The defence of cultural diversity is an ethical imperative, inseparable from respect for human dignity. It implies a commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular the rights of persons belonging to minorities and those of indigenous peoples. No one may invoke cultural diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor to limit their scope.

Article 5 – Cultural rights as an enabling environment for cultural diversity

Cultural rights are an integral part of human rights, which are universal, indivisible and interdependent. The flourishing of creative diversity requires the full implementation of cultural rights as defined in Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in Articles 13 and 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. All persons have therefore the right to express themselves and to create and disseminate their work in the language of their choice, and particularly in their mother tongue; all persons are entitled to quality education and training that fully respect their cultural identity; and all persons have the right to participate in the cultural life of their choice and conduct their own cultural practices, subject to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Article 6 – Towards access for all to cultural diversity

While ensuring the free flow of ideas by word and image care should be exercised so that all cultures can express themselves and make themselves known. Freedom of expression, media pluralism, multilingualism, equal access to art and to scientific and technological knowledge, including in digital form, and the possibility for all cultures to have access to the means of expression and dissemination are the guarantees of cultural diversity.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND CREATIVITY

Article 7 – Cultural heritage as the wellspring of creativity

Creation draws on the roots of cultural tradition, but flourishes in contact with other cultures. For this reason, heritage in all its forms must be preserved, enhanced and handed on to future generations as a record of human experience and aspirations, so as to foster creativity in all its diversity and to inspire genuine dialogue among cultures.

Article 8 – Cultural goods and services: commodities of a unique kind

In the face of present-day economic and technological change, opening up vast prospects for creation and innovation, particular attention must be paid to the diversity of the supply of creative work, to due recognition of the rights of authors and artists and to the specificity of cultural goods and services which, as vectors of identity, values and meaning, must not be treated as mere commodities or consumer goods.

Article 9 – Cultural policies as catalysts of creativity

While ensuring the free circulation of ideas and works, cultural policies must create conditions conducive to the production and dissemination of diversified cultural goods and services through cul-

tural industries that have the means to assert themselves at the local and global level. It is for each State, with due regard to its international obligations, to define its cultural policy and to implement it through the means it considers fit, whether by operational support or appropriate regulations.

CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY

Article 10 – Strengthening capacities for creation and dissemination worldwide

In the face of current imbalances in flows and exchanges of cultural goods at the global level, it is necessary to reinforce international cooperation and solidarity aimed at enabling all countries, especially developing countries and countries in transition, to establish cultural industries that are viable and competitive at national and international level.

Article 11 – Building partnerships between the public sector, the private sector and civil society

Market forces alone cannot guarantee the preservation and promotion of cultural diversity, which is the key to sustainable human development. From this perspective, the pre-eminence of public policy, in partnership with the private sector and civil society, must be reaffirmed.

Article 12 – The role of UNESCO

UNESCO, by virtue of its mandate and functions, has the responsibility to:

- (a) promote the incorporation of the principles set out in the present Declaration into the development strategies drawn up within the various intergovernmental bodies;
- (b) serve as a reference point and a forum where States, international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, civil society and the private sector may join together in elaborating concepts, objectives and policies in favour of cultural diversity;
- (c) pursue its activities in standard-setting, awareness raising and capacity-building in the areas related to the present Declaration within its fields of competence;
- (d) facilitate the implementation of the Action Plan, the main lines of which are appended to the present Declaration.

(1) Including, in particular, the Florence Agreement of 1950 and its Nairobi Protocol of 1976, the Universal Copyright Convention of 1952, the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation of 1966, the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of 1970, the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of 1972, the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice of 1978, the Recommendation concerning the Status of the Artist of 1980, and the Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore of 1989.

(2) This definition is in line with the conclusions of the World Conference on Cultural Policies (MONDIACULT, Mexico City, 1982), of the World Commission on Culture and Development Our Creative Diversity, 1995), and of the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development (Stockholm, 1998)

Annex II Main lines of an action plan for the implementation of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity

The Member States commit themselves to taking appropriate steps to disseminate widely the “UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity” and to encourage its effective application, in particular by cooperating with a view to achieving the following objectives:

1. Deepening the international debate on questions relating to cultural diversity, particularly in respect of its links with development and its impact on policy-making, at both national and international level; taking forward notably consideration of the advisability of an international legal instrument on cultural diversity.

2. Advancing in the definition of principles, standards and practices, on both the national and the international levels, as well as of awareness-raising modalities and patterns of cooperation, that are most conducive to the safeguarding and promotion of cultural diversity.

3. Fostering the exchange of knowledge and best practices in regard to cultural pluralism with a view to facilitating, in diversified societies, the inclusion and participation of persons and groups from varied cultural backgrounds.

4. Making further headway in understanding and clarifying the content of cultural rights as an integral part of human rights.

5. Safeguarding the linguistic heritage of humanity and giving support to expression, creation and dissemination in the greatest possible number of languages.

6. Encouraging linguistic diversity – while respecting the mother tongue – at all levels of education, wherever possible, and fostering the learning of several languages from the earliest age.

7. Promoting through education an awareness of the positive value of cultural diversity and improving to this end both curriculum design and teacher education.

8. Incorporating, where appropriate, traditional pedagogies into the education process with a view to preserving and making full use of culturally appropriate methods of communication and transmission of knowledge.

9. Encouraging “digital literacy” and ensuring greater mastery of the new information and communication technologies, which should be seen both as educational disciplines and as pedagogical tools capable of enhancing the effectiveness of educational services.

10. Promoting linguistic diversity in cyberspace and encouraging universal access through the global network to all information in the public domain.

11. Countering the digital divide, in close cooperation in relevant United Nations system organizations, by fostering access by the developing countries to the new technologies, by helping them to master information technologies and by facilitating the digital dissemination of endogenous cultural products and access by those

countries to the educational, cultural and scientific digital resources available worldwide.

12. Encouraging the production, safeguarding and dissemination of diversified contents in the media and global information networks and, to that end, promoting the role of public radio and television services in the development of audiovisual productions of good quality, in particular by fostering the establishment of cooperative mechanisms to facilitate their distribution.

13. Formulating policies and strategies for the preservation and enhancement of the cultural and natural heritage, notably the oral and intangible cultural heritage, and combating illicit traffic in cultural goods and services.

14. Respecting and protecting traditional knowledge, in particular that of indigenous peoples; recognizing the contribution of traditional knowledge, particularly with regard to environmental protection and the management

of natural resources, and fostering synergies between modern science and local knowledge.

15. Fostering the mobility of creators, artists, researchers, scientists and intellectuals and the development of international research programmes and partnerships, while striving to preserve and enhance the creative capacity of developing countries and countries in transition.

16. Ensuring protection of copyright and related rights in the interest of the development of contemporary creativity and fair remuneration for creative work, while at the same time upholding a public right of access to culture, in accordance with Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

17. Assisting in the emergence or consolidation of cultural industries in the developing countries and countries in transition and, to this end, cooperating in the development of the necessary in-

frastructures and skills, fostering the emergence of viable local markets, and facilitating access for the cultural products of those countries to the global market and international distribution networks.

18. Developing cultural policies, including operational support arrangements and/or appropriate regulatory frameworks, designed to promote the principles enshrined in this Declaration, in accordance with the international obligations incumbent upon each State.

19. Involving the various sections of civil society closely in the framing of public policies aimed at safeguarding and promoting cultural diversity.

20. Recognizing and encouraging the contribution that the private sector can make to enhancing cultural diversity and facilitating, to that end, the establishment of forums for dialogue between the public sector and the private sector.

The Member States recommend that the Director- General take the objectives set forth in this Action Plan into account in the implementation of UNESCO's programmes and communicate it to institutions of the United Nations system and to other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned with a view to enhancing the synergy of actions in favour of cultural diversity.

Source: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13179&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

General assembly resolution. International cooperation on humanitarian assistance in the field of natural disasters, from relief to development. March 3, 2003

United Nations

A/RES/59/212



General Assembly

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Fifty-ninth session
Agenda item 39 (a)

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly

[without reference to a Main Committee (A/59/L.26/Rev.1 and Add.1)]

59/212. International cooperation on humanitarian assistance in the field of natural disasters, from relief to development

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991, the annex to which contains the guiding principles for the strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations system, as well as all its resolutions on international cooperation on humanitarian assistance in the field of natural disasters, from relief to development, and recalling the resolutions of the humanitarian segments of the substantive sessions of the Economic and Social Council,

Recognizing the importance of the principles of neutrality, humanity and impartiality for the provision of humanitarian assistance,

Emphasizing that the affected State has the primary responsibility in the initiation, organization, coordination and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory and in the facilitation of the work of humanitarian organizations in mitigating the consequences of natural disasters,

Emphasizing also the importance of integrating risk reduction into all phases of disaster management, development planning and post-disaster recovery,

Emphasizing further, in this context, the important role of development organizations in supporting national efforts to mitigate the consequences of natural disasters,

Emphasizing the responsibility of all States to undertake disaster preparedness, response and mitigation efforts in order to minimize the impact of natural disasters, while recognizing the importance of international cooperation in support of the efforts of affected countries which may have limited capacities to fulfil this requirement,

Welcoming the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction,

Stressing that national authorities need to enhance the resilience of populations to disasters through, inter alia, implementation of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction so as to reduce risks to people, their livelihoods, the social and economic infrastructure and environmental resources,

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Taking into account the outcome of the Second International Conference on Early Warning, held in Bonn, Germany, from 16 to 18 October 2003, under the auspices of the United Nations,

Welcoming the efforts undertaken in preparation for the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, to be held in Kobe, Japan, from 18 to 22 January 2005, and underlining the importance of this conference in the promotion of new efforts in the field of disaster risk reduction,

Noting the critical role played by local resources, as well as by existing in-country capacities, in natural disaster response and risk management,

Recognizing the significant role played by national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, as part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in disaster preparedness and risk reduction, disaster response, rehabilitation and development,

Emphasizing the importance of raising awareness among developing countries of the capacities existing at the national, regional and international levels that could be deployed to assist them,

Noting the lack of progress made in finalizing the establishment of the Directory of Advanced Technologies for Disaster Response as a new part of the Central Register of Disaster Management Capacities¹ as requested in its resolution 58/25 of 5 December 2003,

Emphasizing the importance of international cooperation in support of the efforts of the affected States in dealing with natural disasters in all their phases, including prevention, preparedness, mitigation and recovery and reconstruction, and of strengthening the response capacity of affected countries,

Recognizing that efforts to achieve economic growth, sustainable development and internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals, can be adversely affected by natural disasters, and noting the positive contribution that those efforts can make in strengthening the resilience of populations to such disasters,

Welcoming the efforts of Member States, with facilitation by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat and in cooperation with the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group, to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of international urban search and rescue assistance, and, in this context noting its resolution 57/150 of 16 December 2002 entitled "Strengthening the effectiveness and coordination of international urban search and rescue assistance",

Encouraging, in this regard, efforts aimed at strengthening the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group and its regional groups, particularly through the participation in their activities of representatives of a larger number of countries,

Mindful of the effects that shortfalls in resources can have on the preparedness for and response to natural disasters, and underscoring, in this regard, the need to gain a more precise understanding of the impact of levels of funding on natural disaster response,

¹ Available from <http://ocha.unog.ch/cr/>.

Underlining the need for further improvement in information and analyses available regarding needs, responses and funding related to natural disasters,

1. *Takes note* of the reports of the Secretary-General entitled "International cooperation on humanitarian assistance in the field of natural disasters, from relief to development"² and "Strengthening the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations",³

2. *Expresses its deep concern* at the high number and the scale of natural disasters and their increasing impact, resulting in massive losses of life and property worldwide, in particular in vulnerable societies lacking adequate capacity to mitigate effectively the long-term negative social, economic and environmental consequences of natural disasters;

3. *Calls upon* all States to adopt, where required, and to continue to implement effectively necessary legislative and other appropriate measures to mitigate the effects of natural disasters and integrate disaster risk reduction strategies into development planning, inter alia, by disaster prevention, including appropriate land-use and building regulations, as well as disaster preparedness and capacity-building in disaster response and mitigation, and requests the international community to continue to assist developing countries as well as countries with economies in transition, bearing in mind their vulnerability to natural hazards, in this regard;

4. *Stresses*, in this context, the importance of strengthening international cooperation, particularly through the effective use of multilateral mechanisms, in the provision of humanitarian assistance through all phases of a disaster, from relief and mitigation to development, including the provision of adequate resources;

5. *Also stresses* that humanitarian assistance for natural disasters should be provided in accordance with and with due respect for the guiding principles contained in the annex to resolution 46/182 and should be determined on the basis of the human dimension and needs arising out of the particular natural disasters;

6. *Recognizes* that economic growth and sustainable development contribute to improving the capacity of States to mitigate, respond to and prepare for natural disasters;

7. *Reaffirms* that disaster risk analysis and vulnerability reduction form an integral part of humanitarian assistance, poverty eradication and sustainable development strategies and need to be considered in the development plans of all vulnerable countries and communities, including, where appropriate, in plans relating to post-disaster recovery and the transition from relief to development, and affirms that within such preventive strategies, disaster preparedness and early warning systems must be further strengthened at the country and regional levels, inter alia, through better coordination among relevant United Nations bodies and cooperation with Governments of affected countries and regional and other relevant organizations with the aim of maximizing the effectiveness of natural disaster response and reducing the impact of natural disasters, particularly in developing countries;

² A/59/374.

³ A/59/93-E/2004/74.

A/RES/59/212

8. *Emphasizes* the importance of the outcome of the Twenty-eighth International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, held in Geneva from 2 to 6 December 2003;

9. *Also emphasizes* the importance of enhanced international cooperation, including through the United Nations and regional organizations, to assist developing countries in their efforts to build local and national capacities and to effectively and efficiently predict, prepare for and respond to natural disasters;

10. *Stresses* the need for partnerships among Governments, organizations of the United Nations system, relevant humanitarian organizations and specialized companies to promote training to strengthen preparedness for and response to natural disasters;

11. *Calls upon* States, the United Nations and other relevant actors, as appropriate, to assist in addressing knowledge gaps in disaster management and risk reduction by identifying ways of improving systems and networks for the collection and analysis of information on disasters, vulnerability and risk to facilitate informed decision-making;

12. *Stresses* the need to promote the access to and transfer of technology and knowledge related to early warning systems and to mitigation programmes to developing countries affected by natural disasters;

13. *Encourages* the further use of space-based and ground-based remote-sensing technologies for the prevention, mitigation and management of natural disasters, where appropriate;

14. *Also encourages* in such operations the sharing of geographical data, including remotely sensed images and geographic information system and global positioning system data, among Governments, space agencies and relevant international humanitarian and development organizations, as appropriate, and notes in that context initiatives such as those undertaken by the International Charter on Space and Major Disasters and the Global Disaster Information Network;

15. *Stresses* that particular international cooperation efforts should be undertaken to enhance and broaden further the utilization of national and local capacities, including within the framework of the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group, and, where appropriate, of regional and subregional capacities of developing countries for disaster preparedness and response, which may be made available in closer proximity to the site of a disaster, more efficiently and at lower cost;

16. *Recognizes*, in this regard, that the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination system continues to be a valuable tool by which disaster management expertise is made available by Member States to respond to the sudden onset of emergencies;

17. *Urges* Member States, with the support of relevant bodies of the United Nations system, to strengthen efforts to identify practical ways to channel resources to and strengthen support for national disaster management capacities in disaster-prone countries;

18. *Welcomes* the role of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat as the focal point within the overall United Nations system for the promotion and coordination of disaster responses among United Nations humanitarian agencies and other humanitarian partners;

19. *Takes note with interest* of the initiatives taken by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme for the establishment of regional positions of disaster response advisers and disaster reduction advisers to assist developing countries in capacity-building for disaster prevention, preparedness, mitigation and response in a coordinated and complementary manner;

20. *Encourages* further cooperation between the United Nations system and regional organizations in order to increase the capacity of these organizations to respond to natural disasters;

21. *Encourages* States that have not acceded to or ratified the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations, adopted at Tampere, Finland, on 18 June 1998, to consider doing so;

22. *Reiterates its request* that the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the relevant organizations and partners, finalize the establishment of, and then update periodically, the Directory of Advanced Technologies for Disaster Response as a new part of the Central Register of Disaster Management Capacities;¹

23. *Encourages* donors to consider the importance of ensuring that assistance in the case of higher-profile natural disasters does not come at the expense of those that may have a relatively lower profile, bearing in mind that the allocation of resources should be driven by needs, as well as the importance of making efforts to increase the level of assistance for disaster reduction and preparedness programmes and for disaster response and mitigation activities;

24. *Requests* the Secretary-General to examine ways to further improve the assessment of needs and responses and to enhance the availability of data regarding funding in response to natural disasters and to consider concrete recommendations to improve the international response to natural disasters, as necessary, based on his examination, keeping in mind also the need to address any geographical and sectoral imbalances and shortfalls in such responses, where they exist, as well as the more effective use of national emergency response agencies, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session.

*74th plenary meeting
20 December 2004*

The Future of Civilizations and a Strategy of Civilizational Partnership. October 27, 2009



The Future of Civilizations and a Strategy of Civilizational Partnership

Recommendations of the roundtable within the 64th session of the
General Assembly of the United Nations
New York, UN headquarters, 27 October 2009

The participants of the roundtable within the 64th session of the UN General Assembly "The Future of Civilizations and a Strategy of Civilizational Partnership" arranged by the Pitirim Sorokin — Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute (Russia) and National Science and Technology Holding "Parasat" (Kazakhstan) under support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, Permanent Mission of the Republic Kazakhstan to the UN discussed the summary part of the Global forecast for 2050 "The Future of Civilizations and a Strategy of Civilizational Partnership" elaborated by scientists of Russia and Kazakhstan with the involvement of scientists from other UN member countries, heard the greeting of the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the UN Byrgan Aitimova, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs Sha Zukang, the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United States Erlan Idrisov, reports of the President of

the Pitirim Sorokin — Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute Yuri Yakovets, Chairman of the Board of National Science and Technology Complex "Parasat" Nuraly Bekturganov, Director of the Institute for Economic Strategies Boris Kuzyk, Chairman of the Council for the Study of Production Forces Alexander Granberg, speech of Professor of the Russian Academy of Public Service under the RF President Anatoly Spitsyn, President of the International Futures Studies Academy Alexander Ageev, Professor of the Beirut University Suheil Farah, Associate Professor of the Dnipropetrovsk University of Economics and Law Dmitry Chistilin, reviewed the book of Nursultan Nazarbaev "The Strategy of a Drastic Renewal of the Global Community and Partnership of Civilizations", monograph of Boris Kuzyk and Yuri Yakovets "The Prospects for the Establishment of the Integral Civilization" and other academic publications in regard to the subject-matter of the roundtable session and arrived at the following conclusions and recommendations.

1. The depth and scale of crises and transformations in the present-day world in the early 21st century requires, along with short- and medium-term steps proposed by G-20, G-8 and UN Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development, the formulation of a long-term strategy based on partnership of civilizations and states for an efficient response to new challenges threatening the future of humanity.

Such strategy should be based on a long-term scientific forecast disclosing the scenarios of economic, socio-demographic, technological, economic, geopolitical and socio-cultural development of civilizations and states.

The roundtable session participants note that the specialized agencies have worked out long-term global demographic, ecological and food forecasts for 2050 and second the proposals to renew the activities on long-term forecasting and strategic planning within the UN and UNESCO conducted in 1950–1970s and the establishment of the Global Academic Council under the UNESCO for long-term forecasting to coordinate such efforts.

2. The roundtable session participants welcome the initiative of the Russian and Kazakhstan scientists who with the involvement of other scientists from the UN member countries and powered by the administration of Russia and Kazakhstan have worked out the Global Forecast "Future of Civilizations" for 2050, and also recommendations for a long-term strategy of partnership of civilizations, note a high scientific level of the forecast built on the original methodology for integral forecasting, versatility of the coverage of the outlooks for the energy-ecological, socio-demographic, innovative-technological, economic, geopolitical and socio-cultural development of the world, local civilizations and leading countries, practical significance of recommendations for a long-term strategy of partnership of civilizations and enhancement of the UN role.

The session participants recommend the roundtable session organizers placing in the Internet and submitting to the UN members the outputs of the forecast and proceedings of the roundtable session.

3. The roundtable session participants endorse the recommendations for formulating, based on the forecast, a draft long-term strategy for partnership of civilizations by the High Level Group to be discussed at the UN General Assembly ses-

sion in 2011 and World Summit on Sustainable Development "Rio 20" in 2012 and proposals to hold the Global Energy-Ecological Forum for the formulation of a long-term strategy of energy-ecological partnership of civilizations in 2011 with a further presentation at the World Summit "Rio 20" in 2012.

4. Noting the need for long-term efforts to implement the partnership strategies of civilizations targeted at the carrying out of the global and national programs, the roundtable session participants apply to the management of the UN General Assembly with a proposal to proclaim the years 2011–2020 the Decade of Partnership of Civilizations focusing the efforts of the global community on specific lines and results of partnership of civilizations in this or that area in each year.

5. The session participants support the proposals:

- To enhance the UNESCO role in uniting the efforts of scientists in regular formulation, update and extension of long-term global proposals and the UNDP role in coordination of activities to formulate and implement long-term strategies and global programs on the nodal issues of the implementation of the long-term strategy;

- To establish along with the Global Environment Facility, the Global Socio-Cultural Facility under the aegis of UNESCO and the Global Technology Facility under the aegis of UNDP to finance global programs and major projects, and also to support countries and civilizations lack-

ing of adequate own resources to modernize economy, assimilate high and energy efficiency, environmentally clean technologies, training of highly skilled human resources, and also financing the activities on drawing up global forecasts, strategies and programs;

- To work out, based on partnership of civilizations, the global project to construct the Poly Transport Link Eurasia-America with the tunnel via the Bering Strait and recommend to examine the option to implement such project to the countries concerned;

- To expand the study of the theory, history, dialogue and the future of civilizations at the leading Universities of countries under coordination of the Global Innovation Internet-University, based on the textbook drawn up by the Russian scientists, and also to develop civilizational tourism as a mass form of dialogue among civilizations that meets the action plan of the UN resolution dated 09.11.2001 "Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations".

6. The roundtable session participants favor the proposals of Columbia University and Pitirim Sorokin — Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute to hold in September 2010 within the 65th UN General Assembly session the Global Civilization Forum "Future of Civilizations: Degradation or Revival Based on Partnership" so that to elaborate the scientific foundations for a global partnership strategy of civilizations in preparation for the World Summit "Rio 20".

Putin's speech at the Munich conference. February 10, 2007

Vladimir Putin: Thank you very much dear Madam Federal Chancellor, Mr Teltschik, ladies and gentlemen!

I am truly grateful to be invited to such a representative conference that has assembled politicians, military officials, entrepreneurs and experts from more than 40 nations.

This conference's structure allows me to avoid excessive politeness and the need to speak in round-about, pleasant but empty diplomatic terms. This conference's format will allow me to say what I really think about international security problems. And if my comments seem unduly polemical, pointed or inexact to our colleagues, then I would ask you not to get angry with me. After all, this is only a conference. And I hope that after the first two or three minutes of my speech Mr Teltschik will not turn on the red light over there.

Therefore. It is well known that international security comprises much more than issues relating to military and political stability. It involves the stability of the global economy, overcoming poverty, economic security and developing a dialogue between civilisations.

This universal, indivisible character of security is expressed as the basic principle that "security for one is security for all". As Franklin D. Roosevelt said during the first few days that the Second World War was breaking out: "When peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger."

These words remain topical today. Incidentally, the theme of our conference – global crises, global responsibility – exemplifies this.

Only two decades ago the world was ideologically and economically divided and it was the huge strategic potential of two superpowers that ensured global security.

This global stand-off pushed the sharpest economic and social problems to the margins of the international community's and the world's agenda. And, just like any war, the Cold War left us with live ammunition, figuratively speaking. I am referring to ideological stereotypes, double standards and other typical aspects of Cold War bloc thinking.

The unipolar world that had been proposed after the Cold War did not take place either.

The history of humanity certainly has gone through unipolar periods and seen aspirations to world supremacy. And what hasn't happened in world history?

However, what is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it refers to one type of situation, namely one centre of authority, one centre of force, one centre of decision-making.

It is world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within.

And this certainly has nothing in common with democracy. Because, as you know, democracy is the power of the majority in light of the interests and opinions of the minority.

Incidentally, Russia – we – are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves.

I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today's world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today's – and precisely in today's – world, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilisation.

Along with this, what is happening in today's world – and we just started to discuss this – is a tentative to introduce precisely this concept into international affairs, the concept of a unipolar world.

And with which results?

Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centres of tension. Judge for yourselves: wars as well as local and regional conflicts have not diminished. Mr Teltschik mentioned this very gently. And no less people perish in these conflicts – even more are dying than before. Significantly more, significantly more!

Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible.

We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state's legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?

In international relations we increasingly see the desire to resolve a given question according to so-called issues of political expediency, based on the current political climate.

And of course this is extremely dangerous. It results in the fact that no one feels safe. I want to emphasise this – no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will protect them. Of course such a policy stimulates an arms race.

The force's dominance inevitably encourages a number of countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, significantly new threats – though they were also well-known before – have appeared, and today threats such as terrorism have taken on a global character.

I am convinced that we have reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security.

And we must proceed by searching for a reasonable balance between the interests of all participants in the international dialogue. Especially since the international landscape is so varied and changes so quickly – changes in light of the dynamic development in a whole number of countries and regions.

Madam Federal Chancellor already mentioned this. The combined GDP measured in purchasing power parity of countries such as India and China is already greater than that of the United States. And a similar calculation with the GDP of the BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China – surpasses the cumulative GDP of the EU. And according to experts this gap will only increase in the future.

There is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centres of global economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity.

In connection with this the role of multilateral diplomacy is significantly increasing. The need for principles such as openness, transparency and predictability in politics is uncontested and the use of force should be a really exceptional measure, comparable to using the death penalty in the judicial systems of certain states.

However, today we are witnessing the opposite tendency, namely a situation in which countries that forbid the death penalty even for murderers and other, dangerous criminals are airily participating in military operations that are difficult to consider legitimate. And as a matter of fact, these conflicts are killing people – hundreds and thousands of civilians!

But at the same time the question arises of whether we should be indifferent and aloof to various internal conflicts inside countries, to authoritarian regimes, to tyrants, and to the proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction? As a matter of fact, this was also at the centre of the question that our dear colleague Mr Lieberman asked the Federal Chancellor. If I correctly understood your question (addressing Mr Lieberman), then of course it is a serious one! Can we be indifferent observers in view of what is happening? I will try to answer your question as well: of course not.

But do we have the means to counter these threats? Certainly we do. It is sufficient to look at recent history. Did not our country have a peaceful transition to democracy? Indeed, we witnessed a peaceful transformation of the Soviet regime – a peaceful transformation! And what a regime! With what a number of weapons, including nuclear weapons! Why should we start bombing and shooting now at every available opportunity? Is it the case when without the threat of mutual destruction we do not have enough political culture, respect for democratic values and for the law?

I am convinced that the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force as a last resort is the Charter of the United Nations. And in connection with this, either I did not understand what our colleague, the Italian Defence Minister, just said or what he said was inexact. In any case, I understood that the use of force can only be legitimate when the decision is taken by NATO, the EU, or the UN. If he really does think so, then we have different points of view. Or I didn't hear correctly. The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN. When the UN will truly unite the forces of the international community and can really react to events in various countries, when we will leave behind this disdain for international law, then the situation will be able to change. Otherwise the situation will simply result in a dead end, and the number of serious mistakes will be multiplied. Along with this, it is necessary to make sure that international law have a universal character both in the conception and application of its norms.

And one must not forget that democratic political actions necessarily go along with discussion and a laborious decision-making process.

Dear ladies and gentlemen!

The potential danger of the destabilisation of international relations is connected with obvious stagnation in the disarmament issue.

Russia supports the renewal of dialogue on this important question.

It is important to conserve the international legal framework relating to weapons destruction and therefore ensure continuity in the process of reducing nuclear weapons.

Together with the United States of America we agreed to reduce our nuclear strategic missile capabilities to up to 1700–2000 nuclear warheads by 31 December 2012. Russia intends to strictly fulfil the obligations it has taken on. We hope that our partners will also act in a transparent way and will refrain from laying aside a couple of hundred superfluous nuclear warheads for a rainy day. And if today the new American Defence Minister declares that the United States will not hide these superfluous weapons in warehouse or, as one might say, under a pillow or under the blanket, then I suggest that we all rise and greet this declaration standing. It would be a very important declaration.

Russia strictly adheres to and intends to further adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as the multilateral supervision regime for missile technologies. The principles incorporated in these documents are universal ones.

In connection with this I would like to recall that in the 1980s the USSR and the United States signed an agreement on destroying a whole range of small- and medium-range missiles but these documents do not have a universal character.

Today many other countries have these missiles, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan and Israel. Many countries are working on these systems and plan to incorporate them as part of their weapons arsenals. And only the United States and Russia bear the responsibility to not create such weapons systems.

It is obvious that in these conditions we must think about ensuring our own security.

At the same time, it is impossible to sanction the appearance of new, destabilising high-tech weapons. Needless to say it refers to measures to prevent a new area of confrontation, especially in outer space. Star wars is no longer a fantasy – it is a reality. In the middle of the 1980s our American partners were already able to intercept their own satellite.

In Russia's opinion, the militarisation of outer space could have unpredictable consequences for the international community, and provoke nothing less than the beginning of a nuclear era. And we have come forward more than once with initiatives designed to prevent the use of weapons in outer space.

Today I would like to tell you that we have prepared a project for an agreement on the prevention of deploying weapons in outer space. And in the near future it will be sent to our partners as an official proposal. Let's work on this together.

Plans to expand certain elements of the anti-missile defence system to Europe cannot help but disturb us. Who needs the next step of what would be, in this case, an inevitable arms race? I deeply doubt that Europeans themselves do.

Missile weapons with a range of about five to eight thousand kilometres that really pose a threat to Europe do not exist in any of the so-called problem countries. And in the near future and prospects, this will not happen and is not even foreseeable. And any hypothetical launch of, for example, a North Korean rocket to American territory through western Europe obviously contradicts the laws of ballistics. As we say in Russia, it would be like using the right hand to reach the left ear.

And here in Germany I cannot help but mention the pitiable condition of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in 1999. It took into account a new geopolitical reality, namely the elimination of the Warsaw bloc. Seven years have passed and only four states have ratified this document, including the Russian Federation.

NATO countries openly declared that they will not ratify this treaty, including the provisions on flank restrictions (on deploying a certain number of armed forces in the flank zones), until Russia removed its military bases from Georgia and Moldova. Our army is leaving Georgia, even according to an accelerated schedule. We resolved the problems we had with our Georgian colleagues, as everybody knows. There are still 1,500 servicemen in Moldova that are carrying out peacekeeping operations and protecting warehouses with ammunition left over from Soviet times. We constantly discuss this issue with Mr Solana and he knows our position. We are ready to further work in this direction.

But what is happening at the same time? Simultaneously the so-called flexible frontline American bases with up to five thousand men in each. It turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and we continue to strictly fulfil the treaty obligations and do not react to these actions at all.

I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: "the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee". Where are these guarantees?

The stones and concrete blocks of the Berlin Wall have long been distributed as souvenirs. But we should not forget that the fall of the Berlin Wall was possible thanks to a historic choice – one that was

also made by our people, the people of Russia – a choice in favour of democracy, freedom, openness and a sincere partnership with all the members of the big European family.

And now they are trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on us – these walls may be virtual but they are nevertheless dividing, ones that cut through our continent. And is it possible that we will once again require many years and decades, as well as several generations of politicians, to disassemble and dismantle these new walls?

Dear ladies and gentlemen!

We are unequivocally in favour of strengthening the regime of non-proliferation. The present international legal principles allow us to develop technologies to manufacture nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. And many countries with all good reasons want to create their own nuclear energy as a basis for their energy independence. But we also understand that these technologies can be quickly transformed into nuclear weapons.

This creates serious international tensions. The situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme acts as a clear example. And if the international community does not find a reasonable solution for resolving this conflict of interests, the world will continue to suffer similar, destabilising crises because there are more threshold countries than simply Iran. We both know this. We are going to constantly fight against the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Last year Russia put forward the initiative to establish international centres for the enrichment of uranium. We are open to the possibility that such centres not only be created in Russia, but also in other countries where there is a legitimate basis for using civil nuclear energy. Countries that want to develop their nuclear energy could guarantee that they will receive fuel through direct participation in these centres. And the centres would, of course, operate under strict IAEA supervision.

The latest initiatives put forward by American President George W. Bush are in conformity with the Russian proposals. I consider that Russia and the USA are objectively and equally interested in strengthening the regime of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their deployment. It is precisely our countries, with leading nuclear and missile capabilities, that must act as leaders in developing new, stricter non-proliferation measures. Russia is ready for such work. We are engaged in consultations with our American friends.

In general, we should talk about establishing a whole system of political incentives and economic stimuli whereby it would not be in states' interests to establish their own capabilities in the nuclear fuel cycle but they would still have the opportunity to develop nuclear energy and strengthen their energy capabilities.

In connection with this I shall talk about international energy cooperation in more detail. Madam Federal Chancellor also spoke about this briefly – she mentioned, touched on this theme. In the energy sector Russia intends to create uniform market principles and transparent conditions for all. It is obvious that energy prices must be determined by the market instead of being the subject of political speculation, economic pressure or blackmail.

We are open to cooperation. Foreign companies participate in all our major energy projects. According to different estimates, up to 26 percent of the oil extraction in Russia – and please think about this figure – up to 26 percent of the oil extraction in Russia is done by foreign capital. Try, try to find me a similar example where Russian business participates extensively in key economic sectors in western countries. Such examples do not exist! There are no such examples.

I would also recall the parity of foreign investments in Russia and those Russia makes abroad. The parity is about fifteen to one. And here you have an obvious example of the openness and stability of the Russian economy.

Economic security is the sector in which all must adhere to uniform principles. We are ready to compete fairly.

For that reason more and more opportunities are appearing in the Russian economy. Experts and our western partners are objectively evaluating these changes. As such, Russia's OECD sovereign credit rating improved and Russia passed from the fourth to the third group. And today in Munich I would like to use this occasion to thank our German colleagues for their help in the above decision.

Furthermore. As you know, the process of Russia joining the WTO has reached its final stages. I would point out that during long, difficult talks we heard words about freedom of speech, free trade, and equal possibilities more than once but, for some reason, exclusively in reference to the Russian market.

And there is still one more important theme that directly affects global security. Today many talk about the struggle against poverty. What is actually happening in this sphere? On the one hand, financial resources are allocated for programmes to help the world's poorest countries – and at times substantial financial resources. But to be honest – and many here also know this – linked with the development of that same donor country's companies. And on the other hand, developed countries simultaneously keep their agricultural subsidies and limit some countries' access to high-tech products.

And let's say things as they are – one hand distributes charitable help and the other hand not only preserves economic backwardness but also reaps the profits thereof. The increasing social tension in depressed regions inevitably results in the growth of radicalism, extremism, feeds terrorism and local conflicts. And if all this happens in, shall we say, a region such as the Middle East where there is increasingly the sense that the world at large is unfair, then there is the risk of global destabilisation.

It is obvious that the world's leading countries should see this threat. And that they should therefore build a more democratic, fairer system of global economic relations, a system that would give everyone the chance and the possibility to develop.

Dear ladies and gentlemen, speaking at the Conference on Security Policy, it is impossible not to mention the activities of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As is well-known, this organisation was created to examine all – I shall emphasise this – all aspects of security: military, political, economic, humanitarian and, especially, the relations between these spheres.

What do we see happening today? We see that this balance is clearly destroyed. People are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries. And this task is also being accomplished by the OSCE's bureaucratic apparatus which is absolutely not connected with the state founders in any way. Decision-making procedures and the involvement of so-called non-governmental organisations are tailored for this task. These organisations are formally independent but they are purposefully financed and therefore under control.

According to the founding documents, in the humanitarian sphere the OSCE is designed to assist country members in observing international human rights norms at their request. This is an important task. We support this. But this does not mean interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, and especially not imposing a regime that determines how these states should live and develop.

It is obvious that such interference does not promote the development of democratic states at all. On the contrary, it makes them dependent and, as a consequence, politically and economically unstable.

We expect that the OSCE be guided by its primary tasks and build relations with sovereign states based on respect, trust and transparency.

Dear ladies and gentlemen!

In conclusion I would like to note the following. We very often – and personally, I very often – hear appeals by our partners, including our European partners, to the effect that Russia should play an increasingly active role in world affairs.

In connection with this I would allow myself to make one small remark. It is hardly necessary to incite us to do so. Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy.

We are not going to change this tradition today. At the same time, we are well aware of how the world has changed and we have a realistic sense of our own opportunities and potential. And of course we would like to interact with responsible and independent partners with whom we could work together in constructing a fair and democratic world order that would ensure security and prosperity not only for a select few, but for all.

Thank you for your attention.

Horst Teltschik: Thank you very much for your important speech. We heard new themes, including the issue of global security architecture – one was not in the foreground over the last few years – disarmament, arms control, the issue of the NATO-Russian relations, and cooperation in the field of technology.

There are still a whole number of questions and Mr President is ready to answer.

Question: Dear Mr President, thank you for your speech. I would like to emphasise that the German Bundestag is convinced of Russia's importance as Europe's partner and of the importance of the role you play. The Federal Chancellor said this in her speech.

Proceeding from experience, I would like to mention two issues in your speech. First of all, on your opinion of NATO and NATO expansion, a phenomenon that you consider dangerous for Russia. Would you acknowledge that this phenomenon is, in practice, not expansion but rather the self-determination of democratic states who want this? And that NATO finds it difficult to accept states that do not declare this readiness? You could admit that thanks to NATO expansion eastern borders have become more reliable, more secure. Why are you afraid of democracy? I am convinced that only democratic states can become members of NATO. This stabilises neighbours.

About what is happening inside your country. The murder of Anna Politkovskaya was a symbol. One can say that this affects many journalists, makes everybody afraid, and the law on non-governmental organisations also causes alarm.

Question: I well understand your comments about non-proliferation. Especially at the end of the Cold War we saw a reduction of the deployment of nuclear weapons, but we also saw increased terrorism. Nuclear materials must be kept away from terrorists.

Question: Coming back to the question that was also asked to the Federal Chancellor. What does the future hold for Kosovo and Serbia? What is your opinion of Mr Ahtisaari? How will Russia influence resolving this problem?

Question: Can you comment on the experiences of Russian servicemen in Chechnya? And about your comments on energy: you briefly mentioned the market role energy plays in politics. The EU is interested in reaching a partnership agreement that contains fixed policy principles. Are you ready to guarantee reliable energy deliveries, including in the agreement?

Question: Mr President, your speech was both sincere and frank. I hope that you understand my frank and direct question. In the 1990s Russian experts actively helped Iran develop missile technologies. Iran now has advanced medium- and long-range missiles that would enable it to strike Russia and part of Europe. They are also working towards placing nuclear warheads on these missiles. Your country has made efforts to negotiate with Iran on this issue and supported the UN Security Council resolution to prevent Iran from carrying out such a policy.

My question is as follows: what efforts will Russia make – through the UN or otherwise – to stop these very serious events in Iran?

Question: I am confident that the historians of the future will not describe our conference as one in which the Second Cold War was declared. But they could. You said that it is necessary to put pres-

sure on Iran and to provide positive incentives. But is it not true that Russia is interfering with the process of applying strong pressure through sanctions? Secondly, with regards to deliveries of weapons, Russia is encouraging Iran, especially since these weapons appeared in Lebanon and in Gaza. What are your comments on this?

Question: I understand your sincerity and I hope that you will accept our sincerity. First of all, about arms control. Who needs a new arms race? I want to point out that the USA has not developed a new strategic weapon in more than two decades and that you recently tested the Topol-M missile, and that it is already deployed in silos and on mobile installations. You criticised the USA for unilateral actions and said twice that military actions can only be legitimate if they receive UN approval. The USA is carrying out military actions in Iraq and in Afghanistan according to UN decisions and today in Kosovo the majority of troops are supporting peace-making operations in this country.

My question is the following: are you saying that independently of how Russia perceives a threat to its international interests, it will not undertake military operations without UN approval?

Question: You talked about the danger of a unipolar world in which one sovereign makes a decision without consulting anyone else. In many people's opinion, in Russia we are seeing an increasingly unipolar government where competing centres of influence are forced to tow the party line, whether it be in the State Duma, the regional leadership, the media, business communities or non-governmental organisations. Would a unipolar government be such a reliable partner when the issue of energy security is at stake?

President Vladimir Putin: First of all I would like to thank you for your questions. Very interesting. It is a shame that we have little time left because I would be pleased to have a separate discussion with all of you. I very much enjoy this, I like it.

I will begin with the last question about the unipolar nature of the Russian government. Today the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the United Russia Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and other political forces as well sit in the Russian parliament. And their basic positions differ significantly. If you aren't aware of this then just have a talk with the leadership of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and then with the leader of our liberal democrats, Mr Zhirinovskiy. You will see the difference at once. If you cannot see it now, then have a talk with them. There is no problem here, simply go to Moscow and talk to them.

About our future plans. We would like to have a mature political system, a multi-party system with responsible politicians who can anticipate the country's development and not only work responsibly before elections and immediately after, but in a long-term future as well. That is what we aspire to. And this system will certainly be a multi-party one. All our actions within Russia, including changing the State Duma election regime, the election regime in the Russian parliament, are designed to strengthen a multi-party system in Russia.

And now about whether our government cabinet is able to operate responsibly in resolving issues linked to energy deliveries and ensuring energy security. Of course it can! Moreover, all that we have done and are doing is designed to achieve only one goal, namely to transfer our relations with consumers and countries that transport our energy to market-based, transparent principles and long-term contracts.

I will remind you and my colleague, the President of Ukraine, who is sitting opposite from me, also knows this. For fifteen years prior to 2006, as long as we did not make the corresponding decisions during our difficult talks, deliveries of Russian energy and, first and foremost, of gas to Europe depended on the conditions and prices for the deliveries of Russian gas to Ukraine itself. And this was something that Ukraine and Russia agreed among themselves. And if we reached no agreement, then all European consumers would sit there with no gas. Would you like to see this happen? I don't think so. And despite all the scandals, the protection of interests, and differences of opinion we were able

to agree with President Yushchenko. I consider that he made a responsible, absolutely correct and market-oriented decision. We signed separate contracts for the delivery of our gas to Ukraine and for delivering Russian gas to Europe for the next five years. You should thank us, both Russia and Ukraine, for this decision. And thank you also for your question.

It would have been better if I answered your questions at once.

Regarding our perception of NATO's eastern expansion, I already mentioned the guarantees that were made and that are not being observed today. Do you happen to think that this is normal practice in international affairs? But all right, forget it. Forget these guarantees. With respect to democracy and NATO expansion. NATO is not a universal organisation, as opposed to the UN. It is first and foremost a military and political alliance, military and political! Well, ensuring one's own security is the right of any sovereign state. We are not arguing against this. Of course we are not objecting to this. But why is it necessary to put military infrastructure on our borders during this expansion? Can someone answer this question? Unless the expansion of military infrastructure is connected with fighting against today's global threats? Let's put it this way, what is the most important of these threats for us today – the most important for Russia, for the USA and for Europe – it is terrorism and the fight against it.

Does one need Russia to fight against terrorism? Of course! Does one need India to fight against terrorism! Of course! But we are not members of NATO and other countries aren't either. But we can only work on this issue effectively by joining our forces. As such, expanding infrastructure, especially military infrastructure, to our borders is not connected in any way with the democratic choices of individual states. And I would ask that we not mix these two concepts.

You know, I wrote so illegibly here that even I cannot read my own writing. I will therefore answer what I can read and if I do not answer something, please remind me of the question.

What will happen with Kosovo and with Serbia? Only Kosovars and Serbs can know. And let's not tell them how they should live their lives. There is no need to play God and resolve all of these peoples' problems. Together we can only create certain necessary conditions and help people resolve their own problems. Create the necessary conditions and act as the guarantors of certain agreements. But we should not impose these agreements. Otherwise, we shall simply put the situation into a dead end. And if one of the participants in this difficult process feels offended or humiliated, then the problem will last for centuries. We will only create a dead end.

What does our position consist in? Our position consists in adhering precisely to this principle. And if we see that one party is clearly dissatisfied with the proposals to resolve the situation then we are not going to support this option.

I did not exactly understand what you meant when you asked about our servicemen's experience in Chechnya. Their experience is not pleasant, but it is extensive. And if you are interested in the general situation in Chechnya, then I can tell you that a parliament and a president have been elected, and that the government is functioning. All the bodies of authority and administration have been formed. Practically all the political forces in Chechnya have been involved in work in the Republic. As an example, the former Defence Minister of Aslan Maskhadov's government is now a member of parliament in Chechnya. And we made a whole series of decisions that would allow former insurgents to return not only to normal life, but also to the Republic's political activities. As such, today we prefer to act by using economic and political means and, in practice, we have transferred the responsibility for ensuring security almost 100 percent to the Chechen people. Because the agencies of law and order that were formed in Chechnya are almost 100 percent composed of local citizens, from those living in Chechnya on a permanent basis – from Chechens.

As to Lebanon, I also did not quite understand what you meant. But, yes, the fact that we sent military construction workers to Lebanon to restore bridges and infrastructure that was destroyed in the conflict with Israel is a confirmation of a well-known situation, the one I described just now. And military units protecting these builders were made up of servicemen from Chechnya and with Chechen origins. We recognised that if our servicemen must operate in regions inhabited by Muslims, sending a contingent of Muslim servicemen would be no bad thing. And we were not mistaken. The local population really gave a warm welcome to our military builders.

Now about the energy agreement with the European Union, since this is how I understood the question. We have said many times that we are not against agreeing on the principles underlying our energy relations with the EU. Moreover, the principles contained in the Charter are generally comprehensible. But the Charter itself is not so acceptable to us. Because not only Russia but also our European partners do not adhere to its principles. It is enough to remember that the market for nuclear materials remains closed for us. Nobody has opened this market to us.

There are also other moments which I simply do not want to draw attention to now. But as to the principles themselves, we are already using these principles in our work with German companies. I shall remind you of the transaction that took place between Gazprom and BASF. As a matter of fact, this was an asset swap. We are ready to continue to work this way. We are ready. But in each concrete instance we must understand what we give, what our partners give, calculate, have an independent international expert evaluation, and then make a decision. We are ready to engage in this work. We have actually just recently done something similar with our Italian partners, with the company ENI. And we did more than simply sign an agreement about deliveries until 2035 – I think – we also talked about swapping assets. And we are studying this same type of cooperation with our Ukrainian friends. This is going ahead.

And is it necessary to fix these principles in a possible future fundamental text between Russia and the EU? It is possible to have different opinions on this issue. I consider that it is not necessary because, in addition to energy, we have other spheres in which we cooperate with the EU, including agriculture, high-tech and transportation. And all of this is very important and very interesting. And we cannot put all of this in one fundamental act that should act as a framework document. Or would you want us to put only what you need in the document and leave what we need outside of the framework? Let's discuss things honestly with one another and take mutually acceptable decisions.

“In the 1990s Russia helped Iran develop missile technologies”. I think that you asked me this question. “Today Iran wants to put nuclear warheads on these missiles that could reach Europe. What is Russia going to do about the Iranian nuclear programme?” Is that so?

Well first of all, I do not have data that in the 1990s Russia helped Iran create its own missile technologies. It was other countries that worked very actively towards this. And technology was transferred through different channels. And we have proof of this. At the time I gave these proofs directly to the President of the United States. And technology also came from Europe and from Asian countries.

So Russia is hardly at fault here. I assure you. Russia is the country least involved here. Least of all. If it is involved at all. At the time I was still working in St Petersburg, but we were not involved with this. I can assure you of this. But you know that at the business level something could have happened. We trained experts in institutes and so on. And at the request and according to the information of our American partners we reacted harshly to this. Immediately and harshly. We did not observe such a reaction from our other partners, including European partners. Moreover, I do not know whether you are

aware of this or not but you should know that military technology and special equipment is still coming from the United States. Until now. Until now spare parts for F-14 planes come from the armed forces and the Pentagon. As far as I know, there is even an investigation taking place in the United States on this account. And despite the fact that this investigation is proceeding and that these spare parts were seized at the border and then sent back, after a certain amount of time, according to the data I have – and if they are not correct then check them – those same cargos were again seized at the border. Even bearing a tag ‘material evidence’.

You know, this stream is really hard to stop. We need to work together to do so.

About whether or not Iran has missiles that threaten Europe. You are mistaken. Today Iran has – Mr Gates is here today and certainly knows this data better than I do, and the Russian Defence Minister is also here – missiles with a range of 2000 kilometres.

Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov: 1600–1700 kilometres.

Vladimir Putin: 1600–1700 kilometres. Only. Well, count how many kilometres there are between Munich and the Iranian border. Iran has no such missiles. They plan to develop some with a range of 2400 kilometres. It is not known whether they have the technology to do so. And with respect to 4000, 5000 or 6000 kilometres, then I think that this would simply require a different economy. So, it is improbable in general. And Iran is not threatening Europe. With regard to the idea that they are preparing to use nuclear warheads then we do not have such data. We do not have this data about nuclear warheads.

North Korea has tested a nuclear device. Iranians are constantly saying that their nuclear programme has a peaceful character. But I agree with you that the international community has concerns about the character and quality of Iran’s nuclear programmes. And Mr ElBaradai recently stated these concerns in what I think were six or seven points. I agree with you about this. And I do not understand why the Iranian party has still not reacted in a positive and constructive way to the concerns that Mr ElBaradai stated and therefore assuaged these concerns. I do not understand this just as you do not understand it.

What are we going to do? I think that together we need to work patiently and carefully. And, that’s right, to create incentives and show the Iranian leadership that cooperation with the international community is much better than confrontation.

Yes, and again about the deliveries of weapons to Iran. You know that there has been more talk than deliveries. Our military and technical cooperation with Iran is minimal. Simply minimal. I am not sure what minimal figures it is estimated at. In general we deliver much less arms to the Middle East than other countries, including the United States. No comparison is possible there. We recently delivered an anti-aircraft weapon system to Iran – that is true – with a medium range, approximately 30 to 50 kilometres. That is true. Why did we do this? I can explain why. We did this so that Iran did not feel it had been driven into a corner. So that it didn’t feel that it was in some kind of hostile environment. Rather that Iran could understand that it had channels of communication and friends that it could trust. We very much expect that the Iranian party will understand and hear our signals.

As to our weapons in Lebanon and in the Gaza strip. I am not aware of our weapons in the Gaza strip. I have not heard of such examples. Well, Kalashnikovs are in general the most widely used small arms in the world. They are probably everywhere. And probably there are still automatic Kalashnikovs in Germany or, in any case, some that have still not been destroyed. That is one hundred percent certain.

In Lebanon it is true. Elements of our anti-tank systems really have been seen there. That is true. Our Israeli partners told me about this at once. We carried out a thorough investigation into what happened. And we determined that these systems had remained in Lebanese territory after the Syrian army left. We carried out the corresponding work with our Syrian partners. We determined that our

future military and technical cooperation with Syria would exclude the possibility that weapons could fall into any hands other than the ones they were destined for. We developed such a system. Among other things, we agreed on a system of possible warehouse inspections, at any time that is convenient for Russian experts. Inspections in warehouses after deliveries of Russian weapons systems to Syria.

“The USA are not developing strategic weapons but Russia is. Will Russia use force in the future if it is not sanctioned by the UN? Russia is developing a system of strategic weapons”.

Fine question, excellent! I am very grateful to you for this question. It will give me the opportunity to talk about the essence of what is happening. What are we indebted to in the past decades if there was a stand-off between two superpowers and two systems but nevertheless a big war did not take place? We are indebted to the balance of powers between these two superpowers. There was an equilibrium and a fear of mutual destruction. And in those days one party was afraid to make an extra step without consulting the other. And this was certainly a fragile peace and a frightening one. But as we see today, it was reliable enough. Today, it seems that the peace is not so reliable.

Yes, the United States is ostensibly not developing an offensive weapon. In any case, the public does not know about this. Even though they are certainly developing them. But we aren't even going to ask about this now. We know that these developments are proceeding. But we pretend that we don't know, so we say that they aren't developing new weapons. But what do we know? That the United States is actively developing and already strengthening an anti-missile defence system. Today this system is ineffective but we do not know exactly whether it will one day be effective. But in theory it is being created for that purpose. So hypothetically we recognise that when this moment arrives, the possible threat from our nuclear forces will be completely neutralised. Russia's present nuclear capabilities, that is. The balance of powers will be absolutely destroyed and one of the parties will benefit from the feeling of complete security. This means that its hands will be free not only in local but eventually also in global conflicts.

We are discussing this with you now. I would not want anyone to suspect any aggressive intentions on our part. But the system of international relations is just like mathematics. There are no personal dimensions. And of course we should react to this. How? Either the same as you and therefore by building a multi-billion dollar anti-missile system or, in view of our present economic and financial possibilities, by developing an asymmetrical answer. So that everybody can understand that the anti-missile defence system is useless against Russia because we have certain weapons that easily overcome it. And we are proceeding in this direction. It is cheaper for us. And this is in no way directed against the United States themselves.

I completely agree if you say that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is not directed against us, just as our new weapons are not directed against you. And I fully agree with my colleague and my friend about another thing. Do you know – and I will not be afraid of the word – that in spite of all our disagreements I consider the President of the United States my friend. He is a decent person and I know that today the wolves can blame the United States for everything that is being done on the international arena and internally. But I know that he is a decent person and it is possible to talk and reach agreements with him. And when I talked to him he said: “I proceed from the fact that Russia and the USA will never be opponents and enemies again”. I agree with him. But I repeat once again that there are symmetries and asymmetries here, there is nothing personal. It is simply a calculation.

And now about whether Russia will use military force without the sanction of the UN. We will always operate strictly within the international legal framework. My basic education is in law and I will allow myself to remind both myself and my colleagues that according to the UN Charter peace-keeping operations require the sanction of both the UN and the UN Security Council. This is in the case

of peace-keeping operations. But in the UN Charter there is also an article about self-defence. And no sanctions are required in this case.

So, what have I forgotten?

Question: My question was about multipolarity in Russia itself and about the attitude of the international community towards Russia if Russia does not observe these principles, in reference to the murder of journalists, fears, anxieties, the absence of freedom and non-governmental organisations.

Vladimir Putin: I will say a couple of words. I already answered part of the question when I talked about the structure of the Russian parliament. Look at who is represented there, the political views of the people who have leadership positions in parliament, the legitimate parties. Now, as to non-governmental organisations, they are working actively in Russia. Yes, we introduced a new system for registering these organisations. But it is not that different from registration systems in other countries. And we have not yet seen any complaints from non-governmental organisations themselves. We have not refused registration to almost any organisations. There were two or three cases that were refused on simply formal grounds and these organisations are working on correcting certain provisions in their charters and so on. Nobody has been refused registration based on substantial, fundamental issues. All are continuing to work in the most active possible way and will continue to do so in the future.

What bothers us? I can say and I think that it is clear for all, that when these non-governmental organisations are financed by foreign governments, we see them as an instrument that foreign states use to carry out their Russian policies. That is the first thing. The second. In every country there are certain rules for financing, shall we say, election campaigns. Financing from foreign governments, including within governmental campaigns, proceeds through non-governmental organisations. And who is happy about this? Is this normal democracy? It is secret financing. Hidden from society. Where is the democracy here? Can you tell me? No! You can't tell me and you never will be able to. Because there is no democracy here, there is simply one state exerting influence on another.

But we are interested in developing civil society in Russia, so that it scolds and criticises the authorities, helps them determine their own mistakes, and correct their policies in Russian citizens' interests. We are certainly interested in this and we will support civil society and non-governmental organisations.

As to fears and so on, are you aware that today Russians have fewer fears than citizens in many other countries? Because in the last few years we made cardinal changes to improve the economic well-being of our citizens. We still have a great many problems. And we still have a great many unresolved problems. Including problems linked with poverty. And I can tell you that fears basically come from this source.

As to journalists then yes, this represents an important and difficult problem. And, incidentally, journalists are not only killed in Russia, but in other countries as well. Where are most journalists killed? You are an expert and probably know in which country the most journalists died in, say, the last year and a half? The largest number of journalists were killed in Iraq.

As to tragedies within Russia, we will certainly struggle with these phenomena in the most thorough way possible and sternly punish all criminals who try to undermine trust in Russia and damage our political system.

Thank you for your attention.

Speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin at the plenary session of the 70th anniversary session of the UN General Assembly in new York. September 26, 2015

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr. President,
Mr. Secretary General,
Distinguished heads of state and government,
Ladies and gentlemen,

The 70th anniversary of the United Nations is a good occasion to both take stock of history and talk about our common future. In 1945, the countries that defeated Nazism joined their efforts to lay a solid foundation for the postwar world order. Let me remind you that key decisions on the principles defining interaction between states, as well as the decision to establish the UN, were made in our country, at the Yalta Conference of the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The Yalta system was truly born in travail. It was born at the cost of tens of millions of lives and two world wars that swept through the planet in the 20th century. Let's be fair: it helped humankind pass through turbulent, and at times dramatic, events of the last seven decades. It saved the world from large-scale upheavals.

The United Nations is unique in terms of legitimacy, representation and universality. True, the UN has been criticized lately for being inefficient or for the fact that decision-making on fundamental issues stalls due to insurmountable differences, especially among Security Council members.

However, I'd like to point out that there have always been differences in the UN throughout the 70 years of its history, and that the veto right has been regularly used by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union, and later Russia. It is only natural for such a diverse and representative organization. When the UN was first established, nobody expected that there would always be unanimity. The mission of the organization is to seek and reach compromises, and its strength comes from taking different views and opinions into consideration. The decisions debated within the UN are either taken in the form of resolutions or not. As diplomats say, they either pass or they don't. Any action taken by circumventing this procedure is illegitimate and constitutes a violation of the UN Charter and contemporary international law.

We all know that after the end of the Cold War the world was left with one center of dominance, and those who found themselves at the top of the pyramid were tempted to think that, since they are so powerful and exceptional, they know best what needs to be done and thus they don't need to reckon with the UN, which, instead of rubber-stamping the decisions they need, often stands in their way.

That's why they say that the UN has run its course and is now obsolete and outdated. Of course, the world changes, and the UN should also undergo natural transformation. Russia is ready to work together with its partners to develop the UN further on the basis of a broad consensus, but we consider any attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the United Nations as extremely dangerous. They may result in the collapse of the entire architecture of international relations, and then indeed there will be no rules left except for the rule of force. The world will be dominated by selfishness rather than collective effort, by dictate rather than equality and liberty, and instead of truly independent states we will have protectorates controlled from outside.

What is the meaning of state sovereignty, the term which has been mentioned by our colleagues here? It basically means freedom, every person and every state being free to choose their future.



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By the way, this brings us to the issue of the so-called legitimacy of state authorities. You shouldn't play with words and manipulate them. In international law, international affairs, every term has to be clearly defined, transparent and interpreted the same way by one and all.

We are all different, and we should respect that. Nations shouldn't be forced to all conform to the same development model that somebody has declared the only appropriate one.

We should all remember the lessons of the past. For example, we remember examples from our Soviet past, when the Soviet Union exported social experiments, pushing for changes in other countries for ideological reasons, and this often led to tragic consequences and caused degradation instead of progress.

It seems, however, that instead of learning from other people's mistakes, some prefer to repeat them and continue to export revolutions, only now these are "democratic" revolutions. Just look at the situation in the Middle East and Northern Africa already mentioned by the previous speaker. Of course, political and social problems have been piling up for a long time in this region, and people there wanted change. But what was the actual outcome? Instead of bringing about reforms, aggressive intervention rashly destroyed government institutions and the local way of life. Instead of democracy and progress, there is now violence, poverty, social disasters and total disregard for human rights, including even the right to life.

I'm urged to ask those who created this situation: do you at least realize now what you've done? But I'm afraid that this question will remain unanswered, because they have never abandoned their policy, which is based on arrogance, exceptionalism and impunity.

Power vacuum in some countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa obviously resulted in the emergence of areas of anarchy, which were quickly filled with extremists and terrorists. The so-called Islamic State has tens of thousands of militants fighting for it, including former Iraqi soldiers who were left on the street after the 2003 invasion. Many recruits come from Libya whose statehood was destroyed as a result of a gross violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973. And now radical groups are joined by members of the so-called "moderate" Syrian opposition backed by the West. They get weapons and training, and then they defect and join the so-called Islamic State.

In fact, the Islamic State itself did not come out of nowhere. It was initially developed as a weapon against undesirable secular regimes. Having established control over parts of Syria and Iraq, Islamic State now aggressively expands into other regions. It seeks dominance in the Muslim world and beyond. Their plans go further.



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The situation is extremely dangerous. In these circumstances, it is hypocritical and irresponsible to make declarations about the threat of terrorism and at the same time turn a blind eye to the channels used to finance and support terrorists, including revenues from drug trafficking, the illegal oil trade and the arms trade.

It is equally irresponsible to manipulate extremist groups and use them to achieve your political goals, hoping that later you'll find a way to get rid of them or somehow eliminate them.

I'd like to tell those who engage in this: Gentlemen, the people you are dealing with are cruel but they are not dumb. They are as smart as you are. So, it's a big question: who's playing who here? The recent incident where the most "moderate" opposition group handed over their weapons to terrorists is a vivid example of that.

We consider that any attempts to flirt with terrorists, let alone arm them, are short-sighted and extremely dangerous. This may make the global terrorist threat much worse, spreading it to new regions around the globe, especially since there are fighters from many different countries, including European ones, gaining combat experience with Islamic State. Unfortunately, Russia is no exception.

Now that those thugs have tasted blood, we can't allow them to return home and continue with their criminal activities. Nobody wants that, right?

Russia has consistently opposed terrorism in all its forms. Today, we provide military-technical assistance to Iraq, Syria and other regional countries fighting terrorist groups. We think it's a big mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian authorities and government forces who valiantly fight terrorists on the ground.

We should finally admit that President Assad's government forces and the Kurdish militia are the only forces really fighting terrorists in Syria. Yes, we are aware of all the problems and conflicts in the region, but we definitely have to consider the actual situation on the ground.

Dear colleagues, I must note that such an honest and frank approach on Russia's part has been recently used as a pretext for accusing it of its growing ambitions — as if those who say that have no ambitions at all. However, it is not about Russia's ambitions, dear colleagues, but about the recognition of the fact that we can no longer tolerate the current state of affairs in the world.

What we actually propose is to be guided by common values and common interests rather than by ambitions. Relying on international law, we must join efforts to address the problems that all of us are facing, and create a genuinely broad international coalition against terrorism. Similar to the an-

ti-Hitler coalition, it could unite a broad range of parties willing to stand firm against those who, just like the Nazis, sow evil and hatred of humankind. And of course, Muslim nations should play a key role in such a coalition, since Islamic State not only poses a direct threat to them, but also tarnishes one of the greatest world religions with its atrocities. The ideologues of these extremists make a mockery of Islam and subvert its true humanist values.

I would also like to address Muslim spiritual leaders: Your authority and your guidance are of great importance right now. It is essential to prevent people targeted for recruitment by extremists from making hasty decisions, and those who have already been deceived and, due to various circumstances, found themselves among terrorists, must be assisted in finding a way back to normal life, laying down arms and putting an end to fratricide.



70th session of the UN General Assembly.

In the days to come, Russia, as the current President of the UN Security Council, will convene a ministerial meeting to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the threats in the Middle East. First of all, we propose exploring opportunities for adopting a resolution that would serve to coordinate the efforts of all parties that oppose Islamic State and other terrorist groups. Once again, such coordination should be based upon the principles of the UN Charter.

We hope that the international community will be able to develop a comprehensive strategy of political stabilization, as well as social and economic recovery in the Middle East. Then, dear friends, there would be no need for setting up more refugee camps. Today, the flow of people forced to leave their native land has literally engulfed, first, the neighbouring countries, and then Europe. There are hundreds of thousands of them now, and before long, there might be millions. It is, essentially, a new, tragic Migration Period, and a harsh lesson for all of us, including Europe.

I would like to stress that refugees undoubtedly need our compassion and support. However, the only way to solve this problem for good is to restore statehood where it has been destroyed, to strengthen government institutions where they still exist, or are being re-established, to provide comprehensive military, economic and material assistance to countries in a difficult situation, and certainly to people who, despite all their ordeals, did not abandon their homes. Of course, any assistance to sovereign nations can, and should, be offered rather than imposed, in strict compliance with the UN Charter. In other words, our Organisation should support any measures that have been, or will be, taken in this regard in accordance with international law, and reject any actions that are in breach of the UN Charter. Above all, I believe it is of utmost importance to help restore govern-

ment institutions in Libya, support the new government of Iraq, and provide comprehensive assistance to the legitimate government of Syria.

Dear colleagues, ensuring peace and global and regional stability remains a key task for the international community guided by the United Nations. We believe this means creating an equal and indivisible security environment that would not serve a privileged few, but everyone. Indeed, it is a challenging, complicated and time-consuming task, but there is simply no alternative.

Sadly, some of our counterparts are still dominated by their Cold War-era bloc mentality and the ambition to conquer new geopolitical areas. First, they continued their policy of expanding NATO – one should wonder why, considering that the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist and the Soviet Union had disintegrated.


Nevertheless, NATO has kept on expanding, together with its military infrastructure. Next, the post-Soviet states were forced to face a false choice between joining the West and carrying on with the East. Sooner or later, this logic of confrontation was bound to spark off a major geopolitical crisis. And that is exactly what happened in Ukraine, where the people's widespread frustration with the government was used for instigating a coup d'état from abroad. This has triggered a civil war. We are convinced that the only way out of this dead end lies through comprehensive and diligent implementation of the Minsk agreements of February 12th, 2015. Ukraine's territorial integrity cannot be secured through the use of threats or military force, but it must be secured. The people of Donbas should have their rights and interests genuinely considered, and their choice respected; they should be engaged in devising the key elements of the country's political system, in line with the provisions of the Minsk agreements. Such steps would guarantee that Ukraine will develop as a civilized state, and a vital link in creating a common space of security and economic cooperation, both in Europe and in Eurasia.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have deliberately mentioned a common space for economic cooperation. Until quite recently, it seemed that we would learn to do without dividing lines in the area of the economy with its objective market laws, and act based on transparent and jointly formulated rules, including the WTO principles, which embrace free trade and investment and fair competition. However, unilaterally imposed sanctions circumventing the UN Charter have all but become commonplace today. They not only serve political objectives, but are also used for eliminating market competition.

I would like to note one more sign of rising economic selfishness. A number of nations have chosen to create exclusive economic associations, with their establishment being negotiated behind closed doors, secretly from those very nations' own public and business communities, as well as from the rest of the world. Other states, whose interests may be affected, have not been informed of anything, either. It seems that someone would like to impose upon us some new game rules, deliberately tailored to accommodate the interests of a privileged few, with the WTO having no say in it. This is fraught with utterly unbalancing global trade and splitting up the global economic space.

These issues affect the interests of all nations and influence the future of the entire global economy. That is why we propose discussing those issues within the framework of the United Nations, the WTO and the G20. Contrary to the policy of exclusion, Russia advocates harmonizing regional economic projects. I am referring to the so-called "integration of integrations" based on the universal and transparent rules of international trade. As an example, I would like to cite our plans to interconnect the Eurasian Economic Union with China's initiative for creating a Silk Road economic belt. We continue to see great promise in harmonizing the integration vehicles between the Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union.

Ladies and gentlemen, one more issue that shall affect the future of the entire humankind is climate change. It is in our interest to ensure that the coming UN Climate Change Conference that will take place in Paris in December this year should deliver some feasible results. As part of our national contribution, we plan to limit greenhouse gas emissions to 70–75 percent of the 1990 levels by the year 2030.



70th session of the UN General Assembly.

However, I suggest that we take a broader look at the issue. Admittedly, we may be able to defuse it for a while by introducing emission quotas and using other tactical measures, but we certainly will not solve it for good that way. What we need is an essentially different approach, one that would involve introducing new, groundbreaking, nature-like technologies that would not damage the environment, but rather work in harmony with it, enabling us to restore the balance between the biosphere and technology upset by human activities.

It is indeed a challenge of global proportions. And I am confident that humanity does have the necessary intellectual capacity to respond to it. We need to join our efforts, primarily engaging countries that possess strong research and development capabilities, and have made significant advances in fundamental research. We propose convening a special forum under the auspices of the UN to comprehensively address issues related to the depletion of natural resources, habitat destruction, and climate change. Russia is willing to co-sponsor such a forum.

Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues. On January 10th, 1946, the UN General Assembly convened for its first meeting in London. Chairman of the Preparatory Commission Dr. Zuleta Angel, a Colombian diplomat, opened the session by offering what I see as a very concise definition of the principles that the United Nations should be based upon, which are good will, disdain for scheming and trickery, and a spirit of cooperation. Today, his words sound like guidance for all of us.

Russia is confident of the United Nations' enormous potential, which should help us avoid a new confrontation and embrace a strategy of cooperation. Hand in hand with other nations, we will consistently work to strengthen the UN's central, coordinating role. I am convinced that by working together, we will make the world stable and safe, and provide an enabling environment for the development of all nations and peoples.

Thank you.

Speech by Xi Jinping at 70th UN General Assembly. September 28, 2015

Mr. President,
Dear Colleagues,

Seventy years ago, the earlier generation of mankind fought heroically and secured the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War, closing a dark page in the annals of human history. That victory was hard won.

Seventy years ago, the earlier generation of mankind, with vision and foresight, established the United Nations. This universal and most representative and authoritative international organization has carried mankind's hope for a new future and ushered in a new era of cooperation.

It was a pioneering initiative never undertaken before.

Seventy years ago, the earlier generation of mankind pooled together their wisdom and adopted the Charter of the United Nations, laying the cornerstone of the contemporary international order, and establishing the fundamental principles of contemporary international relations. This was an achievement of profound impact.

Mr. President,
Dear Colleagues,

On the third of September, the Chinese people, together with the world's people, solemnly commemorated the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. As the main theater in the East, China made a national sacrifice of over 35 million casualties in its fight against the majority troops of Japanese militarism, not only saved itself and its people from subjugation, but also gave strong support to the forces against aggression in the European and Pacific theaters, thus making a historic contribution to the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War.

History is a mirror. Only by drawing lessons from history can the world avoid repeating past calamity. We should view history with awe and human conscience. The past cannot be changed, but the future can be shaped. Bearing history in mind is not to perpetuate hatred. Rather, it is for mankind not to forget its lesson. Remembering history does not mean being obsessed with the past. Rather, in doing so, we aim to create a better future and pass the torch of peace from generation to generation.

Mr. President,
Dear Colleagues,

The United Nations has gone through the test of time over the past seven decades. It has witnessed efforts made by all countries to uphold peace, build homeland and pursue cooperation. Having reached a new historical starting point, the United Nations needs to address the central issue of how to better promote world peace and development in the 21st century.

The world is going through a historical process of accelerated evolution: The surging tide of peace, development and progress will be powerful enough to penetrate the clouds of war, poverty and backwardness. The movement toward a multi-polar world, and the rise of emerging markets and developing countries have become an irresistible trend of history. Economic globalization and the advent of an information age have vastly unleashed and boosted social productive forces. They have both created unprecedented development opportunities and given rise to new threats and challenges which we must face squarely.

As an ancient Chinese adage goes, "The greatest ideal is to create a world truly shared by all." Peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom are common values of all mankind and the lofty goals of the United Nations. Yet these goals are far from being achieved, and we must continue our endeavor to meet them. In today's world, all countries are interdependent and share a com-

mon future. We Should renew our commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, build a new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation, .and create a community of shared future for mankind. To achieve this goal, we need to make the following efforts:

We should build partnerships in which countries treat each other as equals, engage in mutual consultation and show mutual understanding. The principle of sovereign equality underpins the UN Charter. The future of the world must be shaped by all countries. All countries are equals. The big, strong and rich should not bully the small, weak and poor, The principle of sovereignty not only means that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries are inviolable and their internal affairs are not subjected to interference. It also means that all countries' right to independently choose social systems and development paths should be upheld, and that all countries' endeavors to promote economic and social development and improve their people's lives should be respected:

We should be committed to multilateralism and reject unilateralism.

We should adopt a new vision of seeking win-win outcomes for all, and reject the outdated mindset that one's gain means the other's loss or that the winner shall take all. Consultation is an important form of democracy, and it should also become an important means of exercising contemporary international governance. We should resolve disputes and differences through dialogue and consultation. We should forge a global partnership at both international and regional levels, and embrace a new approach to state-to-state relations, one that features dialogue rather than confrontation, and seeks partnership rather than alliance. Major countries should, follow the principles of no-conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation in handling their relations. Big countries should treat small countries as equals, and take a right approach to justice and interests by putting justice before interests.

We should create a security architecture featuring fairness, justice, joint contribution and shared benefits. In the age of economic globalization, the security of all countries is interlinked and has impact on one another. No country can maintain absolute security with its own effort, and no country can achieve stability out of other countries' instability. The law of the jungle leaves the weak at the mercy of the strong; it is not the way for countries to conduct their relations. Those who adopt the high-handed approach of using force will find that they are only lifting a rock to drop on their own feet.

We should abandon Cold War mentality in all its manifestation, and foster a new vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. We should give full play to the central role of the United Nations and its Security Council in ending conflict and keeping peace, and adopt the dual approach of seeking peaceful solution to disputes and taking mandatory actions, so as to turn hostility into amity.

We should advance international cooperation in both economic and social fields and take a holistic approach—to addressing traditional and non-traditional security threats, so as to prevent conflicts from breaking out in the first place.

We should promote open, innovative and inclusive development that benefits all. The 2008 international financial crisis has taught us that allowing capital to blindly pursue profit can only create a crisis and that global prosperity cannot be built on the shaky foundation of a market without moral constraints. The growing gap between rich and poor is both unsustainable and unfair. It is important for us to use both the invisible hand and the visible hand to form synergy between market forces and government function and strive to achieve both efficiency and fairness.

Development is meaningful only when it is inclusive and sustainable.

To achieve such development requires openness, mutual assistance and win-win cooperation. In the world today, close to 800 million people still live in extreme poverty, nearly six million kids die before the age of five each year and nearly 60 million children are unable to go to school. The just con-

cluded UN Sustainable Development Summit adopted the Post-2015 Development Agenda. We must translate our commitments into actions and work together to ensure that everyone is free from want, has access to development and lives with dignity.

We should increase inter-civilization exchanges to promote harmony, inclusiveness and respect for differences. The world is simply more colorful as a result of its cultural diversity. Diversity breeds exchanges, exchanges create integration, and integration makes progress possible.

In their interactions, civilizations must accept their differences. Only through mutual respect, mutual learning and harmonious coexistence can the world maintain its diversity and thrive. Each civilization represents the unique vision and contribution of its people, and no civilization is superior to others. Different civilizations should have dialogue and exchanges instead of trying to exclude or replace each other. The history of mankind is a process of active exchanges, interactions and integration among different civilizations. We should respect all civilizations and treat each other as equals. We should draw inspirations from each other to boost the creative development of human civilization.

We should build an ecosystem that puts mother nature and green development first. Mankind may utilize nature and even try to transform it. But we are after all a part of nature. We should care for nature and not place ourselves above it. We should reconcile industrial development with nature and pursue harmony between man and nature to achieve sustainable-development of the world and the all-round development of man.

To build a sound ecology is vital for mankind's future. All members of the international community should work together to build a sound global eco-environment. We should respect nature, follow nature's ways and protect nature. We should firmly pursue green, low-carbon, circular and sustainable development. China will shoulder its share of responsibility and continue to play its part in this common endeavor. We also urge developed countries to fulfill their historical responsibility, honor their emission reduction commitments and help developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate change.

Mr. President,

Dear Colleagues,

The over 1.3 billion and more Chinese people are endeavoring to realize the Chinese dream of great national renewal. The dream of the Chinese people is closely connected with the dreams of other peoples of the world. We cannot realize the Chinese dream without a peaceful international environment, a stable international order and the understanding, support and help from the rest of the world. The realization of the Chinese dream will bring more opportunities to other countries and contribute to global peace and development. China will continue to participate in building world peace. We are committed to peaceful development. No matter how the international landscape may evolve and how strong it may become, China will never pursue hegemony, expansion or sphere of influence.

China will continue to contribute to global development. We will continue to pursue common development and the win-win strategy of opening-up. We are ready to share our development experience and opportunities with other countries and welcome them to board China's express train of development so that all of us will achieve common development.

China will continue to uphold the international order. We will stay committed to the path of development through cooperation. China was the first country to put its signature on the UN Charter. We will continue to uphold the international order and system underpinned by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. China will continue to stand together with other developing countries. We firmly support greater representation and say of developing countries, especially African countries, in the international governance system. China's vote in the United Nations will always belong to the developing countries.

I wish to take this opportunity to announce China's decision to establish a 10-year, US\$1 billion China-UN peace and development fund to support the UN's work, advance multilateral cooperation and contribute more to world peace and development. I wish to announce that China will join the new UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System and has thus decided to take the lead in setting up a permanent peacekeeping police squad and build a peacekeeping standby force of 8,000 troops. I also wish to announce that China will provide a total of US\$100 million of free military assistance to the African Union in the next five years to support the establishment of the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis.

Mr. President,

Dear Colleagues,

As the United Nations enters a new decade, let us unite ever more closely to forge a new partnership of win-win cooperation and a community of shared future for mankind. Let the vision of a world free of war and with lasting peace take root in our hearts. Let the aspiration of development, prosperity, fairness and justice spread across the world!

Thank you.

Source: <https://www.voltairenet.org/article188880.html>

Paris agreement. April 22, 2016

The Parties to this Agreement,

Being Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”,

Pursuant to the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action established by decision 1/CP.17 of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention at its seventeenth session,

In pursuit of the objective of the Convention, and being guided by its principles, including the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances,

Recognizing the need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate change on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge,

Also recognizing the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, as provided for in the Convention,

Taking full account of the specific needs and special situations of the least developed countries with regard to funding and transfer of technology,

Recognizing that Parties may be affected not only by climate change, but also by the impacts of the measures taken in response to it,

Emphasizing the intrinsic relationship that climate change actions, responses and impacts have with equitable access to sustainable development and eradication of poverty,

Recognizing the fundamental priority of safeguarding food security and ending hunger, and the particular vulnerabilities of food production systems to the adverse impacts of climate change,

Taking into account the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities,

Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity,

Recognizing the importance of the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of the greenhouse gases referred to in the Convention,

Noting the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans, and the protection of biodiversity, recognized by some cultures as Mother Earth, and noting the importance for some of the concept of “climate justice”, when taking action to address climate change,

Affirming the importance of education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information and cooperation at all levels on the matters addressed in this Agreement,

Recognizing the importance of the engagements of all levels of government and various actors, in accordance with respective national legislations of Parties, in addressing climate change,

Also recognizing that sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production, with developed country Parties taking the lead, play an important role in addressing climate change,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

For the purpose of this Agreement, the definitions contained in Article 1 of the Convention shall apply. In addition:

1. "Convention" means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted in New York on 9 May 1992.
2. "Conference of the Parties" means the Conference of the Parties to the Convention.
3. "Party" means a Party to this Agreement.

Article 2

1. This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by:

- (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;
- (b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production;
- (c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

2. This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

Article 3

As nationally determined contributions to the global response to climate change, all Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts as defined in Articles 4, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13 with the view to achieving the purpose of this Agreement as set out in Article 2. The efforts of all Parties will represent a progression over time, while recognizing the need to support developing country Parties for the effective implementation of this Agreement.

Article 4

1. In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2, Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.

2. Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.

3. Each Party's successive nationally determined contribution will represent a progression beyond the Party's then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

4. Developed country Parties should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets. Developing country Parties should continue enhancing their mitiga-

tion efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances.

5. Support shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of this Article, in accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 11, recognizing that enhanced support for developing country Parties will allow for higher ambition in their actions.

6. The least developed countries and small island developing States may prepare and communicate strategies, plans and actions for low greenhouse gas emissions development reflecting their special circumstances.

7. Mitigation co-benefits resulting from Parties' adaptation actions and/or economic diversification plans can contribute to mitigation outcomes under this Article.

8. In communicating their nationally determined contributions, all Parties shall provide the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.

9. Each Party shall communicate a nationally determined contribution every five years in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement and be informed by the outcomes of the global stocktake referred to in Article 14.

10. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall consider common time frames for nationally determined contributions at its first session.

11. A Party may at any time adjust its existing nationally determined contribution with a view to enhancing its level of ambition, in accordance with guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.

12. Nationally determined contributions communicated by Parties shall be recorded in a public registry maintained by the secretariat.

13. Parties shall account for their nationally determined contributions. In accounting for anthropogenic emissions and removals corresponding to their nationally determined contributions, Parties shall promote environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability and consistency, and ensure the avoidance of double counting, in accordance with guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.

14. In the context of their nationally determined contributions, when recognizing and implementing mitigation actions with respect to anthropogenic emissions and removals, Parties should take into account, as appropriate, existing methods and guidance under the Convention, in the light of the provisions of paragraph 13 of this Article.

15. Parties shall take into consideration in the implementation of this Agreement the concerns of Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, particularly developing country Parties.

16. Parties, including regional economic integration organizations and their member States, that have reached an agreement to act jointly under paragraph 2 of this Article shall notify the secretariat of the terms of that agreement, including the emission level allocated to each Party within the relevant time period, when they communicate their nationally determined contributions. The secretariat shall in turn inform the Parties and signatories to the Convention of the terms of that agreement.

17. Each party to such an agreement shall be responsible for its emission level as set out in the agreement referred to in paragraph 16 above in accordance with paragraphs 13 and 14 of this Article and Articles 13 and 15.

18. If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional economic integration organization which is itself a Party to this Agreement, each member State of that regional economic

integration organization individually, and together with the regional economic integration organization, shall be responsible for its emission level as set out in the agreement communicated under paragraph 16 of this Article in accordance with paragraphs 13 and 14 of this Article and Articles 13 and 15.

19. All Parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies, mindful of Article 2 taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

Article 5

1. Parties should take action to conserve and enhance, as appropriate, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1(d), of the Convention, including forests.

2. Parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support, including through results-based payments, the existing framework as set out in related guidance and decisions already agreed under the Convention for: policy approaches and positive incentives for activities relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries; and alternative policy approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests, while reaffirming the importance of incentivizing, as appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated with such approaches.

Article 6

1. Parties recognize that some Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote sustainable development and environmental integrity.

2. Parties shall, where engaging on a voluntary basis in cooperative approaches that involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards nationally determined contributions, promote sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity and transparency, including in governance, and shall apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting, consistent with guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.

3. The use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes to achieve nationally determined contributions under this Agreement shall be voluntary and authorized by participating Parties.

4. A mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development is hereby established under the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement for use by Parties on a voluntary basis. It shall be supervised by a body designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, and shall aim:

(a) To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while fostering sustainable development;

(b) To incentivize and facilitate participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by public and private entities authorized by a Party;

(c) To contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party, which will benefit from mitigation activities resulting in emission reductions that can also be used by another Party to fulfil its nationally determined contribution; and

(d) To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions.

5. Emission reductions resulting from the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article shall not be used to demonstrate achievement of the host Party's nationally determined contribution if used by another Party to demonstrate achievement of its nationally determined contribution.

6. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from activities under the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.

7. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall adopt rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article at its first session.

8. Parties recognize the importance of integrated, holistic and balanced non-market approaches being available to Parties to assist in the implementation of their nationally determined contributions, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, in a coordinated and effective manner, including through, inter alia, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, as appropriate. These approaches shall aim to:

(a) Promote mitigation and adaptation ambition;

(b) Enhance public and private sector participation in the implementation of nationally determined contributions; and

(c) Enable opportunities for coordination across instruments and relevant institutional arrangements.

9. A framework for non-market approaches to sustainable development is hereby defined to promote the non-market approaches referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article.

Article 7

1. Parties hereby establish the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2.

2. Parties recognize that adaptation is a global challenge faced by all with local, subnational, national, regional and international dimensions, and that it is a key component of and makes a contribution to the long-term global response to climate change to protect people, livelihoods and ecosystems, taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of those developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.

3. The adaptation efforts of developing country Parties shall be recognized, in accordance with the modalities to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session.

4. Parties recognize that the current need for adaptation is significant and that greater levels of mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts, and that greater adaptation needs can involve greater adaptation costs.

5. Parties acknowledge that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems, and should be based on and guided by the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant socioeconomic and environmental policies and actions, where appropriate.

6. Parties recognize the importance of support for and international cooperation on adaptation efforts and the importance of taking into account the needs of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.

7. Parties should strengthen their cooperation on enhancing action on adaptation, taking into account the Cancun Adaptation Framework, including with regard to:

(a) Sharing information, good practices, experiences and lessons learned, including, as appropriate, as these relate to science, planning, policies and implementation in relation to adaptation actions;

(b) Strengthening institutional arrangements, including those under the Convention that serve this Agreement, to support the synthesis of relevant information and knowledge, and the provision of technical support and guidance to Parties;

(c) Strengthening scientific knowledge on climate, including research, systematic observation of the climate system and early warning systems, in a manner that informs climate services and supports decision-making;

(d) Assisting developing country Parties in identifying effective adaptation practices, adaptation needs, priorities, support provided and received for adaptation actions and efforts, and challenges and gaps, in a manner consistent with encouraging good practices;

(e) Improving the effectiveness and durability of adaptation actions.

8. United Nations specialized organizations and agencies are encouraged to support the efforts of Parties to implement the actions referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article.

9. Each Party shall, as appropriate, engage in adaptation planning processes and the implementation of actions, including the development or enhancement of relevant plans, policies and/or contributions, which may include:

(a) The implementation of adaptation actions, undertakings and/or efforts;

(b) The process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;

(c) The assessment of climate change impacts and vulnerability, with a view to formulating nationally determined prioritized actions, taking into account vulnerable people, places and ecosystems;

(d) Monitoring and evaluating and learning from adaptation plans, policies, programmes and actions; and

(e) Building the resilience of socioeconomic and ecological systems, including through economic diversification and sustainable management of natural resources.

10. Each Party should, as appropriate, submit and update periodically an adaptation communication, which may include its priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions, without creating any additional burden for developing country Parties.

11. The adaptation communication referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article shall be, as appropriate, submitted and updated periodically, as a component of or in conjunction with other communications or documents, including a national adaptation plan, a nationally determined contribution as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 2, and/or a national communication.

12. The adaptation communications referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article shall be recorded in a public registry maintained by the secretariat.

13. Continuous and enhanced international support shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of paragraphs 7, 9, 10 and 11 of this Article, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 9, 10 and 11.

14. The global stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall, inter alia:

(a) Recognize adaptation efforts of developing country Parties;

(b) Enhance the implementation of adaptation action taking into account the adaptation communication referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article;

(c) Review the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support provided for adaptation; and

(d) Review the overall progress made in achieving the global goal on adaptation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article 8

1. Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage.

2. The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement and may be enhanced and strengthened, as determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.

3. Parties should enhance understanding, action and support, including through the Warsaw International Mechanism, as appropriate, on a cooperative and facilitative basis with respect to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change.

4. Accordingly, areas of cooperation and facilitation to enhance understanding, action and support may include:

- (a) Early warning systems;
- (b) Emergency preparedness;
- (c) Slow onset events;
- (d) Events that may involve irreversible and permanent loss and damage;
- (e) Comprehensive risk assessment and management;
- (f) Risk insurance facilities, climate risk pooling and other insurance solutions;
- (g) Non-economic losses;
- (h) Resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems.

5. The Warsaw International Mechanism shall collaborate with existing bodies and expert groups under the Agreement, as well as relevant organizations and expert bodies outside the Agreement.

Article 9

1. Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.

2. Other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily.

3. As part of a global effort, developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds, through a variety of actions, including supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties. Such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts.

4. The provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account country-driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States, considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation.

5. Developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties. Other Parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis.

6. The global stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall take into account the relevant information provided by developed country Parties and/or Agreement bodies on efforts related to climate finance.

7. Developed country Parties shall provide transparent and consistent information on support for developing country Parties provided and mobilized through public interventions biennially in accor-

dance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, at its first session, as stipulated in Article 13, paragraph 13. Other Parties are encouraged to do so.

8. The Financial Mechanism of the Convention, including its operating entities, shall serve as the financial mechanism of this Agreement.

9. The institutions serving this Agreement, including the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, shall aim to ensure efficient access to financial resources through simplified approval procedures and enhanced readiness support for developing country Parties, in particular for the least developed countries and small island developing States, in the context of their national climate strategies and plans.

Article 10

1. Parties share a long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing technology development and transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

2. Parties, noting the importance of technology for the implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions under this Agreement and recognizing existing technology deployment and dissemination efforts, shall strengthen cooperative action on technology development and transfer.

3. The Technology Mechanism established under the Convention shall serve this Agreement.

4. A technology framework is hereby established to provide overarching guidance to the work of the Technology Mechanism in promoting and facilitating enhanced action on technology development and transfer in order to support the implementation of this Agreement, in pursuit of the long-term vision referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

5. Accelerating, encouraging and enabling innovation is critical for an effective, long-term global response to climate change and promoting economic growth and sustainable development. Such effort shall be, as appropriate, supported, including by the Technology Mechanism and, through financial means, by the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, for collaborative approaches to research and development, and facilitating access to technology, in particular for early stages of the technology cycle, to developing country Parties.

6. Support, including financial support, shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of this Article, including for strengthening cooperative action on technology development and transfer at different stages of the technology cycle, with a view to achieving a balance between support for mitigation and adaptation. The global stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall take into account available information on efforts related to support on technology development and transfer for developing country Parties.

Article 11

1. Capacity-building under this Agreement should enhance the capacity and ability of developing country Parties, in particular countries with the least capacity, such as the least developed countries, and those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, such as small island developing States, to take effective climate change action, including, inter alia, to implement adaptation and mitigation actions, and should facilitate technology development, dissemination and deployment, access to climate finance, relevant aspects of education, training and public awareness, and the transparent, timely and accurate communication of information.

2. Capacity-building should be country-driven, based on and responsive to national needs, and foster country ownership of Parties, in particular, for developing country Parties, including at the national, subnational and local levels. Capacity-building should be guided by lessons learned, includ-

ing those from capacity-building activities under the Convention, and should be an effective, iterative process that is participatory, cross-cutting and gender-responsive.

3. All Parties should cooperate to enhance the capacity of developing country Parties to implement this Agreement. Developed country Parties should enhance support for capacity-building actions in developing country Parties.

4. All Parties enhancing the capacity of developing country Parties to implement this Agreement, including through regional, bilateral and multilateral approaches, shall regularly communicate on these actions or measures on capacity-building. Developing country Parties should regularly communicate progress made on implementing capacity-building plans, policies, actions or measures to implement this Agreement.

5. Capacity-building activities shall be enhanced through appropriate institutional arrangements to support the implementation of this Agreement, including the appropriate institutional arrangements established under the Convention that serve this Agreement. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall, at its first session, consider and adopt a decision on the initial institutional arrangements for capacity-building.

Article 12

Parties shall cooperate in taking measures, as appropriate, to enhance climate change education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to information, recognizing the importance of these steps with respect to enhancing actions under this Agreement.

Article 13

1. In order to build mutual trust and confidence and to promote effective implementation, an enhanced transparency framework for action and support, with built-in flexibility which takes into account Parties' different capacities and builds upon collective experience is hereby established.

2. The transparency framework shall provide flexibility in the implementation of the provisions of this Article to those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities. The modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article shall reflect such flexibility.

3. The transparency framework shall build on and enhance the transparency arrangements under the Convention, recognizing the special circumstances of the least developed countries and small island developing States, and be implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of national sovereignty, and avoid placing undue burden on Parties.

4. The transparency arrangements under the Convention, including national communications, biennial reports and biennial update reports, international assessment and review and international consultation and analysis, shall form part of the experience drawn upon for the development of the modalities, procedures and guidelines under paragraph 13 of this Article.

5. The purpose of the framework for transparency of action is to provide a clear understanding of climate change action in the light of the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2, including clarity and tracking of progress towards achieving Parties' individual nationally determined contributions under Article 4, and Parties' adaptation actions under Article 7, including good practices, priorities, needs and gaps, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14.

6. The purpose of the framework for transparency of support is to provide clarity on support provided and received by relevant individual Parties in the context of climate change actions under Articles 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11, and, to the extent possible, to provide a full overview of aggregate financial support provided, to inform the global stocktake under Article 14.

7. Each Party shall regularly provide the following information:

(a) A national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases, prepared using good practice methodologies accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;

(b) Information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving its nationally determined contribution under Article 4.

8. Each Party should also provide information related to climate change impacts and adaptation under Article 7, as appropriate.

9. Developed country Parties shall, and other Parties that provide support should, provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support provided to developing country Parties under Article 9, 10 and 11.

10. Developing country Parties should provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support needed and received under Articles 9, 10 and 11.

11. Information submitted by each Party under paragraphs 7 and 9 of this Article shall undergo a technical expert review, in accordance with decision 1/CP.21. For those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities, the review process shall include assistance in identifying capacity-building needs. In addition, each Party shall participate in a facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress with respect to efforts under Article 9, and its respective implementation and achievement of its nationally determined contribution.

12. The technical expert review under this paragraph shall consist of a consideration of the Party's support provided, as relevant, and its implementation and achievement of its nationally determined contribution. The review shall also identify areas of improvement for the Party, and include a review of the consistency of the information with the modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article, taking into account the flexibility accorded to the Party under paragraph 2 of this Article. The review shall pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of developing country Parties.

13. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall, at its first session, building on experience from the arrangements related to transparency under the Convention, and elaborating on the provisions in this Article, adopt common modalities, procedures and guidelines, as appropriate, for the transparency of action and support.

14. Support shall be provided to developing countries for the implementation of this Article.

15. Support shall also be provided for the building of transparency-related capacity of developing country Parties on a continuous basis.

Article 14

1. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall periodically take stock of the implementation of this Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term goals (referred to as the "global stocktake"). It shall do so in a comprehensive and facilitative manner, considering mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation and support, and in the light of equity and the best available science.

2. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall undertake its first global stocktake in 2023 and every five years thereafter unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.

3. The outcome of the global stocktake shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, as well as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action.

Article 15

1. A mechanism to facilitate implementation of and promote compliance with the provisions of this Agreement is hereby established.

2. The mechanism referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall consist of a committee that shall be expert-based and facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive. The committee shall pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of Parties.

3. The committee shall operate under the modalities and procedures adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its first session and report annually to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.

Article 16

1. The Conference of the Parties, the supreme body of the Convention, shall serve as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.

2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Agreement may participate as observers in the proceedings of any session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement, decisions under this Agreement shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Agreement.

3. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement, any member of the Bureau of the Conference of the Parties representing a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a Party to this Agreement, shall be replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this Agreement.

4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall keep under regular review the implementation of this Agreement and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation. It shall perform the functions assigned to it by this Agreement and shall:

(a) Establish such subsidiary bodies as deemed necessary for the implementation of this Agreement; and

(b) Exercise such other functions as may be required for the implementation of this Agreement.

5. The rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and the financial procedures applied under the Convention shall be applied *mutatis mutandis* under this Agreement, except as may be otherwise decided by consensus by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.

6. The first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall be convened by the secretariat in conjunction with the first session of the Conference of the Parties that is scheduled after the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Subsequent ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall be held in conjunction with ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties, unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.

7. Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement or at the written request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the request being communicated to the Parties by the secretariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties.

8. The United Nations and its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement as observers. Anybody or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by this Agreement and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article.

Article 17

1. The secretariat established by Article 8 of the Convention shall serve as the secretariat of this Agreement.

2. Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the functions of the secretariat, and Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention, on the arrangements made for the functioning of the secretariat, shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Agreement. The secretariat shall, in addition, exercise the functions assigned to it under this Agreement and by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.

Article 18

1. The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention shall serve, respectively, as the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Agreement. The provisions of the Convention relating to the functioning of these two bodies shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Agreement. Sessions of the meetings of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Agreement shall be held in conjunction with the meetings of, respectively, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of the Convention.

2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Agreement may participate as observers in the proceedings of any session of the subsidiary bodies. When the subsidiary bodies serve as the subsidiary bodies of this Agreement, decisions under this Agreement shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Agreement.

3. When the subsidiary bodies established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention exercise their functions with regard to matters concerning this Agreement, any member of the bureaux of those subsidiary bodies representing a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a Party to this Agreement, shall be replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this Agreement.

Article 19

1. Subsidiary bodies or other institutional arrangements established by or under the Convention, other than those referred to in this Agreement, shall serve this Agreement upon a decision of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall specify the functions to be exercised by such subsidiary bodies or arrangements.

2. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement may provide further guidance to such subsidiary bodies and institutional arrangements.

Article 20

1. This Agreement shall be open for signature and subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by States and regional economic integration organizations that are Parties to the Convention. It shall be open for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017. Thereafter, this Agreement shall be open for accession from the day following the date on which it is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depository.

2. Any regional economic integration organization that becomes a Party to this Agreement without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all the obligations under this Agreement. In the case of regional economic integration organizations with one or more member States that are Parties to this Agreement, the organization and its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance of their obligations under this Agreement. In such cases, the organization and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under this Agreement concurrently.

3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, regional economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed by this Agreement. These organizations shall also inform the Depository, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of any substantial modification in the extent of their competence.

Article 21

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date on which at least 55 Parties to the Convention accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 percent of the total global greenhouse gas emissions have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

2. Solely for the limited purpose of paragraph 1 of this Article, “total global greenhouse gas emissions” means the most up-to-date amount communicated on or before the date of adoption of this Agreement by the Parties to the Convention.

3. For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, accepts or approves this Agreement or accedes thereto after the conditions set out in paragraph 1 of this Article for entry into force have been fulfilled, this Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit by such State or regional economic integration organization of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

4. For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this Article, any instrument deposited by a regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited by its member States.

Article 22

The provisions of Article 15 of the Convention on the adoption of amendments to the Convention shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Agreement.

Article 23

1. The provisions of Article 16 of the Convention on the adoption and amendment of annexes to the Convention shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Agreement.

2. Annexes to this Agreement shall form an integral part thereof and, unless otherwise expressly provided for, a reference to this Agreement constitutes at the same time a reference to any annexes thereto. Such annexes shall be restricted to lists, forms and any other material of a descriptive nature that is of a scientific, technical, procedural or administrative character.

Article 24

The provisions of Article 14 of the Convention on settlement of disputes shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Agreement.

Article 25

1. Each Party shall have one vote, except as provided for paragraph 2 of this Article.

2. Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their competence, shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the number of their member States that are Parties to this Agreement. Such an organization shall not exercise its right to vote if any of its member States exercises its right, and vice versa.

Article 26

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Agreement.

Article 27

No reservations may be made to this Agreement.

Article 28

1. At any time after three years from the date on which this Agreement has entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving written notification to the Depositary.

2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.

3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having withdrawn from this Agreement.

Article 29

The original of this Agreement, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

DONE at Paris this twelfth day of December two thousand and fifteen.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have signed this Agreement.

Source: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement

Joint statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Assembly of the Russian Federation Republic of China on strengthening global strategic stability in the world modern era. June 5, 2019

The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, based on the relations of comprehensive, equal and trustful partnership and strategic cooperation between the two states, conscious of their responsibilities for ensuring international security and considering the importance of maintaining global and regional strategic stability, state the following:

Recognizing that nowadays international security is facing serious challenges, the two sides intend to deepen mutual trust and strengthen cooperation in the strategic sphere, as well as persistently protect global and regional strategic stability.

The two sides intend to continue to act in the spirit of the Joint Statement by the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the People's Republic of China on Strengthening Global Strategic Stability signed in Beijing on June 25, 2016, and confirm the importance of the principles set forth therein.

Russia and China note with concern the extremely dangerous actions of certain state that demolish or alter the existing architecture of arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to suit its geopolitical and even commercial needs. In pursuit of strategic advantage in the military sphere and "absolute security", and in order to gain unlimited capabilities of exerting military and political pressure on opponents, such state unceremoniously sabotages the mechanisms instrumental for maintaining stability.

The two sides stress the importance of preserving good relations between the major powers in resolving global strategic issues. Nuclear-weapon States bear great responsibility for maintaining international security and global strategic stability. They should resolve problems of mutual concerns through dialogue and consultations, enhance mutual trust, strengthen common security, as well as avoid misunderstandings and misguided strategic decisions.

The two sides emphasize that the nuclear powers should move away from the Cold War mentality and zero-sum games, stop the unrestricted development of global missile defense (MD) system, diminish the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy and earnestly reduce the threat of nuclear war. The denunciation by the United States of America of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in 2001, that had been one of the pillars of the system maintaining strategic stability for three decades, was a prelude to the building-up of the U.S. global MD system. Actions of the U.S., particularly its plans to develop and deploy strategic missile defense assets in various regions of the world and in outer space, continue to have an extremely negative impact on international and regional strategic balance, as well as security and stability.

The decision by the United States of America to withdraw from the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the INF Treaty) would undermine strategic stability, heighten tensions and mistrust, drastically reduce predictability in the nuclear and missile field, lead to an arms race and increase potential risks of conflict in many regions of the world. Russia and China advocate resolving differences between the Parties to the INF Treaty through dialogues and consultations, restoring the viability of the INF Treaty and preventing developments towards the above-mentioned scenarios. The two sides intend to maintain close dialogues and coordination in this regard.

The collapse of the INF Treaty system can have a negative impact on the prospects of the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, that expires in February 2021. Thus, for the first time in decades, mechanisms of mutual supervision and transparency within the two major nuclear powers are at risk of total destruction with an extremely negative impact on efforts to create prerequisites for multilateral nuclear disarmament. This already complicates the situation in the world and affects international security.

The two sides underline that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is one of the pillars of the modern international security system, a unique international Treaty that harmoniously combines nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and equal cooperation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy. The two sides advocate strengthening the non-proliferation regime, call on all state parties to the NPT to actively implement provisions of the final documents adopted at the previous Review Conferences and actively promote the three pillars of the Treaty: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, so as to contribute to a successful outcome of the 2020 NPT Review Conference.

The two sides are of the view that the irresponsible approach of some states to the fulfillment of their NPT obligations is unacceptable. Such states should renounce the nuclear sharing policy and repatriate all nuclear weapons deployed outside the territory of the nuclear-weapon states.

The two sides underscore the significance of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and reaffirm their irrevocable commitment to the continuous and unconditional implementation of the agreement in conformity with the UN Security Council resolution 2231 and article 25 of the UN Charter. The two sides note with satisfaction the repeated confirmation in the IAEA reports of the Iranian side's strict compliance with its JCPOA obligations and declare that the unilateral U.S. sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran are unacceptable. The two sides call on Iran to refrain from further steps to cease the fulfillment of its JCPOA obligations and urge other JCPOA participants to fulfill their commitments.

The two sides believe that ban on nuclear tests is an important step towards a comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament and is of great importance to international security and stability. The two sides strongly support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as well. Russia and China note that the U.S. statements on not seeking the CTBT ratification and start preparations of their nuclear-test site for potential resumption of nuclear tests undermine the CTBT. The two sides will continue to make every effort to facilitate the early entry into force of the CTBT.

The two sides believe that arms control is an essential tool for strengthening international security and stability. The UN and its multilateral disarmament machinery shall play a central role in the arms control process. The two sides advocate strengthening collective efforts towards multilateralism and deem it necessary to resume substantive multilateral work on the most topical issues of the arms control agenda with no politicization. Any measures in this sphere should be regulated by fundamental principles of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (1978). In particular, measures for reduction and limitation of arms should be equitable, balanced and conducive to strengthening the security of each state.

The realistic prospect of an arms race in outer space and it being turned into an arena for military confrontation that would undermine strategic stability has become a serious concern. Prohibition of the placement of weapons of any kind in outer space could avert a grave threat to international peace and security. All states should, above all, strictly comply with international law that provides for the peaceful use of outer space, including to maintain international peace and security, promote international cooperation and understanding among states. The international community should improve the relevant legal system by joint efforts.

Russia and China welcome the work of the UN Group of Governmental Experts, established to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including, inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, and express regrets that the US has blocked the adoption of the report of the Group.

The two sides advocate that the international community should negotiate a multilateral legally binding instrument that would provide for reliable safeguards against an arms race in outer space and the placement of weapons in outer space, based on the Russian-Chinese Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects. The Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum has the primary role in negotiating an international agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Transparency and confidence-building measures contribute to the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. Russia and China believe that the international community should actively promote the international initiative/political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in outer space.

It is important to comply with and strengthen the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC), including by adopting the Protocol to the Convention providing for, inter alia, an efficient BTWC's compliance verification mechanism, as well as by joint efforts to counteract activities raising questions in the context of the BTWC. It is unacceptable to establish international mechanisms that duplicate the functions of the BTWC and bypass the UN Security Council.

The two sides highly appreciate the contribution that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons makes towards construction of a chemical weapon-free world, and stress that the integrity, effectiveness and universalization of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction are of great relevance to preserving the purposes of and achieving the objectives of the Treaty, as well as to maintaining peace and security. The international community should deal with incidents of alleged uses of chemical weapons by observing the principle of depoliticization within the framework of the Convention.

The ongoing use of chemical weapons in terrorist activities and provocative behaviours, as well as extremist organizations' capacity to produce such weapons cause serious concerns. To address the threat of chemical and biological terrorism, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Chemical and Biological Terrorism should be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament.

WORLD AT A CROSSROADS AND A SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FOR THE FUTURE. 2019

These days, the 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly opens up. So does a new international “political season”.

The session begins at a highly symbolic historical moment. Next year we will celebrate two great and interconnected anniversaries – the 75th Anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic and Second World Wars, and the establishment of the UN.

Reflecting on the spiritual and moral significance of these landmark events, one needs to bear in mind the enormous political meaning of the Victory that ended one of the most brutal wars in the history of mankind.

The defeat of fascism in 1945 had fundamentally affected the further course of world history and created conditions for establishing a post-war world order. The UN Charter became its bearing frame and a key source of international law to this day. The UN-centric system still preserves its sustainability and has a great degree of resilience. It actually is kind of a safety net that ensures peaceful development of mankind amid largely natural divergence of interests and rivalries among leading powers. The War-time experience of ideology-free cooperation of states with different socioeconomic and political systems is still highly relevant.

It is regrettable that these obvious truths are being deliberately silenced or ignored by certain influential forces in the West. Moreover, some have intensified attempts at privatizing the Victory, expunging from memory the Soviet Union’s role in the defeat of Nazism, condemning to oblivion the Red Army’s feat of sacrifice and liberation, forgetting the many millions of Soviet citizens who perished during the War, wiping out from history the consequences of the ruinous policy of appeasement. From this perspective, it is easy to grasp the essence of the concept of expounding the equality of the totalitarian regimes. Its purpose is not just to belittle the Soviet contribution to the Victory, but also to retrospectively strip our country of its historic role as an architect and guarantor of the post-war world order, and label it a “revisionist power” that is posing a threat to the well-being of the so-called free world.

Interpreting the past in such a manner also means that some of our partners see the establishment of a transatlantic link and the permanent implanting of the US military presence in Europe as a major achievement of the post-war system of international relations. This is definitely not the scenario the Allies had in mind while creating the United Nations.

The Soviet Union disintegrated; the Berlin Wall, which had symbolically separated the two “camps,” fell; the irreconcilable ideological stand-off that defined the framework of world politics in virtually all spheres and regions became a thing of the past – yet, these tectonic shifts unfortunately failed to bring the triumph of a unifying agenda. Instead, all we could hear were triumphant pronouncements that the “end of history” had come and that from now on there would be only one global decision-making center.

It is obvious today that efforts to establish a unipolar model have failed. The transformation of the world order has become irreversible. New major players wielding a sustainable economic base seek to increase their influence on regional and global developments; they are fully entitled to claim a greater role in the decision-making process. There is a growing demand for more just and inclusive system. The overwhelming majority of members of the international community reject arrogant neocolonial policies that are employed all over again to empower certain countries to impose their will on others.

All that is greatly disturbing to those who for centuries have been accustomed to setting the patterns of global development by employing exclusive advantages. While the majority of states aspire

to a more just system of international relations and genuine rather than declarative respect for the UN Charter principles, these demands come up against the policies designed to preserve an order allowing a narrow group of countries and transnational corporations to reap from the fruits of globalization. The West's response to the ongoing developments reveals true worldview of its proponents. Their rhetoric on liberalism, democracy and human rights goes hand in hand with the policies of inequality, injustice, selfishness and a belief in their own exceptionalism.

"Liberalism", that the West claims to defend, focuses on individuals and their rights and freedoms. This begs the question: how does this correlate with the policy of sanctions, economic strangulation and overt military threats against a number of independent countries such as Cuba, Iran, Venezuela, North Korea or Syria? Sanctions directly strike at ordinary people and their well-being and violate their social and economic rights. How does the bombing of sovereign nations, the deliberate policy of destroying their statehood leading to the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and condemning millions of Iraqis, Libyans, Syrians and representatives of other peoples to innumerable suffering add up to the imperative of protecting human rights? The reckless Arab Spring gamble destroyed the unique ethnic and religious mosaic in the Middle East and North Africa.

In Europe, the proponents of liberal concepts get along quite well with massive violations of the Russian-speaking population rights in a number of EU and EU-neighboring countries. Those countries violate multilateral international conventions by adopting laws that infringe language and education rights of ethnic minorities.

What is "liberal" about visa denials and other sanctions imposed by the West on residents of Russia's Crimea? They are punished for their democratic vote in favour of reunification with their historical homeland. Does this not contradict the basic right of the people to free self-determination, let alone the right of the citizens to freedom of movement enshrined in international conventions?

Liberalism, or rather its real undistorted essence, has always been an important component of political philosophy both in Russia and worldwide. However, the multiplicity of development models does not allow us to say that the Western "basket" of liberal values has no alternative. And, of course, these values cannot be carried "on bayonets" – ignoring the history of states, their cultural and political identities. Grief and destruction caused by "liberal" aerial bombings are a clear indication of what this can lead to.

The West's unwillingness to accept today's realities, when after centuries of economic, political and military domination it is losing the prerogative of being the only one to shape the global agenda, gave rise to the concept of a "rules-based order." These "rules" are being invented and selectively combined depending on the fleeting needs of the people behind it, and the West persistently introduces this language into everyday usage. The concept is by no means abstract and is actively being implemented. Its purpose is to replace the universally agreed international legal instruments and mechanisms with narrow formats, where alternative, non-consensual methods for resolving various international problems are developed in circumvention of a legitimate multilateral framework. In other words, the expectation is to usurp the decision-making process on key issues.

The intentions of those who initiated this "rules-based order" concept affect the exceptional powers of the UN Security Council. A recent example: when the United States and its allies failed to convince the Security Council to approve politicized decisions that accused, without any proof, the Syrian government of using prohibited toxic substances, they started to promote the "rules" they needed through the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). By manipulating the existing procedures in flagrant violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, they managed (with the votes of a minority of the countries participating in this Convention) to license the OPCW Technical Secretariat to identify those responsible for the use of chemical

weapons, which was a direct intrusion in the prerogatives of the UN Security Council. One can also observe similar attempts to “privatize” the secretariats of international organizations in order to advance interests outside of the framework of universal intergovernmental mechanisms in such areas as biological non-proliferation, peacekeeping, prevention of doping in sports and others.

The initiatives to regulate journalism seeking to suppress media freedom in an arbitrary way, the interventionist ideology of “responsibility to protect”, which justifies violent “humanitarian interventions” without UN Security Council approval under the pretext of an imminent threat to the safety of civilians are part of the same policy.

Separately, attention should be paid to the controversial concept of “countering violent extremism”, which lays the blame for the dissemination of radical ideologies and expansion of the social base of terrorism on political regimes that the West has proclaimed undemocratic, illiberal or authoritarian. This concept provides for direct outreach to civil society over the head of legitimate governments. Obviously, the true goal is to withdraw counterterrorism efforts from beneath the UN umbrella and to obtain a tool of interference in the internal affairs of states.

The introduction of such new concepts is a dangerous phenomenon of revisionism, which rejects the principles of international law embodied in the UN Charter and paves the way back to the times of confrontation and antagonism. It is for a reason that the West is openly discussing a new divide between “the rules-based liberal order” and “authoritarian powers.”

Revisionism clearly manifests itself in the area of strategic stability. The US torpedoing first the ABM Treaty and now the INF Treaty (a decision that enjoys unanimous NATO members’ support) have generated risks of dismantling the entire architecture of nuclear arms control agreements. The prospects of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (The New START) are vague – because the US has not given a clear answer to the Russian proposal to agree to extend the New START beyond its expiry date in February 2021.

Now we are witnessing alarming signs that a media campaign in the United States is being launched to lay the groundwork for abandoning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (which has not been ratified by the United States). This calls into question the future of this treaty, which is vital for international peace and security. Washington has embarked upon the implementation of its plans to deploy weapons in outer space, rejecting proposals to agree on a universal moratorium on such activities.

There is one more example of introducing revisionist “rules”: the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear program, a multilateral agreement approved by the UN Security Council that is of key importance for the nuclear non-proliferation.

Yet another example is Washington’s open refusal to implement unanimous UN Security Council resolutions on the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In the economic field, the “rules” consist of protectionist barriers, sanctions, abuse of the status of the US dollar as the principle means of payment, ensuring competitive advantages by non-market methods, and extraterritorial use of US laws, even towards the United States’ closest allies.

At the same time, our American colleagues are persistently trying to mobilise all of their foreign partners to contain Russia and China. Simultaneously they do not conceal their wish to sow discord between Moscow and Beijing and undermine multilateral alliances and regional integration projects in Eurasia and Asia-Pacific that are operating outside of the US oversight. Pressure is exerted on those countries that do not play by the rules imposed on them and dare make the “wrong choice” of cooperating with US “adversaries”.

So, what do we have as a result? In politics, erosion of the international legal basis, growth of instability and unsustainability, chaotic fragmentation of the global landscape and deepening mistrust

between those involved in the international life. In the area of security, blurring of the dividing line between military and non-military means of achieving foreign policy goals, militarization of international relations, increased reliance on nuclear weapons in US security doctrines, lowering the threshold for the use of such armaments, the emergence of new hotbeds of armed conflicts, the persistence of the global terrorist threat, and militarization of the cyberspace. In the world economy, increased volatility, tougher competition for markets, energy resources and their supply routes, trade wars and undermining the multilateral trade system. We can add a surge of migration and deepening of ethnic and religious strife. Do we need such a “rules-based” world order?

Against this background, attempts by Western liberal ideologues to portray Russia as a “revisionist force” are simply absurd. We were among the first to draw attention to the transformation of the global political and economic systems that cannot remain static due to the objective march of history. It would be appropriate to mention here that the concept of multipolarity in international relations that accurately reflects emerging economic and geopolitical realities was formulated two decades ago by the outstanding Russian statesman Yevgeny Primakov. His intellectual legacy remains relevant now as we mark the 90th anniversary of his birth.

As is evident from the experience of recent years, using unilateral tools to address global problems is doomed to failure. The West-promoted “order” does not meet the needs of humankind’s harmonious development. This “order” is non-inclusive, aims to revise the key international legal mechanisms, rejects the principle of collective action in the relations between states, and by definition cannot generate solutions to global problems that would be viable and stable in the long term rather than seek a propaganda effect within an electoral cycle in this or that country.

What is being proposed by Russia? First of all, it is necessary to keep abreast of the times and recognise the obvious: the emergence of a polycentric world architecture is an irreversible process, no matter how hard anyone tries to artificially hold it back (let alone send it in reverse). Most countries don’t want to be held hostage to someone else’s geopolitical calculations and are determined to conduct nationally oriented domestic and foreign policies. It is our common interest to ensure that multipolarity is not based on a stark balance of power like it was at the earlier stages of human history (for example, in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century), but rather bears a just, democratic and unifying nature, takes into account the approaches and concerns of all those taking part in the international relations without an exception, and ensures a stable and secure future.

There are some people in the West who often speculate that polycentric world order inevitably leads to more chaos and confrontation because the “centers of power” will fail to come to terms among themselves and take responsible decisions. But, firstly, why not try? What if it works? For this, all that is necessary is to start talks on the understanding that the parties should seek a balance of interests. Attempts to invent ones’ own “rules” and impose them on all others as the absolute truth should be stopped. From now on, all parties should strictly comply with the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, starting with the respect for the sovereign equality of states regardless of their size, system of government or development model. Paradoxically, countries that portray themselves as paragons of democracy actually care about it only as they demand from other countries to “put their house in order” on a West-inspired pattern. But as soon as the need arises for democracy in intergovernmental relations, they immediately evade honest talk or attempt to interpret international legal norms at their own discretion.

No doubt, life does not stand still. While taking good care of the post-WWII system of international relations that relies on the United Nations, it is also necessary to cautiously though gradually adjust it to the realities of the current geopolitical landscape. This is completely relevant for the UN Security Council, where, judging by today’s standards, the West is unfairly overrepresented. We are confident that reforming the Security Council shall take into account interests of the Asian,

the African and the Latin American nations whilst any such design must rest upon the principle of the broadest consensus among the UN member states. The same approach should apply to refining the world trade system, with special attention paid to harmonizing the integration projects in various regions.

We should use to the fullest the potential of the G20, an ambitious, all-encompassing global governance body that represents the interests of all key players and takes unanimous decisions. Other associations are playing a growing role as well, alliances projecting the spirit of a true and democratic multipolarity, based on voluntary participation, consensus, values of equality and sound pragmatism, and refraining from confrontation and bloc approaches. These include BRICS and the SCO, which our country is an active member of and which Russia will chair in 2020.

It is evident that without collective effort and without unbiased partnership under the central coordinating role of the UN it is impossible to curb confrontational tendencies, build up trust and cope with common threats and challenges. It is high time to come to terms on uniform interpretation of the principles and norms of international law rather than try to follow the old saying “might goes before right”. It is more difficult to broker deals than to put forward demands. But patiently negotiated trade-offs will be a much more reliable vehicle for predictable handling of international affairs. Such an approach is badly needed to launch substantive talks on the terms and conditions of a reliable and just system of equal and indivisible security in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasia. This objective has been declared multiple times at the top level in the OSCE documents. It is necessary to move from words to deeds. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) have repeatedly expressed their readiness to contribute to such efforts.

It is important to increase our assistance to the peaceful resolution of numerous conflicts, be it in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Latin America or the post-Soviet space. The main point is to live up to the earlier arrangements rather than to invent pretexts for refusing to adhere to the obligations.

As of today, it is especially relevant to counter religious and ethnic intolerance. We urge all the nations to work together to prepare for the World Conference on Interfaith and Inter-Ethnic Dialogue that will be held in Russia in May 2022 under the auspices of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the UN. The OSCE that has formulated a principled position condemning anti-Semitism should act with equal resolve toward Christianophobia and Islamophobia.

Our unconditional priority is to continue providing assistance to the unhindered formation of the Greater Eurasian Partnership, a broad integration framework stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific that involves the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and all other countries of the Eurasian continent, including the EU countries. It would be unwise to contain the unifying processes or, worse still, to put up fences. It would be a mistake to reject the obvious strategic advantages of the common Eurasian region in an increasingly competitive world.

Consistent movement towards this constructive goal will allow us not only to keep up the dynamic development of the national economies and to remove obstacles to the movement of goods, capital, labor and services, but it will also create a solid foundation of security and stability throughout the vast region from Lisbon to Jakarta.

Will the multipolar world continue to take shape through cooperation and harmonization of interests or through confrontation and rivalry? This depends on all of us. Russia will continue to promote a positive and unifying agenda aimed at removing the old dividing lines and preventing the appearance of new ones. Russia has advanced initiatives to prevent an arms race in outer space, establish efficient mechanisms for combating terrorism, including chemical and biological terrorism, and to agree

upon practical measures to prevent the use of cyberspace for undermining national security or for other criminal purposes.

Our proposals to launch a serious discussion on all aspects of strategic stability in the modern era are still on the table.

There have been ideas floated recently to modify the agenda and update the terms. The proposed subjects for discussion vary between “strategic rivalry” and “multilateral deterrence.” Terminology is negotiable, but it is not terms but the essence that really matters. It is now much more important to start a strategic dialogue on the existing threats and risks and to seek consensus on a commonly acceptable agenda. Yet another outstanding statesman from our country, Andrey Gromyko (his 110th birth anniversary we mark this year) said wisely: “Better to have ten years of negotiations than one day of war.”

Source: <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/world-at-a-crossroads-and-a-system-of-international-relations-for-the-future/>

Vladimir Putin at the forum “Preserving the memory of the Holocaust, fighting anti-Semitism”, held at the Yad Vashem memorial complex. January 23, 2020

The international forum held in Jerusalem on January 22–23 is timed to coincide with the 75th anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Nazi death camp and International Holocaust Remembrance Day marked on January 27. On this day in 1945, Soviet troops, which made a crucial contribution to the Victory over Nazi Germany, liberated Auschwitz.

The Yad Vashem memorial complex underwent major renovations in 2005. A new display features documents and exhibits dedicated to the life of European Jews on the eve of World War II and the inhuman suffering inflicted upon them by the Nazis.

* * *

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr President, Mr Prime Minister, colleagues, friends, ladies and gentlemen,

Today we are brought together at the international forum to honour the victims of the Holocaust by a shared responsibility, our duty to the past and the future.

We mourn all the victims of the Nazis, including the six million Jews tortured in ghettos and death camps and killed cruelly during raids. Forty percent of them were citizens of the Soviet Union, so the Holocaust has always been a deep wound for us, a tragedy we will always remember.

Before visiting Jerusalem, I looked through original documents, reports by Red Army officers after the liberation of Auschwitz. I must tell you, colleagues, it is very difficult, unbearable to read these military reports, documents describing in detail how the camp was set up, how the cold-blooded killing machine worked.

Many of them were hand-written by soldiers and officers of the Red Army on the second or third day after the liberation of the prisoners and convey the shock that the Red Army soldiers and officers experienced from what they saw there, from testimonies that caused pain, indignation and compassion.

Red Army Field Marshal Konev, who then led the military operation to capture the densely populated Silesian industrial region of Germany, used tactics to spare as many civilians as possible and, having received a report about the atrocities committed at Auschwitz, forbade himself from even seeing this camp. Later he wrote in his memoirs that he had no right to lose his moral strength, so that a fair sense of revenge would not have blinded him during military operations and would not have caused additional suffering and casualties among the civilian population of Germany.

January 27 marks the 75th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. In this hell, where people from different countries were brought for torture, monstrous experiments and mass killing, hundreds of thousands of people of different ethnicities died. More than half of them were Jews.

The crimes committed by the Nazis, their deliberate, planned, and as they said, “final solution to the Jewish issue,” is one of the darkest and most shameful pages of modern world history.

But we should not forget that this crime also had accomplices. They were often crueler than their masters. Death factories and concentration camps were served not only by the Nazis, but also by their accomplices in many European countries.

In the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, where these criminals were operating, the largest number of Jews were killed. Thus, about 1.4 million Jews were killed in Ukraine, and 220,000 people were killed in Lithuania. I draw your attention, friends, to the fact that this is 95 percent of the pre-war Jewish population of this country. In Latvia, 77,000 Jewish people were killed. Only a few hundred Latvian Jews survived the Holocaust.

The Holocaust was deliberate annihilation of people. But we must remember that the Nazis intended the same fate for many other peoples. Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Poles and many other peoples were declared Untermensch. Their land was meant to serve as living space for the Nazis, providing for their prosperous existence, while the Slavs and other peoples were meant either to be exterminated or to become slaves without rights, culture, historical memory and language.

Back in 1945, it was first of all the Soviet people who put an end to these barbaric plans. As it has just been said, they protected their Fatherland and liberated Europe from Nazism. We paid a price no nation could even imagine in their worst dreams: a toll of 27 million deaths.

We will never forget this. The memory of the Holocaust will serve as a lesson and a warning only if it remains fully intact, without any omissions. Unfortunately, today the memory of war and its lessons and legacy often fall subject to the immediate political situation. This is completely unacceptable. It is the duty of current and future politicians, state and public figures to protect the good name of the living and fallen heroes, civilians and victims of the Nazis and their allies.

We must use everything we have – our informational, political and cultural capabilities as well as the reputation and influence our countries have in the world – to this end. I am sure that everyone present here today, in this audience, shares these concerns and is ready to protect truth and justice together with us.

We are all responsible for making sure that the terrible tragedies of this war will not happen again, that the generations to come will remember the horrors of the Holocaust, the death camps and the siege of Leningrad – Prime Minister Netanyahu has just said that today a monument to the victims of the siege was unveiled here in Jerusalem – Babi Yar, and the burned-down village of Khatyn, remember that we must remain alert and must not overlook when the first seeds of hate, chauvinism and antisemitism take root, or when people start to indulge in xenophobia or other similar manifestations.

Destruction of the past and lack of unity in the face of threats can lead to terrible consequences. We must have the courage to be straight about this and do everything to defend peace.

I think an example could and should be set by the founding countries of the United Nations, the five powers that bear special responsibility for the preservation of civilisation.

We have discussed this with several of our colleagues and, as far as I know, have received a generally positive response to holding a meeting of the heads of state of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: Russia, China, the United States, France and Britain. We can hold it in any country, in any place that our colleagues would find convenient. Russia is ready for such a serious discussion. We intend to send this proposal to the leaders of the Five without delay.

We are faced with many challenges. We discussed one of them recently at the initiative of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. This is about Libya. But we will have to return to this issue at the Security Council and adopt a relevant resolution.

There are many other problems as well. I consider it important and symbolic to hold the proposed meeting this year. After all, we are celebrating 75 years since the end of World War II and the foundation of the United Nations.

A summit of the states that made the main contribution to the routing of the aggressor and the formation of the postwar world order can play a big role in searching for collective ways of responding to current challenges and threats and would demonstrate our common commitment to the spirit of allied relations, historical memory and the lofty ideals and values for which our predecessors, our grandfathers and fathers fought shoulder to shoulder.

In conclusion, I would like to thank our Israeli colleagues for a warm, very hospitable reception here in Jerusalem, and to wish peace, prosperity and all the best to everyone at the conference, and, of course, to the citizens of Israel.

Thank you.

Part 3.

On the Path to a Sustainable Multipolar World Order (Yalta World – 2)

- 3.1. The Destruction Of The Yalta World
- 3.2. Dialogue Among Civilizations
- 3.3. Laying the Foundations of a Sustainable Multipolar World Order
- 3.4. THE SCIENTIFIC PLATFORM FOR THE FORMATION
OF YALTA WORLD – 2**

On a Long-Term Strategy for Sustainable Development Based on a Partnership of Civilizations. December 11, 2011



On a Long-Term Strategy for Sustainable Development Based on Partnership of Civilizations

Report at the Roundtable in conjunction with the 65th session of the UN General Assembly. New York, UN headquarters, June 28, 2011

Introduction

At the Roundtable meeting within the 65th session of the UN General Assembly it is brought up the report "Foundations of Long-Term Strategy for Sustainable Development Based on Partnership of Civilizations" prepared by an international team of scientists to the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development Rio +20 (www.globstrategy.newparadigm.ru).

This report is the result of intense creative activity of scientists of modern Russian civilization school together with scientists from Kazakhstan, Ukraine, United States, France, Lebanon and other countries to form a new branch of social science - the science of civilization (civiliography). Over a period of two decades it has been published a series of monographs where it is validated a civilizational approach to the history and future of humanity, expounded a theory of civilizations of François Guizot, Nikolai Danilevsky, Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee, Pitirim Sorokin, Fernand Braudel. Among these monographs — "At the Cradle of a New Civilization" (1993), "History of Civilizations" (1995, 1997), «The Past and the Future of Civilizations» (USA, 2000), "Globalization and Interaction of Civilizations" (2001, 2003), "Civilizations: Theory, History, Dialogue and the Future" (in 6 volumes, 2006-2009).

An international team of scientists prepared, published in 10 parts (www.globfuture.newparadigm.ru) the Global Outlook "The Future of Civilizations" for 2050, which was discussed

**Yuri Yakovets, Professor,
RANS Academician**

and received a positive assessment at the roundtable within the 64th session of the UN General Assembly on 27.10.2009 and at the 4th Civilization Forum within Expo — 2010 in Shanghai, 12–14.10.2010.

The purpose of this report prepared by an international team of scientists at the initiative and under a coordinative role of the Pitirim Sorokin — Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute in 2010-2011 is the validation of the need and identification of the key areas of a long-term strategy of partnership among civilizations ensuring a surmounting of a cluster of global crises of the first quarter of the 21st century and entering the trajectory of global sustainable development based on the wave of epochal innovations and basic innovations of the civilizational revolution of the 21st century.

1. The need for and distinctions of a long-term strategy

From the end of the 20th century humanity entered into a long period of unsustainable development. The global civilization is shaking under the blows of global crises resonating with each other — energy-ecological, demographic, technological, economic, geopolitical, and socio-cultural. All components of the modern genotype of civilizations have turned to be unsteady, requiring a profound transformation, innovation renewal.

The main cause of these upheavals is that the industrial world civilization prevailed for two centuries has outlived its historical period, is at the decline stage, requires replacement by a higher and progressive society, the main features of which have been predicted by Pitrim Sorokin, Alvin Toffler and other scientists

and that we call the *integral world civilization*, the historical horizon of which is the 21st-22nd centuries.

In these circumstances, there are two possible positions, two strategies of the global community and its institutions, the foremost among which is the UN.

Either to try to partially improve, adapt to new conditions of the system outlived its period, thus prolonging its agony and exacerbating global conflicts and crises. This strategy prevails so far.

Or by defining the contours of a future society, to develop and implement a long-term strategy for a radical renewal of society, concentrate efforts and resources on the fast becoming of an integral civilization with the foundations emerging before our eyes, and thus to ease the labor pains of the risks of transition to a new stage in the development of civilization.

The international team of scientists is on the second position, putting forward theoretical validations and offering practical steps towards the implementation of a strategic breakthrough to a new society.

What are the features of the strategy offered by the report originators?

First, it comes from the recognition of the content in the first half of the 21st century of the civilizational revolution — a long and painful transition from an industrial to an integral global civilization, from the fourth to the fifth generation of local civilizations. The mission of a long-term strategy is to expedite and facilitate this transition, equipping the progressive forces with a clear understanding the goals of the movement and reliable ways to achieve these goals.

Second, the strategy should provide a balanced and synchronous transformation of all aspects of society, all six com-

ponents of the genotype of civilization — natural-environmental, demographic, technological, economic, geopolitical, socio-cultural — reaching greater stability and predictability in the dynamics of society.

Third, the driving force behind the long-term strategy for the transformation of society is recognized the partnership of 12 local civilizations of the fifth generation — the main actors — in the geo-economic and geopolitical arena of the 21st century.

Fourth, there are proposed specific institutions, mechanisms and global partnership programs of civilizations in the implementation of the strategy.

2. Six key areas in the implementation of the strategy

The report validates the six key areas to implement the long-term strategy meeting the structure of the genotype of civilizations.

First, The energy and ecological strategy intended to address the global energy and ecological crisis, the establishment of noospheric energy and ecological mode of production and consumption based on the active energy saving, comprehensive use of fossil fuel, and its wider substitution with renewable and alternative energy sources, to overcome the food crisis, the eradication of hunger on the planet and the full providing of the population of all countries and civilizations with quality food and clean drinking water. The international energy-ecological program "Arctic Energy " with the purpose — to turn the Arctic into space of partnership of civilizations in the development of almost

a quarter of prospective world's hydrocarbon reserves is developed among other things to this end.

Second. The strategy of demographic partnership aimed at surmounting the global demographic crisis — the growing number of countries affected by depopulation and aging of the population, with high rates of population growth and unemployment in the relatively poor countries and civilizations, which generates a high wave of migration with its consequences. Based on the dialogue there is a need in making a demographic strategy and global migration program differentiated for a group of countries to promote optimization of migration flows, as well as the program "Active Aging" for a growing share of older population.

Third. The response to the growing natural-economic and demographic constraints should become a strategy of innovation and technology partnership of civilizations. The proposed program of accelerated development and diffusion of the sixth technological mode will enable to increase the rate of productivity growth and reproduction efficiency, to reduce a dangerous gap between the vanguard and lagging countries and civilizations, to make the fruits of the technological revolution of the 21st century accessible to all.

Fourth. The strategy of economic partnership should be directed to large-scale replacement of the increasingly parasitic late industrial economic system which has led to the formation of a virtual "bubble economy" and the neoliberal model of globalization deepening the gulf between rich and poor countries — to the integral economic system, socially and noospherically innovation-oriented under the primacy of the real rather than speculative

virtual economy, to the humanistic-noospheric model of globalization with the convergence of living standards between rich and poor countries and civilizations.

Fifth. The basis of the geopolitical strategy of dialogue and partnership of nations and civilizations should be a recognition of reality and inevitability of the multi-polar world order, development of mechanisms and institutions for partnership of civilizations, the rise of the UN's role as a central link in the implementation of the global strategy, formation of a system of global law to regulate the basic processes of interaction between countries and civilizations.

Sixth. The strategy of socio-cultural dialogue and partnership of civilizations is aimed at becoming an integral socio-cultural system predicted by Pitirim Sorokin, the elevation of the role of science in the scientific revolution of the 21st century, raising the fundamentality and creativity of education to prepare the new generation to the realities of the 21st century, the revival of high culture and humanistic-noospheric ethics. We intend to discuss these issues at the 5th Civilization Forum in UNESCO and to propose a draft Universal Declaration on the strategy of dialogue and partnership of civilizations in science.

All of these six key areas of strategy represent a unified system, are inextricably linked and must be implemented synchronized and balanced.

3. The driving forces of formation and implementation of a long-term global strategy

The reversal of very dangerous trends of global development is a very complicated and lengthy thing, requiring the consoli-

dation of progressive forces to overcome the resistance of conservative forces that are interested in maintaining the prevailing current orders and trends. What are these progressive forces?

First, the progressive-minded intellectuals — developing a new paradigm scientists and educators, cultural workers alarmed by the arisen threat and with a distant horizon of vision. These are they who are shaping a scientific basis for the formation of a new long-term strategy.

Second, strategically-minded national and international figures and politicians who feel responsible for the fates of nations and humanity.

Third, innovation-minded entrepreneurs focused on the basic innovations and feeling responsibility for further consequences of their activities.

Fourth, the leaders of the new generation, a generation of the 20s of the 21st century to whom a burden and responsibility for making strategic decisions will pass from 2011 for three decades. As the experience of revolutions occurring in 2011 in the Arab countries and commotions in a number of European countries show, this is the revolution and the commotions of a new generation that does not tolerate heavy heritage and seeks to transform it but does not know how to do it.

We hope that strategically-minded state and international leaders will perceive the warnings and recommendations of scientists and proceed to the formation of a long-term global strategy of partnership among civilizations, which allows overcoming the dangerous tendencies and leading humanity to the path of sustainable global development.

**A Long-term Strategy for Global Sustainable Development
Based on Partnership of Civilizations: Concepts,
Strategies, Programs and Projects. June 13-17, 2012**



***A Long-term Strategy for Global
Sustainable Development Based on
Partnership of Civilizations: Concepts,
Strategies, Programs and Projects***

Recommendations of the 6th Civilization Forum within the UN
Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio +20
(Brazil, Rio-de-Janeiro, 13–17 June 2012)

The 6th Civilization Forum “Long-term Strategy for Global Sustainable Development Based on Partnership of Civilizations: Concepts, Strategies, Programs, and Projects” was held within the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio +20. Major Forum organizer — the Pitirim Sorokin — Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute, co-organizers — the Institute for Economic Strategies, Council for Study of Productive Forces, Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Kazakhstan National Academy of Natural Sciences, State Agency on Science, Innovations and Informatization of Ukraine, International Futures Research Academy, International Center for Dialogue and Partnership of civilizations at Lebanese University, Noosphere Spiritual Ecological World Assembly, Brazilian-Russian Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Cândido Mendes University. The Forum is organized under support of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Foundation.

The Forum sessions discussed the report of the international team of scientists to the Conference RIO+20 “The Foundations of a Long-term Strategy for Global Sustainable Development Based on Partnership of Civilizations” as well as issues of the global energy-ecological strategy and strategy for dialogue and partnership of civilizations in science, education and culture. There were

presented the projects of construction of the intercontinental Eurasia-America transport link via the Bering Strait, setting up the Open Internet University of Dialogue and Partnership of Civilizations, arrangement of an educational cruise "The Noah's Ark of Civilizations", as well as monographs "Analysis of the Factors of Scientific-Technological Development in the Context of Civilization Cycles" and "World Energy 2050".

The letter of the group of scientists (Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Brasilia, France, and Lebanon) was transmitted to UN Under-Secretary-General Sha Zukang on the establishment of the UN Institute for Global Forecasting and Strategic Planning under the ECOSOC.

As a result of the discussion, participants have formulated the following conclusions and recommendations.

1. Scientific Foundations of a Long-term strategy for Global Sustainable Development Based on Partnership of Civilizations

1.1. The international team of scientists on the basis of the developed in 2007–2009 Global Forecast "The Future of Civilizations" for 2050, which was reported at the roundtable meeting of the 64th Session of UN General Assembly on October 27, 2009 and the 4th Civilization Forum "Prospects for Development and Partnership Strategy of Civilizations" within EXPO-2010 in Shanghai on October 12, 2010, prepared a report "Foundations of a Long-term Strategy for Global Sustainable Development Based on Partnership of Civilizations."

The Report was discussed at the roundtable meeting within the 65th Session

of the UN General Assembly on June 28, 2011, at the 4th Forum of the UN Alliance of Civilizations in Qatar, on December 11, 2011, at the 5th Civilization Forum in Paris on April 12, 2012, and submitted for discussion at the 6th Civilization Forum within the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio +20.

The Forum participants endorse the work performed by the international team of scientists on the preparation of the Report and share the fundamental positions of its originators that:

- it is necessary to embark on preparations of the long-term strategy for global sustainable development based on the Report submitted by the international team of scientists;

- the development of a long-term strategy should be based on the need for a balanced response to new challenges of the 21st century in all areas of global development— energy-ecological, demographic, technological, economic, geopolitical and socio-cultural; and on the need for a systematic approach to overcome the cluster of global crises of the beginning of the 21st century, and to follow the path of global sustainable development from the second quarter of the century;

- the long-term strategy can be successfully implemented through the partnership of nations and civilizations, under the leading role of the United Nations, and will require the enhancement of its role in the global strategic planning and regulation.

1.2. The Forum participants endorse the basic points of the Report "Foundations of a Long-term Strategy for Global Sustainable Development based on Partnership of Civilizations" and recommend to the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, UN Economic and Social

Council to consider the proposals of the international team of scientists.

The Forum participants support the point of the draft outcome document of the UN Conference that the UN and its organizations in their activities should rely to a greater extent on modern science, and recommend to establish the World Science Council under the UN Secretary-General.

1.3. The World Summits in 1992 and 2002 and the Millennium Summit in 2000 laid down the foundations for a global sustainable development strategy focused on the efficient use of world resources in the interests of the present and future generations, and determined the Millennium Goals that the global community intends to achieve by 2015. It has allowed reaching a certain progress in focusing efforts and resources to achieve these goals.

However, the Forum participants note that the depth and duration of crises and transformations taking place in the world require the development and adoption at the World Summit to be carried out of the scientifically justified long-term global strategy for sustainable development based on partnership of nations and civilizations in response to challenges of the 21st century.

Under the given circumstances, many points of the global strategy for sustainable development adopted in the last century require a system update and new approaches to meet the realities and contradictions of the 21st century. Therefore, scientists should be engaged in refining, on the basis of long-term forecasts, the system of global sustainable development goals to 2030.

1.4. The Forum participants welcome the initiative of the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev to develop a long-term strategy for the future, based on G-Global principles in the context of in-

terests of all nations and civilizations and on the basis of constructive multipolarity, dialogue, consensus and tolerance.

2. The Main Objectives and Features of the Long-Term Strategy

2.1. The main objective of the Strategy is to focus the efforts of the progressive forces of the planet on overcoming the consequences of crises of the transitional period of the first quarter of the 21st century, and establishing in the second quarter of the century the foundations of an integral, humanistic noospheric world civilization ensuring improvement of the quality of life of population, efficiency of reproduction, eradication of poverty and hunger, establishment of "green" economy and more socially fair economic system.

2.2. This objective is realized through:

- establishing the noospheric energy-ecological mode of production and consumption, ensuring harmonious co-evolution of society and nature, improvement of the ecological situation in the world, and more effective and efficient use of mineral, water, land and other natural resources subject to the interests of future generations;

- providing differentiated demographic and migration policies aimed at overcoming the depopulation in some countries and overpopulation in the other, and at optimization of migration flows;

- assimilating the achievements of the technological revolution of the 21st century, the sixth technological mode, and increasing the growth rates of labor productivity, as well as the convergence of levels of technological development of countries and civilizations;

- accelerating the transition to the integral economic system, which is socially, noospherically and innovation-oriented and ensures overcoming of the gap between rich and poor nations, civilizations and social strata, as well as implementation of the principle of social equity in wealth distribution;

- organizing the constructive multipolar world order based on dialogue and partnership among nations and civilizations in response to the challenges of the new century, and enhancement of the UN role in this process;

- promoting the science, increasing the creativity of education, regenerating the high culture, preserving and expanding of the national and world cultural heritage and diversity, strengthening of the moral foundations of a family and society.

• 2.3 The Forum participants proposed the leadership of ECOSOS to establish under its auspices The Institute for Global Forecasting and Strategic Planning, which could be based on the international team of scientists. The purpose of the Institute is to develop and provide an expertise of long-term global forecasts, to justify strategic goals and priorities of sustainable development for 2030 time scale, and to monitor the progress in achievement of these goals, as well as to provide advanced training of UN system's managers in the area of global forecasting, strategic planning, dialogue and partnership of civilizations.

3. The Long-term Strategy for Sustainable Energy-Ecological and Food Development

3.1. The beginning of the 21st century was marked by global energy-ecological and food crises. The Forum participants believe

that the strategy for energy-ecological and food partnership of nations and civilizations should be aimed at overcoming of these crises, while its ultimate goal is establishment of the noospheric energy-ecological mode of production and consumption.

3.2. According to the Forum participants, there are the following basic directions of the strategy implementation:

- establishment of "green" economy, overcome of energy-wasting, transition to energy efficiency in manufacturing, housing and public utility sector and households simultaneously with the increase in the power availability per worker and energy consumption in lagging countries;

- more efficient use of non-renewable fossil fuel resources based on new ecologically clean technologies; effective long-term efforts for ecologically balanced development of the Arctic energy resources;

- wide replacement of fossil fuel with renewable and alternative environmentally clean sources of energy;

- double reduction of the emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere by the middle of the 21st century, that requires to restructure radically the energy sector, and significant reduce other types of environmental pollution;

- reduction of the deforestation of tropical forests which are the "green lungs" of the planet, reduction of losses from forest fires, and multipurpose utilization of forest resources;

- effective measures to overcome the shortage of fresh water, to supply with fresh water all countries and regions, all the world's population; development of water recycling and minimizing the discharge of untreated sewage;

- overcoming the food crisis on the basis of a more efficient use of cultivated

land and increase of their fertility; double increasing of food production by 2050 to overcome hunger in the world;

- integrated, environmentally safe processing of industrial and household wastes, especially in metropolitan areas;
- preservation and transfer to the next generations of biodiversity of the planet.

3.3. The Forum participants believe that all the pressing ecological problems can be addressed effectively only in a global scale through the global strategy for energy-ecological and food partnership of nations and civilizations. It is necessary to expand the competencies, to increase the role and responsibilities of UNEP, FAO, and the Global Environment Facility in the implementation of the strategy for energy-ecological partnership of civilizations.

The Forum participants welcome the initiatives of the Republic of Kazakhstan to establish a specialized agency under the auspices of UN for the global energy development, to implement the Green Bridge program, to hold the World Expo "Energy of the Future" in Astana in 2017, and to develop the Global energy-ecological strategy, and recommend UN Secretary General to establish a High-level Group and Scientific Group to develop a draft of this strategy to be presented and discussed at the Global Energy-Ecological Summit.

3.4. The Forum participants attach great importance to the implementation of the construction project of the intercontinental Eurasia — America transport link via the Bering Strait, viewing it as a project of the century, carried out on the basis of public-private and inter-civilization partnership. The creation of this transport link will become an effective instrument for the efficient exploitation and transportation of abundant energy resources of the

North-East of Russia and the Arctic area in general, as well as for the integrated development of the Arctic regions. The transport link will be the missed component for creation of a global land transport system, the largest transit transport corridor, uniting two hemispheres of the Earth. We call upon the governments of interested countries to show political will and, along with representatives from industry, transport, financial and business community, to engage actively in the process of implementing the Project, setting up for this purpose a special international consortium. The Forum participants support the project, considering it as a powerful tool and a crucial factor for the future uniting of continents, civilizations, nations and major companies on the basis of partnership in order to develop the utmost rich resources of the Arctic and to improve the living conditions of the peoples of the North.

4. The Strategy of Dialogue and Partnership of Civilizations in Demography, Migration and Public Health Promotion

4.1. The Forum participants state that since the end of the 20th century it is observed a reverse of demographic trends. The number of countries facing depopulation is increasing, while the over-population and excess of workers are maintained in other countries. The aging of population, that is growing share of the elderly and senior citizens, becomes a long-term trend. In a number of countries there is a high infant and maternal mortality, HIV/AIDS and other dangerous diseases. The level of expenses per capita on public health differs in hundreds of times by countries of the

world. It is increasing the flow of migrants from poor countries with excess labor to rich countries with a deficit of workers, creating inter-ethnic and inter-civilization conflicts.

4.2. The Forum participants believe that demographic problems should be solved on the basis of dialogue and partnership between nations and civilizations; development of a differentiated by groups of countries demographic policy, of a strategy of active longevity for the elderly, of a large-scale global program of public health development in poor countries with a considerable assistance from rich nations and civilizations; development of a global migration strategy that optimizes the flows of migrants, which creates conditions for employment and decreases the motivation for migration in poor countries, as well as assists migrants to adapt to new conditions of their life and work.

5. The Strategy of Innovation and Technology Partnership of Nations and Civilizations

5.1. The Forum participants note the signs of unfolding a global technological revolution of the 21st century, the main results of which are the establishment of the post-industrial technological mode of production, assimilation and diffusion of the sixth technological mode, humanization and ecologic-balancing of technology. This creates preconditions for a faster economic growth and improvement of labor productivity. On the basis of the technological revolution, the problems of creating "green" economy and eradicating the poverty on the planet can be solved. At the same time, the technological revolution

will be accompanied by a deepening of the process of technological polarization as the lagging countries and civilizations do not have financial and human resources for the transition of economy to a new technological basis.

5.2. The Forum participants proceed from the reason that the strategy of innovation and technology partnership among nations and civilizations should be directed at:

- the increase of innovation activity of population and enterprises, promotion of the development, dissemination and transfer of the six mode technologies to increase the growth rates of labor productivity and saving of resources, to support evolution of a "Green Economy";
 - the prioritized development of socially and environmentally oriented technologies;
 - large-scale assistance of the vanguard countries and civilizations in the technological modernization of economy of the lagging countries in order to reduce the technological polarization;
 - creation of favorable environment for the assimilation of scientific discoveries, major inventions and basic innovations, and intellectual property protection;
 - enhancement the role of the UN, and especially UNDP, in assisting the progress of technology on the basis of dialogue and partnership among nations and civilizations;
 - formation of a global innovation system, which provides a continuous and balanced innovative upgrade of technologies in all countries and civilizations.
- 5.3. The Forum participants support the proposal for determining within the UN system an organization responsible for promoting technological development

and partnership, and setting up, under the aegis of such organization, of the Global Technology Foundation to promote innovative breakthrough projects and assist the lagging in the technical sense countries.

6. The Partnership Strategy for Economic Development and Transformation of Globalization

6.1. The Forum participants have come to the conclusion that the global financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009 and its second wave in 2011–2012 showed that the industrial economic system prevailed during two centuries is undergoing a stage of decline. It is expressed in falling rates of economic growth, formation of the “bubble economy”, growing polarization of the level of economic development between rich and poor countries and civilizations, and uncontrolled domination of TNCs in the world economy and globalization processes.

6.2. The Forum participants believe that the partnership of nations and civilizations in economy and globalization should be directed at:

- accelerating the economic growth rates based on the strategy of innovation breakthrough, assimilation of achievements of the technological revolution of the 21st century, basic innovations of the sixth technological mode;

- progressive changes in the structure of economy, faster development of the real sector of economy, consumer and innovation-investment reproduction sectors while limiting the scope of extremely bloated market infrastructure, overcoming the bubble economy;

- reducing the gap between rich and poor countries and civilizations on the basis of large-scale assistance in modernizing the economy and training human resources for poor countries;

- developing an effective international financial credit and monetary systems, the regulation of world prices, limiting abuses of transnational corporations using global anti-trust laws;

- humanistic-noospheric transformation of globalization under the supervision of the institutions of global civil society in the interests of a more equitable distribution of its results (including rental income) between countries and civilizations;

- enhancing the role and responsibility of the UN Economic and Social Council, and other international economic organizations in the long-term forecasting and regulation of development of the world economy under strengthening of the scientific foundations and democratic principles in their activities, taking into account the interests of all countries and civilizations.

6.3. The Forum participants support the proposal to increase the role of ECOSOC in the development and implementation of a global economic strategy that meets the interests of the majority of the population of the planet and allows the pursuance of an effective global anti-crisis policy.

7. The Strategy for the Establishment of the Multipolar World Order Based on Dialogue and Partnership among Nations and Civilizations

7.1. The Forum participants state that the realignment of the geopolitical architecture at the end of the 20th — early 21st

centuries, the depth of the crisis shocks of the first quarter of this century, aggravation of local conflicts between nations and civilizations, a danger of the spread of international terrorism dictate the need for a system of the world order based on dialogue and partnership of nations and civilizations, and ensuring peace and security in all corners of the planet, and the implementation of pressing democratic reforms.

7.2. The Forum participants uphold a principal stand that the main areas of this strategy are:

- development of the system of constructive multipolar world order, based on the recognition of equality and taking into account the interests of the major centers of economic and geopolitical forces, civilizations and nations on the principles of their dialogue and partnership;
- the elevation of the UN's role as the world democratic body of dialogue and partnership among all nations and civilizations of the world, strengthening its peace-keeping role in solving rising conflicts, the transformation of the UN and its organizations to enhance its strategic role;
- enhancement of coordination of regional inter-governmental and inter-civilizational associations as local centers for dialogue and partnership among nations and civilizations in the regional context;
- formation of a system of a global law for the regulation of critical areas of international activity, as well as bodies for dispute resolution and support of the implementation of global rules of law;
- establishment under the aegis of the UN of the international forces to maintain peace, security and rules of law on the planet and to respond to the emergencies;

- renunciation of the use of wars to resolve conflicts between nations and civilizations, prohibition (under international control) of the spread and use of existing and creating new weapons of mass destruction.

8. The Strategy of Dialogue and Partnership in Science, Education, Culture and Morality

8.1. The Forum participants recognize that the end of the 20th — early 21st centuries are characterized by a global crisis in the socio-cultural area, the fall of the creative and predictive power and prestige of science, extreme pragmatization of education and commercialization of culture, undermining the moral foundations of family and society, and the growing threat to cultural and civilizational diversity.

8.2. The Forum participants endorse the recommendations of the 5th Civilization Forum in Paris "The Long-term Strategy for Dialogue and Partnership of Civilizations in Science, Education and Culture" and iterate that to resist these dangerous trends, it is necessary to develop and implement a global strategy of dialogue and partnership among nations and civilizations in science, education, culture and morality, including the following areas:

- enhancement the role of science in a knowledge-based society; preservation, enrichment and transmission to future generations of the world scientific heritage; fostering the formation and spread of the post-industrial scientific paradigms and achievements of the coming scientific revolution of the 21st century; support of scientific discoveries and major inventions; the provision of large-scale assis-

tance to the lagging countries in strengthening the scientific capacity;

- synthesis of the achievements of scientific, education and information revolutions to improve the fundamentality and creativity of education, to facilitate continuing and distance education, and to transfer accumulated and enriched knowledge and skills to future generations;

- revival of high culture, preservation and transmission to the next generations of the world cultural heritage and cultural diversity, promotion of artistic creativity of children and youth of all nations and civilizations, preservation of linguistic diversity, multi-faceted cultural exchange, civilizational, cultural and historical tourism;

- consolidation of the efforts of representatives of religions, men of science, culture, educators and mass media in strengthening the moral foundations of family and society, in overcoming the trends to moral degradation, violence, drug addiction, alcoholism; education of the younger generation in the spirit of kindness, mutual respect, solidarity, tolerance, and humanistically noospheric morals;

- development and implementation under the leading role of UNESCO as a head organization of UN for cooperation in the sphere of spiritual reproduction, of a long-term strategy of dialogue and partnership of civilizations in the areas of science, education, culture and morality; development and adoption of the Universal UNESCO Declaration on the Strategy of Dialogue and Partnership of Civilizations in Science, Education and Culture; formation of the Global Education Foundation under the aegis of UNESCO and the UN Alliance of Civilizations.

8.3. The Forum participants endorse the points in the draft outcome document of the Conference on strengthening the scientific-technological and innovative capacity of developing countries and transferring of advanced technologies (clause 119); on elaborating the education for sustainable development, raising the next generation in the spirit of values and interdisciplinary paired approaches needed to sustainable development (clause 100, clause 101); on admission of the diversity of cultures and civilizations and their contributions to the enrichment of humanity (clause 16), and consider it necessary to reflect these fundamental points in the draft of UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Strategy of Dialogue and Partnership of Civilizations in Science, Education and Culture.

8.4. The Forum participants note the prime significance for the elaboration and implementation of the Global Strategy for Sustainable Development of the scientific heritage of V.I. Vernadsky and welcome the initiative of scientists from Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other countries in holding scientific conferences and symposia dedicated to the 150th birth anniversary of V.I. Vernadsky, including the World Congress "Society and Nature: the Path to the Noospheric Civilization" (Saint Petersburg, September 2013).

8.5. The Forum participants support the points of the draft outcome document of the Conference on education development and the establishment of the UN High Commissioner for new generation, as well as projects to establish the Open Internet University of Dialogue and Partnership of Civilizations and to arrange an educational cruise in the Mediterranean and Black Sea "Noah's Ark of Civiliza-

tions" in 2014, and call upon the Alliance of Civilizations, the Government of Russia, France and other countries to support these projects.

9. The Strategy of Dialogue and Partnership among Nations and Civilizations and Their Unions

9.1. The global strategy of dialogue and partnership of civilizations determines general approaches and principles to be implemented by nations, civilizations and their unions subject to the conditions of their development, civilization distinctive features and traditions and relying on regional and national long-term strategies.

The Forum participants consider it necessary to develop regional and national long-term strategies for sustainable development based on partnership of civilizations and nations subject to their specific features.

9.2. For the civilizations of Europe (Western European, Eastern European, Eurasian) the prime strategic objectives are to overcome the growing depopulation and aging of the population; to increase self-sufficiency in energy and other natural resources and their efficient use; the balanced and environmentally sound energy resources development in the Arctic; the modernization and raise of competitive capacity of economy through the development and diffusion of the sixth technological mode, improvement the structure of economy, elimination of excessive gaps in the level of economic, technological and social development; to strengthen the mechanism of foreign policy coordination, ensuring security and

peace within the framework of the OSCE; to implement joint efforts to assimilate the achievements in science and education, as well as to preserve and expand the scientific and cultural heritage, and to transfer it to future generations.

9.3. For the civilizations of America, and Oceania (Northern American, Latin American, oceanic) and their unions the prime strategic objectives are the optimization of migration flows; technological modernization of economies and promotion of rapid modernization of lagging countries; overcoming of poverty and extreme poverty in lagging countries; strengthening the regulation of the economy and overcoming the abuses of TNCs and global financial centers; strengthening the struggle against terrorism and drugs; assimilation of achievements of the scientific and education revolutions; the preservation of cultural diversity; strengthening of the moral foundations of the family.

9.4. For the ancient civilizations of Asia and Africa (Japanese, Chinese, Indian, Buddhist, Muslim and African) and their unions the prime objectives are the regulation of demographic and migration processes; effective use of energy and other natural resources, and solution of environmental issues with regard to the interests of future generations; overcoming of the technological and economic backwardness and poverty in many countries; development of scientific and educational capacity; preservation of cultural heritage and diversity.

9.5. For the unions of civilizations in the form of different groups (APEC, SCO, BRICS, and the OSCE) the prime objective is to develop mechanisms for inter-civilizational and inter-state partnership to

implement a long-term strategy for global sustainable development based on partnership of civilizations.

10. Prospects for Sustainable Development of Indigenous Peoples

10.1. Having discussed the problems and prospects for sustainable development of indigenous peoples, the Forum participants note that an important condition for the preservation of civilization and cultural diversity is to create conditions for preservation and development of indigenous peoples of the North who are carriers of the value system of the Arctic (circumpolar) unique civilization — the interaction space of three local civilizations (Eurasian, Western European, and Northern American), as well as the indigenous peoples of America, Asia, Oceania and Africa.

10.2. The Forum participants support proposals on the need to develop a long-term strategy to address the pressing problems of preservation and heritage of indigenous peoples:

- development of historic-archaeological and forecasting studies on the past, present and future of indigenous peoples;
- preservation and transmission to future generations of traditional household methods and modes of life, as well as of cultural heritage and the noospheric ethics of the indigenous peoples;
- enhancement of governmental and international support for economic, social and cultural development of indigenous peoples;
- development of natural resources in the context of interests of the indigenous peoples, their rights to receive a share of the rental income;

- participation of representatives of indigenous peoples in municipal and regional government, public administration, governmental authorities, and international organizations;

10.3. The Forum participants consider it essential to preserve the unique Arctic (circumpolar) civilization, traditional economy and mode of life of indigenous peoples of the North, and support the proposal to establish in Yakutia the real-virtual museum of the Arctic civilization and to develop the Arctic civilization tourism.

11. Closing Provisions

11.1. The Forum participants authorize the Forum Organizing Committee to notify these recommendations to the Preparatory Committee of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, UN leaders, governments of Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Brasilia and other countries, and to publish them and post on the Internet.

11.2. The Forum participants recommend publishing its papers and these Recommendations in the Issue №4 of the journal "Partnership of Civilizations" in Russian and English.

11.3. The Forum participants express their sincere gratitude to the organizers of the Forum for a great job of preparing and holding, and publishing a special issue of the international scientific-practical journal "Partnership of Civilizations"; to the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Foundation for supporting the Forum; and the Brazilian-Russia Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Tourism and Cândido Mendes University — for the warm welcome and hospitality.

The Moscow Declaration of Intellectuals “To Prevent a Global Catastrophe, To Ensure the Preservation and Prosperity of Civilization”. December 5, 2012



***The Moscow Declaration of Intellectuals
“To Prevent a Global Catastrophe,
To Ensure the Preservation and
Prosperity of Civilization”****

We, the intellectuals of three generations — scientists and educators, politicians and public figures, post-graduates and students — participants of the 4th World Congress of Global Civilization “On the Path to the Noosphere Civilization” (Moscow, 03–05.12.2013) appeal to the United Nations and other international organizations, governments and political figures, businessmen and cultural professionals, leaders of the new generation with the following warnings and suggestions.

1. Humanity in the 21st century has faced with the threatening global catastrophe.

The catastrophe has many faces.

Environmental — depletion and rising in prices of vital natural resources, environmental pollution that has reached the critical level, climate change and the growing number of natural and man-made disasters and accidents.

Demographic — spread of depopulation, unregulated migration and epidemics, hunger and poverty of a large part of the population on the Earth.

Technological — aging of fixed capital, slowing innovation renewal of economy and labor productivity growth, the growing polarization between vanguard and lagging countries.

** The document is adopted
at the closing session of
the 4th World Congress of
Global Civilization, December
05, 2013, Moscow.*

Economic — the decline in economic growth, a series of financial and economic crises, growth of the parasitic "bubble economy" and the widening gulf between rich and poor civilizations, countries and social strata.

Geopolitical — increasing tensions and the number of inter-state and socio-political conflicts, international terrorism, a new round of arms race and a threat of a clash of civilizations.

Sociocultural — the crisis of science losing its creative and prognostic potential, excessive pragmatization and a loss of fundamentality of education, spread of commercialized, impersonal mass culture, moral degradation and undermining the foundations of the family — the main unit of society.

All these are manifestations of the crisis of civilization which is a consequence of the decline and decay of the industrial world civilization prevailed in the last centuries, sensate socio-cultural system. But at the same time they are the harbingers of the evolving integral, humanistically-noospheric civilization, the background and elements which are already being formed in the vanguard countries.

2. The scope and depth of the occurring crisis and transformations stumped the governmental and international, business and scientific elite now prevailing. It has failed to understand the nature and prospects of changes occurring in the world nor it was able to develop and implement a radical long-term strategy to meet all the realities of the new century, seeks to restrict itself to half-measures and pseudo-innovations prolonging the agony of the outdated systems and deepening the crisis. Such a short-sighted policy only multiplies the threats to the global civilization.

Steps undertaken by the UN and other international organizations to overcome the crisis and transition to sustainable development are inadequate to the scale of the crisis and insufficient to overcome it.

3. The path to prevent a global catastrophe is shown by such great thinkers as Vladimir Vernadsky and Nikita Moisseev, Pitirim Sorokin and Nikolai Kondratieff, Joseph Schumpeter and Fernand Braudel as well as by modern schools of thought developing their ideas.

Crises and catastrophes are to be surmounted on the basis of the science and technology revolution of the 21st century, a wave of epochal and basic innovations, establishing integral humanistically noospheric civilization. Scientists developed and presented, at the United Nations headquarters, at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development RIO+20 and to the leaders of the G-20, the Global Outlook "The Future of Civilizations" for 2050, and reports "The Foundations of a Long-term Strategy for Global Sustainable Development Based on Partnership of Civilizations" and to the G20 summit — "Scientific Bases for a Strategy to Surmount the Crisis of Civilization and Taking the Path of Global Sustainable Development."

4. The 4th World Congress of Global Civilization (Moscow, December 3-5, 2013) discussed the strategic ways to surmount global crises: projects of the Centennial Plan for the integrated enhancement of the global ecological environment, establishment of the Organization to implement the plan and formation of the Global System for Monitoring, Forecasting and Emergency Response and revealed the significance of V.I. Vernadsky doctrine of noosphere as the basis for a

long-term strategy for global sustainable development. The appeals to the United Nations and governments of the world on these issues have been taken.

It also discussed the issues of a socio-demographic, science and technology base and financial and economic mechanism for transition to sustainable development.

5. Relying on a long-distance vision and understanding the depth of global transformations occurring in the world, the scientists propose:

- adopt the Centennial Plan for the integrated enhancement of the global ecological environment involving harmonization of development of society and nature on the noospheric principles;

- establish the Organization for the integral enhancement of the global ecological environment that has sufficient authority and resources to implement the Centennial Plan;

- set within the UN a Global System for Monitoring, Forecasting and Emergency Response;

- using V.I. Vernadsky's doctrine of noosphere, to develop and adopt a long-term strategy to surmount crises and take the path of global sustainable development on the basis of dialogue and partnership among civilizations, nations, social strata and generations;

- set up an up-to-date science and technology base for surmounting crises and transition to sustainable development based on the assimilation of achievements of the science and technology revolution of the 21st century and the 6th technological order, a wave of epochal and basic in-

novations, significant acceleration of the labor productivity growth rates.

6. To prevent the global catastrophe needs fruitful partnership of power and science. Recent decades have seen a dangerous separation of power from the advanced science and power without science is short-sighted, fussy and strategically helpless. It is taken shape the signs of overcoming this separation. It is established a Scientific Advisory Board at the UN Secretary General. Scientists have taken the next step: it is established an International Academy of Global Studies, which brings together scientists from different branches of learning, countries and civilizations to validate a long-term strategy to surmount the crisis of civilization, take the path of global sustainable development. It is established the Open University for Dialogue among Civilizations. The Congress participants appeal to the UN and other international organizations, governments of countries, business community to support these initiatives.

7. The Congress participants address the UN and governments of the world with an appeal before it is too late to heed the warnings and recommendations of scientists to develop and implement a long-term strategy that could prevent a global catastrophe and enter the path to the humanistically-noospheric civilization. They also address with appeals to the media and the Internet community to bring the vision and recommendations of scientists to authorities, global civil society, leaders of the new generation. Only together we are able to prevent the global catastrophe and to ensure the future for generations to come.

On the Path to the Noospheric Civilization Recommendations of the 4th World Congress of Global Civilization. December 3–5, 2013



On the Path to the Noospheric Civilization Recommendations of the 4th World Congress of Global Civilization

Moscow, 3–5 December, 2013



The 4th World Congress of Global Civilization "On the Path to the Noospheric Civilization" dedicated to the 150th birth anniversary of the world-famous Russian scientist Vladimir Vernadsky was held on 3–5 December, 2013, Moscow.

The Congress organizers — Organization for Promoting Global Civilization, Pitirim Sorokin — Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute, RAS Institute for Far Eastern Studies, V.I. Vernadsky Non-Governmental Ecological Foundation in association with the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Institute for Economic Strategies and the Faculty of Global Processes at the Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov.

The Congress sessions discussed the projects of the Centennial Plan for the integrated enhancement of the global ecological environment, establishment of the Organization to implement the plan and formation of the Global Integral System for Monitoring, Forecasting and Emergency Response. Moreover, the Forum participants discussed The Congress participants highly appreciate the significance of V.I. Vernadsky doctrine of noosphere as

the basis of a strategy for global sustainable development and establishment of the noospheric civilization and exchanged views on the socio-demographic and migration, technological, financial and economic components of the strategy for sustainable development and raising the role of science and education in validation and handling the global problems and lines of activity of the International Academy of Global Studies.

The Congress participants visited the memorial study of V.I. Vernadsky at the V.I. Vernadsky Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry..

As a result of fruitful discussions, the Congress participants have endorsed the following main conclusions and recommendations.

1. Global Civilization in the Face of New Challenges

1.1. At the beginning of the 21st century the global civilization has found itself in a state of deep crisis due to the sunset of the industrial society, a reverse of tendencies of global development, and change of civilizational cycles.

The contradictions between society and nature have aggravated: natural resources being depleted and increasing in prices, environmental pollution has reached the critical level; the scale of natural and man-made disasters increase and as their result a loss of lives and financial losses. It worsens the use of human potential: the unemployment is rising, especially among the young people; hundreds of millions of families suffer from hunger and poverty, while on the other pole it increases the energy wastage, overconsumption, super-

concentration of wealth, intensifying geopolitical tensions and conflicts as well as terrorist threats. The global civilization is in a state of growing instability that threatens the future of humanity.

1.2. The Congress participants believe that the global civilization is at a historical crossroads. If under the inertia-based scenario the today's prevailing trends persist, gray future is expected the humanity — environmental, socio-demographic, food, economic, geopolitical spiritual and moral catastrophes. , the prospects for degeneration of a rapidly aging mankind, the possible extinction of species *Homo Sapiens* as a result of a self-destructive clash of civilizations.

1.3. However, it is also quite realistic an optimistic, innovative- breakthrough scenario, if the healthy forces of the planet are consolidated for an appropriate response to the challenges of the new century, take the path of partnership among civilizations and nations, social strata and generations to overcome the crisis and the formation of the humanistically noospheric integral civilization.

1.4. The global community is seeking the ways to respond to the challenges of the 21st century. At the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, RIO+20 (June 2012) it is determined a long-term strategy targeted at eradication of poverty in the world and building a "green" economy. A system of global sustainable development goals for the period after 2015 is underway. It is established the High-Level Political Group on Sustainable Development and the UN Secretary General's Scientific Advisory Board.

However, these measures are not radical and of systemic nature, nor provide the reverse of the negative trends in the

development of the global civilization, it is necessary to develop and implement a scientifically validated long-term strategy to overcome the crisis of civilization and take the path of global sustainable development on the basis of dialogue and partnership among civilizations, nations, social strata and generations.

The Congress participants recommend the UN with the involvement of scientists to prepare and discuss at the RIO+25 Summit the draft of such strategy.

2. A Long-term Strategy for the Emerging Noospheric Civilization and Global Sustainable Development

2.1. The Congress participants welcome the measures taken by the Organization for Promoting Global Civilization on the prospects for the development of global civilization and the establishment of the world government, preparing the Centennial Plan for the integrated enhancement of the global ecological environment, elaboration by the Pitirim Sorokin — Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute (SKII) and submission to the UN the Global Outlook "Future of Civilizations" for 2050, reports "The Foundations of a Long-term Strategy for Global Sustainable Development Based on Partnership of Civilizations", "Scientific Basis for Strategy to Overcome the Crisis of Civilization and Take the Path of Global Sustainable Development", proposals for the establishment of the establishment of the Global System for Monitoring, Forecasting and Emergency Response. .

2.2. The Congress participants have given full treatment to the program document "Centennial Plan for the Integrated

Enhancement of the Global Ecological Environment", noted its high scientific level, system nature and great practical importance for the future of humanity and prevention of ecological disasters, recommend the originators of the plan to update it in the light of discussion, submit to the UN Secretary-General's Scientific Advisory Board and the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

2.3. The Congress participants recognize that the successful implementation of the Centennial Plan for integrated enhancement of the global ecological environment it is necessary to establish an organization with sufficient authority and resources to implement the plan. The Congress participants endorsed and signed the Appeal to the UN and Governments of the countries on the early establishment of the Organization for integrated enhancement of the global ecological environment.

2.4. The Congress participants consider it necessary the development of a long-term strategy for global sustainable development that ensures balanced and synchronized transformation of all the basic components for sustainable development:

— Natural-ecological — the transition to the noospheric energy-ecological mode of production and consumption, conservation of natural resources, taking into account the interests of future generations, reduction of harmful emissions into the environment, the complex processing of accumulated waste and beautification of the environment;

— Socio-demographic — the elaboration and discussion at the UN Conference on socio-demographic development and migration the transition to a differentiated demographic policy focused on over-

coming depopulation in some countries and overpopulation in others, reducing the gap between wealth and poverty and eradication of poverty and hunger, radical improvement of public health service, development of global policy for optimization of migration flows and the observance of rights and interests of migrants, framing an international treaty to regulate migration;

— Technological — to unite the efforts of the countries and global community to accelerate the development and dissemination of the achievements of scientific and technological revolution of the 21st century and the new technological order, improvement on this basis the growth rates of labor productivity, de-monopolization of the market of intellectual property, definition in the UN system of an organization responsible for coordinating actions and development of innovation and technology partnership; the establishment of the Global Facility for Technological Development;

— Economic — to overcome the "bubble economy", accelerating the economic growth rates, development of the strategy for the evolving integral economic system — socially, environmentally and innovation — oriented; the implementation of progressive structural shifts in economy providing the priority development of consumer and innovation and investment sectors and overcoming the overgrowth of the market infrastructure;

— Socio-cultural — to ensure the faster development of science and enhancing its role in innovation and technology and socio-economic development and in the validation of strategic decisions, preservation, enrichment and transmission to future generations the world scientific heritage,

strengthening the role of UNESCO in the coordination of science development and partnership for the assimilation of the scientific revolution of the 21st century, raising the fundamentality, creativity and continuity of education through effective ICT, providing large-scale assistance in training human resources for laggard countries; encouraging the revival of high culture, preservation and enrichment of the world cultural heritage and cultural diversity; strengthening of moral foundations of family and society;

— Geopolitical — ensuring dialogue and partnership among civilizations and nations in the transition to global sustainable development; increasing the role of the UN Security Council in the resolution of conflicts and in addressing international terrorism; expanding the powers and responsibilities of the United Nations in developing and implementing a long-term strategy for global sustainable development, integrated global environment enhancement and responding to emergencies. The Congress participants feel the need to develop a concept of reforming the UN system to more effectively carry out its functions in the changed world with a long-term prospect of transforming it into the World Confederation of civilizations and nations acting on democratic principles.

2.5. The Congress participants endorse the proposals to form a Global System for monitoring, forecasting and emergency response (GSMFER), and the establishment of the International Aerospace global environmental monitoring system and recommend the SKII to update and spell out in detail these proposals in the light of the discussion and submit to the UN Secretary-General a report on this issue.

2.6. Having discussed the challenges of globalization and regionalization, economic and financial mechanism for sustainable development, the Congress participants come to the conclusion that only in conditions of the multi-polarity it can be developed efficient financial and economic mechanism for sustainable development of the global community as well as regional integration organizations.

To develop a detailed "Roadmap" of forming a financial — economic mechanism for sustainable development it is reasonable:

- to develop the tools for the upward advancement of national economies and international associations based on the identification of strategic points of mutual interest ;

- to perform monitoring of manifestations of transformations in a globalized world that allow to make adjustments to the strategy for sustainable development of world economy;

- to define the basic criteria approach to the financial and economic mechanism for sustainable development taking into account the diversity of integration forms of economic interaction.

3. V.I. Vernadsky Doctrine of Noosphere as the Basis of the Strategy for Global Sustainable Development

3.1. Commemorating the 150th birth anniversary of the genius of world science, Vladimir I. Vernadsky, the Congress participants highly appreciate his doctrine about the transition of the biosphere into the noosphere as the fundamental basis of a long-term strategy for global sustainable development and the evolvement of

the humanistically noospheric civilization of the 21st century, feel the need to make better use of this doctrine expounded by N.N. Moissejev and modern noospheric schools, in the evolvement of humanistically noospheric, in researches and in education and support proposals for translation into the leading languages, publication and posting on the Internet of major works of V.I. Vernadsky, for a more profound incorporation of his academic heritage in the education system, endorse the proposal for creating a virtual multilingual museum of V.I. Vernadsky as a pilot project of the World Museum of the History of Science and the formation under the aegis of UNESCO the internet portal of the World Scientific Heritage for its preservation, enrichment and transmission to future generations.

3.2. The Congress participants endorse the initiative of the Pitirim Sorokin — Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute supported by the 5th and 6th Civilization Forums, of elaborating the UNESCO Universal Declaration on the long-term strategy of dialogue and partnership among civilizations in science, education and culture, and recommend the UNESCO governance to consider and support this initiative.

3.3. The Congress participants welcome the establishment of the UN Secretary General's Scientific Advisory Board, consider this an important step in enhancing the role of science in the validation of strategic decisions and activities of the UN system, endorse setting up the International Academy of Global Studies and recommend to the UN Economic and Social Council and UNESCO to support this initiative

3.4. The Congress participants welcome the initiative of the Eurasian Economic Club of Scientists to develop a draft

of the World anti-crisis plan and setting up an Internet portal G-Global and recommend the Eurasian Economic Club of Scientists to take into account the outcome documents of the 4th World Congress in the preparation of the anti-crisis plan.

3.5. Given that it is currently developing a process of generational change and that the responsibility for the adoption and implementation of strategic decisions passes to a new generation of leaders, the Congress participants consider it crucial the active participation of young people in the development and implementation of the global strategy for sustainable development and the Centennial Plan for an integrated enhancement of the global ecological environment, welcome the initiatives to establish the Open University for Dialogue among Civilizations, making a series of course-books for leaders of the new generation, publication of the international science and education journal

“The Partnership of Civilizations”, setting up of Internet portal “New Paradigm”, support the initiative of International Association “Znanie” on the integration of navigation and telecommunication and information resources of the planet in the interests of the enlightenment and solution of humanitarian issues of humanity, and recommend the UNESCO and the UN Alliance of Civilizations to support these initiatives.

3.6. The Congress participants express gratitude to the organizers for creating the conditions for fruitful discussions and contacts and recommend to publish and put on the internet the proceedings of the Congress in the Russian, English and Chinese languages, submit the documents adopted by them and these recommendations to the senior management of the UN, ECOSOC, UNESCO, the UN Alliance of Civilizations, and the governments of the countries of the world.

**Joint statement by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin
and President of the United States of America Donald Trump
commemorating the 75th Anniversary of the meeting on the Elbe.
April 25, 2020**

April 25, 2020, marks the 75th Anniversary of the historic meeting between Soviet and American soldiers, who shook hands on the damaged bridge over the Elbe River. This event heralded the decisive defeat of the Nazi regime.

The meeting on the Elbe represented a culmination of tremendous efforts by the many countries and peoples that joined forces under the framework of the United Nations Declaration of 1942. This common struggle required enormous sacrifice by millions of soldiers, sailors, and citizens in multiple theaters of war.

We also recognize the contributions from millions of men and women on the home front, who forged vast quantities of war materials for use around the world. Workers and manufacturers played a crucial role in supplying the allied forces with the tools necessary for victory.

The “Spirit of the Elbe” is an example of how our countries can put aside differences, build trust, and cooperate in pursuit of a greater cause. As we work today to confront the most important challenges of the 21st century, we pay tribute to the valor and courage of all those who fought together to defeat fascism. Their heroic feat will never be forgotten.

Source: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/63277>